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Combat History
OF THE

● BRUSSELS

SUPER SIXTH

LUXEMBOURG

● CHERBOURG

● LE HAVRE

● REIMS

● PARIS

● CHATEAUBRIANT

● ORLEANS



STORY *of the* SIXTH ARMORED DIVISION



NORMANDY



NORTH FRANCE



ARDENNES



RHINELAND

COMBAT HISTORY

of the
6th Armored Division

In the European Theatre of Operations
18 July 1944 -- 8 May 1945

With a Statement by
MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT W. GROW
Commanding General, 6th Armored Div.

Containing 103 Photographs
FRANCE -- LUXEMBOURG -- BELGIUM -- GERMANY

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Introduction

"Combat History, The Super Sixth" is a compilation of data from many sources, but by far the greater part of the material was obtained from after-action reports prepared by the G-3 Section, 6th Armored Division, under the direction of Major Clyde J. Burk, Assistant G-3, with Lts. Hunter Haines, Chester Kneller, Bernard Yaeger, and Paul Cundiff assisting, and appears here under Section II with slight variations.

Credit is given to Lt. Col. Ernest W. Mitchell Jr., G-2 of the 6th Armored Division, for his preparation of the material used as a base for Section I, the story of the 6th Armored Division, which gives the overall picture of the Division's role in combat operations in Europe, and for his permission to use same.

The charts and other data presented in another section of this book were chosen from material compiled by the Office of the Chief of Staff under the direction of Captain Cyrus R. Shockey, Aide-de-Camp, and art work was done, for the most part, by Sgt. Frank X. Scalise, G-2 Section. Photographs were made by official U. S. Army Signal Corps photographers and the Publisher.

To the above named individuals, and also to the staff of the Division I & E Section and Public Relations Office, the Publisher wishes to express his appreciation for the use of the material and for the cooperation which made the compilation of this history possible.

Although this book is not an official publication, much of the material contained herein was taken from official records, and the remainder has been carefully checked to avoid any misrepresentation of facts or figures.

It is regrettable that this type of history does not provide for the mention of the many gallant individual achievements which so characterized the men of the 6th Armored Division, whose "esprit de Corps" was second to none in the U. S. Army. However, the reader may well see reflected in this impersonal record the loyalty, devotion, and sacrifices that made this smooth functioning, fighting team such an important member of the Armies on the Western Front, and enabled it to finish all of its missions with the satisfactory label—"Success"—inscribed thereon.

William E. Rutledge, Jr.
PUBLISHER

Dedication

This book is dedicated to the men who sacrificed their lives for their country with the 6th Armored Division for the preservation of the liberty they loved so well.




MAJ. GENERAL GROW

The 6th Armored Division was created February 15, 1942. 29 months and 12 days later it was committed to action in Normandy. Except for a period of less than two weeks, the Division, in whole or in part, was continuously in action in the European Theater until the end of the war with Germany—more than nine months of combat. This volume contains the factual record of combat. No attempt is made to extend credit to the individual officers and men for their leadership and gallantry, the greatest factor in our success. Their record must be sought in the files of citations of the War Department and subordinate echelons of command. For the Division as a whole, the record is one of accomplishment to which every member can point with pride. From the hedges of Brittany through the forest gorges of the Ardennes and the flooded bottoms of Lorraine, to the beautiful rolling hills of Saxony, the Division mastered every variety of terrain. In the pages which follow, there is no account of failure; the combat record of the 6th Armored Division may be closed with the report "mission accomplished". To the heroic sacrifices of more than 1,200 who lost their lives and more than 4,000 others who were wounded, we owe a debt which we can discharge only by our life-long efforts to maintain a just peace.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "R. W. Grow". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

Major General, USA
Commanding



General William H. H. Morris Jr. poses with men at first bowl formation, Camp Chaffee, Arkansas

From Knox To

On February 15, 1942, the 6th Armored Division was officially activated in a brief ceremony held at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the home of the Armored Force. Major General (then Brig. Gen.) William H. H. Morris, Jr. was designated as Division Commander. In a very short time, the division staff of 2,601 officers and enlisted cadremen, predominately cavalrymen chosen from the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, were on their way overland to a new army camp which was to be their home for the next six months—Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. Nearby was the friendly city of Fort Smith, whose citizens extended a

warm welcome to the men of the 6th Armored Division that was never to grow cold.

FILL 'ER UP, BOYS

By the middle of March, all of the cadre had arrived from Fort Knox, the camp had been put into operation, and everything was in readiness to receive the new men who were to make up the 6th Armored Division. The first trainload arrived at Camp Chaffee on 26 March, climbed off the train, and stood shivering in the Arkansas cold before they were hurried off to the big gymnasium where an elaborate set-up had been made for their interviewing, classifying, and assignment to one of the many regiments, battalions, or separate companies that made up the old "heavy" armored division. By the next day the "recruits" began pouring into the division in ever increasing numbers until by the 15th of April the quota of over 15,000 men had satisfied the ever-present "T.O."

DOWN TO BUSINESS

Soon the training of the new men was well underway in basic training and the many technical phases that made up armored operations. Men were first trained as soldiers and then as tankers, engineers, medical technicians and ordnance experts. Soon field exercises were being held and overnight problems called through the near-by countryside. The training for the business that lay ahead was punctuated only by an occasional dance or party given in camp or in Fort Smith.

OFF TO THE RACES

Then came August, 1942, and with it plans for the Division to maneuver in Louisiana. Late in the month saw all the wheeled vehicles on the road headed south for the maneuver grounds in the vicinity of DeRitter and Alexandria, while the track vehicles went by train. The mock warfare began right away.

It was excellent training for combat—the almost constant rain made a quagmire of the terrain once vehicles left hard roads; the mosquitoes became legendary; the chiggers and the wood-ticks contributed their part to life in the field; and men got their first samples of "C" rations. Maneuvers continued until the last days of September. Men learned to drive heavy combat vehicles by starlight and follow tiny, elusive blackout lights of those ahead over dusty trails. Filling Station operators, bankers and insurance salesmen became soldiers. And then the Division returned to Camp Chaffee. At this time a change was made in the division artillery. The 59th, 69th, and 93rd Artillery Battalions, forming a group, were detached and three new ones—the 128th, 212th, and 231st battalions were assigned.

GO WEST, YOUNG MAN

The stay at Chaffee was brief. The "clean-up" program following return from maneuvers was hardly finished when the Division received orders to entrain for California—a program of desert maneuvers was in store for the Division that was now known as the "Super Sixth". Units were alerted for movement to the Desert Training Center, that section of eastern California adjoining the sands of the Mojave Desert.

Division Headquarters pulled to a jerky stop by a little shack labeled Freda, California, on the 10th of October 1942, and unloaded vehicles on the siding for the short ride to the Division Assembly Area at Rice. The dust of the desert floor, face-powder thin, mushroomed in clouds at the touch of a foot; the temperature soared to astronomical heights; construction of the tent city that was to mark the home of the Division for more than five months began. Other units of the division assembled hourly.

Jump-off Time

... LIFE WITH THE SIXTH

LIVE ALONE AND LIKE IT

Further training in field exercises began right away for the Division; overnight problems gave experience in mastering desert terrain and use of maps and compasses; the Division constructed firing ranges and gained its first experience at anti-aircraft firing.

Full scale maneuvers came early in 1943, the Division acquiring valuable experience and "winning-out" over another armored outfit which later proved a famous running-mate in Europe: the 4th Armored Division.

Maneuvers came to a close; men took their last look at beautiful desert sunsets, at the blue haze that enveloped the desert floor in early morning, at the stars that provided a ceiling for their outdoor movies in the cool evenings. On 15 March, the Division units, less vehicles, were on their way to Camp Cooke, on the California coast. Division Headquarters opened its doors on 17 March. Other units detrained rapidly.

ANOTHER PHASE

Men of the Division settled down to another program of the routine training that made up most of their wind-swept, ten months stay at Camp Cooke. Some phases of training had a new twist to them: practice in "street fighting"; close infiltration course under live ammunition; judo; swimming tests at Santa Barbara; extensive training in reconnaissance work; more days on the firing range. This was followed by a field exercise lasting nearly a week. The Division had changed Commanders, and General Morris was replaced by Major General (then Brig. Gen.) Robert W. Grow, who assumed command of the 6th Armored in June, 1943, and who was to guide the Division through the war. In September, the division underwent reorganization, and was changed from the "heavy-type" to the newer "light-type" division of approximately 11,400 officers and men. The Supply Bn. was relieved of assignment, together with Division Service Co., one Engineer Co., and three tank battalions.

AGF tests were completed. The 6th was ready for overseas service. The Division was alerted for shipment in January 1944.

ON THE WAY

The 25th of January saw Division Headquarters and other units pulling out for the east coast, less equipment, other than personal. The Port of Embarkation was Camp Shanks, New York, and the stay was brief. In approximately a week's time, the Battalions and separate companies of the 6th were processed and issued extra equipment, and then boarded ships in New York harbor. The 10th of February saw the Division troops on the high seas, sailing in one of the largest convoys of the war.

The ships docked at Liverpool, England, and Glasgow, Scotland, after a voyage lasting around twelve days. Division Headquarters anchored in the harbor near Glasgow on 22nd February, and debarked 25th February. The troops entrained and reached Gloucestershire and Oxfordshire, England, that night. Division Headquarters was established in Batsford Park, Moreton-in-Marsh, and Division units were billeted in and around small villages in the Oxford-Stratford on Avon-Cheltenham area of England, where they were to remain over four months.

CHEERIO

Here the Division met new customs, new people, new traditions. Men grew accustomed to warm ale, tea, "fish 'n chips", and found a few hours for sight-seeing trips. Training continued; another round with range firing; practicing in Wales, and exercises at Salisbury Plains; one more Division CPX.

The Division had trained extensively for 29 months. It was ready in every way for combat. As D-day grew nearer, and then dawned, there was a tenseness in the air that told the men the big moment was coming at last; that the many months of working and planning and training would be put to the test.

The middle of July found the Division on the road to Southampton, the "hards", and the LST's.

Across the English Channel lay the shores of France and destiny.



Lord and Lady Dulverton serve tea to Division men at Batsford Castle in England, where Division Headquarters was located



GEN. PATTON MAJ. GEN. GROW MAJ. GEN. EDDY

General George S. Patton, Jr., Commander of Third U. S. Army, above left, is pictured with Major General Robert W. Grow, Commander of 6th Armored Division, center, and Major General Manton S. Eddy, Commander of XII Corps, right, at Division Headquarters near Nancy, France, just prior to the opening of the offensive on November 8, 1944.

COMBAT COMMAND A

To most men in Combat Command A the most important highlight in their European Campaign was the action encountered at LANDROFF and in the HAN-SUR-NIED areas in November 1944, when gains were measured in yards and the miserable weather conditions made even the most optimistic soldiers wonder if the war would ever end in their time.

The Combat Command has no organic troops with the exception of a Headquarters Company. Composition of troops under its command were made and changed as the occasion demanded it, the only consistent member being Battery A, 777th AAA Battalion.

Past commanders of Combat Command A have been Brigadier General James Taylor, Colonel Harry F. Hanson, and Colonel John L. Hines.



COL. ALBERT E. HARRIS
Commanding, Combat Command A
(SS, BS w/C, Croix de Guerre w/palm)



COMBAT COMMAND B

Combat Command B fought its toughest battles at FORET DE GREMECEY in the SEILLE River campaign, and at WARDIN and ARLONCOURT in the ARDENNES. Both Combat Commands found the full meaning of exploitation during the first and the last month of their action as they swept through first BRITTANY and then GERMANY at a speed that belied the near-perfect setup of their armored columns and Combat Teams.

As in the case of Combat Command A, Combat Command B has its headquarters staff and its Headquarters Company, with composition of the command changing in accordance with the mission at hand. Battery B, 777th AAA Battalion was an almost permanent attachment to the headquarters.

Other commanders of Combat Command B were Brigadier General (then Colonel) George W. Read, Jr., and Colonel Harry F. Hanson, who was in command until 18 April 1945.



COL. EMBRY D. LAGREW
Commanding, Combat Command B
(LM, SS w/C, BS w/C (3), PH w/C
Croix de Guerre w/palm)

RESERVE COMMAND

Throughout most of the Division's action, Reserve Command was used primarily to control all combat troops temporarily held in Division reserve, both those assigned and those placed in Reserve from front line service for rest and refitting. Although Reserve Command did not lack in offensive action, it was set up to carry out defensive missions which normally did not require the complete command set-up provided for in a combat command headquarters.

The Command was composed of a staff section with a small detachment of men considerably less than a company. Reserve Command's big fight was at ZEITZ, and, as with the other commands, in the BASTOGNE battle.

Former commanders of Reserve Command were Colonel Harry F. Hanson, Colonel Albert E. Harris, and Lt. Col. Embry D. Lagrew, who was in command until 18 April 1945.



LT. COL. RALPH H. MCKEE
Commanding, Reserve Command
(SS w/C, BS w/C)



DIVISION ARTILLERY

The 6th Armored Division Artillery consists of three organic 105mm self-propelled howitzer battalions: the 128th, 212th, and 231st Armored Field Artillery Battalions. The "Divarty" headquarters is supplemented by a Headquarters Battery. Additional artillery battalions have been attached to "Divarty" for special operations.

The Division attributes the greater part of its success in breaking up the many strong counter-attacks in the ARDENNES to the terrific barrages laid down by the artillery battalions that enabled our troops to push the Germans back to Germany.

Armored artillery is designed to move and shoot fast. Giving close support to speeding tank and infantry columns, the battalions can roll off the road into firing positions, with fire direction centers operating, in less than ten minutes. The fluid, intelligent use of Divarty has been an outstanding feature of the Division's success.



COL. LOWELL M. RILEY
Commanding, Division Artillery
(LM, SS, BS w/C, Air Medal)

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

The nerve center of the 6th Armored Division is the Division Headquarters, Forward and Rear Echelons.

Forward Echelon is the tactical headquarters of the Commanding General, the General Staff and those directly concerned with the conduct of the fighting. In the Rear Echelon are the administrative offices which maintain the vast amount of records and reports.

Closely behind the fighting elements move the halftracks, trucks and peeps of the Forward Echelon. Into this headquarters flow orders from higher headquarters, reports on the progress of the fighting, a mass of information concerning the enemy, reports of the division's strength in personnel and materiel and the availability of supplies. This information is correlated to form the basis for the Commanding General's plan of action. Here the decisions are made, and from this headquarters the orders covering all phases of the operation go out by radio, wire, liaison officer and messenger.

To speed communication with the fighting elements and enable the Division Commander to reach the front positions quickly, the Forward Echelon was kept well forward during action. Defending it was the Headquarters Co. Defense Platoon of light tanks and infantry halftracks.

In addition to the Division Commander, his Chief of Staff and his General Staff, (G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4) the Forward Echelon includes the Chemical Warfare Officer, Signal Officer, Military Government Officer, Assistant Division Engineer, and Division Surgeon.

Administrative center of the division is the office of the Adjutant General, Lt. Col. George W. Moore Jr. This section maintains files and prepares division records, publishes general and special orders and conducts division correspondence. Here, also, are offices and staffs of the Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Division Chaplain, Special Service Officer, Red Cross Field Director and Postal Officer, traveling with Division Trains.

Personnel officers and company clerks of all division units maintain the records of men here during action so they may work with a minimum of interruptions from enemy action.



CHIEF OF STAFF

In a command as large as a division, it is impossible for the Commanding General personally to take care of the thousands of details that make a division function as a smoothly-working machine. Here is where the General Staff comes in.

Each staff section is given certain responsibilities. Their activities are explained on the next two pages. The work of one section often depends upon the work of other sections. Obviously there must be someone to coordinate all these activities. This is one of the principal duties of the Chief of Staff.

It is likewise obvious that the Division Commander cannot always remain at the headquarters. When he is away, someone must be present who can give decisions in his name. Due to his close association with the Division Commander, the Chief of Staff is able to make such decisions in conformity with the Commander's policies.

The Chief of Staff keeps the Division Commander informed on the many matters pertaining to the Division's operations. He also disseminates the orders of the Commander to the persons who are to execute such orders.

In short, the Chief of Staff is the Division Commander's principal assistant and adviser.



COL. GLEN C. MCBRIDE
Chief of Staff
Now Brig. Gen.
(LM, BS w/C, PH, Legion D'Honneur,
Croix de Guerre)

G-1

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, is responsible for matters pertaining to the division's personnel and policies affecting it. He obtains trained officer and enlisted replacements, directs their assignment to duties in which they are of most value to the army, and arranges the return of personnel discharged from hospitals.

The evacuation of enemy prisoners of war and liberated Allied ex-prisoners of war is under the G-1's control.

Recommendations for decorations and promotions of officers and appointment of enlisted men to be officers and WO's are processed by the G-1, who makes recommendations to the General for approval or disapproval.

The G-1, through the Special Service Officer, supervises all special service activity within the division. This includes Red Cross clubmobiles and "doughnut dugouts", USO and movie showings and the athletic and recreational programs.

The appointment of general courts martial and knowledge of the morale of the command, which includes knowledge of the number of men AWOL and of the number of violations of orders serious enough to merit disciplinary action, are G-1 matters.



LT. COL. JAMES S. MONCRIEF
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1
(LM, BS w/C)



G-2

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is responsible for the collection, evaluation, interpretation and dissemination of all pertinent information about the enemy and terrain. His is the task of gathering and weighing reports from all sources to form a picture of the enemy's strength, his positions and his capabilities.

