

Lt Col J D Scott

**HISTORY
OF
G-4 SECTION
HEADQUARTERS**

SIXTH



ARMY

25 JAN. 1943 - 26 JAN. 1946

FORWARD

To all those who served so faithfully in
the G-4 Section of Sixth Army:

The operations in the Pacific against Japan combined to produce the most extensive series of amphibious operations in the history of the world. As the principal striking force in the Southwest Pacific Area throughout the period of offensive operations, the exploits of the Sixth Army of General Walter Krueger will long be a matter of interest in military men.

Battles, operations and campaigns are not won by the individual efforts of one arm or branch of service but by the co-ordinated efforts of all; so too the history of the Sixth Army is not to be found in a listing of the duties, functions and operations of a single section.

As a recital of the problems and accomplishments of the G-4 Section this short account of operations from Camp Columbia, Australia to Kyoto, Japan may serve in future days to recall the part you had in making successful the logistic support of these far flung operations.


To those members of the G-4 Section who, under the most trying conditions, gave unstintingly of their efforts and a loyal devotion to duty as their contribution to the success of the Sixth Army, may your future endeavors be crowned with even greater rewards.

William N. Leaf

WILLIAM N. LEAF
Col., G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff G-4

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1. ORGANIZATION AND MOVEMENT TO SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

Upon activation of the Sixth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, the G-4 Section initially consisted of eight officers and sixteen enlisted men with Colonel Kenneth Pierce, O-12385, as G-4. Colonel Pierce, with his executive officer, Colonel George W. Palmer, O-15593, Major Clark Mayne, Assistant G-4, WO(JG) Thurman C. Satterfield, Chief Clerk, and two enlisted men departed with the airborne echelon for Brisbane, Australia. Colonels Pierce and Palmer arrived at Brisbane on 7 February 1943, however, Major Mayne was lost in an airplane crash off Canton Island. WO(JG) Satterfield and the two enlisted men arrived at Brisbane on 9 February 1943. The remainder of the G-4 Section moved to Brisbane, Australia by water, embarking at Oakland, California on 30 March 1943 and arriving at Brisbane, Australia on 17 April 1943. The first few weeks in Australia were spent in getting settled and organized and becoming familiar with SWPA theater organization and policies.

2. WOODLARK AND KIRIWINA CAMPAIGNS.

The initial operations of the Sixth Army were the simultaneous invasions of Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands. For these operations the Sixth Army G-4 Section was organized as follows:

G-4
Executive Officer
Administrative Section
Woodlark Task Force Section
Kiriwina Task Force Section

The Woodlark Task Force and Kiriwina Task Force Sections handled all G-4 matters pertaining to their respective forces under the supervision and co-ordination of the G-4 and Executive Officer Liaison officers were detailed to each force and they actively assisted in near and far shore operations. On 20 June 1943 the forward echelon of Sixth Army Headquarters opened at Milne Bay, New Guinea, the rear echelon remaining at Brisbane, Australia (Camp Columbia). The Woodlark Force, consisting of a reinforced Cavalry RCT, staged and mounted from Townsville, Australia. USASOS Base 2 at Townsville furnished the supplies which accompanied this force in accordance with levels prescribed generally at 15 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class I (except for carbine and antiaircraft which were set at 6 U/F and 5 U/F respectively). Initially some resupply came from Base 2 at Townsville by LSTs. However, the bulk of resupply was from USASOS Base A at Milne Bay with supply levels built to the prescribed levels of 45 days of Classes I to IV inclusive and 6 U/F for Class V (except for carbine and antiaircraft which were set at 10 U/F). Supply requirements of the air force were furnished initially from Base 2 and later from Base A and moved on resupply echelons. LSTs and a few small ships were utilized in resupply operations. Evacuation of all types was to Base A by returning supply ships. The principal construction effort centered around one airstrip, which was operable in fourteen days, roads and port and service installations to support the force. No enemy opposition was met which eased supply requirements and permitted maximum effort on construction projects.

The Kiriwina Force, consisting of a reinforced RCT, staged and mounted from Milne Bay, New Guinea. USASOS Base A at Milne Bay furnished the supplies which accompanied this force and also furnished resupply requirements. The same initial and maximum levels prescribed for the Woodlark Force applied to the Kiriwina Force. Evacuation was to Base A by returning supply ships. Major construction projects included an airstrip, a coral jetty, roads, port and service installations. A liberty ship dock constructed late in the operation with much difficulty, was of little use due to unfavorable exposure and was finally abandoned. No enemy opposition was encountered on Kiriwina Island; however, extremely heavy rains created adverse conditions which retarded construction progress and hindered supply operations.

In order to support current operations, by direction of GHQ,

the USASOS Base at Milne Bay was placed under the control of the Commanding General, Sixth Army, for the critical period prior to and after the landings on Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands. During this period Base A worked directly under the corresponding staff sections of Headquarters, Sixth Army. As soon as the success of the operations was assured, Base A reverted to the control of USASOS. In both the Woodlark and Kiriwina Operations, the initial movement of troops and supplies and the greater part of resupply was accomplished by the use of naval amphibious craft. Much experience, of considerable value in subsequent operations, in the use of this type of craft was gained by both the Army and the Navy in these small operations. One interesting feature employed in these operations was the use of approximately 450 2½-ton cargo trucks as a means of making mobile all cargo moved by LSTs on initial echelons. This was effected in order to reduce to a minimum the time that LSTs would remain on the beaches in the target areas. All mobile loaded trucks were operated by a provisional battalion (FA) which provided drivers, maintenance and administration. The principle of waterproofing vehicles for amphibious landings was followed in these and all subsequent operations. With the limited amphibious lift and cargo trucks available, great precision was required in setting up and maintaining echelon schedules and handling loading and unloading of vessels and trucks.

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3. ARAWE, CAPE GLOUCESTER, SAIDOR AND ADMIRALTY ISLANDS CAMPAIGNS.

Near the end of the Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands operations, a planning group of the G-4 Section proceeded from the forward echelon at Milne Bay to the rear echelon at Brisbane to start planning the next operations. For these operations the G-4 Section was organized as follows:

G-4
Executive Officer
Administrative Section
Operations Section
Supply Section

The Operations Section planned and executed the operations and was divided into sub-sections as required for the several current operations. The Supply Section handled general supply matters for all Sixth Army units. During the last stages of the Woodlark-Kiriwina Islands operations, the G-4 Section received fillers to reach 1/0 strength of eighteen officers and thirty enlisted men and this strength with slight variations was maintained throughout succeeding operations. Early directives from GHQ prescribed two invasions, one aimed at Gasmata, New Britain and the second to follow very shortly and land near Cape Gloucester, New Britain. Each was to be conducted with a reinforced RCT. The early directive was changed, however, and the operations were launched first against Arawe, New Britain on 16 December 1943, with a reinforced RCT, followed in ten days with an assault on Cape Gloucester, New Britain, with a reinforced Marine division. After the Woodlark-Kiriwina Islands operations the Command Post of Headquarters, Sixth Army (forward echelon) moved from Milne Bay to Goodenough Island at which place sizeable supply stocks were accumulated for units staging there for commitment in forthcoming operations. The rear echelon of Sixth Army remained at Brisbane.

The Arawe Force staged and moved from Goodenough Island. Supply services on Goodenough Island, operated directly under Sixth Army (under designation of Alamo Supply Point No. 1), furnished the accompanying supplies for this force which were set by the Administrative Order at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. Oro Bay, New Guinea (USASOS Base B) was designated as the resupply base for this force with Milne Bay, New Guinea (Base A) designated as a supplementary base with furnishing all supplies not available at Base B. An Army supply point (designated as Alamo Supply Point No. 2) was established at Cape Cretin near Finschhafen, New Guinea and initially gave such logistical support as was possible with its limited stocks and facilities. Maximum levels in the target area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 10 U/F antiaircraft and 6 U/F all other types of Class V. Owing to beach and shoal conditions, resupply was accomplished by the use of only LCTs, as larger type amphibious craft could not navigate the area. Evacuation was by returning supply vessels to either Bases A or B, Goodenough Island or Finschhafen with most evacuation from this force going to Finschhafen and Oro Bay (Base B). Little construction was

prescribed for the Arawe area, such work being limited to a PT refueling dock, necessary beach facilities and supporting service installations. An airstrip in this area was not required.

The Cape Gloucester force staged and mounted from several locations which greatly complicated the logistical problems. This operation clearly indicated the desirability of staging an entire invasion force at one location whenever possible. One RCT (reinforced) staged at Oro Bay. Another RCT staged initially at Milne Bay and moved by heavy shipping to Oro Bay where it trans-shipped by amphibious craft to the target area. A third RCT staged initially at Goodenough Island from which location it moved to the Finschhafen area for further staging and movement to the target area. Oro Bay and the other initial staging areas furnished the accompanying supplies for the appropriate elements of this force. These levels were set at 20 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. Oro Bay (Base B) was designated as the resupply base for this force with Milne Bay (Base A) designated as a supplementary base to furnish such supplies as Base B could not furnish. Base B was able to and did furnish the bulk of the supply requirements of this force. LSTs and a few small cargo ships were the principal means employed in initial resupply operations. Heavy supply ships were eventually received in this area and included in such shipping was the first approach to the standard loaded supply ship which played such an important part in later operations. This ship, loaded at Milne Bay, carried balanced stocks of Classes I to III inclusive, loaded in such manner to permit discharge of any class of supply. Maximum levels for the target area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 10 U/F anti-aircraft and 6 U/F all other types of Class V. Mobile loaded trucks were used in the early phases of the operation but not as extensively as in the Woodlark-Kiriwina Islands operations. This was the last operation in which mobile loaded trucks were used in an organization status for resupply since resupply shipping was permitted to remain in the target areas for longer periods. Construction requirements in the Cape Gloucester area consisted of one major airstrip with supporting installations, port and service installations and a bulk avgas system with a total capacity of 20,000 barrels. The area was not suitable for the construction of a Liberty ship dock as planned. Evacuation from the Cape Gloucester area was on returning supply vessels to Bases A or B, Goodenough Island or Finschhafen. Emergency evacuation of casualties by air was accomplished as soon as the airstrip was available for the use of aircraft. Most evacuation by water was to Base B (Oro Bay) on LSTs. Certain of this type of craft were provided with a Portable Surgical Hospital unit, augmented with additional medical supplies and equipment, to take care of casualties being evacuated. This provision met the situation and was a step in the right direction, but better service was afforded under the policy adopted during later operations which required the Navy to furnish medical attendance to casualties evacuated on naval vessels.

Emergency air resupply was used for the first time by this Headquarters in support of the Arawe and Cape Gloucester operations

A provisional air supply unit was organized and operated from the Dobodura, New Guinea area under the direct control of Sixth Army. A considerable tonnage of supplies was dropped to these forces during the period of action and proved of great value to the success of these operations. Relations with the civil government and the employment of native labor was accomplished through ANGAU representatives present with each force. After the main force secured the Cape Gloucester area, a part of the force seized the Talasea Hosking airdrome area by shore to shore operations. This smaller force was based on the supply dumps in the Cape Gloucester area and was resupplied overwater by LSTs and LCTs. The Arawe and Cape Gloucester operations introduced to Sixth Army several new logistical features; namely, the use of emergency air resupply and the early construction of bulk avgas installations at Cape Gloucester. Also, on a minor scale, use was made of non-beaching type craft (small and heavy ships) for resupply to the Cape Gloucester Force. The value of balanced standard type supply ships was evident. These operations also initiated Engineer Special Brigade units to Sixth Army operations, and their need and value were clearly demonstrated. ANGAU representatives proved most valuable to task force commanders in procuring and handling native labor.