Vast amounts of information come from combat units through G-2's (intelligence officers), higher headquarters, adjacent units and attached intelligence teams such as Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Photo Interpretation, Order of Battle, Counter Intelligence Corps, and Military Intelligence and Interpretation. From prisoners, civilians, documents, photographs, radio, air and ground reconnaissance and from the G-2's own records come the bits of information which, pieced together, provide a picture of the enemy.

This information, together with estimates of enemy capabilities, is submitted to the Commanding General to aid him in forming his plans for a given operation. Reports on the enemy, his gun positions, everything which can be found out about him and the terrain, is made known to the combat units of the division to enable them to meet and defeat the enemy with a minimum loss of men.

Counter intelligence, also, is the G-2's responsibility. He recommends and supervises measures taken to limit the enemy's information of our troops.

The G-2 is also responsible for distribution of maps to division units through the headquarters of the 25th Armored Engineer Battalion.



LT. COL. ERNEST W. MITCHELL, JR.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2
(LM, SS, BS w/C, Croix de Guerre w/Palm)

G-3

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, acts as an adviser to the Division Commander on matters pertaining to operations during combat and on those of training when the division is not in combat. The G-3 has three assistants, the Assistant G-3, the Air Support Officer, and the G-3 Information-Education Officer. Operations sergeants, draftsmen, stenographers and clerks comprise the enlisted personnel of the section.

During training periods the G-3 organizes and coordinates the training of the division as prescribed by the Division Commander and higher headquarters. This involves the issuance of training directives, arranging for training areas, training aids, schools, ranges and equipment with the object of building the division personnel into a fighting team, in conjunction with Division G-3's.

In time of combat the G-3 and his assistants plan and coordinate the operations of the division in accordance with the desires of the Division Commander and orders from higher headquarters. Fighter-bomber airplanes are controlled through the Air Officer who works closely with the G-3 and dispatches fighter support to units as needed. From the G-3 situation map, kept current by information from the combat commands and units, the Division Commander and the G-3 keep a constant check on the progress of the operations, making changes as dictated by the situation.



LT. COL. MICHAEL J. GALVIN
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3
(LM, SS, BS w/C)



G-4

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, takes the plan of operations as outlined by the Commanding General and estimates the requirements for supplies and equipment. In conjunction with the other members of the General Staff, he works out such details as the location of supply points, evacuation of prisoners of war, and the road net to be cleared and maintained. The G-4 must then meet with the Division's supply officers, such as the Division Quartermaster and Division Ordnance Officer, to work out the many details to make the plan effective. These are the officers who execute the plans that are made by the G-4, together with Battalion S-4's.

When the Division had reached BREST, it was 205 miles from the nearest Army dump, but it never went without food, gasoline or ammunition because of careful planning and tireless efforts of Division Trains and QM truck companies, coordinated by G-4. Also tied-in with the G-4 Section was Engineer Supply, the Medical Battalion, traffic control, Special Service Supplies, mail, salvage, and arranging for water points.

Higher headquarters must be contacted constantly to coordinate plans and details.

From the numerous reports received each day, a picture of the supply status of the division is formed. From this picture the required adjustments and changes must be decided upon by the G-4 and executed by division supply officers. Reports are forwarded to higher headquarters so that they may, in turn, have a picture of the supply status of the division and make the necessary changes in their requirements and locations.



LT. COL. JAMES C. BOGGS
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4
(LM, BS w/C, Croix de Guerre w/Palm)

BRITTANY CAMPAIGN

18 JULY TO 17 SEPT '44



CHAPTER I

BRITTANY CAMPAIGN

18 July to 17 September 1944

On 18 July 1944, two years and five months after the organization of the 6th Armored Division, leading elements commenced disembarking at UTAH BEACH on the NORMANDY PENINSULA. By 24 July, the last of the division personnel and material was assembled in the vicinity of LE MESNIL, near the west coast of the CHERBOURG PENINSULA, and everything was in readiness for commitment to action. Originally the Division was assigned to the XX U. S. Corps, Third U. S. Army, not yet operational, but when a breakthrough was sighted in the VIII Corps zone on 25 July, the 6th Armored Division was assigned to the VIII Corps of the First U. S. Army, with instructions to pass through the 79th



French towns look like this after the Germans and Americans pass through

Division on Corps order and seize the Corps objective—the high ground northwest of COUTANCES.

At 0930 on 27 July the Corps Commander issued oral orders to the Division Commander to prepare to pass through the 79th Division and seize its objective. After conference with the 79th Division Commander, fragmentary oral orders were issued, confirmed in Field Order Number 1 issued early 28 July. VIII Corps authorized one cavalry troop to pass through the 8th Division zone to the east in advance of the Division. Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized thus became the first unit committed. The Troop moved out at 1630 on 27 July and gained the south bank of the SEVES RIVER before dark and subsequently led Combat Command A to the SIENNE RIVER on 28 July. Troop A had the Division's first contact with the enemy late in the evening of 28 July, near COUTANCES, and captured the first prisoner of war.

THE DIVISION MOVES OUT

The bottleneck at LESSAY where two divisions had one bridge to cross greatly delayed our passage.

Contact in force came for the first time to the 6th Armored Division units on 29 July, when Combat Command A supported by Division Artillery forced a crossing of the SIENNE RIVER at PONT DE LA ROQUE west of COUTANCES, by fording the two foot deep stream and scaling the bluffs beyond at twilight, after clearing moderate resistance on the north bank. The Division advanced 26 miles on its first day in combat.

The Division plan stipulated a development in two columns, with Combat Command A following Combat Command B across the river and thence advancing on the left flank. The following 48 hour period saw the liberation of the French cities of BREHAL and GRANVILLE. The former fell to us on 30 July, with GRANVILLE being captured the following day. Resistance was stubborn in spots, but by small forces in delaying action. The city of GRANVILLE was not defended but BREHAL was surrounded by many strong points. More than 800 green-clad prisoners were captured during the three days.

"OLD BLOOD AND GUTS" ENTERS THE SCENE

On 1 August, the Third U. S. Army became operational under the leadership of dynamic General George S. Patton Jr. This brought the VIII Corps, together with the 6th Armored, under new leadership. With this change of Armies the 6th Armored Division received the general directive to drive up the center of the BRITTANY PENINSULA and capture BREST. The 4th Armored Division, following initially, was to move on to RENNES and LORIENT.

The directive from Corps had not ordered an advance beyond AVRANCHES as of the beginning of the month. Because of this reason, the Reserve Command, rather than Combat Command A or B, had been given the mission of holding the bridges south of that city. The Division policy at this time, and throughout the balance of the way, was to use the Reserve Command headquarters primarily to control all combat troops temporarily held in divisional reserve, and secondarily to carry out defensive missions which did not require the complete command set-up provided in a combat command headquarters. There were times, however, as this history will show, when it was necessary for the Reserve Command to undertake offensive action.

There was only one road through AVRANCHES and PONTAUBAULT, and over this road it would be necessary to move all of the divisions of the VIII Corps. 6th Armored MPs took charge of the road and kept it open for division traffic for 24 hours. It was the worst bottleneck encountered by the division during the war, and conditions were made worse by the Luftwaffe, who bombed and strafed the road especially during the hours of darkness. This concentrated air activity continued heavily against the Division's columns for a 72 hour period commencing 31 July. Early in the Division's route considerable small arms and sniper fire marked the way. In the vicinity of BREE determined enemy resistance was encountered. Light and medium artillery, 88mm direct fire, mortar and bazooka fire harassed the column's progress.

OBJECTIVE—BREST

VIII Corps selected two routes through the center of the BRITTANY PENINSULA toward BREST as guides for the Division to follow, but instructions directed that major centers of resistance be avoided in order to reach BREST with all possible speed. On 2 August, the advance on the coastal city began in earnest according to the plan—namely, in two columns, with CCB on the right. Because of the bottleneck at AVRANCHES, the 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized was unable at first to gain its position properly to cover the front of the Division; later, troops of the Squadron led or protected the flanks of both combat command columns.

When it became apparent during the morning that DINAN could not be captured without a major battle, the Division Commander gave instructions for Combat Command B to by-pass the city to the south. Since the Command was already engaged when these orders were received, it was not until the enemy outposts had been defeated and driven in that the engagement could be broken off. Meanwhile, Combat Command A advanced by the southern route against little opposition. Consequently, Reserve Command changed from the northern to the southern route to follow Combat Command A.

All elements of the Division marched all night, 4—5 August, halting only to refuel. No opposition was encountered, other than a few scattered shots, and there were no obstacles except one blown bridge on each combat command route. By this time, the French FFI, which had kept discreetly under cover during the first few days, was now coming out into the open and proved to be of the greatest assistance to the Division as guides and informative agents. They also harassed and hurried the departure of small German garrisons in the interior towns. During the all night march, FFI men were out in each town to guide columns.

On 5 August, another bypass was made, information reached the Division from the FFI that the city of CARHAIX was heavily prepared for defense by 2,000 German paratroopers of the 2nd Paratroop Division. As a result of the Division's bypassing movement, the city was later evacuated, and the armor was not delayed on its advance on BREST. During the same afternoon after bypassing CARHAIX, the two combat commands advanced on HUELGOAT. After engaging the enemy for two hours at POL-LAOUEN and driving the remnants back to HUELGOAT, the command continued only to be stopped by a well prepared minefield and numerous road blocks, which littered the defile in which it was marching.



An Infantryman meets a cow while looking for German ammunition dump near Lorient, France

Combat Command A moved forward on HUELGOAT from the south. The command after a sharp action captured the village, forcing the remaining force to withdraw into the MORLAIX sector. Combat Command B proceeded to the north, after bypassing CARHAIX. At noon, 5 August, brisk enemy action was encountered east of LE CLOITRE. The resistance was reduced, and by early afternoon the march was resumed. Upon reaching LE CLOITRE, Combat Command B's advance guard met several mortar and artillery barrages and intensive machine gun fire. Darkness set in postponing the attack until the following morning, 6 August, when all resistance in the village was overcome.



9th Armored Infantrymen hitch a ride on an armored car while on patrol duty

THE LINES STRETCH OUT

As the days passed and the distance from supply points increased, the first pinch for gasoline was felt by the Division. The Division had moved so far from Corps and Army that evacuation of wounded and prisoners was extremely difficult. Some wounded were carried forward in ambulances. Division Trains, supported many times with armor in their columns, were constantly on the road supplying the Division from supply points now far back towards the base of the Peninsula.

While Combat Command B engaged the enemy at LESNEVEN on 6 August, Troop D, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized encountered a force superior to them in number, in the village of CHATEAUNEUF. The Reconnaissance Troop disengaged the enemy to bypass this resistance.

Although all of BRITTANY is a hedgerow country, the hedges in the vicinity of BREST are particularly formidable. The earth embankments, often reaching the height of over six feet, are surmounted by trees and shrubs. Observation is extremely limited. Tank bulldozers, of which the Division had only two, proved to be the only equipment that could knock down these hedges.

In the final days of the drive on BREST a fierce and determined enemy was met by the 6th Armored Division. The village of PLOUVIEN was originally captured and liberated by Combat Command B on 7 August and on two successive mornings was retaken from enemy troops who had filtered back into the village in their attempted withdrawal from MORLAIX to the coast, and were harassing Division Trains.

BEFORE BREST

On 7 August Combat Command B struck the BREST defenses from the northwest but met strong direct fire resistance which made it apparent that a stronger force and a coordinated attack would be necessary. Unfortunately Combat Command A did not come up on the left until late in the evening and Reserve Command following Combat Command B could not reach a position in the center in time for a coordinated attack on 7 August or even early on 8 August. A study of the situation during the night 7—8 August indicated that a coordinated attack, employing the entire power of the Division, would be necessary to take BREST and that this attack would have to be made quickly or even more force would be required. A certain amount of reconnaissance, reorganization, and occupation of attack and supporting artillery positions, however, was necessary on 8 August.

If these three columns could have struck simultaneously during the day of 7 August, before the enemy had a chance to recover from the surprise which the approach from the north occasioned, it is very likely that the city could have been entered against light resistance. As was proved later, the defenses in the vicinity of GUIPAVAS were not prepared to meet a strong attack on this day. Unfortunately, the columns could not arrive at the same time, and Combat Command B, which encountered the strongest of the BREST defenses, arrived first. It was late in the evening before the Reserve Command came up in the center and Combat Command A, due to very bad road conditions and spotty resistance, halted some distance north of its assigned position. The enemy was given ample warning to man his defenses to the northeast and to sight his anti-aircraft guns for ground fire.

These defenses continued to be strengthened by reinforcements arriving from the CROZON PENINSULA, so that the task became more difficult each day.

On the morning of 8 August, the Division G-2, Lt. Col. Ernest W. Mitchell Jr., entered the fortress city of BREST in a ¼ ton flying a white flag, and was taken to the German commander where he delivered an ultimatum in the name of the Division Commander. The ultimatum, which gave the fortress the choice of surrendering or of being destroyed, was refused.

A change in the entire plan was forced, however, early that evening. A considerable enemy force, which was identified in a few hours as the 266 German Infantry Division, was moving toward BREST from MORLAIX by way of PLOUVIEN and elements had struck the rear of the Division, including the Division Trains, during the early evening. A serious threat was building up, but by midnight the German Division Commander was captured and the identity of the unit was determined. Therefore, General Grow immediately cancelled the attack on BREST, and directed the combat commands to reverse their directions, leave a covering force facing BREST, and move to the north at daylight to attack and destroy the enemy Division.

By 10 August, the 266th German Infantry Division was considered completely destroyed, and the greater part of the 6th Armored Division troops were in an assembly area west of PLOUVIEN. It was the first day since 27 July that the troops had an opportunity for a day's rest and reservice. Plans continued for an attack against BREST, and artillery positions were picked that would allow for support of attacking column all the way into the city without a displacement of guns.

BEAUCOUP EMPLACEMENTS

The Division G-2 estimated that the enemy defenders, of unknown strength, were holding the outer defenses of BREST along the general line of ST RENAN-GOUESNOU-GUIPAVAS. These defenses consisted of many previously prepared positions including concrete pillboxes, fox holes, AT guns, and minefields all covered by registered artillery fire. Road blocks were well emplaced to cover the approaches to the city. Bridges and certain buildings had been prepared for demolition, with the city itself similarly prepared. Guarding the outer defenses was an estimated force of three thousand reportedly reinforced by at least one regiment of the 2nd Paratroop Division and naval and marine units as well as flak units of unknown strength.

The diversion of the fight with the infantry division that had come in on the rear of the 6th Armored Division allowed the garrison at BREST to become fully alerted and the chance for capture by a sudden stroke, which might have been possible on 7 August, was now lost. At this time it was estimated that there were 20,000 enemy troops in BREST.

Three days earlier, the Division Commander had called upon VIII Corps for reinforcements of both artillery and infantry to insure a successful attack on BREST. Now orders were received at 1900 on 12 August to halt the attack on BREST, leave one combat command to contain the enemy, and move at once the remainder of the Division to the LORIENT area to relieve the 4th Armored Division. VIII

Corps then began the movement of 3 Infantry Divisions to assault the Fortress City.

The Commander of Combat Command B made arrangements to relieve elements of the 4th Armored Division in the area north and east of VANNES beginning on 14 August. The Command closed in an assembly area about 2 miles north of LOCMINE at 132300. The move had been made without incident. There was no enemy contact and no casualties either to vehicles or personnel were suffered during the 111 mile march. Reserve Command marched toward LORIENT at 1200 to relieve other 4th Armored Division troops containing the fortress there. The Command arrived in a temporary bivouac in the vicinity of LE FAOUIET at 2045.



"Walkie-talkie" radio is used on patrol mission while trying to locate German ammunition dump

By 15 August, all elements of the 4th Armored Division were relieved in the LORIENT sector of the Peninsula. The front included the defenses of LORIENT and QUIBERON PENINSULA to the east, a line of some 25 miles, plus patrols as far west as the base of the DAOULAS PENINSULA and east to REDON.

ANOTHER DAY, ANOTHER GARRISON

The City of VANNES and the surrounding area had been entirely cleared of enemy forces and were under complete control of the French FFI, and the German garrison had withdrawn into the defenses of LORIENT. The German garrison of LORIENT was disposed on a semicircle completely surrounding the city on the land side. The line naturally divided itself into three sectors. The QUIBERON defenses constituted a separate enemy stronghold which was connected to the LORIENT defenses by a narrow strip along the coast with one road passing through BELZ which was enemy held. From BELZ the line ran to a point on the BLAVET River, just south of HENNEBONT. This sector was relatively inactive and could be contained by a small force. To the west, a second sector lay between the BLAVET and SCORFF Rivers. This was a relatively important sector and included strong enemy gun positions. The most important sector, which included the main approaches to the city of LORIENT and the bulk of the defenses, extended west from the SCORFF River to a point about three miles south of QUIMPERLE, then south to the coast.



The task force moves in. Sometimes the Infantry needs the tanks, and again the tanks need the Infantry. Together they're a team.