As a means of aiding logistical operations in support of these invasions Liaison groups from Sixth Army Headquarters were placed at Oro Bay and Milne Bay. Each of these groups contained G-4 representatives and representatives from most of the Special Staff Sections with supply and service functions. They maintained liaison between task forces and the bases and between Sixth Army Headquarters and the bases, assisted in procuring needed equipment and supplies, coordinated with the bases the use of base facilities such as staging areas and loading beaches and actively engaged in the supervision of loading and unloading operations. The Oro Bay Liaison group eventually took over full responsibility for the resupply of the Cape Gloucester force. All of the features mentioned above were improved and greatly enlarged in subsequent operations. The experience and insight gained in these fields during the Arawe and Cape Gloucester operations greatly contributed to the success of operations to follow. A G-4 Liaison Officer also was present with the Cape Gloucester Task Force.

Following closely after the Cape Gloucester landing came the landing at Saidor, New Guinea, on 2 January 1944. This force consisted of a reinforced RCT staged and mounted from Goodenough Island. Accompanying supplies were furnished by the supply services operating on Goodenough Island under Sixth Army. Assault units took 20 D/S Class I, 30 D/S Classes II to IV, 15 D/S Class III, 5 U/F antiaircraft and 3 U/F all other types of Class V. Supporting service units took the same Class V levels as set out above and 30 D/S all other classes of supply. Milne Bay (Base A) was designated as the resupply base for this force, however, as it worked out initial resupply came from the Sixth Army Supply Point at Cape Cretin by amphibious craft and later resupply from various USASOS Bases by heavy shipping. USASOS was charged with

forwarding supplies from their bases to the Sixth Army Supply Point at Cape Cretin by small and heavy ships where the supplies were trans-shipped to the target area on amphibious craft. As soon as fighter protection was available in the target area, USASOS was charged with forwarding supply requirements direct to the target area by small and heavy ships under their control. USASOS loaded these supplies on Sixth Army requisitions from bases of their selection. Sixth Army handled all logistical operations in support of this force in the Cape Cretin area, the Sidor force handled such operations in the target area, and USASOS at their bases. Maximum supply levels for the target area were prescribed at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 10 U/F antiaircraft and 6 U/F all other types of Class V. Initial evacuation was by returning amphibious vessels to the Sixth Army Supply Point at Cape Cretin for hospitalization at Base F (Finschhafen) and later by USASOS heavy shipping to USASOS bases. The construction program for the Sidor area included one airstrip with supporting installations, port facilities to include only landing points for amphibious craft and lighterage facilities, light naval facilities, bulk avgas facilities and service installations for the support of the force. Liaison Officers from the G-4 Section were placed on duty with the Sidor force.

After the Sidor operation and prior to the Admiralty Islands campaign, the G-4 Section was reorganized into four sections, namely, Administrative, Planning, Operations and Supply. This organization was maintained throughout all succeeding operations. In general, the Planning Section planned an operation to include preparation of the Administrative Order. When an operation was launched it was divorced from the Planning Section and came under the supervision of the Operations Section. The Supply Section attended to general supply matters for all operations and for those Sixth Army units not engaged in operations.

The Admiralty Islands operation was initially planned as a full scale divisional landing. However, in view of aerial reconnaissance reports the target date was advanced from 1 April 1944 to 29 February 1944 and the initial landing was made with only a reinforced Cavalry Squadron which moved to the target area on destroyers and APDs. The remainder of the division moved by amphibious craft on succeeding echelons over a period of several weeks. The Admiralty Islands Force staged and mounted at Oro Bay. Base B at Oro Bay furnished the initial accompanying supplies and also, with Base F at Finschhafen, served as the resupply base. The assault force took in 15 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V and units moving on subsequent echelons took in 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. Levels to be maintained in the target area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 6 U/F Class V. Early resupply was accomplished by means of amphibious craft. Later, both small and heavy shipping were utilized and the Navy was relieved of the responsibility of furnishing amphibious craft for resupply purposes. Emergency air resupply by dropping was extensively used during the early phases

of the operation. Evacuation was permitted to USASOS Bases in the supply chain, Oro Bay and Finschhafen receiving all casualties. Early evacuation was by amphibious craft and later by heavy shipping and aircraft. Portable Surgical Hospitals were again used on LSTs to care for casualties being evacuated by that means. The reasons for invading the Admiralty Islands were to provide advanced air bases for long range bomber operations and to obtain a good harbor and establish facilities for a major naval base. The Navy was charged with the eventual construction of the naval base. However, the task force was charged with initiating such construction and USASOS was charged with furnishing the materials required for this early development. The South Pacific area was charged with furnishing the construction materials required for the eventual naval base. Aside from the naval installations, two airdromes were built, a bulk avgas and mogas installation was constructed and several liberty docks and lighterage wharves were erected, together with service installations to support the area.

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4. AITAPE, HOLLANDIA-TANAHMERAH BAY, WAKDE-TOEM, BLAK, NOEMFOOR, CAPE SANSAPOR, MOROTAI CAMPAIGNS.

With the security of the Dampier Straits assured by the Gloucester-Saidor-Admiralty Islands operations the pattern was shaped for future operations of the Sixth Army south of the Philippine Islands. For most of the operations along the north coast of New Guinea and the Halmaharas the pattern consisted of establishing a beachhead, preferably in a lightly held area, followed by the rapid construction of an airstrip(s) and minimum base and port facilities. This type of operation permitted the advance of our forces from the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea to the Halmaharas within a period of eight months but not without imposing almost insuperable obstacles in the field of supply, evacuation and constructions. Staging and supply was from newly opened and meagerly stocked bases, unloading operations were generally conducted in open roadsteads and construction accomplished under combat conditions and in spite of incessant rains and difficult jungle terrain.

In previous operations under Sixth Army the largest task force consisted of a reinforced division. The next Sixth Army operation involved the use of a corps of two infantry divisions, reinforced. The I Corps landed in the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay area with two infantry divisions, reinforced (minus one RCT), and the 163rd RCT, operating directly under the Sixth Army, landed in the Aitape area. The three landings took place on 22 April 1944. The I Corps and the 24th Infantry Division, reinforced, staged and mounted from Goodenough Island. The Sixth Army Supply Point operating on Goodenough Island furnished the supplies which accompanied the above units to the target area. The 41st Infantry Division, reinforced (minus one RCT), staged and mounted from the Finschhafen area and Base F, serving that area, furnished the supplies accompanying this force to the target area. Supply levels to accompany the I Corps assault units on movement to the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay area were prescribed at 20 D/S Class I, 15 D/S Classes II to IV inclusive, 6 U/F field artillery, antiaircraft, 4.2" chemical mortar and grenades and 5 U/F all other types of Class V. To insure availability of supplies to units during the first few days on the far shore, provision was made requiring all assault elements to have in their possession for the movement to the target area a minimum of 5 D/S Class I and 2 U/F Class V. The difference between the above levels and the total levels set out first above were carried in bulk on LSTs moving in the assault echelons.

Supply levels to accompany the 163rd RCT assault elements on movement to the Aitape area were prescribed at 18 D/S Class I, 15 D/S Classes II to IV inclusive, 6 U/F field artillery, anti-aircraft, 4.2" chemical mortar and grenades and 5 U/F all other types of Class V. To insure availability of supplies to units during the first days ashore the same provisions were made as outlined above for the I Corps. To insure adequate ammunition resupply in the target areas, in addition to that ammunition carried by the forces, 2 U/F all types of Class V were sent into each target area on D / 8, 1 U/F moving by LST and 1 U/F moving by liberty type ship. Ammunition required in addition to that scheduled in was

obtained by each force on requisition to Sixth Army. Reinforcing units of both the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay Force and the Aitape Force moved to the target areas with 15 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F. Maximum supply levels to be maintained in each objective area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 6 U/F Class V. In view of the light enemy opposition encountered, the Class V level was later reduced to 3 U/F. Resupply of both forces was the responsibility of Sixth Army.

For the first time heavy cargo ships (liberty type) were extensively used for the movement of general supplies and, due to the limited amphibious lift available, moved troops and unit equipment as well on later echelons. Slow tow convoys were assembled for the movement of fuel and cargo barges, tugs, floating cranes, reefers, harbor craft and other type vessels incapable of maintaining regular convoy speed. The Navy controlled all shipping forward of US.SOS bases regardless of type until D / 45 at which time the Navy was relieved of the responsibility for transportation of troop and supplies to the target area and US.SOS was charged with such responsibility. These operations employed large numbers of amphibious type naval craft and introduced the use of several types of naval vessels not heretofore used by Sixth Army, such as A.P.s, A.K.s and LSDs. A heavy shipping schedule representing considerable tonnage was set up by this headquarters under the direction of G-4 and Quartermaster (Transportation) Sections. In view of likely enemy reaction heavy shipping was not moved into the target areas until D / 8. Aside from the standard type supply ship used in support of the Cape Gloucester operation, the first major use was made of standard type supply ships in a Sixth Army operation. These ships were liberty type vessels, loaded in the United States, and initially each carried, in general, 30 D/S of all classes of supplies for 10,000 troops. The standard supply ship was a tremendous success and with various modifications as to cargo was used extensively throughout all succeeding operations. Other heavy type shipping was employed in the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay-Aitape operations, such shipping being loaded in New Guinea and Australian ports by US.SOS and carried cargo as requisitioned by Sixth Army for the resupply of the target areas.

Several conditions were encountered in the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay areas which greatly complicated the resupply program. The landing beaches at Humboldt Bay and Tanahmerah Bay were poor and the area behind the beaches was very limited permitting little or no dispersal of supplies and equipment. Very rugged terrain inland from the landing beaches created bottlenecks in the movement of supplies and equipment and offered little suitable area for needed dump areas and service installations. On D / 2 a lone enemy plane dropped one bomb on the supply dump along the narrow Hollandia beach and much cargo (11 LST loads) was lost through the resulting fire. Japanese ammunition and bombs which were stored on the Hollandia beach at the time of landing, and with which through necessity our supplies were mingled, caught fire and exploded and the beach itself was thereby rendered unusable for several days.

The loss of supplies through fire, plus the poor beach and dispersa conditions which caused greatly lowered tonnage discharge rates, resulted in meager supply levels. However, LST echelons which arrived after the fire, plus LSTs which were diverted from the Tanahmerah Bay area to Hollandia, because of a major landslide which completely blocked the only road leading inland from the Tanahmerah Bay landing beach, plus the arrival on D / 8 of the first heavy shipping which included one standard supply ship, alleviated the situation and prevented a critical shortage of supplies. The loss of Tanahmerah Bay as a point of cargo discharge and the generally unfavorable road and terrain conditions in the Hollandia area did cause a considerable backlog of shipping in the Hollandia harbor. Despite all efforts it was several weeks before this backlog was reduced to the desired working level.