LORIENT'S garrison was too strong to be attacked, so that activity on both sides was limited to patrolling and artillery action. Tankers and tank destroyer personnel operated dismounted the same as infantry, cavalry and engineers. Since entering combat on the 18th of July the Division had been continuously on the move. This was the first time in thirty days that the men had been given a rest and to summarize the lessons learned in the month's action. To increase the battle training of the Division and to destroy all enemy personnel and materiel possible, the Commanding General directed the following tactics in the performance of this containing mission:

1. That every stratagem be used to "mouse-trap" enemy patrols. To this end, Division Artillery established approximately 12 observation posts along the Division front from the coast west of LORIENT to the BLAVET River. Enemy patrols were permitted to advance well forward to open areas before artillery fire was brought down on them. On several occasions forward observers in fox holes at OPs permitted enemy patrols to reach the area of their OPs before directing artillery fire on their own OP and the enemy. Also, enemy troops were permitted to penetrate our lines sometimes as deep as a mile before being cut off and attacked by local reserves.

2. That a system of patrolling deep into the enemy lines be instituted in the sector from the coast west of LORIENT east to the SCORFF River. This system prevailed daily throughout the entire month the division was at LORIENT. Patrols consisted of 25 to 50 men under the control of one or more officers and included an artillery officer forward observer. These patrols were very successful in destroying isolated enemy forces and numerous artillery pieces.

3. That all fronts be extensively booby-trapped. A comprehensive system of booby-trapping the entire front in the LORIENT area was instituted and ingenious additions and enlargements throughout the month so thoroughly booby-trapped the front that it was very difficult for the enemy to pass through our lines at night without setting one off.

For the first time on French soil a formation of all available personnel in the Division was held in the vicinity of PLOUAY, on 25 August, in a Memorial Service commemorating those members of the Division who lost their lives in the BRITTANY campaign. The three-round salute by a platoon of TDs was with service ammunition laid on LORIENT.

Something new in "V" weapons was the one constructed by the 9th Armed Infantry Battalion while the division contained the LORIENT sector—the "Gestel Special". Acquiring an old automobile and modifying the wheels to run on rails, it was loaded with 700 pounds of TNT and sent down the tracks near the 9th outpost to meet a daily German supply train which ran from LORIENT to GESTEL. Results of the experiment are not known but it did explode down the track 27 minutes after it was released.

The story of the BRITTANY campaign would not be complete without a mention of one of the few excursions sent out by the division to capture small water-front garrisons. One of these was CONCARNEAU, approached with a task force under Lt. Col. Brown. His report is presented below just as he submitted it to the Division Commander.

REPORT OF TASK FORCE BROWN—CONCARNEAU

"Task Force Brown left Division area at 1600, 16 August 1944 and proceeded along route outlined by Division CIC to the point about 1600 Yds NE of CONCARNEAU. Task Force halted and the sound truck was used several times with no results. French civilians reported Germans 1200 Yds closer to town and sound truck moved on in. After several attempts by sound truck no results were immediately apparent. At this point Capt. Samiripa (psychological warfare team) went into town with a white flag and was gone about an hour during which time he contacted officer personnel of the garrison. At the end of this period Capt. Samiripa with a German marine captain and an infantry lieutenant came back to Col. Brown."

"Negotiations continued until 2300 during which time the Germans wanted our task force to fire over the Germans' heads while they fired into an empty field. This was not agreed on and they finally consented to surrender their fortress. Lt. Gilpin (Military Intelligence & Interpretation Team) came back to the Division Headquarters to pick up six additional trucks and six ambulances. These vehicles left Division area at 0400. Meanwhile, two higher ranking Nazi officers exerted enough force to prevent capitulation of the garrison at specified time and Col. Brown agreed to wait until 0600 at which time the prisoners were to march out. At 0600 the same two German officers came out again and said

that the majority of the garrison wanted to surrender but that the same two officers still refused to surrender the garrison. The marine captain suggested that if our tanks could be seen by the garrison they would certainly capitulate. Two TDs were brought up on the sky line east of town in plain view of the whole area. The public address system was used again. Capt. Samiripa went back into town and contacted the two friendly German officers who pointed out the command post in the hotel and machine gun guarding same, suggesting that the tanks come into town and shoot up the command post. This Col. Brown refused to do. Agreement was finally reached and TDs fired 40 rounds of HE and AP into the CP and at two plainly visible artillery sites, knocking out the guns. Public address system was used again and ninety prisoners in the immediate vicinity of the truck came out and surrendered. After an hour's wait no additional enemy appeared and the task force moved on back to the Division area. No rounds were fired by the Germans throughout the period."

"The Germans are very much afraid of the French FFI."

At noon, 28 August, Combat Command B moved on orders to clear the enemy from the north bank of the LOIRE River from NANTES to ORLEANS. Operating in two columns, the command moved east. As the southern column neared BEAUGENCY north of the LOIRE River, it came under enemy small arms and antitank fire from the south bank of the river. The fire was returned, and the enemy was driven out of range. Combat Command B reached LORRIS 1 September without further incident.



The kitchen doesn't set up very often, so you open your own cans

Close on the heels of the LORRIS mission, Combat Command B received 2 September the task to protect the southern flank of the Third U. S. Army from ORLEANS to AUXIERRE.

Spread out as the Division was up to now, these orders extended its units and before the Division was again operative as a combat unit in one area it stretched a distance of 460 miles from BREST to AUXIERRE. In the center of this huge expansion, from REDON to ORLEANS, the 83rd Infantry Division was responsible for the south flank. Combat Command A assumed responsibility for the entire LORIENT front, and was given the remaining troops of Reserve Command.

On 5 September Third Army Operations Orders were published, placing the Division in Army Reserve upon its relief from the present mission. On the same day, the Division, less Combat Command B, was relieved from the Third Army and assigned to the Ninth Army. The Commanding General of the Ninth Army, Lieutenant General Simpson, visited the Division and on 7 September inspected the front.

Relief of the Division at LORIENT was made by the 94th Infantry Division, beginning 10 September and being completed 16 September, the date of the passing of command responsibility. The Division was reassigned to the Third U. S. Army. All the Division units except those with Combat Command B were ordered to assemble in the vicinity of LORRIS by 18 September.

Meanwhile, while Combat Command B held the right flank of the Third U. S. Army, its commander was directed to contact the Seventh U. S. Army driving up from the south. At SAULIEU, first physical contact was made between Third and Seventh U. S. Armies. Combat Command B's Troop B, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized, linked up with the southern Army's Second Dragoons, Second French Armored Division, at 1600 11 September.

The Brittany campaign was finished. The 6th Armored Division had driven a distance of 230 miles, cutting a swath twenty miles wide through the center of the BRITTANY PENINSULA; disrupting and destroying communications which precipitated the complete disorganization of the enemy's garrisons, comprised of about 60,000 troops; killed an estimated 4,000 enemy troops and captured 6,270; and 1,000 guns, combat and other vehicles were knocked out or abandoned during the period.

The 6th Armored Division turned east. Greater things lay ahead.



The Medics earn decorations, too. Tec 5 John Spisak receives one from the Commanding General

SEILLE RIVER CAMPAIGN

18 SEPT TO 7 NOV '44



CHAPTER II

SEILLE RIVER CAMPAIGN

17 September 1944 to 7 November 1944

At the close of the BRITANNY campaign the situation of the United States Armies fighting in France was quite fluid. The breakthrough at AVRANCHES had enabled armor to make vast gains in territory and to split the German occupation forces into isolated units. Our forces were pursuing the enemy, linking up, and containing the enemy. The Seventh U. S. Army had launched its invasion from the south and the enemy was retreating into positions before the SIEGFRIED LINE where he hoped to hold. On the 4th of September the 6th Armored Division, under VIII Corps' Third U.S. Army, was charged with the mission, containing LORIENT and protecting the south flank of the Third and Ninth Armies. The Division front extended 460



Tankers are tough, and S/Sgt. Waldo Shumway grins while pointing to shrapnel hole in his crash helmet and goggles

miles from the eastern edge of the BREST area to AUXERRE. As new Army units arrived in France and on the BREST PENINSULA, elements of the Division were relieved and pulled into an assembly area near LORRIS.

The entire Division never assembled at LORRIS. Before all units arrived, Combat Command B was ordered east and the remainder of the Division expected orders to follow. Thus instead of gaining a chance to complete much-needed maintenance, vehicles which had already seen extensive combat action were about to be used to pursue the enemy. Combat Command B, then at TROYES, received orders from Third U. S. Army to move to an assembly area near NEUFCHATEAU, southwest of NANCY.

At this time a very confused situation existed in the vicinity of NANCY where XII Corps had forced crossings of the MOSELLE and SEILLE Rivers. Resistance was very strong, the enemy having apparently determined to hold this area as an outpost line for SIEGFRIED defenses. After the arrival of the 6th Armored, there ensued a series of bitter attacks and counterattacks in which the Division was employed to drive back the enemy and establish a new MLR which was turned over to the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions to hold for the Corps. Several times the Corps bridgehead was seriously threatened but the 6th Armored drove the Germans back repeatedly over a period of a month and a half, protecting and strengthening the bridgehead in preparation for future thrusts east by the Third U. S. Army.

The period was marked by unusually heavy rains which seriously restricted maneuver and employment of armor.

GIRDING FOR ACTION

The remainder of the Division units, while in the LORRIS area, carried out a thorough maintenance program. New tracks were placed on vehicles, motors were overhauled and worn parts were replaced. Then, on 18 September, verbal orders of General George S. Patton directed movement of the Division to the vicinity of COLOMBEY-LES-BELLES. In three days all units had arrived at the new area.

The situation on the XII Corps front was nebulous. Both the Germans and Americans were sparring for position and girding for a test of strength to determine whether the line could be held here or whether the Germans would be forced back into the Westwall. Both sides were using "pick-up" teams of any and all units that happened to be in the area—a Cavalry Group here—part of an armored division there—an engineer company somewhere else. It was into this situation that Combat Command B was committed. On 17 September, the Command moved to the east to an area southeast

of MARTIGNY, where it was attached to the XII Corps with a mission to relieve the 4th Armored Division in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE and also maintain contact with the 6th Cavalry Group south of LA VEZOUS River. Upon relieving the 4th Armored Division 19 September, the command occupied LUNEVILLE against sniper and machine gun fire. All through the day's occupation, heavy enemy artillery fire and mines were encountered; enemy patrols attempted to infiltrate through the infantry lines, and three German Mark IV tanks unsuccessfully ran our flanks only to be destroyed.

A change in mission came late the following afternoon, when Combat Command B was relieved from the LUNEVILLE scene by the 6th Cavalry Group and the 695th Tank Destroyer Group. The Armored Command was to assemble in the FORET DE GREMECEY near JALLAUCOURT. The movement was made in three columns over two routes, commencing at 0700A, 22 September. As the south column approached the SEILLE River bridge at MANHOUE, enemy resistance stiffened, and held up the armored column with considerable small arms, antitank and bazooka fire. This tenacious action provided a means for the resisting force to withdraw and blow the bridges behind.

In the meantime, early in the morning a strong enemy force of anti-tank guns, tanks and infantry was contacted at ARMAUCOURT by the leading elements of the north column which had forded the SEILLE River at HAN. The enemy was engaged, split, and driven back, the column advancing to LANFROICOURT. At early noon, the reserve column, following the northern route, encountered the Germans again at ARMAUCOURT to which they had returned. Outnumbered 3-1 by the German defenders, the village fell to the small tank force, after three hours of intensive street fighting. With ARMAUCOURT cleared the reserve force proceeded south towards LANFROICOURT.

The combat command continued to attack the withdrawing German troops moving north along the LEYR-LETRICOURT road. The successful attack by Combat Command B forced the evacuation of AMANEE HILL and it was occupied by the 35th Infantry Division doughboys. With AMANEE HILL taken, Combat Command B was then ordered to capture LEYR, and block any enemy troop movement to the north or east. Three swift movements succeeded this order: LEYR was captured, a roadblock was established on the highway west of ARRAYE-ET-HAN, and a line of defense was consolidated on the high ground north of ARMAUCOURT. In the two days following three German counterattacks were repulsed.

MUD, MUD, MUD

On the same day, 22 September, the balance of the Division (less two tank battalions left to change tracks) marched northeast from COLOMBEY-LES-BELLES to occupy the center of the Corps line in front of GREMECEY WOODS. With the Command Post and trains in the forest, the front line extended in an arc along the rim of the low plateau a mile north-west to north-east of JALLAUCOURT. A strong position but dominated by the massive COTE DE DELME to the north. The position was occupied by Combat Command A without opposition and artillery support sited in the valley between JALLAUCOURT and the wood. The Division planned to extend to the north and east capturing COTE DE DELME as soon as the tank battalions could be refitted but higher authority intervened. Reserve Command was ordered north as XX Corps reserve. It had no action and was returned on 30

September. The 35th Division was ordered to take over our front and the 6th Armored Division, less Combat Command B and Artillery went into XII Corps reserve west of the SEILLE River on 25 September, in the area near SAULX-URES LES NANCY. The Division Commander ordered that wherever possible, all men in the Division were to be sheltered indoors as protection from the extremely wet weather.

When the 35th Division relieved Combat Command A north of GREMECEY WOODS, they did not relieve them in place, but sited their front line in GREMECEY WOODS. The enemy promptly followed up this withdrawal and beginning 26 September initiated an infiltration in force into the woods which reached



The Wehrmacht lost this round. SP gun and AT gun litter road through French countryside

dangerous proportions and took the form of a full scale artillery supported counterattack on 30 September.

On this date General George S. Patton Jr. with General Manton S. Eddy visited the Division Command Post just east of NANCY at 1725 and issued orders through the Corps Commander for the Division, less Combat Command B, to attack through the 35th Division to restore the Corps MLR. The Corps Main Line of Resistance at this time was driven in about one and one-half miles on a two-mile front by a strong counterattack of the enemy at GREMECEY WOODS, and the enemy threatened to pinch off the whole Corps bridgehead across the SEILLE River, thereby forcing a retirement of four miles on a six-mile front. Prior to this order by General Patton the Corps plan had been to withdraw the 35th through the 6th Armored and give up the whole Corps bridgehead. General Patton emphatically stated that he would not give up another foot of ground to the Germans.

NO REST FOR THE WEARY

Accordingly, Combat Command A attacked to the north of the woods with two combat teams abreast and one following, through the units of the 35th Division, on 1 October. By early morning the Command had reached and captured its objective, the high ground between FRESNES EN SAULNOIS and LEMONCOURT. Reserve Command attacked east to the south of the woods with two combat teams abreast, and at about the same time captured its objective, the ridge north of CHAMBREY. Both Commands were relieved during the afternoon and evening by the 35th which had followed closely, and then returned to the assembly area east of NANCY in Corps Reserve.

Meanwhile, Combat Command B was given the task to support elements of the 80th Infantry Division in an attack on MOIVRON 26 September. Boggy terrain prevented proper maneuver of tanks across country. Enemy infantry in well defended positions, supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire, stopped the 80th Infantry attack and the combat command reverted to its original line north of LEYR.

The next use of the Division in a Corps attack was planned on 4 October. The objective of the attack, beginning 8 October, was to drive the German forces from the western side of the SEILLE River, and to eliminate the enemy from the two hill masses, MT. TOULON and MT. ST. JEAN. The plan: 80th Infantry Division on the left and the 35th Infantry Division on the right, the 6th Armored Division driving north in the center between the SEILLE River and MT. ST. JEAN; This terrain consisted of a broad plain, studded with villages and with several small forests. The front being too narrow for combat commands abreast, Combat Command B, with two infantry and two tank battalions reinforced, made the Division attack the first day, jumping off in a heavy fog and striking from the center toward the villages on both flanks simultaneously. Within two hours, MOIVRON had been taken against moderate enemy small arms and mortar fire interspersed with light artillery fire. Leaving a covering force to clear the wooded areas, the remaining force swung north-west to JEANDELIN-COURT. At 1100, the force had the town surrounded on three sides. By noon the burning town was captured and outposted. Shortly afterwards, 80th Infantry Division troops took over the line established by the Division, and the armored force pushed to the northeast.

The enemy at ARRAYE-ET-HAN was encountered under a very heavy fog. Direct tank, artillery and bazooka fire reduced the village after four hours of impeded observation. Dismounted armored infantry took the village and made contact with the 35th Infantry Division. To the left of ARRAYE-ET-HAN, additional Combat Command B troops entered AJONCOURT against moderate resistance. Enemy resistance mounted in the wooded areas west of AJONCOURT and it was necessary to call for all available infantry to clear and consolidate the forest.



A German trench comes in handy while you're waiting for orders

CHENICOURT and the BOIS DE TRAPPES and LETRICOURT were objectives given Combat Command A, which passed through Combat Command B on the morning of 9 October with one tank and two infantry battalions. Heavy artillery shelling was met by the advancing troops, with the right column receiving the bulk of the fire. By early afternoon, CHENICOURT, source of the artillery and mortar fire, was contained by the right armored column. The village was assaulted and cleared by 1500, 9 October.

Progress was slow, but by noon the forests between LETRICOURT and NOMENY were cleared and a defense line established. Elements of the 80th Infantry Division spreading to the right relieved the 6th Armored Division in the afternoon and evening. The Division, less Artillery and one Combat Command in local reserve, returned to Corps reserve.

Terrain afforded many difficulties in this campaign. The SEILLE River was unfordable except in one place. A number of small streams ran into the SEILLE cutting the area into a series of low ridges and stream bottoms, which were generally soft and difficult for heavy vehicles. Heavy rains followed this operation and continued for the balance of the Fall, so that maneuver was extremely restricted.

At 0945 General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, visited the Division Command Post at SAULXURES LES NANCY and congratulated the Division on its excellent work.

SOME DAYS ARE DULL, THANK GOD

Most of the Division remained in Corps Reserve, prepared for future operations. Combat Command A was on one-hour alert status for movement to meet a possible counterattack. Division Artillery remained in position reinforcing fires along the Corps front. The Division assumed guard over 14 bridges over the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers, which fell to Reserve Command.

For the first time in many weeks, the greater part of the Division was out of action. Refitting, rest, and maintenance was the order of the day, and for many men came passes into the nearby city of NANCY for a few hours of relaxation, a beer, and then a movie under the auspices of Special Service—with mud still clinging to their combat boots and a gun over their shoulder.

The beginning of inclement weather characterized by heavy rains made movement by armor practically an impossibility, but plans were now directed toward the offensive which was to open on 8 November and which was to push the enemy back within the Reich. Although most of the Division was in Corps Reserve and ready to support infantry divisions on the line, it was primarily occupied with the preparation of plans for the forthcoming operations. One feature was the placing of "duck bills" on tanks to help movement through mud.

Although no serious action occurred from 10 October until 8 November, the artillery, reinforced by some tanks and destroyers firing indirect fire, was in action daily.


The stage was now set for the drive. Reconnaissance of routes of advance to development areas had been made by all commands. Weapons and vehicles were in a state of readiness. The troops had been rested and individual equipment had been overhauled. On 7 November orders were issued by Division to all commands, alerting them for movement at 0800 the following day.



Two Mademoiselles entertain two division men at Christmas dance arranged at Merlebach, France. Front is three miles away

SAAR CAMPAIGN

8 NOV TO 24 DEC '44



CHAPTER III

SAAR CAMPAIGN

8 November to 24 December 1944



Infantrymen dash across an open street in a German town as fighting reaches its height

The Fall offensive of the Third U. S. Army, projecting a drive through to the Rhine, opened 8 November. The XII Corps with three Infantry Divisions (26th, 35th and 80th) and two armored divisions, the 4th and 6th, was to advance generally east from NANCY across the SAAR River south of SAARBRUCKEN.

A bridgehead was forced across the SEILLE River 8 November by the 80th Infantry Division, and the 6th Armored Division was rushed through the Infantry Division to exploit the breakthrough. Reserve Command was immediately moved northwest to the vicinity of ATTON with a view to crossing behind the foot troops and enlarging the bridgehead to the north if necessary. This action would have given the 6th

Armored more elbow room to break out to the east. It was particularly important that the ridge which the main highway follows from CHEMINOT toward VIGNY be included in the bridgehead. Actually this plan for Reserve Command was never carried out since the 5th Infantry Division, attacking the following day, secured the necessary ground on the north flank to enable the northern command to break out.

Early in the morning of 9 November, Combat Command A crossed the SEILLE at NOMENY, while Combat Command B crossed at PORT-SUR-SEILLE. Forty-eight hours after crossing the SEILLE, the Division captured five strongly fortified towns, advanced five miles on a ten mile front, and destroyed many large pieces of enemy equipment. The enemy had fortified himself in small towns along the axis of advance and held doggedly but unsuccessfully against armored thrusts.

Each Combat Command planned to advance in two columns to reach the NIED, thus enabling the Division to arrive on a front of about ten miles. The objective was to secure one or more crossings of a river known to be at flood stage.

BITTER, BITTER RAGED THE FIGHT

On Armistice Day of World War I the 6th Armored and its personnel exemplified the traditional courage and resourcefulness of the American Army. By bold, rapid thrusts two bridges across the NIED FRANCAISE River were captured. Two bridgeheads were secured on the eastern banks of the river—one at SANRY SUR NIED and the other at HAN SUR NIED. Both attacking commands met bitter resistance in their zones, and intermittent showers added to their difficulties. Crossings of the NIED River, however, placed the Division in a favorable position for continuing the advance east the following day. The enemy had withdrawn across the bridge followed shortly thereafter by an armored engineer platoon leader, who cut the lead wires from the demolitions, saving the bridge from complete destruction. As he completed his mission he was fatally wounded. The crossing at HAN had been personally led by Combat Command A's commander under a screen of smoke, as enemy resistance had mounted to a furious pace. Officers and men had been killed and wounded in great numbers.

At SANRY, Combat Command B's crossing had been made through combined efforts of tank and infantry teams. Working closely with the armored command was the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division, which later used the bridge at SANRY to cross the NIED, and turned north in its operation against the fortress city of METZ.

Bridgeheads at REMILLY and BAUDRECOURT (12 November) were established, then the villages of HERNY (12 November) VATIMONT (12 November) and ARRIANCOURT (13 November) were taken from the German defenders under the roughest of action.

Progress on the Division front became painfully slow as enemy resistance stiffened and counterattacks and artillery fire became more vicious. Characteristic of the type of action that occurred in the SAAR Campaign is the battle that took place at LANDROFF, 14—15 November. Tank-infantry forces of Combat Command A entered the village at 1400, 14 November, after destroying exceptionally strong enemy resistance, and established security outposts. Four times during the night the enemy launched counterattacks from the north, employing infantry and self propelled guns, each time with a larger force than before.

As the 6th Armored finished its mission in helping the 80th Infantry Division in its drive to capture FAULQUEMONT and turned east once more, a new Corps plan was announced. Advance to the SAAR would be continued with the 26th and 35th Infantry Divisions abreast in the assault, followed by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions. The terrain between the flooded valleys of the ROTTE and the GERMAN NIED Rivers presented a very narrow exit to the east. It therefore appeared necessary for the Division to cross to the south of the ROTTE in order to follow the 35th Division. Combat Command A was to remain on the north side of the river and Combat Command B was to move south then east through MORHANGE.

When Combat Command B arrived in the MORHANGE area it found that the 35th Division's advance northeast had met light resistance. Therefore, Corps ordered the Division to pass through the infantry the following day and exploit to the east. On 19 November the Command attacked northeast and fought bitterly in four towns to overcome tank ditches, minefields, AT guns, heavy artillery and mud. The Germans defended every foot of ground with great determination but the superior will of the Command overcame this stubborn resistance and the enemy was either killed or forced back.

ANOTHER DAY, ANOTHER VILLAGE TO CONQUER

Envelopment tactics were employed to keep the offensive moving as enemy resistance and weather conspired to hold down gains to a few thousand yards. However, within the next eight days, at least one village was taken a day: BERTRING and GROS-TENQUIN (19 November), HEMERING (20 November), HELLIMER and DIFFEMBACH (21 November), LEYVILLER and ST. JEAN ROHRBACH (22 November), and FREMSTROFF (23 November). During the Division's operation in the SAAR, the MAGINOT LINE defenses were penetrated in bitter fighting north of LEYVILLER through 26 November. The forts had been improved and strengthened by the Germans and were being used as an outpost line for the Westwall beyond the SAAR. Cross-country operation by tanks was virtually impossible and only limited advances could be made on the few roads.

The heavy fighting terminated on 5 December. On this date the Division reached the SAAR River north of SARREGUEMINES after a two day battle to secure the plateau of MT. CADERBRONN. The Division faced both east (SAAR River) and north (SIEGFRIED LINE south of SAARBRUCKEN) from SAAREGUEMINES to ST. NIKOLAS, the first territory in Germany to come into our possession. This, by far, was the most difficult campaign of sheer "knockdown", "drag-out" fighting the Division had fought to date.

During the period from 6 to 19 December, preparations were being made to resume the offensive, when the German counter-attack broke in the ARDENNES.



A General Sherman tank and its commander do sentinel duty on top of a hill in Luxembourg

ARDENNES CAMPAIGN

25 DEC '44 TO 26 JAN '45



CHAPTER IV

ARDENNES CAMPAIGN

25 December 1944 to 26 January 1945

The ARDENNES offensive was the biggest German effort since the Allies started their campaign in Western Europe. On 16 December simultaneous attacks were launched at five places along a 70-mile sector of the Western Front. Enemy intelligence concerning our dispositions was, as usual, excellent. The attack was directed at a part of the line in the north held by the 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions which were seeing their first action and a front in the south held by the 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions which had recently seen much action and had been placed in a quiet sector for rest.

Against these fronts the Germans threw their elite SS Panzer Divisions with all available reserves, striking south of LIEGE and north and east of BASTOGNE with a total of 24 divisions. Supplies had been accumulated over a period of time and gasoline had been hoarded. The objective in the north was a drive to LIEGE to cut off the First and Ninth U. S. Armies with a possible objective of reaching ANTWERP; the objective in the south was a drive to the MEUSE and LUXEMBOURG. By 21 December the 116th Panzer Division was launching heavy attacks against the 101 Airborne Division in BASTOGNE, and in LUXEMBOURG, ETTTELBRUCK had been captured. The 4th Armored Division began its drive north from ARLON toward the encircled city. The 6th Armored, now coming into METZ, was preparing to enter the battle after having been relieved in the FORBACH and SARREGUEMINES sector by the 103rd Infantry Division.

Upon the arrival of the final units of the Division in METZ on Christmas Day, the Division reorganized its combat commands, and headed north to relieve elements of the 10th Armored Division in the vicinity of MERSCH, LUXEMBOURG.



This 1/4 ton "Peep" is good salvage material after a direct hit in street at Bastogne

INTO THE BULGE

By 27 December, Combat Commands A and B were in positions south of the SAURE River. The Division assumed responsibility for its sector at 0900. Contact with the 80th Infantry Division on the left was made by Combat Command B, with Combat Command A linking in on the right with the 5th Infantry Division. Patrols were sent to the front at once. It was soon discovered that the town of EPPELDORF was not occupied by the enemy so the line on the right was straightened, thereby eliminating the front held by Combat Command A.

Within forty-eight hours, however, another swift change came into effect, and the 6th Armored was withdrawn from the XII Corps and assigned to the III Corps, with orders to assemble northwest of ARLON for future operations. For two days, 29—30 December, the Division remained in the BELGIUM assembly area, reorganizing combat command forces and maintaining vehicles and weapons.

With efforts to hold BASTOGNE appearing to be successful, and that terrain being more favorable for armored operations, the 6th Armored Division was rushed into the zone southeast of the city to attack. During this period, BASTOGNE was under constant enemy artillery shelling and nightly bombing attacks. The German high command was massing a strong force to the east and southeast of the city in an effort to cut off the BASTOGNE salient.

Elements of Combat Command A moved forward during the hours of darkness, 31 December, and attacked the high ground in the vicinity of WARDIN, east of BASTOGNE, against strong enemy frontal and flank resistance.

New Year's Day sent two Combat Commands, A and B, attacking abreast to the northeast and east, with Combat Command A on the right and Combat Command B on the left. Passing through the 501st Parachute Regiment, the Commands advanced northeast against determined enemy resistance, clearing the towns of NEFFE and BIZORY and occupying the town of MAGERET. Contact was maintained with the 101st Airborne Infantry Division on the left and the 80th Infantry Division on the right. This drive represented the first real offensive thrust into the flank of the ARDENNES salient. BASTOGNE, now safe, was never seriously threatened again. In the late afternoon Corps orders broadened the zone to the right in the direction of BRAS. Such a broad objective forced the commitment of all reserves, so practically all the Division's combat strength was put in the two combat commands.

The men in the line fought in weather that had turned bitterly cold in their first engagement in the BASTOGNE sector. Snow, ice and sub-freezing weather provided the setting for one of the most severe campaigns ever fought by American troops. Tank turrets froze, and would not traverse until chipped free of ice. Iced breach blocks had to be manually operated. M-1s refused to function until bolts were beaten back and forth. Tank escape hatches and doors stuck fast and were opened by blow torches. Ice formed in gas tanks and clogged lines. And in fox holes, feet froze.

On 2 January, the Division advanced for a gain of approximately six square miles, encountering savage resistance. Later, enemy counterattacks of powerful infantry and tank formations were successful in driving our forces out of MICHAMPS and repulsing an attack on ARLONCOURT. WARDIN was entered, however, and the Division held firmly to the high ground west of the line MICHAMPS—ARLONCOURT—WARDIN for the night.

THE SLUGGING MATCH IS ON

Each gain was fought and refought against heavy enemy concentrations of artillery, intensive small arms, huge 120mm mortars and terrifying Nebelwerfer fire. By nightfall, 3 January, the two combat commands were spread over a front of 12,000 yards, which proved too much to hold, and at dark the next day the lines were shortened to 8,000 yards.

It was apparent that the enemy was massing unusually strong concentrations of infantry and armor along the Division's front. It was estimated that elements of six enemy divisions were facing the 6th. Supporting artillery fired many concentrations on these troops during this period, nine battalions massing to fire on enemy troops attempting a counterattack near MAGERET and again in the vicinity of WARDIN. During the attack, Artillery fired TOTs on ARLONCOURT and massed fires of 12 battalions on MICHAMPS, with heavy concentrations being placed on WARDIN.

XIX TAC fighter bombers worked in close support, hitting one ammunition dump, concentrations of enemy vehicles, columns on roads, enemy tanks and defended enemy towns.

After three days of bitter fighting and constant enemy counterattacks in deep snow and near-zero weather, the Division halted temporarily to consolidate its positions and secure much needed rest.

Two combat teams of Combat Command A made small gains in the vicinity of WARDIN and fresh elements entered the line. The line at this time ran generally south from the neighborhood of OUBOURCY along the edge of the woods a distance of 1500 yards, then southeast across the BASTOGNE—LONGVILLY road where it turned southwest through the BOIS ST LAMBERT, around the western edge of WARDIN to the banks of the MARVIE and a junction with the 35th Infantry Division.

Plans at this time were to clear the large wooded pocket southeast of BASTOGNE and destroy the large enemy concentration sheltered there. The 6th was to continue the attack toward LONGVILLY.



44th Armored Infantrymen move forward on foot to attack Germans surrounding Bastogne, Belgium

For five days following, the enemy tank-infantry teams struck at the Division's line seeking a soft spot. Under the greatest of stress and strain the Division's troops withstood the German drives, turning them back each time with heavy personnel and vehicular losses.

On the 9th of January the tide was beginning to turn. Reinforced by part of the 320th Regiment, 35th Infantry Division, the 6th Armored Division pushed forward on an attack. Combat Command A attacked and captured the high ground southeast of MARVIE, strengthening its tie-in with elements of the 35th Infantry Division on its right which was reinforced by a loan of tanks from the Division, while Combat Command B continued

contact with 101 Airborne Division on the Division's left flank. On 10 January the 4th Armored Division was inserted on a narrow front on the left to attack through Combat Command B. The attack failed to make headway north of MAGERET and in midafternoon, that Division was suddenly pulled back into reserve while Combat Command B resumed defense of the line.



A battery of artillery sets up anywhere for action, giving supporting fire until their "T.O." load is exhausted. Then "Trains" resupply them

LOAD UP, BOYS, WE'RE HEADING EAST

Now the Division was ready to punch back, and while the enemy was able to put up stubborn resistance, he was never able to stop the 6th Armored Division. The Division mission was to straighten its front into a strong north-south line extending from the east edge of MICHAMPS, thence west of LONGVILLY and east of BENONCHAMPS and WARDIN to a junction with the 35th Infantry Division one mile west of BRAS. CT 2, 320th Infantry Regiment was to make the attack, supported by CTs 9 and 44. By noon the objective was reached with the new line extending along the high ground to the southeast of MARVIE.

The attack to the east was resumed on 11 January with Combat Command A on the right making the initial drive. With the balance of the 320th Infantry attached on 12 January, the attack was continued day after day on the whole Division front. Cutting the BOURCY-LONGVILLY road, the Division's objective, was accomplished by 17 January, only after driving through severe enemy resistance. Enemy defenses in the Corps zone had weakened and crumbled on the 4th day of the offensive. It was here, after nine long bitter-cold days, that the backbone of the German strength was broken. The towns of WARDIN, BENONCHAMPS, ARLONCOURT, OUBOURCY, LONGVILLY, and MICHAMPS had been taken.

By now the enemy had definitely lost the "Battle of the Bulge", and was concentrating all his efforts in fighting a savage rear guard action, hoping to get as much of his armor as possible back across the OUR River and behind the WESTWALL.

The 134th Infantry of the 35th Infantry Division relieved the 320th Infantry on 18 January and continued attached to the Division for the balance of the campaign.

Corps orders to attack to the east and northeast were received 20 January. In the morning, 21 January, the Division's tank-infantry forces pushed forward in their zones. Combat Command B on the left and Combat Command A to its right. The Division, maintaining contact with the 90th Infantry Division on the southern flank, and the 11th Armored Division on the north and rear, advanced approximately seven miles, capturing six towns and clearing the greatly weakened and discouraged enemy from its zone. Constant delays due to terrain difficulties, heavy snows and enemy delaying forces hindered the speed of the attack. By dark, the towns of TROINE, BARAQUE DE TROINE, GRENDAL, LULLANGE, HOFFELT and HACHIVILLE were captured by the advancing armored force.

During the ARDENNES salient, the air corps was of tremendous help to the 6th Armored and other American forces. In the BELGIAN sector, on the single day of 22 January, the air force destroyed or damaged more than 4,192 pieces of heavy equipment, including locomotives, rail cars, tanks, and motor and horse-drawn vehicles.

In spite of mines and demolitions blocking the valley leading into TROIS VIERGES, the Division's infantry and tanks worked into the city. Here the attacking force was met by considerable fire of all types—small arms, mortar, artillery and Nebelwerfer. Street fighting marked every thoroughfare. TROIS VIERGES was cleared after dusk, 23 January, secured and outposted.