Plans called for the establishment of a major supply base (US.SOS Base G) in the Hollandia area. In an effort to initiate early measures toward the establishment of the base and to insure a smooth transition from Sixth Army to US.SOS control, US.SOS attached to the Sixth Army prior to the operation the Commanding General and Staff designated for Base B. The Commanding General and Staff was attached by Sixth Army to the I Corps to be employed by the I Corps in connection with their logistical operations and the development of Base G. Base G was activated and took over logistical responsibilities for the area from the I Corps on D / 47

The construction effort required of the I Corps was of large proportion compared with previous operations and due to the difficult terrain conditions turned out to be a tremendous task fraught with many difficulties. Three airdromes (Cyclops, Sentani and hollandia dromes) were put in condition for our use but before this work could be undertaken with adequate effort beach areas in the Hollandia region had to be cleared and roads built from Humboldt Bay to the airdrome area. The road building job was a huge task because of very rugged terrain and recurrent landslides. Intended developments in the Tanahmerah Bay area were abandoned in view of a major landslide and general unfavorable terrain conditions except for the bulk avgas installations and a pipeline to the airdrome area. Prior to activation of Base G two liberty ship docks were erected in Humboldt Bay plus numerous small piers and wharves for barges and lighters. Bulk fuel facilities included storage for avgas, mogas and diesel fuel. An air depot was constructed to support the 5th Air Force and a Supply Point was established to give support to early operations along the coast of New Guinea. Much construction effort was required for the main base (to support 200,000 troops) and staging area (for 100,000 troops). The I Corps was charged with assisting the Navy in their construction effort in the Hollandia area which was a project of considerable proportions. Several large headquarters were constructed to include GHQ, AF, US.SOS, Sixth Army and I Corps. The construction program for the Mitape area included reconstruction of one airdrome with supporting installations, a bulk avgas system, light naval facilities and beach unloading and service installations necessary for the support of the force. The extreme terrain condition encountered in the

Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay areas were not found in the Aitape area. Unloading of cargo proceeded at the estimated rate in spite of bad surf conditions and construction objectives that were met. The airstrip was operable on D + 7.

To meet a fuel shortage in the airdrome area in the Hollandia region caused by inability to move drummed fuel in from the beaches, initial Hollandia fuel requirements were unloaded at Aitape and flown from Aitape to the Hollandia airdrome area. This procedure was followed until the roads and pipeline in the Hollandia area permitted the adequate supply of avgas to the airdromes. Evacuation from the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay-Aitape areas was permitted to all USASOS Bases to the rear, most evacuation going to Base F at Finschhafen. Naval craft, heavy shipping and aircraft were utilized in evacuation. Sixth Army was responsible for providing medical care enroute for casualties evacuated by naval craft. USASOS had the same responsibility in the evacuation of casualties by heavy shipping and AAF for evacuation by aircraft. Many Dutch nationals were liberated and evacuated from the Hollandia area. In the Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay area, relations with the civil government and the supervision and employment of natives was handled by the Netherland Indies Civil Administration (NICIA) which attached a unit to the I Corps for this purpose. Similar matters in the Aitape area were handled by PNGU, since Aitape was in British New Guinea. The G-4 Section detailed a liaison officer with the Aitape force and also with each division operating under the I Corps. The Sixth Army Headquarters was located at Finschhafen during this operation, opening in the Hollandia area on 16 June 1944.

As originally planned, the operation to follow the Aitape-Hollandia-Tanahmerah Bay landings was to invade the Wakde Island-Sarmi-Sawar River area. The Sixth Army Field and Administrative Orders for such an invasion had been prepared and published. These orders were superseded by later orders which directed two landings, one near Toem with a RCT, reinforced, on 17 May 1944 and a second landing on Biak Island with a division (minus one RCT) on 27 May 1944. The force landing near Toem invaded Wakde Island by shore to shore operations on the day following the landing.

The Toem-Wakde Island Force staged and mounted from the Aitape area. The Aitape Task Force was charged with furnishing the supplies which accompanied elements of the Toem-Wakde Island Force to the target area. Units which arrived in the target area during the first three days took 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 6 U/F 4.2" mortar and 3 U/F all other types of Class V. Units which arrived after D + 2 took 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. Base F was designated as the resupply base for this force with the Hollandia and Aitape supply points (operated under the control of the Hollandia and Aitape Task Force Commanders respectively) designated as Supply and Trans-shipment Points. The resupply plan in support of this force was very intricate and complicated for several reasons; namely, the short period of time between these landings and the landings in the

Hollandia-Aitape areas, the distance from US.SOS supply bases, the inadequate supply situation at Hollandia and Aitape and the usual difficulties in loading ships from any newly occupied areas. The resupply of ammunition required particular attention in view of availability and was effected as follows: 1 U/F field artillery (from Hollandia) and 2 U/F mortar and fragmentation hand grenades from Aitape, were moved to the target area by LSTs on D / 1. 2 U/F 4.2" mortar and 1 U/F all other types (except field artillery, 60 and 81mm mortar and fragmentation hand grenades) were moved by LST from Aitape to arrive in the target area on D / 2. 1 U/F 105mm field artillery arrived in the target area by liberty ship on D / 2. On D / 5, 2 U/F 105mm field artillery and 1 U/F 155mm Howitzer field artillery and antiaircraft arrived in the target area by liberty ship. Ammunition required in addition to that shipped in as set out above was requisitioned by the task force on Sixth Army which made delivery by LSTs or liberty ships as the situation dictated. The above ammunition resupply plan was necessitated by the time factors involved and the availability and location of ammunition in the forward areas. The resupply of rations to the Toem-Wakde Island force was effected by the task force shipping a 5 D/S for the force by LST from Aitape to the target area arriving on D/5 and Sixth Army delivering to the target area on the same day a standard type supply ship (30 D/S for 10,000 troops). Further resupply was on US.SOS heavy shipping, loaded at various US.SOS bases on Sixth Army requisition.

The Biak Force staged and mounted from Hollandia. The Hollandia Task Force was charged with furnishing the supplies which accompanied the Biak force to the target area. Accompanying levels for units arriving in the objective area during the first two days were prescribed at 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 6 U/F 4.2" mortar and 2 U/F all other types of Class V. Units arriving after the first two days took 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. The reason for the relatively light levels of supplies taken in on the assault echelons was due to the presence of almost continuous fringing reefs in front of the landing area which served to prevent amphibious craft from gaining close access to the beach. Such a condition required the use of DUKWS and amphibious tractors to remove bulk stores from the assault shipping, over the reef, and to the beach until such time as means were devised and constructed to facilitate the unloading of bulk stores from amphibious craft. Through the improvement of existing piers and location of some favorable stretches of beach, the larger bulk stores on the later echelons were unloaded in the normal manner.

The resupply program for the Biak Island force was almost as complicated as that used for the Toem-Wakde Island force. The Biak Island force shipped 2 U/F Class V for all weapons (from Hollandia) which arrived in the target area by LST on Z (landing day) / 1. On Z / 3, 2 U/F 4.2" mortar, 3 U/F field artillery, antiaircraft, mortar (except 4.2") and fragmentation hand grenades and 1 U/F all other types arrived in the target area by LST from Hollandia. Further ammunition requirements were requisitioned on Sixth Army for delivery by either LST or US.SOS shipping. The

Biak Island force shipped a 5 D/S of rations which arrived in the target area on Z / 6 and a similar shipment on Z / 9. Both shipments were from Hollandia and moved by LSTs. After Z / 9 resupply was effected by US.SOS shipping which loaded at various US.SOS bases to the rear. The Hollandia and Aitape Task Forces were charged with the responsibility of furnishing to both the Toem-Wakde Island Force and the Biak Island Force such supplies and equipment as were required and available for shipment to the target areas (by amphibious craft) and further to furnish such labor and motor transportation as was required to assist the Toem-Wakde Island and Biak Forces in loading units, equipment and supplies in the Hollandia and Aitape areas.

The Toem-Wakde Island and Biak Task Forces were responsible for the actual loading and shipment of all supplies to their respective target areas by amphibious craft from Hollandia and Aitape. After the amphibious craft phases, which ended approximately ten days after each landing, the Sixth Army was responsible for the resupply of both forces and used US.SOS shipping loaded by US.SOS at points of their choice, on Sixth Army requisitions. It proved necessary to make emergency air drops to each force involving considerable tonnage. The resupply plan for these forces required much coordination and to meet the situation, the G-4 Section and certain special staff sections sent Liaison Officers to each force, to the Hollandia and Aitape Task Forces and to US.SOS.

Evacuation (except in the case of POWs) from both forces was permitted to Hollandia or Aitape or to any US.SOS bases in New Guinea by returning naval or heavy shipping and by aircraft in emergency and when practicable. Most evacuation went to Hollandia. For the first time the Navy provided medical care and attendance enroute for casualties evacuated by naval craft thereby relieving the Army of their previous responsibility in this connection. US.SOS furnished this care for casualties evacuated by water transportation other than naval and the Allied Air Forces provided this care for casualties evacuated by air. All three means of evacuation were utilized. Initially, the evacuation of POWs was from each force under guards furnished by the force to Base F at Finschhafen. This was later changed to Base G at Hollandia when this base was activated. Relations with the civil government and the supervision of natives employed as laborers was handled by NIC units attached to each force. Initial construction directives were the same for the Toem-Wakde Island and the Biak areas and, for each locality, called for one airdrome with supporting installations, a bulk avgas installation, minimum port and base facilities to support the force and assistance to the Navy in the installation of minor naval facilities. Additional construction directives were issued later and the facilities in the Biak Island area were considerably enlarged both before and after the US.SOS Base was established there.

Effective 20 August 1944, US.SOS Base H was activated on Biak Island. On this date, the Biak Task Force Commander was relieved of responsibility for and the Commanding Officer, Base H

assumed responsibility for the operation of the port and base in the Biak area; provision of logistical support for all units in the Biak area; all construction and maintenance of port, base and air facilities except naval; transportation of all personnel, supplies and equipment to the Biak area and the operation and maintenance of non-tactical signal communication facilities. The Navy was directed by GHQ to assume full responsibility for naval construction and maintenance and for the logistical support of naval forces in the Biak area. The Biak Task Force was charged with arranging the details and manner of passing the above responsibilities to Base H and the Navy. The adjustment of areas between Sixth Army units, Base H and the Navy was performed in accordance with a GHQ general allocation of areas. The Biak Task Force was further required to give assistance to Base H in the form of labor and equipment. POWs of the Biak Task Force were delivered to Base H and service units (fifty-nine in number) were transferred from the Biak Task Force to Base H.

The invasion of Noemfoor Island followed the Biak operation. This force consisting of a RCT, reinforced, staged and mounted from the Toem area and landed in the objective area on 2 July 1944. The Supply and Trans-shipment Point at Toem furnished the supplies which accompanied the force on its movement to the target area and also furnished some of the resupply requirements of the force for a short period after the landing. Unusually bad fringing reef conditions in the Noemfoor Island area again presented major difficulties in the discharge of cargo from amphibious and other type supply vessels. This known condition was responsible for minimum supplies being moved with the early elements. Units arriving in the target area on D Day took 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 4 U/F 4.2" mortar and 2 U/F all other types of Class V. To assist in unloading these supplies the Toem Task Force furnished 800 men who went in with the D Day echelon, assisted in the unloading of supplies and returned to the Toem area on the same echelon. Units arriving on D + 2 took only 5 D/S Class I, minimum requirements for Classes II to IV inclusive and 2 U/F Class V. All cargo on this echelon was mobile loaded. With units arriving after D + 2 on amphibious craft, 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V were taken. With units arriving after D + 2 on US.SOS shipping 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V were taken. For resupply the Noemfoor Island Task Force was responsible for loading and shipment of the supplies to the target area which were lifted by amphibious craft from the Toem area. The Toem Task Force was charged to furnish such supplies and equipment as were required and available and also to furnish such labor and motor transportation as required to assist the Noemfoor Island Task Force in loading units, equipment and supplies in the Toem area. After D + 12 the Noemfoor Island Task Force was relieved of resupply responsibility and the Sixth Army assumed the same, using US.SOS shipping as the means of moving supply requirements.

The resupply of ammunition was greatly aided by the use of a standard type supply ship which contained a 30 days balanced

ammunition supply for 20,000 troops. This vessel was sent forward with the D / 2 echelon. Additional ammunition was supplied in the following manner: 2 U/F for all weapons was lifted from Toem, arriving on D / 4 and a like quantity of ammunition was lifted from Toem arriving on D / 6. The Toem Supply and Trans-shipment Point was charged to furnish further ammunition requirements until D / 15 on which date Sixth Army assumed responsibility for furnishing ammunition needs. The standard supply ship mentioned above contained 300,000 rations and the Noemfoor Island Task Force forwarded from Toem by LSTs a 5 D/S of Class I arriving on D / 6 and the same on D / 12. Further resupply was effected by Sixth Army employing USASOS shipping. Maximum levels for the target area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV and 3 U/F Class V. Some resupply to this force by air dropping became necessary during the course of the operation. Evacuation of POWs was to Base G (Hollandia) under guards furnished by the task force. All other evacuation was to Toem and USASOS Bases in New Guinea by returning supply ships and aircraft. Relations with the civil government and the employment of natives as laborers were handled by NICA. A total of two airdromes were constructed on Noemfoor Island. A bulk avgas system was installed, minor naval facilities were built and minimum port and base facilities to support the force were constructed. The provision of landing facilities over the coral reefs in the face of rough seas was a major and difficult problem. Continuous cargo discharge was assured only after the landing point was transferred to protected waters and an extensive road net was completed. For this operation, the Sixth Army G-4 Section functioned at Hollandia and maintained officer liaison with the task force. Prior to this landing (on 1 July 1944) Colonel Kenneth Pierce was advanced to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, Sixth Army Headquarters and Colonel William N. Leaf O-15129, CE, was designated as G-4. Colonel Leaf continued in such capacity throughout all of the succeeding Sixth Army operations.

The landing in the Cape Sansapor area took place on 30 July 1944 with a division (minus one RCT), reinforced. The force staged and mounted from the Toem area and the Toem Supply and Trans-shipment Point furnished the supplies which accompanied the force and also furnished resupply requirements until D / 10. Early echelons took 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 2 U/F Class V (except that later echelons moving by LSTs took only 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive). Maximum levels for the area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. The Toem Task Force furnished the initial supplies and resupply requirements as mentioned above and also furnished labor and motor transportation to assist the Cape Sansapor Task Force in loading operation in the Toem area. The Cape Sansapor Task Force was responsible for its resupply by amphibious craft from the Toem area until such time (D / 10), as heavy shipping was permitted to remain in the target area. When heavy shipping was permitted forward the Sixth Army assumed resupply responsibility and accomplished the same with USASOS heavy shipping loaded at various USASOS

Bases on Sixth Army requisitions. Evacuation of POWs was to Base G under task force guards. All other evacuation was to Toem or USASOS Bases in New Guinea. NICA again handled relations with the civil government. Major construction consisted of two airdromes (one on nearby Middleburg Island), a bulk avgas system, light naval facilities and minor port and base facilities to support the force. Negligible enemy opposition permitted maximum concentration on primary mission of the force, the construction of airdromes.

The invasion of Morotai Island was accomplished on 15 September 1944 and was the last Sixth Army operation prior to the Philippine Island invasion. This was a Corps operation in which the XI Corps consisting of the 31st Infantry Division and one RCT of the 32nd Infantry Division were used. The major units of this force staged and mounted from the Aitape and Toem areas. Some minor elements staged and mounted from Hollandia, Biak and Cape Sansapor. Bases G and H and the Task Forces in the other staging areas mentioned above furnished the supplies which accompanied elements of this force staging in their respective areas. Accompanying levels were set by this Headquarters at 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 4 U/F hand grenades and 2 U/F all other types Class V for assault units (D through D / 4). Units arriving on subsequent echelons took 15 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V for elements moving on amphibious craft and 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V for units moving on cargo type ships. Maximum levels for the Morotai area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. Initial resupply was an involved process and many organizations had specific responsibilities. The Aitape and Toem Task Forces furnished certain items of resupply and labor and motor transportation to aid the Morotai Task Force in loading the same. Base G at Hollandia and Base H at Biak furnished items of resupply and the Task Force Commanders at each place furnished labor and motor transportation to assist the Morotai Task Force in loading same for shipment. In general, the Morotai Task Force was responsible for and did ship on amphibious craft and troop-carrying cargo type shipping all resupply arriving in the target area through D / 4. After that date, resupply to the Morotai area was furnished by Sixth Army on USASOS shipping loaded by USASOS at bases of their choice on Sixth Army requisitions.

An important addition to Sixth Army Headquarters was the activation of a separate Transportation Section on 2 August 1944. For all operations prior to the Morotai operation, supply transportation matters had been handled by a transportation sub-section of the Quartermaster Section. This work, which is most important and extremely heavy and detailed in amphibious warfare, proved quite a burden on the Quartermaster Section and led to the activation of the Sixth Army Transportation Section under a provisional Table of Organization. With the newly organized Transportation Section, a procedure was set up whereby the Transportation Section moved all troops in accordance with priorities set by G-3 (with G-4

furnishing priorities on service units) and moved all supplies (resupply) in accordance with the resupply program set up by G-4. The G-4 Section received the resupply requirements of the various Special Staff Sections and the air force and after review and consolidation a specific resupply program was submitted to the Transportation Section which obtained the necessary shipping, supervised and assisted in loading and was in charge of the movement of all such shipping to the target areas.

POWs were evacuated under Task Force guards to Base G at Hollandia. Captured materiel was evacuated to the Enemy Equipment Depot which had been established at Base F. Salvage was evacuated to USASOS Bases and casualties were evacuated to Toem and Aitape and USASOS Bases. Returning supply boats and aircraft were utilized in evacuation operations. NICA handled relations with the civil government and supervised the employment of native labor. Construction in the Morotai area consisted of four airdromes with supporting air force installations, a bulk fuel system (for avgas, mogas and Diesel fuel) with a capacity of 132,000 barrels and including two fueling jetties and a drum filling and cleaning plant, port facilities to include LST landing points, floating Liberty ship docks and small piers and other base installations to support the force. Minor naval facilities were also constructed in the Morotai area, this construction being performed by the Navy. A liaison officer from the G-4 Section was detailed for duty with the Morotai Task Force. Control of the Morotai Task Force and logistical responsibility for the Morotai area passed from the Sixth to the Eighth Army on 4 October 1944.

5. LEYTE, MINDORO, LUZON, LEGASPI CAMPAIGNS.

The invasion of Leyte and Samar Islands in the Philippine Islands was the first full scale Army operation in which the Sixth Army was engaged as well as the first of several operations to liberate the Filipinos. The initial detailed planning for the Leyte (K-2) operation was accomplished at GHQ, Brisbane, Australia by a representative group of Sixth Army officers (including two G-4 representatives) in conference with representatives of GHQ, Allied Naval Force, Allied Air Forces and USASOS. Early planning at GHQ covered two operations, one aimed at southern Mindanao (Sarangani Bay) and the second, an invasion of the Leyte-Samar area. During the development of plans, the invasion of southern Mindanao was discarded and the landing date for the Leyte operation was advanced to 20 October 1944. As finally settled, the Sixth Army force for the Leyte invasion included the following major units which staged and mounted as indicated:

- X Corps (1st Cav Div; 24th Inf Div (-) - Mounted from New Guinea axis.
- XXIV Corps (7th Inf Div; 96th Inf Div (-) - Mounted from bases in the Pacific Ocean area.
- Army troops - Mounted from New Guinea axis.
- ASCOM Troops - Mounted from New Guinea axis.
- Air Force Troops - Mounted from New Guinea axis.
- Army Reserve - (32nd Inf Div - Mounted from New Guinea axis;
77th Inf Div - Mounted from Guam; 381st Inf Regt - afloat as part of the 96th Inf Div).

In general, the supply plan for the Leyte operation, as prescribed by Administrative Order 14, covered the first sixty days of the operation during which period a total of approximately 9 U/F Class V and 90 D/S all other Classes of supplies were delivered to the objective area by means of the Navy lift, resupply shipping and tankers. This shipping was augmented as necessary by the commitment of reserve supply ships. A target date of A (landing date) / 30 was prescribed as the time at which responsibility for the logistical support of the Leyte-Samar area would pass to USASOS. However, owing to unfavorable unloading conditions, adverse weather and vagaries of the tactical situation, this transfer was not effected until A / 66. Mounting areas indicated above furnished the supplies which accompanied units to the target area. In this connection, it should be noted that the XXIV Corps was afloat for a landing on Yap Island at the time it was attached to the Sixth Army for the Leyte invasion, the Yap Island operation being cancelled. As loaded and afloat the XXIV Corps possessed 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 5 U/F. Other elements of the Leyte force took to the target area, during the first ten day period, a total of 30 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 15 D/S motor transport and Diesel fuel and 30 D/S all other types of Class III, 5 U/F Class V for combat units and 3 U/F Class V for non-divisional service units. All units except the XXIV Corps, were required to

have in unit possession (of the above levels) not less than 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 2 U/F Class V. This provision was made to insure that each unit landed with sufficient ammunition and other supplies to support itself independently until dumps could be established and put into operation. Units arriving after the first ten days took 30 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 10 D/S Class III and 5 U/F Class V for combat units and 3 U/F for non-divisional service units. Voyage rations in required quantities were taken in addition to the levels prescribed above.

Maximum levels for the target area were set at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. The forwarding of supplies (or resupply) over and above those transported by units as outlined above was the responsibility of the Sixth Army. To accomplish resupply, several means were used; namely, standard supply ships (now containing generally a 30 D/S, Classes I to IV inclusive for 20,000 troops), fuel barges and tankers, supplementary supply ships (containing construction materials, ammunition, civilian relief supplies and supplies necessary for augmentation of standard loaded supply ships), air force standard supply ships, and emergency air resupply. A total of 54 resupply ships were tentatively scheduled for arrival in the objective area during the first sixty days of the operation. Slow tow convoys moved fuel barges, tugs, cranes, cargo barges, reefers, harbor craft and other slow moving vessels to the target area. These schedules were generally followed during the course of the operation.

The resupply of Class III supplies received much attention in an effort to reduce the amount of drummed fuel to be handled in the objective area. In addition to the quantities accompanying units as set forth above, the standard supply ships contained drummed stocks of Class III. The use of fuel barges and tankers and the installation of extensive bulk storage and distribution facilities (although considerably delayed) greatly facilitated the handling of fuel and served to ease the burden on port operations. The furnishing of supplies peculiar to the air force, and needed for the support of their operations was a difficult problem in view of their large requirements. Several means were used as follows: Early requirements on LSTs (approximately 3,300 DWTs spread over 110 LSTs) followed later by air force standard supply ships (containing balanced supplies of aviation, ammunition, bombs, gas, oil and technical supplies). The distribution of avgas through the bulk system and use of air force reserve supply ships as needed, completed the means used to support the air force with supplies peculiar to their operations. To permit flexibility of supply and to compensate for expected loss of supplies by enemy action or other catastrophes, a total of ten emergency reserve supply ships were set up. Six of these contained ammunition for ground and air forces and four contained fuel for the ground and air forces. Half the number of each type ship was held in rendezvous for call forward at Palau and half at Hollandia. In the course of the operation, seven of the ten reserve supply ships were either totally or partially discharged in the objective area. A pool of standard supply ships under USASOS control served as a

reserve for the types of supplies they contained.