Under the cover of darkness, Combat Command A with great success attacked and captured the towns of HOLLER and BREIDFELD, 24 January. Its attack during the night proved a surprise to the enemy, and only light rear-guard action was encountered by the foot-troops.

A last ditch stand by the German defenders warded off the armored attack on the village of WEISWAMPACH on 25 January, but by early morning of 26 January the heavy artillery and antitank fire had been overcome, and the high ground east of the village was taken. Once this occurred, the German salient was wiped out completely. This plot of high ground astride SKYLINE DRIVE secured the Corps objective, and again placed the 6th Armored Division in a position where activity in Germany could be observed.

An exchange of divisional zones with the 90th Infantry Division placed the 6th Armored to the right of the zone in which it had previously attacked. By 27 January the Division had also relieved the 26th Infantry Division in its zone.

ON THE BORDER AGAIN

The Germans had been pushed back to the REICH. From the first of the year, it had been a continuous fight, and counterattacks against the Division had varied in strength from one company to a reinforced regiment, and all forces were accompanied by tanks. For its success in the ARDENNES drive, and for the great numbers of enemy casualties, the Division gives a great part of the credit to the large amount of artillery fire it was able to place on the enemy.

The 6th Armored Division had a major part in holding and clearing the south shoulder of the ARDENNES Bulge.



When the Luftwaffe comes over, the 777 AAA Bn is ready to give it a hot reception

ASBURG-PRUM RIVER CAMPAIGN

27 JAN TO 8 MAR '45



YOU ARE NOW ENTERING
GERMANY
THROUGH THE FORESTS OF THE
U S
6 ARMORED DIVISION



CHAPTER V

DASBURG-PRUM RIVER CAMPAIGN

27 January to 8 March 1945



An infantryman waits in his frozen foxhole for whatever may come along

By 27 January the entire Third U. S. Army front had been stabilized along "SKYLINE DRIVE" facing the SIEGFRIED LINE fortifications. With the 6th Armored Division covering a 12 mile front from LIELER along the Drive to UBER EISENBACH, the troops were kept extremely busy, aggressively patrolling in the belt of land lying between the SKYLINE DRIVE and the OUR River.

The Division mission was to patrol to and across the OUR River, prevent enemy infiltration across the OUR, prepare plans to cross the river, and be prepared to attack northeast or east to the KYLL River.

III Corps believed that the bulk of enemy strategic reserves east of the OUR had been withdrawn and also that local forces had been

drawn to the north by the VIII Corps attack. It appeared that the SIEGFRIED LINE was inadequately manned on the Corps front.

Oral instructions were received from the III Corps Commander to make a reconnaissance in force across the OUR River during the night 6—7 February, and if a bridgehead could be maintained, establish one for future operations to the east.

Four bridgesites for the OUR crossing had been chosen by infantry engineer reconnaissance parties.

WATER, WATER EVERYWHERE

With the thaw having swollen the OUR River to several times its normal width, and the flow of the river at 15 miles per hour, a crossing was very difficult. Repeated attempts to launch boats failed. By 0845A 7 February, the first boatload of the northern force landed on the east shore, and by 1000A a company had crossed. Despite the fact that many boats were swept downstream by the swift current, the whole operation had remained a secret from the enemy, because of the dense fog present over the body of water.

In an exceptionally well conducted operation, the difficult stream was crossed at two places, above and below the KALBORN—DAHNNEN road by two reinforced companies, followed by other companies prepared to cross and exploit any ground gained. During the day 18 assault teams consisting of engineers equipped with flame throwers to reduce pillboxes were formed.

Footbridges were constructed in the north and the battalion that had crossed moved to the south and east to secure the east bank of the Bailey bridge site, which was to go in at the approach leading east from KALBORN. Fanning out, the foot-troops enlarged the bridgehead to a depth of one mile on a two mile front. On the 8th of February the Division continued to expand and consolidate its bridgehead on the east side of the OUR against increasing resistance. Rising waters hampered bridging operations, as the river had increased 15 feet in width during the last 24 hours, but three foot bridges, two pontoon, and one suspension bridge had been established. The suspension bridge was short-lived, however, for enemy mortar fire knocked it out shortly after it had been placed in operation. Work was under way on the Bailey bridge.

Rotation of the tiring troops on the east shore of the OUR River was made 10 February, when Combat Command B sent a force into the bridgehead relieving Reserve Command's men. On 11 February the Division passed to control of VIII Corps and completed relieving the 17th Airborne Division in its zone, taking over the small bridgehead the Airborne Division had effected 1200 yards north of DASBURG.

AHEAD—THE GREAT LINE

Preceded by a twenty minute artillery preparation, the 6th Armored Division assaulted the SIEGFRIED LINE on 20 February. Following the first twenty minute artillery fire which covered the entire front, the fire was lifted for ten minutes to allow the enemy to come out of their pillboxes and man their outside defenses to meet a probable attack. Then for one minute all of the artillery concentrated on the small area of the first objective with a terrific TOT which was the signal for the assault parties to attack. The first pillbox fell by 0830, and by noon 17 pillboxes had fallen to Combat Command B's attacking force.

Assaulting troops found their greatest obstacles to be mines, wire and booby traps and the physical difficulty of breaking into pillboxes. Enemy fire was comparatively light.

PILLBOX NUMBER NINE

The most tenacious of all the pillboxes of the SIEGFRIED LINE in the Division front was pillbox number nine, so marked on company maps. The fortress held out all day and night against all the tricks in the bag, including direct fire by a tank destroyer from a few yards, without a sign of surrender. Finally, engineers placed 450 pounds of TNT against the steel door at the rear of the pillbox. After a terrific explosion, one German officer and 11 enlisted men were dragged out in a stunned condition.

The command continued its advance, fanning to the left and right cleaning out the rest of the fortifications from DAHNEN to the northern boundary of the Division's zone. The defense put up by the Germans was of low caliber. Enemy fire, both artillery and mortar, as well as small arms, was comparatively light.

Initial gains against the SIEGFRIED LINE were approximately two miles in depth and two miles in width. A total of 40 pillboxes was taken with a loss of only two of our troops killed. In the early morning of 21 February, Combat Command B's tank-riding infantry raced to the south and east through meager defenses to capture four German towns: DAHNEN, DALEIDEN, DASBURG and REIPEINGEN. By nightfall the northern flank had been secured with a force waiting to link up with the 11th Armored Division, which was attacking to the Division's north.

Combat Command A came into play the following day, when combat engineers mounted on armor quickly dashed south on the road leading from DASBURG to capture PREISCHEID and AFFLER, bypassing the pillboxes facing the OUR River. This force rode into UBER EISENBACH late that afternoon, tying in with the southern elements of the command. A line of engineers and tanks was now strung to the rear of the SIEGFRIED fortifications cutting off any possible enemy withdrawal.

In the northern zone the attack continued. An effort was made to delay the armored force. The enemy sent some tanks against the attack in the hills south of the DASBURG—DALEIDEN road on 23 February. Dismounting, the foot troops made short work of the counterattack by destroying two German Mark IV tanks and driving the others off. Operations by dark showed the Division had successfully secured a line from IRRHAUSEN on the north boundary southwest to PREISCHEID and south to the junction of the OUR and IRSEN Rivers. At dawn the next morning a special mounted task force was released by Combat Command B to drive southeast across the 6th Cavalry front which was on the Division's southern flank, and cut off the fleeing enemy's escape route. Added to their mission, this mounted force was to contact the northern flank of the XII Corps and capture NEUERBERG. By 1330A 24 February, the task force radioed Combat Command B telling the command the mission was accomplished and that it was withdrawing to the Division zone.



A member of Military Government checks two German civilians in a town just occupied

THE PAYOFF



Pvt. Harold Bowne uses German scope to scan approaching plane for anti-aircraft battery

After 72 hours of continuous attack and mopping-up exercises, the 6th Armored Division had penetrated into and beyond the SIEGFRIED LINE for 10,000 meters, on a 12,000 meter front, capturing 32 towns and 253 pill-boxes, took 1033 prisoners, and inflicted heavy personnel and materiel losses upon the enemy. The entire operation followed almost exactly the previously made plans.

After relieving the 90th Infantry Division west of the PRUM River, the Division resumed the attack to the east on 25th February. Under darkness, elements of Combat Command A forded the PRUM River on 27 February in the vicinity of HEILHAUSEN to seize the high ground to the southeast against light enemy

resistance. In the early morning of the same day, a force from Combat Command B breached the river and held positions to the north.

The bridgeheads were enlarged on the 28th February, with the capturing of DACKSCHEID, EILSCHEID, MERLSCHIED, LIERFELD, and LUNEBACH.

A coordinated attack was launched 2 March to secure a bridgehead across the NIMS River and continue east. Combat Command B on the left with three forces, and Combat Command A on the Division right flank advanced steadily meeting little opposition. By 3 March, three bridges spanning the NIMS were taken intact and by late afternoon positions on the high ground east of the river were secured and outposted.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division began relieving the forward troops of the 6th Armored by night-fall of the 3rd of March, and within 24 hours the entire division was out of contact with the enemy—the first time since its commitment on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA, 221 consecutive fighting days. From COUTANCES to AVRANCHES (spearheading the breakthrough) and the 230-mile race alone to BREST; at LORIENT; from the NANCY bridgehead to the SIEGFRIED defenses of SAARBRUCKEN; and from BASTOGNE through the SIEGFRIED LINE to SCHONECKEN on the NIMS River, the 6th Armored had continuously faced the enemy.

BACK TO FRANCE

For four days the Division remained in SHAEF reserve, continuing its vehicular maintenance and rehabilitation program. Assignment to the Seventh U. S. Army came 8 March, and a secret move was ordered to the vicinity of VIC-SUR-SEILLE, FRANCE. At the time of the move, shoulder patches and vehicular markings were removed, and a new mission was planned for the 6th Armored Division in the SAAR River area.

GERMANY CAMPAIGN

10 MAR TO 16 APR '45



CHAPTER VI GERMANY CAMPAIGN

9 March to 8 May 1945



Two reconnaissance men of the 603d Tank Destroyer Bn take time out for a cup of coffee

Immediately after the 6th Armored Division had received orders assigning it to Seventh U. S. Army on 8 March, advance parties consisting of commanding officers and members of the general and special staffs departed for the Army Headquarters.

In effect, the transferring of the division at this time constituted a loan of the Division by the Third to the Seventh Army. The Division was assigned to XV Corps which also included the 3rd, 44th, 45th, 71st and 100th Inf. Div's.

A breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED defenses was expected on the Corps front, and the 6th Armored Division was to exploit the penetration. XV Corps was holding a sector of the front generally in the old MAGINOT LINE. This

sector extended from southeast of BITCHE on the east to a point north of SAARGUEMINES where it joined XXI Corps on the west. The front was relatively stable and was held by the 100th and 44th Divisions. The 3rd and 45th Divisions were being rested in the rear to be brought forward to make the Corps assault through the 44th Division in position generally south of ZWEIBRUCKEN. The 100th Division was to capture BITCHE and then to be relieved by a new division, the 71st. The attack was scheduled for 15 March. It was estimated that the 3rd and 45th Divisions would be through the SIEGFRIED LINE in three to five days. When the breakthrough occurred the 6th Armored Division was to pass through on the ZWEIBRUCKEN front and exploit to the Corps objective which was the west bank of the RHINE in the vicinity of WORMS. These plans gave the 6th Armored about a week to rest and refit some 50 miles in rear of the line, and then to move forward to be ready to jump off on Corps order.

RHINELAND

9 MARCH—24 MARCH 1945

On the 14th of March Division Artillery displaced to forward positions in the vicinity of ACHEN to support the 3rd Infantry Division attack of the German fortifications. While in the support of the 3rd and 45th Infantry Division assault, units of Division Artillery fired 22,724 rounds in six days.

On 20 March, about 1000A, the German line gave way and the armored exploitation began. By the end of the day, the Division had five thrusts driving into Germany.

Combat Command B on the right passed through the 3rd Infantry Division front lines then split into two columns at ZWEIBRUCKEN advancing to the northeast. Following closely behind was Reserve Command. The 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized, reinforced, composed the center thrust, breaking through the 45th Infantry Division line at EINOD on LES BLIES River. Attacking on the left at ENSHEIM were Combat Command A's two columns, which had been attached to the XXI Corps, 19 March, because of the evident breakthrough by the 63rd Infantry Division on that Corps front. The command reverted to Division control immediately after passing through the XXI Corps line.

Jumping off at noon, 20 March, Combat Command A sped rapidly in two columns through light disorganized resistance. The brunt of the resistance, felt by the advance parties, was soon destroyed or routed, permitting the main body of the columns to pass without delay. Throughout the day the towns of KLEINOTT, WEILER, JAGERSBURG, KUBELBERG, and SCHONEBURG had fallen to the speeding columns.

With less speed than the left column, Combat Command B drove through heavy enemy resistance north of WEISSERHUBEL, destroying antitank guns, medium artillery pieces, and capturing many prisoners. After continuing the march into MORSBACH and KASHOFFEN, one of the forces of the command had a heavy fight at ROZENKOPP. A more determined enemy in the second line of SIEGFRIED defenses was encountered by Combat Command B's columns.

Enemy rear guard action caused only short delays until the resistance could be run down or bypassed. An enemy ambush was almost successful in cutting off a portion of the Combat Command B left column, but after bitter fighting the small force fought off its attackers and hurriedly raced to rejoin the main body of the column at KASHOFFEN. After almost 36 hours of hard hitting through German held towns and villages, including RANSTEIN, RODENBACH, OTTERBACH, NEUKIRCHEN, WINTERBACH, LANDSTUHL, MEHLINGEN and RAMSEN, the columns reached EBERTSHEIM.

Bypassing HOMBURG at 2030A, 20 March, because of a large enemy force reported there, Combat Command A's column continued north. First contact with Third U. S. Army troops advancing from the MOSELLE River was made with the 26th Infantry Division on 20 March at LANDSTUHL. After swinging east, the parallel columns of Combat Command A rapidly moved into and captured DRIESEN and OSTHOFEN. By 1200 21 March, Combat Command A had a force on the west bank of the RHINE River in RHINE-DURKHEIM—the only town on the RHINE captured by XV Corps troops. At 0900 that morning patrols had gone into WORMS and contacted Third U. S. Army forces in that city.

ON THE RUN

The entire area from KAISERLAUTERN to the RHINE had been crossed by elements of the Third U. S. Army which had moved very rapidly on the main roads, by-passing many disorganized German formations and failing to cover many roads and towns. Their movement was generally from northwest to southeast almost at right angles to the movement of the XV Corps from southwest to northeast. As a result, considerable confusion was caused by crossing columns, but no serious delay was encountered.

6th Armored Division troops patrolled the west bank of the RHINE River in the vicinity of RHINE-DURKHEIM until 21 March when 3rd and 45th Infantry Division elements relieved them. On this date the 6th Armored was assigned to the XII Corps, Third U. S. Army. After word was received of the three Allied bridgeheads across the RHINE River, it was sensed by the officers and men of the Division that the final phase of the European War was at hand. The 6th's armored columns would fully contribute to that last chapter.

FRANKFURT—DRESDEN

25 MARCH—9 MAY 1945

The 6th Armored Division assembled near DEXHEIM and then crossed the RHINE River at OPPENHEIM, passing through the 5th and 90th Divisions' bridgehead. The entire Division cleared the single pontoon bridge there in fourteen hours, eight hours less than the 4th Armored, whom it was following, and continued its attack northeast to capture MORFELDEN.

After crossing the RHINE, the 6th Armored Division passed through the 5th Infantry Division foothold in the vicinity of GROSS GERAU on 25th March. The Division continued marching in five columns and drove to the MAIN River, seeking to secure a crossing. Advancing in a northeasterly direction, the armored columns repeatedly encountered



An anti-aircraft crew guards pontoon bridge across Rhine River at Oppenheim where Division crossed



Commanding General presents Bronze Star to Sgt. Merlin Weise at the end of a battle in Luxembourg

light enemy resistance, consisting of small arms, bazooka and some light artillery fire. By nightfall, Combat Command A had reached the MAIN River between RUSSELSHEIM and RAUNHEIM. Combat Command B bypassed heavy resistance at MORFELDEN and raced northeast, going into assembly south of WALLDORF, making contact with Combat Command A on the left, and elements of the 90th Infantry Division on the right near LANGEN.

THE CITY THAT WAS FRANKFURT

At daybreak the next morning, 26 March, both commands moved towards the FRANKFURT area. Combat Command A marched through the FRANKFURT CITY FOREST, a huge plot of wooded

ground that was studded with small enemy infantry and bazooka teams that harassed the armored command until it had cleared the forest by noon. By early afternoon forward tank elements were racing into NIEDERRAD, a suburb across the river south of FRANKFURT.

Before reaching the MAIN River, Combat Command B captured LANGER and SPRENDLINGEN, fought its way against heavy antitank fire along the SPRENGLINGEN-NEW-ISENBERG road, and attacked OFFENBACH from two directions. Resistance was surprisingly shallow, and the town fell by 1500, 26 March.

Immediately upon reaching NIEDERRAD, Combat Command A sent patrols to the MAIN to find a crossing. A partially destroyed bridge was found, and a company of armored infantry, dismounted, was alerted to secure the north shore. Tanks were rushed up on the south shore to cover, by fire, the infantry crossing. Small waves of infantry assaulted the opposite shore against heavy machine gun and antitank fire.