Provisions were made to resupply the Leyte-Samar area by emergency air dropping from points in the New Guinea axis. This did not prove necessary in the course of the operation and the only emergency air drops were made to isolated forces on Leyte from airdromes and stocks on Leyte. Emergency air resupply was performed by the 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron operating directly under the Sixth Army. The first drop was made on A / 27. From that date until A / 66, a total of 1,167,818 pounds of supplies were dropped or delivered by air to forward units. A total of 282 plane loads were involved and 2,776 parachutes were used. Satisfactory recovery of supplies was effected in most cases.

An Army Service Command (ASCOM) was used by Sixth Army for the first time in the Leyte operation. This command was organized by direction of GHQ. Its headquarters personnel largely came from USASOS and it included the personnel and organization which eventually was activated as Base K (the USASOS Base for the Leyte-Samar area). This command passed to the control of Sixth Army on or about A - 30 and laid plans for assuming under Sixth Army the following major duties and functions in the objective area upon direction of Sixth Army:

- a. Discharge, storage, and issue of supplies and materials.
- b. Discharge of troop ships.
- c. Continuation of approved construction projects.
- d. Operation of supply point facilities in service areas.
- e. Recruitment, allocation, administration, and supervision of civilian labor.
- f. Hospitalization and evacuation.

Beach operations at Leyte involved three distinct phases. During the first or assault phase, the X and XXIV Corps accomplished all beach operations in their respective zones of action. All troops and cargo scheduled over each corps beach were unloaded by the corps. Each corps was given the means to handle this responsibility by the attachment of adequate lighterage and service units. This phase lasted in the X Corps zone until A / 8 and in the XXIV Corps zone until A / 20. Except for the 24th Infantry Division beach in the X Corps zone, all beaches selected and the areas behind them were adequate for amphibious landings but suitable dump and dispersal areas were extremely limited. The 24th Infantry Division beach offered poor exits and practically no dispersal areas. The result was the partial shift of 24th Infantry Division cargo to the beach used by the 1st Cavalry Division which brought about excessively crowded beach conditions in that area and some interference with initial construction activities on the Tacloban airstrip. The necessity for placing all available engineer effort on the construction of airstrips and access roads from landing areas did not permit desired improvements or development of dump areas to allow more dispersal and protection of supplies. It followed that initially, this crowded and congested condition caused the loss of substantial quantities of supplies

from enemy action and antiaircraft fire from our ships in the harbor. The capture on 2 of the Tacloban dock which had capacity for three Liberty ships gave much assistance in the discharge of cargo. The channel to this dock prior to dredging operations would pass lightly loaded Liberty ships (21' draft) at high tide. On 6, this dock received one Liberty ship and shortly thereafter, received two additional Liberty ships, from which time it was worked to full capacity.

The second or SCOM phase succeeded the assault phase in each corps zone and began with the time that SCOM took over existing beaches and dumps from the corps. To accomplish this phase, most of the service units provided the corps passed to the control of SCOM and in addition, SCOM had certain units by initial attachment which assisted in this task. The third or base phase followed the SCOM phase on 66. On this date, Base K (under US.SOS) was activated and assumed responsibility for the logistic support and maintenance of the area. Most of the service units theretofore utilized by SCOM passed to Base K. Shortly after Base K was activated, the Eighth Army took control of the Army combat units in the Leyte-Samar area, thereby relieving the Sixth Army Headquarters for future operations.

The matter of supplying combat troops in forward areas on Leyte Island was a problem of considerable difficulty. During the late phases of the operation, supply lines became greatly extended and the limited road net and incessant rains (26 inches in November) served to aggravate the problem of putting needed supplies in the hands of the front-line troops. In the X Corps zone, all troops were supplied from dumps located in the Tacloban area. Road conditions permitted only the limited use of trucks, making it necessary to supplement truck transportation with LCMs loaded in the Tacloban area and moved through San Juanico Strait to Pinamopoan for discharge. The movement of these supplies from Pinamopoan to front-line units was accomplished by amphibious tractors, tractors pulling trailers and Filipino carriers. In the XXIV Corps zone, troops in the northern area were supplied from dumps in the Dulag area. The movement of supplies from these dumps to forward units was accomplished by trucks, amphibious tractors, "weasels", liaison type aircraft and even carabaos. Substantial quantities of supplies were transported by liaison-type planes. A supply point was established at Abuyog to support troops operating in the southern area of the XXIV Corps zone. This was necessary because of road conditions south of Dulag. As the 7th Infantry Division moved toward the Baybay area, it was supplied by a difficult truck haul from the Abuyog dumps. A supply point with barely minimum levels was established by Baybay by this means. After the 77th Infantry Division landed by overwater movement in the Ipil-Binoljo area, supply of both the 7th and 77th Infantry Division was accomplished by means of LSMs loaded at Abuyog and moved to Ormoc for discharge. The supply requirements of guerillas were met by drawing on available Army stocks and the use of some captured enemy supplies. Only limited quantities of supplies were forwarded for the specific purpose of issuance to guerilla forces.

The evacuation of casualties in the Leyte area was initially the responsibility of the X and XXIV Corps, each corps being responsible for evacuation from its zone. Assault type naval craft were used (APFs, LSTs, APAs), and later, Geneva Protected Hospital ships and aircraft. The Sixth Army relieved the X Corps of the responsibility for evacuation of casualties to the rear of division and corps clearing stations on A / 5. The XXIV Corps was relieved of this responsibility in its area by the Sixth Army on A / 25. ASCOM assumed responsibility for the evacuation of casualties from the objective area on A / 48. At the time Base K was activated (A / 66), a total of 12,785 casualties had been evacuated, 7,452 by assault naval craft, 848 by Geneva Protected Hospital ships and 4,485 by aircraft. The first air evacuation took place on A / 17. The Geneva Protected Hospital ships failed to play as important a role in evacuation as they could have due to reluctance on the part of the Navy to send them forward. Only 383 POWs had been captured by A / 66. They were initially confined in divisional enclosures, later in ASCOM enclosures and were transferred to Base K upon its activation. Salvage and captured materiel were evacuated to ASCOM dumps from division dumps. Early hospitalization was in field and evacuation type hospitals, attached to and operated by the corps or divisions under them. These hospitals served all units in the respective corps or division areas. Sixth Army took over the operation of these hospitals in the X Corps area on A / 5 and in XXIV Corps area on A / 25. Fixed hospitalization was constructed and operated in the target area under the direction of ASCOM.

Civil administration and relief was handled in the target area by eight Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs) and the shipment of civilian relief supplies into the Leyte area. Each Corps and ASCOM received two PCAUs by attachment and two PCAUs remained under Army control. The corps were responsible for civilian administration and relief within their zones and ASCOM within its area upon its establishment. Captured enemy stocks suitable for relief purposes were delivered to the PCAUs for disposition to the civilian populace. Civilian relief supplies shipped in were warehoused by ASCOM and distributed to PCAUs on requisitions approved by Sixth Army. Civilian retail stores were opened as soon as supplies were available in adequate quantities, all supplies being sold at prices established by the Philippine Commonwealth government. The Governmental institutions were rehabilitated and opened or put in operation as soon as possible and local governments established to take over their normal functions and to assist in the resettlement and control of the civilian populace.

The Sixth Army performed all construction in the Leyte-Samar area until A / 66 at which time this responsibility passed to USASOS and the Allied Naval Forces. To discharge this responsibility, the Sixth Army employed ASCOM and a Naval Service Command furnished by the Allied Naval Forces for Navy construction. The final allocation of areas for the construction of facilities was made by Sixth Army after ground reconnaissance and insofar as practicable, conformed with the general assignment of areas tentatively made

by GHQ prior to the landing. To make final allocation of areas, an Area Allocation Board consisting of representatives of ASCOM (Base K), X and XXIV Corps, Allied Air Forces, Allied Naval Forces and Sixth Army was organized and functioned in the objective area. Major construction projects in the target area consisted of the following: four airdromes with supporting installations (work on two additional airdromes was abandoned because of adverse soil and drainage conditions and poor access roads); naval facilities to include one naval air base, a PT boat base, a destroyer repair base, an amphibious repair base and other miscellaneous naval installations; bulk petroleum storage and handling facilities for avgas, mogas, and Diesel fuel; base facilities to support 200,000 troops; port facilities to include necessary IST landing points, three Liberty ship docks (dockage for three Liberty ships was captured intact on 1 / 2) and several lighter jetties and small ships wharves; and headquarters installations to include GHQ, Allied Air Forces, Allied Naval Forces, USAFFE and USASOS. Two dredges were employed; one, to obtain fill for the Tacloban strip and the other, to deepen the channel to the Tacloban dock. For this operation, the Sixth Army G-4 Section was arranged into a forward and rear echelon. The rear echelon consisting of two officers and one enlisted man remained at Hollandia and engaged in planning for the Luzon operation, at the same time attending to certain rear echelon matters for the Leyte force. The forward echelon moved to the target area on early echelons and was established ashore on 1 / 4.

The second major Sixth Army operation in the Philippine Islands was the invasion of Mindoro. The initial landing was made on 15 December 1944 with a force designated as the Western Visayan Task Force which consisted of one Infantry RCT and one Parachute Infantry RCT (waterborne), reinforced. The Western Visayan Task Force staged and mounted from Leyte Island. ASCOM was charged by Sixth Army to furnish this force its equipment and accompanying supplies and also to render the task force such assistance in the form of labor and motor transportation as it required to load for the initial movement and for resupply operations under supervision of the task force. Accompanying supply levels for units moving by amphibious craft were set at 15 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 10 D/S Class III and 2 U/F Class V. Units moving by cargo type shipping took 30 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 15 D/S Class III and 3 U/F Class V. Voyage rations were taken in addition to the above levels. Maximum levels for the Mindoro area were established at 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 3 U/F Class V for combat units and 2 U/F Class V for service units. To aid in early unloading operations, the Sixth Army furnished the Western Visayan Task Force with 1,200 men which accompanied the initial echelon and returned to Leyte on returning vessels of the second echelon.

The initial resupply to the Mindoro area was under the control of the Western Visayan Task Force which used amphibious type craft to forward from Leyte quantities of supplies to maintain levels prescribed by the Sixth Army. ASCOM was charged to furnish these supplies and to assist the Western Visayan Task Force in loading the same. The initial phase of resupply as prescribed

above was followed by Sixth Army dispatching to the target area standard supply ships, supplementary type supply ships and tankers. The Western Visayan Task Force forwarded air force supplies as well as Army supplies during the initial phase of resupply and additional air force supplies in heavy shipping were forwarded later by Sixth Army. Leyte Island was designated as the supply base for the Western Visayan Task Force with US.SOS providing certain quantities of supplies from its bases in the New Guinea axis by means of heavy shipping and furnishing standard supply ships as needed. Severe losses of supplies through destruction of and damage to heavy supply shipping by enemy air action resulted in dangerously low supply levels. The forwarding of additional heavy supply shipping from the Leyte area, augmented by extensive air resupply, provided the essential requirements of the force and prevented an adverse effect on the operation through a failure of logistic support.

Casualties were evacuated from the target area to Leyte by assault naval craft, Geneva Protected Hospital ships and in emergency, by heavy ships. Surface evacuation was supplemented by air evacuation as soon as an airstrip was operable. Evacuation of POWs under guards furnished by the task force was to ASCOM on Leyte Island. Other types of evacuation were not moved from the island except on the direction of Sixth Army. Major construction performed in the target area consisted of two airdromes with supporting installations, a bulk petroleum system to handle avgas and mogas, port facilities to consist of necessary LST landing points, one lighter jetty and one small ships wharf and base installations to support a force of 25,000. The control of the Western Visayan Task Force and the logistical responsibility for the force passed from Sixth Army to the Eighth Army on 1 January 1945.

The initial detailed planning for the Luzon (M-1) operation was accomplished at Hollandia, New Guinea. Many of the plans were laid prior to the Leyte invasion even though the order was not published until 23 November 1944 and was issued on Leyte Island. The Luzon operation was the second full scale Army operation. The initial landing was in the Lingayen Gulf area on 9 January 1945 with the following major tactical units comprising the Sixth Army force:

I Corps -- 6th and 43rd Infantry Divisions
XIV Corps -- 37th and 40th Infantry Divisions
158th RCT
13th Armored Group

The 25th Division and the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion were in Sixth Army reserve, both being committed to action in the early phases of the operation. In addition to the above major units, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32nd Infantry Division and the 33rd Infantry Division were designated as reinforcing units for the Luzon operation and were moved to the target area on the turn around of Navy shipping. The 1st Cavalry and the 32nd Infantry

Divisions landed in the Lingayen Gulf area on S / 18 and both were moved to forward areas to give relief to units which had been engaged since D Day. The 33rd Infantry Division landed in the Lingayen Gulf area on S / 31 and immediately was placed in combat. All of the above units moved from their staging areas with 30 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 3 U/F Class V. In support of the Sixth Army landing, the Eighth Army landed two smaller forces on Luzon, the 11th Airborne Division landing at Nasugbu on 31 January 1945 and advancing on Manila and the XI Corps (38th Infantry Division and one RCT, 24th Infantry Division) landing in the San Narciso-San Antonio area on 26 January 1945 and seizing the Subic Bay area. The 11th Airborne Division passed to Sixth Army control on 10 February 1945 and the XI Corps passed to Sixth Army control on 29 January 1945.

The logistical plan in support of the Luzon operation closely resembled that used in the Leyte operation. The experience gained in the Leyte operation served to good advantage in the Luzon landing. The supply plan as prescribed by the Administrative Order covered a sixty day period during which period a total of approximately 15 U/F field artillery and mortar and 10 U/F all other types Class V and 90 D/S all other classes of supplies were scheduled for delivery to the target area. This quantity of supplies was supported by reserve supply shipping and provisions for emergency air resupply as necessary. The logistical support of the Luzon area passed to US.SOS on S (landing day) / 35. Elements of the Luzon force staged and mounted from points in the South Pacific area, the New Guinea-New Britain axis and Leyte. Supply agencies supplying each staging area were charged to furnish units staging in their areas with accompanying supplies. The bulk of resupply came direct from the United States with some resupply from bases in Australia, New Guinea and Leyte. Units delivered to the objective area during the period S to S / 12 the following totals of unit supplies: 30 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 15 D/S motor transport and Diesel fuel and 30 D/S all other types of Class III, 5 U/F Class V for combat units and 3 U/F Class V for non-divisional service units. Of the above quantities, each unit had in unit possession not less than 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 2 U/F Class V. Units arriving in the objective area subsequent to S / 12 took 30 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 10 D/S Class III, 5 U/F Class V combat units and 3 U/F Class V for non-divisional service units. In addition to the above levels, voyage rations were taken in required quantities depending upon the estimated period of time at sea. Maximum levels for the area were established at 30 D/S Classes I to III inclusive, Class IV as required and 5 U/F Class V.

The same means were employed for resupply of the Luzon force as were used in the Leyte operation and resupply to the Luzon area was again a Sixth Army responsibility. A total of 71 resupply ships were tentatively scheduled for arrival in the objective area during the first sixty days of the operation. A total of eight emergency reserve supply ships (four with Class V and four with Class III supplies) were set up of which all but two (ground force ammunition) were called forward and discharged. The reserve supply

ships were divided for rendezvous at Hollandia and Leyte and were in place for call forward on S Day. Standard type supply ships under USASOS control served as a pool of reserve ships of this type which were called forward as needed. The supply of Class III followed the same pattern as in the Leyte operation with the added feature of the construction of 4" pipelines from the main tank farm in the Lingayen Gulf area to the combat troops in forward areas as they advanced. Railroads provided a new means of transporting fuel in drums and in bulk and this method of moving fuel to forward areas from the beachhead area was extensively used. Difficulties were encountered in maintaining the continuous flow of fuel from barges due to unfavorable anchorages which could not be used during periods of inclement weather. In general, however, the requirements of the tactical forces were adequately met. All emergency air resupply was made with planes based in the Luzon area and from supply stocks available in that area. It was not necessary to draw on the emergency supplies in reserve at Leyte for purposes of emergency air resupply to the Luzon force. The first drop was made on S / 10. During the period S / 10 to S / 35, a total of 339,421 pounds were dropped. By June 30 1945, (S / 170) a total of 5,020,592 pounds comprising 1,319 plane loads were dropped. The overall percentage of recovery of supplies dropped was 87%. In addition to the above supplies which were dropped, a total of 1,265,100 pounds were delivered by aircraft (landing) to forces in the forward area.

An Army Service Command (ASCOM) was again employed under Sixth Army in the Luzon operation, the same ASCOM Headquarters used in the Leyte operation being employed in the Luzon operation. This organization with the personnel to constitute Base M (the USASOS base for the Lingayen Gulf area) passed to Sixth Army control on S - 45 and completed its organization and plans for assuming under Sixth Army the following major duties and functions in the objective area on direction of Sixth Army:

- a. Discharge, storage and issue of supplies and materials.
- b. Discharge of troop ships.
- c. Initiation and continuation of approved construction projects.
- d. Operation of supply point facilities within the Army Base Area.
- e. Delivery of supplies from supply points in the Army Base Area to advance Army Supply Points.
- f. Recruit, allocate, administer and supervise civilian labor used in the Army Base Area.

Beach operations in support of the Luzon invasion consisted of the same three phases as in the Leyte operation. The second, or ASCOM phase, began on S / 10 on which date ASCOM was made responsible for the discharge of all cargo and troops over all beaches in the Lingayen Gulf area. Effective on S / 10, the initial Army Base Area under the control of ASCOM was established. The inland boundary of this area was the rear boundary of the two corps

within their respective zones of action. Within the Army Base Area, ASCOM was responsible for Military Police and traffic control, road maintenance and construction, bridge maintenance and construction (with a few exceptions) and all other construction work except a few projects remaining the responsibility of other commands. On S / 10, units continued to draw supplies from unit dumps thereby giving ASCOM an opportunity to establish ASCOM dumps in the Army Base Area with supplies discharged from resupply shipping and at the same time, many small unit dumps were depleted by issue. As the combat forces advanced, the Army Base Area (under ASCOM control) was advanced inland and enlarged. Effective S / 35, Base M was activated and assumed responsibility for the logistic support of the Luzon force.

No docks or lighterage facilities were captured during the initial phases of the operation and all cargo from heavy shipping was discharged over the beach by means of ESB and Navy lighterage. The physical conditions of the beaches in the Lingayen Gulf area left much to be desired from the standpoint of an amphibious operation. The approaches were shallow causing amphibious craft to ground at considerable distances from the shoreline which resulted in wet ramps for the most part. Surf and wind action caused considerable broaching of vessels from the smallest type to and including LSTs. The area behind the beaches afforded adequate open space for dumps and other installations and connected with a good road net. Until S / 10, the two corps discharged approximately 34,000 DWTs of supplies from cargo type shipping. ASCOM discharged approximately 216,000 DWTs of supplies from cargo ships from S / 10 until S / 35. For the period S Day to S / 60, a total of 506,327 DWTs of supplies were discharged from cargo shipping in the Lingayen Gulf area. In addition to the above figures, approximately fifty cargo type ships carrying troops and their equipment and accompanying supplies were discharged by S / 60. The average daily rate of discharge from cargo type ships until S / 35 was 7,454 DWTs. Serviceable craft on hand for lighterage were available at the daily average as follows: 37 LCTs; 132 LCMs; 241 DUKWs and 48 barges. On S / 35, a backlog of approximately 134,000 DWTs remained in the Lingayen Gulf area. The transfer of service units from the two corps to ASCOM and then to Base M was effected in accordance with the transfer of logistical responsibility.

After the establishment of the beachhead and initial supply dumps and as the combat forces advanced inland, a phase of mobile warfare took place which, with the exception of the Leyte operation, was a deviation from the previous pattern of Sixth Army amphibious operations in which little movement inland was effected. As long as possible, the combat forces during their advance, continued to draw supplies with unit transportation from supply dumps in the Lingayen Gulf beach area. When the combat forces advanced beyond economical trucking distance for unit transportation, advance Army Supply Points (under Army operation) were established which served divisions, corps and Army units within geographical limits. These points were announced in Administrative Orders issued by Sixth Army. ASCOM moved supplies from the Lingayen Gulf area to the Army Supply Points on Sixth Army requisitions. During the mobile

phase a shortage of truck transportation became increasingly apparent. This was primarily due to the initial non-availability of sufficient truck companies to support the operation and acute truck shortages in assigned truck companies. This condition was further aggravated by the delay of the arrival of heavy truck equipment from the United States, the delay in the arrival of provisional units from New Guinea bases to operate the equipment and the rapid advance of the combat units. This shortage reached a critical stage and all appropriate available transportation within the Army was organized into provisional units to relieve the situation. As sections of the Manila Railroad were captured, they were rehabilitated and placed in operation as rapidly as possible. The initial section from San Fabian to Bayambang was opened on S / 13 with a capacity of 200 DWTs per day. The railroad bridge at Bayambang required major repairs and upon completion thereof, additional captured rolling stock located south of Bayambang became available and railway service was extended to Tarlac with a considerable increase in tonnage capacity. Rail service was extended to Manila on S / 68. Tonnage transported by the railroad proved of tremendous value in relieving the acute transportation shortage.

The XI Corps which passed to Sixth Army control on 29 January 1945 continued to supply itself with supplies discharged in the Subic Bay area. Resupply ships in required numbers were diverted from the Lingayen Gulf area to the Subic Bay area to meet the needs of this force. Certain items of supply were furnished this force from Army Supply Points which were in operation for the support of the main force in central Luzon. The 11th Airborne Division which passed to Sixth Army control on 10 February 1945, continued to supply itself for a short period of time from supply stocks unloaded in the Nasugbu area and moved overland by truck to forward elements of the force. When firm contact was made between the 11th Airborne Division and elements of the main Sixth Army force, the logistical support of the 11th Airborne Division was transferred to the Lingayen Gulf area and later to the Manila area. Logistical operations in the Nasugbu area were closed out when the supply of the division was assured from other sources. The large scale use of guerilla units resulted in considerable demands on Army supply stocks especially for clothing, equipment and weapons. An operational project had been prepared for the purpose of furnishing estimated requirements of the guerilla forces. Shipments under the operational project did not arrive in the objective area in time to meet requirements with the result that early issues were made from Army replacement stocks. Some captured Japanese equipment was made available for the guerilla forces.