Upon reaching the FRANKFURT river bank at 1630, 26 March, the small group commenced to clear out and secure their little bridgehead, the first one to be established in FRANKFURT. Additional troops were summoned to reinforce the troops in the bridgehead. Before this force could be assembled to cross the river, the enemy unleashed a barrage of artillery (all calibers), dual purpose antiaircraft guns, heavy mortars and volleys of small arms, the like of which the Division had never witnessed since it had been in combat. The German fury was directed on the partially destroyed bridge, in an effort to prevent reinforcement of the bridgehead. In spite of the heavy fire, armored foot-troops continued to pour on the opposite bank into FRANKFURT. The shelling made it impossible to repair the bridge, preventing a vehicular crossing to support the foot-troops.

HOT LEAD, HOT STEEL EVERYWHERE

All through the night and into the next day, 27 March, the shelling continued. At 0900 the construction of a Bailey bridge was started, but intense artillery fire prevented its continuance. It was estimated that approximately 4,000 rounds of artillery fire fell on the construction site during the morning. At this time elements of the 5th Infantry Division moved across the MAIN into the 6th Armored Division bridgehead and took control of the infantry positions developed by Combat Command A troops.

On 28 March, orders were received to cross the MAIN River at the 90th Infantry Division bridge at DRONIGSHEIM. By late afternoon of the same day the Division's columns cleared the bridge and advanced north and northwest.

PUSH, PUSH, PUSH

Orders to exploit its breakthrough to the northeast towards KASSEL were received by the Division 30 March. Gains of 50 miles were made by the armored forces through sporadic resistance lying principally in the German towns. ALSFELD fell after a stiff engagement. HERELBACH, HOMBERG,

CARTE, WEITERSSHAIN, ZENNERH, and many more towns displayed white flags as the 6th Armored Division rolled through. The days' action was marked by an exceptionally large number of German prisoners and a large number of uncovered Allied prisoners.

Within 24 hours a second change of orders relieved the Division from the KASSEL mission, and sent it to the east to attack in the direction of WEIMAR. This had been anticipated on 30 March when the Corps Commander met the Division Commander and directed that KASSEL be captured unless resistance proved too great, in which case authority was given to cut east across the FULDA River south of KASSEL. This was done, and the mission of capturing KASSEL was given to the 80th Infantry Division.

Nazi government offices were believed moved into the WEIMAR area, and a quick thrust, it was believed, would result in their capture. Now under XX Corps control, the Division resumed pursuit of the enemy to the east with Combat Command A on the left and Combat Command B on the southern flank (right).

Greatest of the delays to the Division were blown bridges, detonated by the fleeing enemy. Only after long reconnaissance, costly bridgeheads were secured and tiring bridge-building tasks were necessary to enable the commands to cross the FULDA, WEHRE and WERRA Rivers. These delays permitted the Division's columns to advance only 45 miles on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of April.

Once the WERRA River was spanned, 4 April, the Division's columns fanned out to encircle the city of MUHLHAUSEN which lay ahead. Elements of Combat Command B advanced on the city from the southwest, south, and southeast, while troops from Combat Command A swept far to the north to encircle and attack MUHLHAUSEN from the north, west, and northeast. In conjunction with the assault on MUHLHAUSEN, a tank force from Combat Command B was to spearhead to the east and capture SCHLOTHEIM, cutting off any enemy element attempting to assist the trapped troops in MUHLHAUSEN.

Preceded by patrols, the main force entered MUHLHAUSEN under darkness 4 April. Coordinated, the armored vise closed on the city. Offering practically no resistance, the German garrison surrendered and the city was cleared by 0905B, 5 April. Reserve Command was given the task of maintaining law and order and guarding all installations and supply stores in the city.

Resuming the march to the east, Combat Command A entered the city of LANGENSALZA in the afternoon of 5 April. After a series of roadblocks and light enemy resistance within the city, the tank-infantry teams cleared the defenders by noon the following day. While this action was occurring, Combat Command B was deployed in the MUHLHAUSEN sector, limiting its activity to light patrols to the north and east. On the 5th both commands established a line of 40 miles length to the north and east of their respective captured cities and began a reorganization and refitting program, prevented from further advance by Corps order pending the arrival of the First U. S. Army on the north flank.

On 7 April Reserve Command was sent to the west to relieve pressure on the 76th Infantry Division and the 3rd Cavalry Group which were still on the WERRA River held up by a pocket of heavily armed enemy troops. After two days of heavy fighting the German pocket was finally dissolved and contact was made with the troops of the 76th Infantry Division and elements of the 3rd Cavalry Group.

Enemy who had been opposing the 76th Infantry Division along the WERRA River began withdrawal during the night 6-7 April in the direction of MUHLHAUSEN. Before daylight, this enemy force of considerable strength attacked the 3rd Battalion, 261st Infantry at STRUTH and threatened to defeat it. Information that 86th CC Trains in STRUTH were overrun reached Division Headquarters at 0730. Fortunately, a Battalion of the 304th Infantry, mounted in trucks, was on the road just southeast of MUHLHAUSEN, and reinforced



128th Ordnance men examine German plane captured by Division at Langensalza, Germany



Liberated Allied prisoners welcome Tankers as they roar by after the enemy

by a company combat team of the 69th Tank Battalion, the Battalion was rushed west and restored the situation at STRUTH. Contact was also made with Reserve Command further northwest. The enemy force of about 1,500 troops reinforced by tanks and self-propelled guns was completely destroyed. The town of STRUTH, practically untouched up until this counterattack, was almost totally destroyed in the fight.

ENTERS THE LUFTWAFFE

Enemy aircraft became increasingly active during this period, bombing and strafing bivouac areas, ineffectively for the most part. Friendly supporting fighter-bombers gave cover and performed missions during which 6 enemy aircraft were shot down. The 777th AAA Battalion accounted for 14 enemy aircraft during one day, 4 April, and hardly a day passed that the quadruple mounted AA guns did not duel with the Luftwaffe.

Anxious to return to the attack, after six days of comparative inactivity, the tank-infantry forces rolled forward on 11 April, moving rapidly through the 76th Infantry Division and by nightfall the Division had travelled 60 miles. Resistance was moderate, consisting mostly of small isolated pockets of enemy infantry bazooka teams defending the towns and villages dotting the roadside. During the day's operations many German installations were captured, a large Allied Prisoner of War camp near BAD SULZA had been liberated as well as 21,000 inmates of the infamous German concentration camp, BUCHENWALD, north of WEIMAR. Bridges across

the SAALE River near CAMBURG and KLEINHEIRGER were captured at sundown.

The multiple columns of the Division rolled on and were not stopped until they were met by extreme fire from the antiaircraft defenses of the ZEITZ-LEIPZIG line in the vicinity of DROYSSIG, 12 April. Combat Command B was instructed to bypass the city of ZEITZ, close by, and circle north, while Combat Command A was to swing south on a bypass. Reserve Command, reinforced, was committed on a frontal attack to secure a bridge across the WEISSE-ELSTER River in the city of ZEITZ.

By midnight forward elements of Reserve Command were in the outer zone of the city's defenses. Bypassed enemy groups and antiaircraft installations slowed the advance. By early morning, 13 April, as Reserve Command elements were attempting to seize the northern bridge, it was blown before them. Simultaneously, the other two bridges in the city were destroyed. A bridgehead was established in ZEITZ, but enemy direct fire weapons prevented the construction of a bridge, restricting vehicular crossing. The small party in the city was soon reinforced and after 24 hours of continuous street fighting ZEITZ was cleared, and the antiaircraft installations were silenced. In the meantime Combat Command B to the north of the city and Combat Command A to the south had forced crossings and in brilliantly executed attacks with strong air cooperation knocked out over 100 large caliber dual-purpose AA guns.

The Division's attack to the east continued against stubborn but isolated enemy action. After clearing the zone of the dual purpose 88mm weapons and blown bridges around ZEITZ the three commands came abreast upon the Corps limiting line 15 April, at the ZACHOPAU River with Reserve Command at the southern sector with Combat Command A's elements in MITTWEIDA. The 9th Armored Division having followed Combat Command B through PEGAU came upon the Division's left rear, while the 76th Infantry Division which had followed from LANGENSALZA had the sector to the south. Except for a few outposts on the eastern shore of the ZACHOPAU River, the 6th Armored Division remained deployed on the west banks. On this date the Division passed from XX Corps control to that of the VIII Corps. Aggressive patrolling was maintained by each command to the east in an effort to survey enemy activity, and to watch for a possible contact with the rapidly advancing

Russian Armies driving west. Further advance was prohibited by Corps order. So ended the fight for most of the men in the 6th Armored Division.

From the 18th of April until the termination of the war with Germany on midnight, 8 May, the Division was engaged in Military Government activities along the front recently captured and to a depth of 60 miles.

The campaign from the RHINE to the ZACHOPAU River, a distance of 275 miles, was a perfect example of exploitation. Enemy in sufficient strength to completely block the Division was met regularly and frequently, but in no case was the enemy allowed to have time to deploy, to employ his guns, to maneuver, to place his demolitions or in any way to organize a sizeable delaying force. The only delays of any consequence were caused by permanently emplaced dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns in the industrial areas and the long prepared demolitions at major stream crossings.

Many memories will be carried off by the officers and men of the 6th Armored Division in its operations in Germany, but among the most vivid will be the four lanes of armored traffic racing up the Autobahn on 29 March into the heart of Germany, with streams of broken and tired German soldiers trudging to PW enclosures in the opposite direction, between the concrete strips of highway. Later, in the early days of April, the Division's six columns deploying as they flowed across the rolling plains of THURINGIA and SAXONY, engulfing the cities and pockets of resistance formed a picture that would gladden the heart of any mounted soldier. Weather was almost perfect and the terrain admitted mounted maneuver at will. This major operation of spanning the breadth of Germany in 22 days was one that was fitting to the termination of a war in which the 6th Armored Division had fought under most difficult and trying conditions.



Brig. Gen. George Read, Jr., and Col. Glen McBride meet with Russian officers May 8, 1945 as Sgt. Charles Rinka interprets

THE PAY-OFF

MAY 8, 1945

Tonight the War in Europe nears the end, as once again a conqueror
feels the weight

Of conquered fall upon him. Soon the shouts of wild hysteria will fill
the air.

Look! Even now, the headlines would outdo each other in proclaiming
the pursuit

Of shattered German legions. Can it be that we forget so soon the
shattering?

The days when gains, if any, were in yards? The dog-days in the mud
and snow where men

Who have not lived to see the pay-off, fought the best the Nazis had,
and beat it back?

Do Normandy, Cassino, and Bastogne lack glamour? Nothing happened
perhaps?

No. We know better. But we soon forget.

Tonight I cannot bring myself to joy as this war closes. I have seen
too much.

Cessation of an evil act brings peace, relief, but never joy. One might
as well turn cartwheels at an execution.

I have seen too much. Just let the curtain drop.

Tonight the tragedy has run its course. The final act. Just let the curtain
drop.

Let audience and players now rejoin the babbling outer world. For me
tonight the spell cannot be broken.

Quietly I slip outside and walk the streets alone.

—CAPTAIN FREDERICK KEFFER
9th Armored Infantry Bn.

Facts

&

Figures

SECTION I. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Total Casualties (Battle & Non-Battle)

FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44—8 MAY 45

Unit	Killed		Wounded		MIA		Total BC		Total NBC		Aggregate	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	em	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
Fwd Ech Div Hq	1	1	6				7	4	4	5	11	
Rear Ech Div Hq			1	1	1		1	7	9	7	10	
Div Hq Co	3		6		6		9	2	12	2	21	
Hq, Hq Co CCA	1	4	8		9		9	7	20	11	29	
Hq, Hq, Co CCB	5	4	4		9		9	7	21	12	30	
Hq Res Comd	1							1	4	1	4	
Hq, Hq Btry, Div Arty	1	2	1	1	1		3	8	21	11	22	
Hq, Hq Co Div Trains			1	1	1		2	3	15	3	17	
MP Platoon	2	10	10		12		12	1	37	1	49	
Div Band	1	1	1		2		2	1	7	1	9	
146th Armd Sig Co	2	1	10		1		13	3	30	4	43	
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	95	18	301		4		400	28	355	54	755	
128th Armd FA Bn	2	14	8	43	10		57	11	130	21	187	
212th Armd FA Bn	1	9	9	55	10		64	9	103	19	167	
231st Armd FA Bn	3	20	11	65	14		85	12	73	26	158	
25th Armd FA Bn	4	40	10	148	3		191	7	261	21	452	
15th Tank Bn	14	88	27	279	3	41	370	23	281	64	651	
68th Tank Bn	9	75	27	185	1	36	261	12	260	48	521	
69th Tank Bn	9	86	36	290	1	45	377	6	215	51	592	
9th Armd Inf Bn	15	237	41	812	1	57	1,058	28	911	85	1,969	
44th Armd Inf Bn	13	222	37	863	2	52	1,106	33	661	85	1,767	
50th Armd Inf Bn	9	204	32	797	3	41	1,004	25	834	66	1,838	
76th Med Bn Armd	5	2	16		2		21	6	80	8	101	
128th Ord Maint Bn	1	1	2	5	3		6	11	94	14	100	
603rd TD Bn	7	51	18	153	3	25	207	12	232	37	439	
777th AAA AW Bn	3	9	3	22	6		31	2	113	8	144	
3803d QM Truck Co				4			4		67	1	71	
642d QM Truck Co									9		9	
Attached Teams	1								2	6	6	
Division Totals	100	1,172	294	4,086	3	49	5,307	272	4,865	669	10,172	

Battle casualties include only those men not present for duty for at least 24 hours. Non-battle casualties include only those men evacuated from the Division.

CASUALTY LOSSES, RETURNEES AND REINFORCEMENTS

FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44—8 MAY 45

Unit	Cas. Losses	Ret. from Cas status	New Reinf
Fwd Ech	16	5	5
Rear Ech	17	5	39
Hq Co	23	15	24
Hq & Hq Co, CCA	40	13	22
Hq & Hq Co, CCB	42	11	31
Hq Res Comd	5	1	11
Div Arty	33	20	21
Hq, Hq Co, Div Tns	20	6	17
MP Platoon	50	17	61
Band	10	6	3
146th Armd Sig Co	47	19	47
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	809	236	581
128th Armd FA Bn	208	73	108
212th Armd FA Bn	186	90	93
231st Armd FA Bn	184	75	112
25th Armd FA Bn	473	163	320
15th Tank Bn	715	192	456
68th Tank Bn	569	187	373
69th Tank Bn	643	209	408
9th Armd Inf Bn	2,054	533	1,493
44th Armd Inf Bn	1,852	524	1,350
50th Armd Inf Bn	1,904	588	1,371
76th Med Bn Armd	109	35	70
128th Ord Maint Bn	114	61	41
603rd TD Bn	477	166	262
777th AAA AW Bn	152	69	111
3803d Trk Co	72	28	21
642d Trk Co	9	5	
Attchd Teams	9		
990th Bridge Co	1	1	3
Division Totals	10,842	3,353*	7,454**

* Returnees fr Cas. Status
** New Reinforcements

Totals


Off EM Total
155 3,198 3,353
425 7,029 7,454

580 10,227 10,807

**SECTION X.
MEDICAL SERVICE**
FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44
to 8 MAY 45
(Data from Records of Div. Surgeon)

**NON-BATTLE
CASUALTIES
10,696**


**BATTLE
CASUALTIES
5,704**



Battle Casualties		Officers	EM	Total	% of B.C.	% of Tot Cas
Gunshot	64	840	904	15.9	5.5	
Shell Fragment	215	2952	3167	55.5	19.3	
Other Types	110	1385	1495	26.2	9.1	
Burns	5	81	86	1.5	.5	
Missing in Action	3	49	52	.9	.3	
Total	397	5307	5704	100.0	34.7	

Non-Battle Casualties		Officers	EM	Total	% of B. C.	% of Tot Cas
Neuropsychiatric	60	2017	2077	19.4	12.7	
Diseases, all types	254	5728	5982	56.0	36.6	
Non-battle injuries	37	1592	1629	15.2	9.9	
Frost bite & trench foot	21	987	1008	9.4	6.1	
Total	372	10324	10696	100.0	65.3	
Grand Total	769	15631	16400		100.0	

FROST BITE & TRENCH FOOT



TOTAL CASES - 1008

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	% of B. C.	% of Tot Cas	
Ret'd to duty w/o lv. Div.	9.0	3.1	516
Evacuated	91.0	31.6	5188
Total Battle Casualties	100.0	34.7	5704

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES


	% of N.B.C.	% of Tot Cas	
Ret'd to duty w/o lv. Div.	52.0	33.9	5559
Evacuated	48.0	31.4	5137
Total Non-Battle Cas.	100.0	65.3	10696
Total Battle & Non-Battle Cas.		100.	16400
Total Battle Casualties Evacuated			5188
Total Non-Battle Casualties Evacuated			5137
Total Casualties Evacuated			10325
Ret'd to duty from Casualty Status as Reinforcements			3353
Net Loss to Div.			6972

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	Officers	EM	Total	% of Bat Cas
K A.....	81	994	1075	18.9
DOW.....	17	174	191	3.4
DOI.....	2	4	6	0.1
SWA.....	60	507	567	9.9
SIA.....	2	82	84	1.5
LWA.....	193	2649	2842	49.9
LIA.....	39	848	887	15.6
MIA.....	3	49	52	0.7
Totals.....	397	5307	5704	100.0

COMBAT CASUALTIES

SIXTH ARMORED DIVISION PERSONNEL



LEGEND:



PRISONERS CAPTURED BY CAMPAIGNS

BRITTANY




SEILLE RIVER



SAAR



GERMANY



18 JUL.-17 SEP. 18 SEP.- 7 NOV. 8 NOV.- 24 DEC.

ARDENNES



DASBURG - PRUM



25 DEC.- 26 JAN.

27 JAN.- 8 MAR.

9 MAR.- 8 MAY

SECTION V. PROVOST MARSHAL PRISONERS OF WAR PROCESSED

FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44—8 MAY 45

Month	Off.	Non-Coms	Priv.	Civ.*	Mthly Total
July	2	1	149	0	152
Aug	109	737	4267	117	5230
Sept	5	34	289	77	405
Oct	33	157	844	13	1047
Nov	7	43	513	183	746
Dec	0	48	193	273	514
Jan	29	170	2104	91	2394
Feb	23	216	1111	25	1375
Mar	400	1633	13591	73	15697
Apr	639	1852	17849	342	20682
May	80	332	2437	13	2862
Totals	1327	5223	43347	1207	51104

Prisoners evacuated by Provost Marshal 51104

Prisoners evacuated through Medical Channels 1340

Prisoners captured in Hospitals (not evacuated) 9420**
61864

** 746 prisoners evacuated from Hospitals by Provost Marshal and included in figure, 51,104.

* Enemy agents, persons working for enemy, informers, deserters, and other persons processed by the CIC.