The evacuation of casualties in the Luzon area was initially the responsibility of the I and XIV Corps, each corps being responsible for evacuation from its zone. Assault naval craft, Geneva Protected Hospital ships and aircraft were used for evacuation of casualties. On S / 7, the Sixth Army relieved both corps of the responsibility for all evacuation of casualties to the rear of division and corps clearing stations and ASCOM (Base M)

assumed responsibility for the evacuation of casualties from Luzon on S / 35. From S Day to S / 170, a total of 37,716 casualties were evacuated from the Luzon area; 11,955 by water and 25,761 by air. The first off-the-island evacuation took place on S / 9. Leyte was the main point of reception for Luzon casualties and all evacuation by air was to the Leyte area. The rate of evacuation compared favorably with previous operations, the principal reason being the fact that fixed bed hospitals were able to set up quicker than usual due to favorable weather and the presence and availability of permanent hospital structures for housing. A new evacuation feature, employed on a large scale in the Luzon operation, was the use of three squadrons of liaison type planes for on-the-island evacuation. A total of 18,409 casualties were evacuated on Luzon Island during the period S Day to S / 170 in which task L-5s, C-46s and PBYS were used.

Approximately 1,579 POWs were captured by S / 60. They were initially confined in divisional enclosures and later in ASCOM enclosures and were transferred to Base M on S / 35. None were evacuated from Luzon. Large quantities of enemy supplies and equipment were captured. Captured weapons and ammunition were collected, repaired as necessary, and distributed to guerilla and Philippine Army forces. Some captured supplies were suitable for civilian relief purposes and were delivered to PCAUs for distribution to the civilian populace. Civilian vehicles recovered from the enemy were held in salvage dumps and with the exception of those needed for immediate combat requirements were turned to the Commonwealth government for disposition. Both corps and ASCOM established salvage dumps for the receipt of salvage and captured enemy supplies and materials. The ASCOM dumps later became the salvage dumps for Base M.

Thirteen PCAUs were employed in the target area for civilian administration and relief. Corps were responsible for their employment within their respective zones and three PCAUs were attached to each corps for this purpose. The 158th RCT had one PCAU for its area until the I Corps took over such area. Six PCAUs were retained under Sixth Army control for use as the overall situation required. ASCOM was made responsible for civilian relief and administration within the Army Base Area when such area was established and received necessary PCAUs from those initially retained under Army control. Civilian relief supplies were shipped into the target area with a total of approximately 20,000 DWTs scheduled for delivery during the first sixty days. The most difficult civilian administration and relief problem faced was that in the Greater Manila area. Just prior to the entry into Manila, eight PCAUs were grouped under a provisional command which in turn was placed under the XIV Corps. These PCAUs were assigned specific areas within Greater Manila and handled civilian administration and relief under such command during the hostilities in Manila. Shortly after the termination of the battle for Manila, USAFFE took control of these eight PCAUs and existing civilian relief stocks in Manila and administered civilian relief for the Greater Manila area. Civilian administration and relief outside the Greater Manila area remained the responsibility of Sixth Army and Base M (on its activation), within their respective areas. PCAUs supervised retail stores and sold supplies to civilians at prices established by the Commonwealth government. Medical installations, schools, local governments and other governmental institutions

were reestablished at the earliest possible time and many of the problems relative to civilian administration were assumed by such agencies. Responsibility for construction projects belonged to Sixth Army which used ASCOM and a Naval Service Command (for Navy construction.)

The allocation of areas for the construction of facilities was made by the Sixth Army Area Allocation Group which consisted of representatives of ASCOM (Base M), I and XIV Corps, Allied Air Forces, Allied Naval Forces and the Sixth Army. Allocations of areas were made in general conformity with a tentative allocation made by GHQ prior to the operation. Two airstrips were constructed in the Lingayen Gulf area, (one being ready by S / 5) and air-dromes in the Clark Field and Manila areas were repaired and put in operation shortly after their capture. Bulk fuel installations were built and a pipeline was laid down the axis of the advance on Manila. There were no suitable sites for Liberty docks in the initial beachhead area. Not until San Fernando, La Union, was captured, was it possible to use or construct Liberty docks. The only dockage constructed in the Lingayen beachhead area was a fuel jetty and a jetty used for discharging heavy railroad equipment. Fixed hospital facilities were constructed according to plan and proved adequate for the care of casualties received. Upon the capture of Manila, use was made of existing hospitals and other buildings which permitted the rapid installation of fixed type hospitalization. Only minor naval facilities were constructed in the Lingayen Gulf area, this area not being suitable for naval installations. The Navy eventually took over all of the Subic Bay area and part of the Manila area (Cavite) for naval installations. Navy construction in these areas was performed by the Navy. The construction and maintenance of roads and bridges was divided between the Corps, Sixth Army and ASCOM depending upon the areas occupied by various elements. Special effort, under the direction of the Sixth Army Engineer, was applied toward the repair of bridges on the MSRs and the rehabilitation and repair of the Manila Railroad. After Base M was activated in the Lingayen Gulf area on S / 35, the Sixth Army still retained logistical responsibility for the area forward of the Army Base Area including the Greater Manila area, all requirements being requisitioned from Base M stocks. Shortly after the capture of San Fernando, La Union, and the opening of the road to that area from the south, Base M moved to San Fernando, La Union, and use was made of existing docks and other facilities in that area to facilitate the discharge of cargo. Base M operated under the Luzon Base Section (LUBSEC) and established three sub-bases, the principal one being No. 1 at White Beach (San Fabian). Sub-base No. 2 was established at Dagupan and Sub-base No. 3 was located in the Lingayen-Port Sual area. Upon the capture of Manila and the opening of Manila Bay, the development of the port of Manila was undertaken, initially by LUBSEC, and later under a base (Base X) established in Manila. Base M continued to supply units in the Manila area until such time as Base X built up adequate supply stocks to take over this logistic responsibility. Service units for Base X were of necessity taken from Base M in order to meet the requirements of Base X.

Toward the close of operations clearing Manila and adjacent

areas of the enemy, plans were undertaken for a landing on the lower Bicol peninsula to seal the fate of those enemy forces thereby cut off from possible escape. This landing was effected in the vicinity of Legaspi on 1 April 1945 with a RCT, reinforced. This force staged and mounted from Lemery (Balayan Bay) with the exception of a few small units which staged and mounted from Subic Bay. The supply plan for this operation was an involved one due to the location of the major force for staging and the availability of supplies, particularly ammunition. Since the amphibious lift for the operation was in rendezvous at Subic Bay and also certain elements of the task force were staging at Subic Bay, the supply plan provided that 10 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 1 U/F Class V for the assault forces be bulk loaded in the amphibious lift at Subic Bay prior to its movement to the Lemery area to unload the main force. In addition to the above bulk loaded supplies, elements of the assault force staging and moving from Subic Bay took, in unit possession, 5 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 1 U/F Class V and 7 D/S voyage rations and the elements of the task force staging and mounting from Lemery took, in unit possession, the same levels except only 2 D/S voyage rations. All units moving to the target area on the reinforcing echelon (arrived D / 8) took 5 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive, 1 U/F Class V and 2 D/S voyage rations. The first resupply shipment also moved forward with the reinforcing echelon and consisted of 15 D/S Classes I to IV inclusive and 1 U/F Class V loaded on amphibious craft at Subic Bay plus one FS boat which loaded (at Subic Bay) 3/4 U/F artillery and mortar and 1/2 U/F all other types Class V. This FS boat was ready at Subic Bay for emergency call forward on D Day in event the situation required its commitment prior to the reinforcing echelon arrival date. After D / 8, USASOS (Base K at Leyte) was responsible for resupply of the Legaspi force by FS boats, the first echelon arriving on D / 18 and succeeding echelons following thereafter at seven day intervals. The XI Corps, which was in command of the Subic Bay area and supply dumps, was charged with furnishing for the Legaspi force the quantities of supplies set out above for movement from Subic Bay and further was responsible for loading same on the craft utilized for their movement. The XIV Corps, which was in command of the Lemery area, was charged with furnishing to the Legaspi force at Lemery the quantities of supplies to be lifted at that location for movement to the target area. The Legaspi force was responsible for loading all task force units and the supplies to be lifted from Lemery with the XIV Corps charged to give such assistance in the form of labor and motor transportation as was necessary. Some emergency air resupply by dropping became necessary in the course of the operation but the tonnage involved was not great. Evacuation from this force was to Subic Bay so long as amphibious craft were employed (on or about D / 18) and thereafter by air to points in the Manila Clark Field area and by surface craft to Leyte (Base K). Civilian administration and relief were handled by a PCAU attached to the task force. This unit moved with minor quantities of civilian relief supplies and further shipments were received on the reinforcing and succeeding echelons. Construction in the Legaspi area

was very minor and consisted of placing the Legaspi airfield in operable condition for liaison and transport type planes and the necessary road, port and base facilities to support the task force. The pier at Legaspi was only slightly damaged at the time of its capture and, being able to receive three FS boats at once, offered adequate port facilities to support the force. A liaison officer from the G-4 Section assisted the task force in loading out at Lemery and accompanied the task force to the target area.

6. OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

As the Philippine campaign drew to a close, the principal effort of the G-4 Section was centered in bringing units loaded in the Philippines up to their authorized levels of equipment. During this period the furnishing of supplies to these units was in the hands of USA-SOS (later AFWESPAC) bases. This effort was continuous until the eventual embarkation for the occupation of Japan. In the meantime, a directive (OLYMPIC Operation) was received from GHQ in which the role of the Sixth Army in the invasion of Japan was prescribed. Planning proceeded pursuant to this directive at Sixth Army Headquarters (then located at San Fernando, Pampanga) and at GHQ in Manila. The plans for this invasion were practically completed and the Administrative Order was ready for publication at the time the directive was received from GHQ to start planning for the occupation of Japan in event of an early surrender. Planning proceeded on both directives at the same time until the surrender of Japan became a reality and the invasion plans were suspended. The invasion plans called for the Sixth Army to land on southern Kyushu in four widely separated localities with four corps, totaling more than thirteen divisions. The pattern of the operation as planned was similar to the Leyte and Luzon invasions except being larger in size and the program of resupply greatly improved through an elaborate provision of various type standard supply ships. Separate type standard supply ships were set up for Classes I to IV inclusive, Class I, Class III, Classes II and IV, Engineer construction supplies, Signal construction supplies, Ordnance vehicle replacement ships, Class V, civilian relief supplies and air force supplies (to include separate ships for avgas, avammo and AF technical supplies).

The Sixth Army occupation zone within Japan included the islands of Kyushu and Shikoku and the western half of Honshu. This area was occupied by Sixth Army with three corps employed as follows:

- a. The V Amphibious Corps, reinforced, occupied the island of Kyushu and the Yamaguchi prefecture on Honshu with an initial landing on 22 September 1945 in the Sasebo area with the 5th Marine Division. The 2nd Marine Division landed at Nagasaki on 23 September 1945 and the 32nd Infantry Division landed during October at Sasebo and occupied points in northern Kyushu and westernmost Honshu. The 2nd Marine Division staged at Saipan, the 5th Marine Division staged on Hawaii and the 32nd Infantry Division staged on Luzon.
- b. The I Corps, reinforced, occupied the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto-Nagoya area of Honshu with an initial landing on 25 September 1945 in the vicinity of Wakayama by the 33rd Infantry Division followed two days later by the 98th Infantry Division. A later landing on 25 October 1945 in the Nagoya area was made with the 25th Infantry Division. The 98th Infantry Division mounted and staged from Hawaii and the 33rd and 25th Infantry Divisions mounted and staged from Luzon.

- c. The X Corps, reinforced, occupied a part of western Honshu and the island of Shikoku with an initial landing on 6 October 1945 near Kure with elements of the 41st Infantry Division and later landings in the same area and on the island of Shikoku with elements of the 24th Infantry Division. The 41st and 24th Infantry Divisions staged and mounted from the island of Mindanao in the Philippines.

Supplies which accompanied units to Japan were set at 30 D/S Classes I, II and IV, 15 D/S Class III, 3 U/F Class V for combat units and 1 U/F Class V for non-divisional service units. Voyage rations in required quantities were taken in addition to the above levels. Prescribed tonnages of Military Government supplies were taken forward by each corps. All of the above accompanying supplies were furnished units by the responsible supply agencies serving respective staging areas. Each corps was responsible for loading its units and accompanying supplies receiving necessary assistance from the commands in charge of the various staging areas. Resupply of the occupied zone was a Sixth Army responsibility except for fuel products (bulk and drummed) which AFMARPAC furnished through Sub-area Petroleum Officers located in the Sixth Army zone. Resupply was accomplished by the diversion of theater maintenance shipping and the use of operational type shipping (standard type supply ships loaded for the OLYMPIC Operation) when such shipping became available. Supply requirements were worked out between the Sixth Army and AFMARPAC and supply ships suitable and available at the time of the Sixth Army occupation were scheduled into the various ports serving the occupied areas. Since the ship loadings were not tailored for the operation, large quantities of unneeded supplies and equipment had to be unloaded in the early phases of the operation. All resupply to the Sixth Army force came from or through AFMARPAC except Class II and IV supplies for the marine units which were furnished and moved to the regulating station at Okinawa by CINCPAC. CINCPAC was also responsible for providing all supplies required by the naval forces ashore and afloat. Reserve ammunition ships were available in event they might be needed. As the need for additional ammunition did not arise, these ships were not called forward to Japan. The V Amphibious Corps was responsible for all beach, port and logistical operations in its area of occupation.

An Army Service Command (designated ASCOMO) was provided the Sixth Army by AFMARPAC which organization eventually assumed responsibility for the logistic support of all troops in the I and X Corps zones on dates after the initial landings determined by Sixth Army. ASCOMO was organized into an ASCOMO Headquarters and three Base Headquarters; namely, the Kobe Base Headquarters, Nagoya Base Headquarters, and Kure Base Headquarters. Prior to the movement to Japan, the Kobe and Nagoya Base Headquarters were attached to the I Corps and the Kure Base Headquarters was attached to the X Corps, each Base Headquarters to be utilized in logistical operations as directed by the Corps to which attached. ASCOMO Headquarters remained under the Sixth Army and was made responsible for Base operations in the three ports upon the activation of the bases. Due to pressure mines blocking the entrance to Kobe harbor, it was necessary for all troops debarking

for that area, and the Osaka-Kyoto areas as well, to unload at Wakayama. Initial beach operations in the Wakayama area were handled by the I Corps. On 15 October 1945, the Kobe Base was activated and Kobe Base Headquarters (under ASCOMO) was placed in charge of operations in the Wakayama area and made responsible for the logistical support of all troops in the Wakayama-Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area. The I Corps was also initially responsible for port operations in the Nagoya area. On 15 November 1945, the Nagoya Base was activated and the Nagoya Base Headquarters assumed responsibility for the Nagoya port operations and the logistical support of all troops in the Nagoya area. Port operations were discontinued at Wakayama and the Nagoya Base became responsible for the logistic support of all troops in the Wakayama-Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto areas. The Kobe Base, upon removal from the Wakayama area, assumed control of all supply and service installations in operation in the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto areas. The X Corps relinquished logistical responsibilities in the X Corps area on 3 November 1945 and on the same date, the Kure Base (under ASCOMO) was activated with the Kure Base Headquarters in charge of port operations in the Kure area and responsible for the logistical support of all troops in the X Corps zone. Owing to pressure mines in the Kure harbor, all supplies had to be lightered ashore until the docks were opened to supply ships on 22 November.

As directed, each corps and division formed a procurement agency within its command for the purpose of procuring for all units within its area needed Japanese supplies, real estate, equipment and facilities. Each procurement agency operated under policies and procedures handed down by the Sixth Army Procurement Section, originally set up as a Sub-section of G-4 and later activated as a separate section of Sixth Army Headquarters to handle the procurement problem. The Japanese side of procurement was handled by the Japanese Liaison Office which was established by the Japanese Government to receive and handle all procurement requests of the occupation forces. The disposition of the enormous stores of surrendered Japanese war materiel was handled by the tactical commands under instructions from Sixth Army Headquarters. The Second Japanese General Army (which occupied the Sixth Army zone) was directed to make an inventory (with locations) of Japanese war materiel. Based on this inventory, the G-2 information and tactical commands proceeded to seize installations and then rendered useless for war by various means the surrendered Japanese war materiel. Equipment required by the War Department and unique and newly developed items were assembled for shipment to the United States. Items authorized for retention as war trophies were collected and disposition made to the various commands based on their troop strengths. Enemy equipment and supplies suitable for peacetime civilian use and not exclusively for use in war such as food, medical supplies, tentage, clothing, trucks and scrap metal was turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry for disposition. Evacuation from the occupied zone was to points in AFWESPAC, AFMIDPAC and the United States. Means used included naval craft, heavy shipping, hospital ships and aircraft. Construction in the zone of occupation was held to a minimum with

full use made of existing Japanese facilities and materials. Only necessary road and bridge maintenance on MSRs was done with truck transportation reduced to a minimum through full use of the excellent railroad system. Japanese airdromes were put in operable use for our planes; minor road construction was accomplished and beach and port installations necessary to our unloading operations were constructed. Japanese agencies were required to perform such construction as they were capable of performing in time to meet our operational requirements. Two representatives of the G-4 Section proceeded by air to the Sixth Army zone in Japan with the advance detachment which met with the Second Japanese General Army and other governmental agencies to facilitate the entry of the Sixth Army into Japan. The remainder of the G-4 Section moved to Japan in two echelons; the first consisting of most of the Section, arrived at Wakayama on 25 September 1945 and the second echelon arrived at the same place approximately one month later. Liaison Officers were detailed with the V Amphibious Corps and the X Corps and moved with their Corps into their respective areas of occupation.

7. ROSTER OF PERSONNEL G-4 SECTION

OFFICERS

Colonel Kenneth Pierce (G-4 25 Jan 1943 -
30 Jun 1944)
Colonel William N. Leaf (G-4 1 Jul 1944 -
26 Jan 1946)

Colonel George W. Palmer *
Lt. Colonel Joe ... Lee **
Colonel Jasper L. Cummings
Colonel Frederick ... Daugherty
Lt. Colonel John C. Bowes
Lt. Colonel Donald D. Dickson
Major Clark W. Mayne **
Captain Clifford E. Cross
Lt. Colonel Elwood H. Spackman
Captain Hill C. Eubank, Jr.
Lt. Colonel James M. Fielding, Jr.
Colonel Elbert H. Smith
Lt. Colonel Irwin T. Shaw
Lt. Colonel James D. Scott
Lt. Colonel James W. Ewing
Colonel Harry B. Emigh
Captain Arthur E. Keay
Major Hugh P. Carter
Lt. Colonel Irwin M. Diamond
Major Herbert E. Gerfen ***
Captain Herbert T. Condon, Jr.
Captain Benjamin Huger, Jr.
Major Eldon M. Knox
Major Wilson E. Still
Major George R. McColl
1st Lt. George W. Gramley
1st Lt. Eugene L. Bailey
Major Joseph W. Moore
Captain Charles W. Stanton
Captain Gordon E. Mooney
1st Lt. George F. Baker
1st Lt. Thurman C. Satterfield
Captain William M. Beaver
Major Edmond C. Ryan
Captain Haley Fiske, II
Captain David M. Cartwright
1st Lt. John W. Welch
Captain Lerue W. Winget
1st Lt. Clive E. Levoir
Lt. Colonel Theo. ...hrenbeck
Major Edward C. Stothart, Jr.
Colonel Gunnard W. Carlson

Major John H. Koops
Captain Robert D. Honig
CWO Jack A. Davis *
CWO Harry F. Stevens

ENLISTED MEN

M/Sgt Isaac L. Lundell
T/Sgt Frederick H. Andrews
T/Sgt Vernon A. Schiff
T/Sgt Samuel A. Brion
T/3 John J. Donovan
T/Sgt Frank P. Wilfley
S/Sgt Rupert A. Altizer
T/4 Lyle A. Clay ***
T/3 Kennon S. Furr ***
T/4 Dean M. Howen
T/3 Robert L. Kelley
T/4 Joseph A. Maffei, Jr.
T/4 Walter W. Christopherson
Cpl Mortimer A. Heinrich
T/5 Dario (NMI) Cassei
T/5 Arthur J. DelVecchio
T/5 Jasper (NMI) Diaz
T/4 Joseph W. Lindquist
Sgt Carl E. Mayer
S/Sgt Andrew J. Skipper
Sgt Godfrey D. Green
T/3 Ralph L. Beuthin
T/5 James C. Haboush **
Pfc Parker S. Nelson **
T/Sgt Lamar W. Owens
Pfc Kenneth R. Porsborg ***
T/5 Ellery Wankel
T/Sgt Frederick E. Kronewitter
T/3 Richard G. Schiltz
T/3 Matias L. Chacon
T/Sgt Robert E. Wilcox
T/5 Harry T. Chandler
T/5 John H. McKelvey
T/3 Herbert B. Spence
T/4 Norman Buerdsell
T/3 Marland D. Mills
T/5 Floyd F. Cronwell
T/4 Norman H. Stovall
T/3 Paul E. Slatton
T/4 Chester M. Badach
T/4 Allen C. Yates
T/3 Johnny Scott

T/4 C. Frederic Zundell
T/4 Joseph F. Badach
S/Sgt Robert K. Schaeve
T/Sgt Joseph V. Manders
Cpl Frank J. Clendenin
T/5 Paul Reichert
Pfc John J. Barnhardt
Pfc Donald W. Anderson
Pfc Raymond N. Alford
Pvt J. ... Selvaggi

* Indicates personnel who came overseas with Sixth Army G-4 Section and still remain with G-4 Section.

** Indicates personnel killed.

*** Indicates personnel wounded.

8. Decorations Awarded Members of the G-4 Section

Colonel Kenneth Pierce	Legion of Merit Bronze Star
Colonel William N. Leaf	Legion of Merit Bronze Star
Colonel George W. Palmer	Legion of Merit Bronze Star
Colonel Harry B. Emigh	Bronze Star
Colonel Jasper L. Cummings	Bronze Star
Colonel Frederick A. Daugherty	Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster Bronze Star
Colonel Elbert H. Smith	Legion of Merit Bronze Star
Lt. Colonel James D. Scott	Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster
Lt. Colonel James M. Fielding, Jr.	Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster
Lt. Colonel Irwin T. Shaw	Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster
Major Herbert E. Gerfen	Silver Star Bronze Star Purple Heart
Major Hugh P. Carter	Bronze Star
Major Eldon M. Knox	Bronze Star
Major Wilson E. Still	Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster
Major Joseph W. Moore	Bronze Star
Captain Clifford E. Cross	Bronze Star
1st Lt. George F. Baker	Bronze Star
1st Lt. Thurman C. Satterfield	Bronze Star

CWO Jack A. Davis	Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster
T/Sgt Vernon A. Schiff	Bronze Star
T/Sgt Samuel A. Brion	Bronze Star
T/Sgt Frederick E. Kronewitter	Bronze Star
S/Sgt Andrew J. Skipper	Bronze Star
T/4 Lyle A. Clay	Bronze Star Purple Heart
T/3 Kennon S. Furr	Purple Heart
S/Sgt Rupert A. Altizer	Purple Heart
T/5 James C. Haboush	Purple Heart (Posthumous)
Pfc Kenneth R. Porsborg	Purple Heart
Pfc Parker S. Nelson	Purple Heart (Posthumous)

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