GRAVES REGISTRATION

Number of American dead evacuated 1,289*
Number of German dead evacuated 826**
Percentage of American dead unidentified Less than 1%


Cemeteries where Division dead are buried:

St. Mere Eglise, France	Fay, Belgium
Blonville, France	Hamm, Luxembourg
St. James, France	Stromberg, Germany
Chalons, France	Butzbach, Germany
Andilly, France	Eisenach, Germany
Limey, France	Brenau, Germany
Grand Faily, France	
Epernal, France	
St. Avold, France	

* Includes other units in addition to Division and attached units.

** Figures on German dead evacuated not available for Brittany and Seille River Campaigns. During the Ardennes & Dasburg Prum Campaigns, 635 German dead were evacuated and it is estimated that 600 of these died in the fight for Bastogne.

Percentage of Personnel in Division V-E Day Who Sailed With Division From U. S.



LEGEND: Officers and W.O.'s.
 N.C.O.'s, First Three Grades
 EM, Less First Three Grades



HT's
443-82%



6x6's
421-83%



L-4's
0-0%



1/4 TONS
318-58%



TD's
17-47%



AC's
36-38%



L.Tks
29-35%




M. Tks
7-4%



M 7's
37-69%

VEHICLES STILL IN SERVICE THAT LANDED ON BEACH

LOSSES: Light tanks 54; Medium tanks 161; M7-Artillery 105, 17; Halftracks 104; Tank Destroyers 19; Armored cars 55; GMC 6x6 trucks 88; 1/4 ton trucks 233; L4 Liaison Planes 8. (Other types omitted, losses negligible.)



36
TD's



91
AC's



168
M.Tks



83
L.Tks



54
M 7's



547
HT's



551
1/4 TONS



8
L-4's



509
6x6's


VEHICLES LANDED ON "UTAH" BEACH

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44—8 MAY 45


	DSC	DSM	LM	SS	SM	BSM	AM	PH
Hq 6th Armd Div...	1	1	3	7		174	1	9
Hq Co, 6th Armd Div				2		43		5
Hq & Hq Co, CCA.	1			11	2	80		9
Hq & Hq Co, CCB.				8		80		5
Reserve Command.				3		21		1
Hq & Hq Btry Div		2		11	2	72	14	4
Arty.								
Hq & Hq Co, 6th Armd Tns				9		48		1
146th Sig Co.				24		114		9
MP Plat, 6th Armd Div				5	1	33		8
6th Armd Div Band				2		14		
15th Tank Bn.	2		1	93	2	347		161
68th Tank Bn.	2			97	2	327		126
69th Tank Bn.				103	1	348		162
9th Armd Inf Bn.		1		170		416		222
44th Armd Inf Bn.	1			185	1	416		211
50th Armd Inf Bn.	2			177	2	417		172
128th Armd FA Bn.				50	1	264	21	39
212th Armd FA Bn.				64	2	217	40	67
231st Armd FA Bn.	1			53		221	40	48
25th Armd Engr Bn	4			76	1	245		58
76th Med Bn Armd				30	1	117		13
86th Cav Ron Sq								
Mecz.				121	2	389		171
128th Ord Maint Bn				19	4	183		5
603rd TD Bn.	1			86		321		90
777th AAA AW Bn				49	7	221		34
506th CIC Det.						17		
642d QM Truck Co				1		19		1
3803rd QM Truck Co.				1		24		2
Attached Teams						33		
Totals	15	1	7	1457	31	5221	116	1633

Presidential Citations Awarded—3
 Troop A, 86th Cav Rcn Sq; Co B, 68th Tank Bn; 3rd Plat, Co C, 25th Armd Engr Bn
 Certificates of Merit Awarded—5120
 Pending Approval of Higher Headquarters:
 CMH—4 DSC—11 DSM—11 LM—59
 Legend:
 CMH—Congressional Medal of Honor
 DSC—Distinguished Service Cross
 DSM—Distinguished Service Medal
 LM—Legion of Merit
 PH—Purple Heart
 T/O Strength of Div and Attached Units (Off & EM) 12,366
 SS—Silver Star
 BSM—Bronze Star Medal
 AM—Air Medal
 PH—Purple Heart




TOTAL GAS CONSUMPTION - ALL CAMPAIGNS
5,479,770 GALS.

BATTLE CASUALTIES



VEHICLES DESTROYED - 449



VEHICLES DISABLED - 588

(DIRECT FIRE DOES NOT INCLUDE SMALL ARMS)

UNITS AND COMMANDERS

FOR PERIOD 18 JULY 44—1 JUNE 45

Division Headquarters
Division Commander: Maj Gen Robert W. Grow, 04621, USA, 18 Jul 44 to 30 Apr 45 & 31 May 45
Brig Gen George W. Read, Jr., 012603, USA, 30 Apr 45 to 31 May 45

Assistant Division Commander: (Office created—Oct 44 by Division Order)
Col Harry F. Hanson, 010821, Inf, 18 Nov 44 to 24 Feb 45
Brig Gen George W. Read, Jr., 012603, USA, 24 Feb 45 to 30 Apr 45 & 31 May 45

Chief of Staff: Col Glen C. McBride, 0217851, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 1 Jun 45
Lt Col Phillip H. Pope, 019115, FA, 1 Jun 45

Combat Command A: Brig Gen James Taylor, 07262, USA, 18 Jul 44 to 29 Aug 44
Col Harry F. Hanson, 010821, Inf, 30 Aug 44 to 18 Oct 44 (Evac)
BTD and reasgd CCA 2 Nov 44 to 8 Nov 44 (Evac)
Col John L. Hines, Jr., 016749, Cav, 19 Oct 44 to 2 Nov 44 & 8 Nov 44 to 25 Mar 45 (Evac)
Col Albert E. Harris, 018121, Cav, 25 Mar 45

Combat Command B: Col George W. Read, Jr., 012603, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 13 Feb 45
Brig Gen George W. Read, Jr., 012603, USA, 13 Feb 45 to 24 Feb 45
Col Harry F. Hanson, 010821, Inf, 24 Feb 45 to 17 Apr 45 (Evac)
Col Embry D. Lagrew, 0298494, Cav, 18 Apr 45 to 31 May 45
Col Glen C. McBride, 0217851, Cav, 1 Jun 45

Reserve Command: Col Harry F. Hanson, 010821, Inf, 18 Jul 44 to 30 Aug 44
Col Albert E. Harris, 018121, Cav, 30 Aug 44 to 25 Mar 45
Lt Col Embry D. Lagrew, 0298494, Cav, 25 Mar 45 to 18 Apr 45
Lt Col Ralph H. McKee, 0234931, Inf, 18 Apr 45

Division Artillery: Lt Col William R. Jesse, 0190287, FA, 18 Jul 44 to 14 Sep 44
Col Lowell M. Riley, 08654, FA, 14 Sep 44

Division Trains: Col Elmer H. Droste, 0218641, Inf, 18 Jul 44

Tank Battalions

15th Tank Bn: Lt Col Embry D. Lagrew, 0298494, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 25 Mar 45
Lt Col William A. Sussmann, 021165, Cav (Atchd), 25 Mar 45
until asgd to Div on 5 Apr 45 & fr 5 Apr 45

68th Tank Bn: Lt Col Harold C. Davall, 019425, Inf, 18 Jul 44

69th Tank Bn: Lt Col Bedford H. Forrest, 0292597, Inf, 18 Jul 44 to 26 Nov 44
Lt Col Chester E. Kennedy, 024242, Cav, 26 Nov 44

Infantry Battalions

9th Armd Inf Bn: Lt Col Thomas E. Godfrey, 0296852, Inf, 18 Jul 44 to 12 Nov 44
Maj Milford F. Stablein, 022929, Cav, 13 Nov 44 to 14 Nov 44
Lt Col Frank K. Britton, 0395458, Inf, 14 Nov 44 to 27 Mar 45
Maj Paul C. Root, Jr., 023979, Inf (DS fr 50th Inf), 27 Mar 45 to 10 Apr 45
Maj Gilman F. Morse, 0339198, Inf, 10 Apr 45

44th Armd Inf Bn: Lt Col Lewis E. McCorison, 0308419, Inf, 18 Jul 44 to 23 Oct 44 & 27 Nov 44 to 1 Dec 44
 Lt Col Charles E. Brown, 019552, Inf, 23 Oct 44 to 27 Nov 44 & 1 Dec 44

50th Armd Inf Bn: Lt Col Arnold R. Wall, 0299942, Inf, 18 Jul 44 to 2 Jan 45 & 7 Jan 45 to 19 Jan 45 (Evac)
 Maj Paul C. Root, Jr., 023979, Inf, 2 Jan 45 to 7 Jan 45 & 19 Jan 45 to 6 Feb 45
 Lt Col Albert N. Ward, Jr., 0337150, Inf, 6 Feb 45

Field Artillery Battalions

128th Armd FA Bn: Lt Col Thomas R. Bruce, Jr., 0353158, FA, 18 Jul 44

212th Armd FA Bn: Lt Col Phillip H. Pope, 019115, FA, 18 Jul 44 to 1 Jun 45
 Maj Arnold M. Anderson, 0287381, FA, 1 Jun 45

231st Armd FA Bn: Lt Col Robert S. Perkins, 0290331, FA, 18 Jul 44 to 11 Aug 44
 Maj Benjamin A. Goodin, 0366129, FA, 12 Aug 44 to 26 Oct 44
 Lt Col Thomas M. Crawford, 021983, FA, 27 Oct 44

25th Armd Engr Bn: Lt Col Donald G. Williams, 021071, CE, 18 Jul 44

86th Cav Rcn Sq: Lt Col Albert E. Harris, 018121, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 30 Aug 44
 Lt Col Harry Brindle, 0321107, Cav, 30 Aug 44

Division Trains

76th Armd Med Bn: Lt Col James W. Branch, 0333113, MC, 18 Jul 44 to 30 Nov 44
 Maj Leonard E. Rothman, 0400888, MC, 30 Nov 44

128th Ord Maint Bn: Lt Col Raymond B. (IO) Graeves, Jr., 0351106, Ord, 18 Jul 44 to 4 Mar 45 (Evac) & 9 Apr 45
 Maj Chester C. Stiteler, 0330991, Ord, 4 Mar 45 to 9 Apr 45

Attached Units (Permanent)

603d TD Battalion: Lt Col John G. Minniece, Jr., 017532, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 8 Aug 44
 Lt Col Clarence D. McCurry, 0359032, FA, 8 Aug 44

777th AAA AW Bn: Lt Col Joseph H. Twyman, Jr., 018116, CAC, 18 Jul 44

Separate Companies

Div Hq Co: Capt Harrigan E. Wortsmith, 01010914, Inf, 18 Jul 44 to 19 Nov 44
 Capt Anthony A. Imbriano, 01013704, Inf, 19 Nov 44

146th Armd Sig Co: Capt Thomas E. Fisher, 01634752, Sig C, 18 Jul 44

Hq Co, CCA: Capt Leroy H. Manuel, 0438417, Cav, 18 Jul 44

Hq Co, CCB: Capt Jerry E. Rouse, 0339275, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 6 Aug 44
 1st Lt Teddy Stivason, 01012823, Inf, 6 Aug 44 to 13 Oct 44
 Capt Kenneth L. Deichler, 01013555, Inf, 13 Oct 44

Hq Btry, Div Arty: Capt John L. Quaday, 01172608, FA, 18 Jul 44 to 20 Aug 44 & 4 Oct 44
 Capt Eugene F. Wolf, 0380689, FA, 20 Aug 44 to 4 Oct 44

Hq Co, Div Trains: Capt Jack F. Marsden, 0438837, Cav, 18 Jul 44 to 14 Feb 45
 1st Lt Theodore V. Schaaf, 01010614, Inf, 14 Feb 45

642d QM Trk Co: Capt Joseph P. Lanfear, 01578744, QMC, 18 Jul 44

3803d QM Trk Co: Capt Billy G. Yeatts, 01586387, QMC, 18 Jul 44

HIGHER AUTHORITY UNDER WHICH 6th ARMORED DIVISION OPERATED

Dates	Event	Resulting Assignment of 6th Armd Div		
		Corps	Army	Group
18—24 July	Continuation of assignment effective in U.K.	XX	Third	—
25 July	Attached to VIII Corps V.O.C.G.	VIII	First	21
1 Aug	VIII Corps assigned to Third Army	VIII	Third	12
5 Sept	VIII Corps assigned to Ninth Army	VIII	Ninth	12
16 Sept	Div relieved from VIII Corps, assigned to Third Army, placed in Army Reserve.	—	Third	12
20 Sept	From Army Reserve to XII Corps.	XII	Third	12
15 Dec	From XII to III Corps.	III	Third	12
18 Dec	From III to XII Corps.	XII	Third	12
21 Dec	From XII to XX Corps.	XX	Third	12
25 Dec	From XX to XII Corps.	XII	Third	12
28 Dec	From XII to III Corps.	III	Third	12
11 Feb	From III to VIII Corps.	VIII	Third	12
4 Mar	Placed in SHAEF Reserve.	—	—	—
8 Mar	Attached to XV Corps of Seventh Army.	XV	Seventh	6
23 Mar	Relieved from Seventh Army and reassigned to Third Army, XX Corps.	XX	Third	12
24 Mar	From XX to XII Corps.	XII	Third	12
28 Mar	From XII to XX Corps.	XX	Third	12
17 Apr	From XX to VIII Corps.	VIII	Third	12
22 Apr	VIII Corps transferred to First Army.	VIII	First	12

NOTES: The dates given in most instances are the dates on which the Division came under operational control of the higher headquarters, and do not always agree with the confirming administrative orders usually published at later date.

2. Detachments of combat command or less are listed on page 69.

UNITS ATTACHED TO DIVISION

18 JULY 44—8 MAY 45

PERMANENT ATTACHMENTS

	Date Attached	Date Relieved
603 TD Bn.	Attached in UK
777th AAA AW Bn.	22 July 44
I.P.W. Team No 53.	Attached in UK
I.P.W. Team No 64.	Attached in UK
P.I. Team No 60.	Attached in UK
O.B. Team No 35.	Attached in UK
M.I.I. Team No 437 (German).	24 Nov 44
C.I.C. Dec. No 506.	Attached in US
3398th QM Truck Co.	28 July 44	21 Sept 44
3916th Gas Trans Co.	28 July 44	10 Sept 44
3803d QM Truck Co.	30 July 44
642d QM Truck Co.	21 Sept 44

TEMPORARY ATTACHMENTS

ARTILLERY

	Date Attached	Date Relieved
Btry C, 965th FA Bn.	29 July 44	31 July 44
83d AFA Bn.	31 July 44	21 Aug 44
174th AFA Bn.	31 July 44	21 Aug 44
969th FA Bn.	15 Aug 44	19 Aug 44
45th FA Bn.	18 Aug 44	21 Aug 44

	Date Attached	Date Relieved
28th FA Bn.	18 Aug 44	21 Aug 44
161st FA Bn, 35th Inf Div.	22 Nov 44	3 Dec 44
	20 Jan 45	1 Feb 45
696th AFA Bn.	16 Dec 44	23 Dec 44
193d FA Gp.	29 Dec 44	27 Jan 45
177th FA Bn.		
253d AFA Bn.		
696th AFA Bn.		
776th FA Bn.		
193d FA Gp.	29 Mar 45	16 Apr 45
689th FA Bn.		
176th FA Bn.		
274th FA Bn.		
216th FA Bn.	13 Jan 45	18 Jan 45
208th FA Gp.	19 Mar 45	23 Mar 45
995th FA Bn.		
991st FA Bn.		
342d FA Bn.		
191st FA Bn.	18 Apr 45	27 Apr 45

INFANTRY

1st Bn, 28th Inf Regt, 8th Inf Div.	8 Aug 44	18 Aug 44
28th Inf Regt, 8th Inf Div.	18 Aug 44	21 Aug 44
134th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div.	22 Nov 44	3 Dec 44
134th Inf Regt (—), 35th Inf Div.	27 Jan 45	31 Jan 45
1st Bn, 134th Inf Regt.	23 Sept 44	26 Sept 44
	15 Jan 45	1 Feb 45
320th Inf Regt (—), 35th Inf Div.	10 Jan 45	18 Jan 45
2d Bn, 320th Inf Regt.	8 Jan 45	18 Jan 45
3d Bn, 320th Inf Regt.	6 Jan 45	18 Jan 45
261st CT, 65th Inf Div.	30 Mar 45	1 Apr 45
869th FA Bn.		
Btry D, 546th AAA Bn.		
Co A, 691st TD Bn.		
Rcn Tr, 65th Inf Div.		
Co C, 81st Cml Bn.		
1st Plat, Co C, 265th Engr Bn.		
Co C, 365th Med Bn.		
318th CT, 80th Inf Div.	30 Mar 45	1 Apr 45
3d Bn, 304th Inf Regt.	7 Apr 45	8 Apr 45
5th Ranger Bn.	24 Dec 44	25 Dec 44

CAVALRY

6th Cav Gp.	21 Dec 44	24 Dec 44
6th Cav Rcn Sq.		
5th Ranger Bn.		
Co C, 602d TD Bn.		
Co D, 295th Engr C Bn.		
Tr E, 28th Cav Rcn Sq.		
41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, 11th Armd Div.	11 Feb 45	21 Feb 45

TANKS AND TANK DESTROYERS

737th Tank Bn.	22 Nov 44	3 Dec 44
691st TD Bn (T)	15 Dec 44	23 Dec 44
11th Armd Gp.	19 Apr 45

ENGINEER

	Date Attached	Date Relieved
990th Tdwy Br Co.....	30 Jul 44	10 Sept 44
997th Tdwy Br Co.....	7 Nov 44	18 Nov 44
	3 Dec 44	27 Dec 44
	29 Apr 45	8 May 45
996th Tdwy Br Co.....	30 Dec 44	28 Mar 45
284th Engr C Bn.....	9 Feb 45	15 Feb 45
184th Engr C Bn.....	9 Feb 45	15 Feb 45
1252d Engr C Bn.....	9 Feb 45	24 Feb 45
1014th Tdwy Br Co.....	19 Mar 45	23 Mar 45
257th Engr C Bn.....	19 Mar 45	23 Mar 45
993d Tdwy Br Co.....	3 Apr 45	26 Apr 45

CHEMICAL

Co A, 86th Cml Bn.....	6 Oct 44	10 Oct 44
Co B, 3d Cml Bn.....	6 Jan 45	26 Jan 45
Co C, 3d Cml Bn.....	26 Jan 45	4 Feb 45
161st Cml SG Co.....	9 Feb 45	24 Feb 45
	2 Mar 45	5 Mar 45

SIGNAL

166th Sig Photo Team.....	1 Aug 44	10 Mar 45
	1 Apr 45
188th Sig Serv Co.....	17 Mar 45	18 May 45

MEDICAL

566th Amb Co.....	28 Jul 44	1 Aug 44
595th Amb Co.....	1 Aug 44	17 Sept 44
Surg Gp Plat, 53d Fld Hosp.....	7 Aug 44	14 Aug 44
593d Amb Co.....	17 Sept 44	20 Sept 44
433d Med Coll Co.....	20 Sept 44	30 Sept 44
585th Amb Co.....	26 Sept 44	7 Oct 44
434th Med Coll Co.....	7 Oct 44	26 Oct 44
586th Amb Co.....	26 Oct 44	25 Dec 44
	30 Jan 45	9 Mar 45
	25 Mar 45	22 Apr 45
3d Plat Surg Gp, 16th Fld Hosp.....	27 Oct 44	23 Nov 44
	31 Dec 44	31 Jan 45
2d Plat, 16th Fld Hosp.....	23 Nov 44	15 Dec 44
3d Plat, 60th Fld Hosp.....	15 Dec 44	31 Dec 44
417th Amb Co.....	25 Dec 44	30 Jan 45
589th Amb Co.....	18 Mar 45	25 Mar 45
584th Amb Co.....	22 Apr 45	5 May 45

INTELLIGENCE

M.I.I. Team No 437 (French).....	Assigned in UK	27 Nov 44
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ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION ATTACHED TO OTHER UNITS

18 JULY 44—8 MAY 45

Dates		Event
18—21 Aug	CCA atchd to VIII Corps Composition of CCA: 50th Arm Inf Bn Co A, 68th Tk Bn Co A & Rcn Co, 603d TD Bn	

Dates	Event
18—21 Aug	Btry A, 777th AAA Bn Trs A and E, 86th Rcn Sq Co B, 25th Engr Bn 1st Bn, 28th Inf Regt, 8th Inf Div (atchd) 83d AFA Bn (atchd) 174th FA Bn (atchd)
21 Aug—10 Sept	CCA Hq reverted to Div control; attachments of CCA (1st Bn, 28th Inf Regt, 83d AFA Bn, 174th FA Bn) reverted to VIII Corps; Trs A and E, 86th Rcn Sq atchd to 29th Inf Div; CT 50 atchd to VIII Corps Composition of CT 50: 50th Armd Inf Bn Co A, 603d TD Bn Co A, 68th Tk Bn Btry A, 777th AAA Bn
16 Sept—10 Oct	Composite company consisting of Co Hq and 1st Plat, Co F, 86th Rcn Sq; 2nd Plat, Co D, 15th Tk Bn; 3d Plat, Co D, 68th Tk Bn atchd to 94th Inf Div
17 Sept—23 Sept	CCB atchd to XII Corps and placed under control of 35th Inf Div, 21 Sept. Composition of CCB: 44th Armd Inf Bn 69th Tk Bn 212th Armd FA Bn Co C, 25th Armd Engr Bn Co C & Rcn Co, 603d TD Bn Tr B, 86th Rcn Sq Btry B, 777th AAA Bn
23 Sept—29 Sept	Res Comd atchd to XX Corps Composition of Res Comd: 9th Armd Inf Bn 68th Tk Bn (—) 128th FA Bn
31 Jan—7 Feb	Co C, 15th Tk Bn, atchd to 17th AB Div
7 Feb—11 Feb	Co B, 603d TD Bn, atchd to 17th AB Div
14 Mar—18 Mar	Div Arty placed in direct support of 3d Inf Div
19 Mar—20 Mar	CCA atchd to XXI Corps Composition of CCA: 9th Armd Inf Bn 15th Tk Bn Tr A, 86th Cav Rcn Sq Co B, 25th Engr Bn Co B, 603d TD Bn Btry A (—), 777th AAA Bn 212th FA Bn
4 Apr—8 Apr	Co B, 603d TD Bn, atchd to 80th Inf Div
4 Apr—17 Apr	Co A, 603d TD Bn, atched to 3d Cav
14 Apr	86th Cav and CCB under operational control of V Corps and 9th Armd Div until clear of V Corps zone. Composition of CCB: 44th Armd Inf Bn 69th Tk Bn Co A, 25th Engr Bn Co C, 603d TD Bn Btry B, 777th AAA Bn Det 993d Tdwy Br Co

SECTION II

DAILY RECORD OF OPERATIONS

Chapter I

BRITTANY CAMPAIGN

18 July to 17 September 1944

On 18 July 1944, two years and five months after the organization of the 6th Armored Division, leading elements commenced disembarking at UTAH BEACH on the NORMANDY PENINSULA. Since its organization, the Div had been stationed and trained successively in Arkansas, Louisiana, the California Desert and Camp Cooke, California, all of which training was culminated by five months of polishing off and range practice in the British Isles. The 6th Armd was prepared in every way for active service.

During the following nine months which preceded the end of the war in Europe, the Div, in whole or in part with the exception of less than two weeks in March when it was in reserve, was continually engaged. The account which follows is divided into campaigns which generally conform to the campaigns of the THIRD ARMY to which the Div was assigned during the majority of its operations. The nomenclature and dates of these campaigns do not necessarily coincide with the "Battles" of Europe as announced by the War Department, because the Div was, from time to time, switched from one front to another during the progress of one of the major battles.

The first campaign (BRITTANY) and the last (GERMANY) were pure exploitations in which the power of an armored division was given full play in carrying out the role for which it was designed. They are classic examples of the effective and decisive results that may be obtained by correct employment of a powerful and highly mobile division. Between these two campaigns, during the fall and winter months, were a series of hard-fought actions, mostly offensive, occasionally defensive, in which the Div proved itself capable of meeting every contingency imposed by an active and aggressive enemy assisted by difficult weather and terrain.

The situation existing when the 6th Armd landed is best understood by referring to Situation Sketch No 2 which shows the approximate location of lines four days after the Div landed. The COTENTIN PENINSULA had been cleared to the north and the main effort was now to the south.

Resistance along the entire front was heavy and progress was slow. Infantry troops were slugging it out and there was no immediate use for armor when, on 24 July, the last units of the 6th Armd under XX Corps, THIRD US ARMY closed in assembly near LES MESNIL. On the next day, however, a breakthrough became imminent and the Div was attached to the VIII Corps of the FIRST US ARMY.

On the 27th of July, the eve of the 6th Armd's first commitment to action, the Div was composed of the following troops:

9th Armd Inf Bn	68th Tk Bn	603d TD Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn	69th Tk Bn	86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
50th Armd Inf Bn	128th Armd FA Bn	25th Armd Engr Bn
777th AAA Bn	212th Armd FA Bn	146th Armd Sig Co
15th Tk Bn	231st Armd FA Bn	
Hq & Hq Co 6th Armd Div		76th Med Bn Armd
Hq & Hq Co CCA		128th Ord Maint Bn
Hq & Hq Co CCB		3803d QM Trk Co
Hq RES COMD		3398th QM Trk Co
Hq & Hq Btry Div Arty		3916th QM Gasoline Co
Hq & Hq Co Div Tns		

NORMANDY

18 July—31 July 1944

CORPS MISSION: The FIRST ARMY plan in general was to attack south and southwest on the COTENTIN PENINSULA. The main effort, to be made by VII Corps, was to seize commanding ground on the right bank of the SIENNE River and destroy the enemy in the COUTANCES—ST LO area. The mission of the VIII Corps was to secure the high ground northwest of COUTANCES.

DIVISION MISSION: On the 27th of July the Div was ordered to pass through the 79th Inf Div at LESSAY, advance south astride the LESSAY—COUTANCES highway, and seize the Corps objective northwest of COUTANCES.

Composition of Commands:

C C A

Brig Gen JAMES TAYLOR Commanding
44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B (Plat Tr E atchd), 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Res Comd

Col HARRY F HANSON Commanding

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)

C C B

Col GEORGE W READ Commanding
50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

Arty Comd

Lt Col WILLIAM J JESSE Commanding
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
777th AAA Bn (—2 Btrys)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Lt Col ALBERT E HARRIS Commanding

27 July 1944

The first unit to be committed was Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz with the following attached elements:

1st Plat Tr E
3d Plat Co F and a
Rcn Sect, 25th Armd Engr Bn

At 1630 this force moved through the 8th Inf Div via MILLIERES and seized high ground in the vicinity of LE BINGARD.

28 July 1944

C C A (Taylor): Advanced along the Div axis at 1000, passing through the 79th Inf Div lines, and crossed the AY River at 1345 to proceed south. The advance was slowed by enemy mines and booby traps. First contact with the enemy was made at 1910.

Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, having accomplished its first mission, joined CCA during the afternoon of the 28th.

During the night 28—29 July Trs A and B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were pushed forward to reconnoiter crossings of the SIENNE River west of COUTANCES.

Div, less CCA: Was ordered to remain in bivouac because of a delay caused by the bottleneck of a single narrow bridge at LESSAY.

29 July 1944

Success of the breakthrough caused VIII Corps to order the exploitation to continue south with 2 armored divisions abreast. On the right the 6th Armd with the 79th Inf Div following in support advanced to capture GRANVILLE; on the left the 4th Armd with the 8th Inf Div following in support advanced to capture AVRANCHES. The remainder of the Div moved out of LES MESNIL along the Div axis in the following order of march:

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Div Hq (Fwd)
Arty Comd
CCB
Res Comd
Div Tns

CCA (Taylor): Continued the advance south on the right of the VIII Corps zone. After driving in a slight enemy outpost line, the Command was held up along the SIENNE River near PONT DE LA

ROCHE. All bridges in this area were destroyed and the enemy was holding the high ground south of the river. During the afternoon resistance on the north bank of the river was eliminated.

At 2030, preceded by a 5-minute artillery preparation by all of the Div Arty, the attack was launched across the river at PONT DE LA ROCHE by CT 44 reinforced by the 68th Tk Bn. The attack was successful and by 2145 the 44th Armd Inf Bn had consolidated its positions south of the river. During the night the 25th Armd Engr Bn constructed a bridge and ford across the river west of PONT DE LA ROCHE.

Div Arty (Jesse): During the afternoon the Command occupied positions and reinforced fires of the 231st Armd FA Bn.

CCB (Read): Assembled near BELLAIS during the day.

Res Comd (Hanson): Because of heavy traffic on the road, the Command closed late in the vicinity of BRAINVILLE—BLANCHET.

Remaining elements of the Div reached the general area of Res Comd during the day and night.

30 July 1944

The narrow zone assigned the Div forced it to use one road and one bridge to and across the SIENNE River. By the night of 29 July, the Div was all assembled north of the SIENNE River crossing which had been secured by CCA. CCA, however, was unable to cross its vehicles until 30 July after the bridge and ford were built. Consequently, the bridgehead was held only by dismantled personnel who were separated from their vehicles. For this reason, CCB was passed through the bridgehead position and put in the lead of the Div for the advance on 30 July. The Div plan stipulated a development in two columns, with CCA following CCB across the river and thence advancing on the left (east) flank.

CCA (Taylor): Remained in position in its bridgehead across the SIENNE River at PONT DE LA ROCHE while CCB passed through. CCA then continued the march south by an eastern route. A march halt of 2 hours was made in the vicinity of MUNEVILLE SUR MER, after which the column bivouaced north of BREHAL.

CCB (Read): Composed of:

50th Armd Inf Bn

69th Tk Bn

Tr B plus Plat Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn with an atchd sect 990th Tdwy Br Co

Co C 603d TD Bn

The Command moved through CCA's bridgehead at daylight and advanced via BREHAL on GRANVILLE with a mission to block the east and south exits of the city. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz preceded the column. At 1255 enemy small arms, mortar and artillery fire was encountered in the vicinity of BREHAL. It was estimated that the town and vicinity was occupied by an enemy infantry battalion and a battery of four self-propelled 88mm guns plus some smaller caliber anti-tank guns. The town was taken at 1325. Defensively-minded, the enemy was making every effort to withdraw either to GRANVILLE or to the south. The Command halted for the night on a line approximately three miles south of BREHAL.

Res Comd (Hanson): Followed the route of CCB to BREHAL and then to positions northeast of GRANVILLE, prepared to attack the city in conjunction with CCB. The Command closed at BRAINVILLE—BLANCHAT with the 9th Armd Inf Bn at COUDEVILLE.

Arty Comd (Jesse): Closed southeast of BREHAL.

31 July 1944


The Div received orders from VIII Corps to continue the advance in its zone at 0600 to LE PONT GILBERT, remain disposed in depth, and await orders. Subsequent orders confined the Div's movement to a point about 1 mile northwest of SARTILLY until the AVRANCHES road was clear of 4th Armd vehicles.

Finding the AVRANCHES road clear, the Div issued orders at 1600 to move to areas astride the GRANVILLE—AVRANCHES road. Forward elements were at LE PONT GILBERT.

At 2100 the Div received orders to relieve the 4th Armd Div and the 13th Inf Regt at AVRANCHES and to secure bridges northwest of AVRANCHES and at PONT AU BAULT.

CCA (Taylor): Continued the advance south to HUDIMESNIL. At 0904 contact with the enemy was made south of the village. The resistance was overcome and 97 prisoners were taken. At 1100

Scale: 1 inch equals approximately 16 miles.
Yellow: Territory conquered by Division.
LEGEND: Red: Main route of advance.



hours the Combat Command halted south of HUDIMESNIL for 7 hours. About 40 prisoners were taken by the advance guard during this period.

At 1600 hours elements of the 79th Inf Div commenced passing through on foot. At 1800 hours the Combat Command resumed the march, passing through the 79th Inf Div, and advanced to an area north of the GRANVILLE—AVRANCHES road northwest of SARTILLY.

CCB (Read) and Div Arty (Jesse): Advanced to positions astride the GRANVILLE—AVRANCHES road. Disposed in 3 combat teams, each team was comprised of an infantry company, a tank company and a battalion of artillery. The Command moved out at 1058. One of the Combat Teams took the coastal road through JULLOUVILLE—ST JEAN to AVRANCHES. At one point tanks were brought up to place direct fire upon boats evacuating Germans from the peninsula at ST LEONARD to BOYERÉ. Another combat team travelled the GRANVILLE—AVRANCHES road and the third took a route generally paralleling the GRANVILLE—AVRANCHES road. The first SS prisoners were taken at ST JEAN. In the late afternoon the Command was ordered to continue to an area just north and west of AVRANCHES. 70 prisoners were taken near ST AUBIN. At 2200 the Command assembled in the vicinity of SOUILLET.

Res Comd (Hanson): Picked up the 9th Armd Inf Bn at COUDEVILLE and advanced on the right (west) of CCB to an area southeast of GRANVILLE. One platoon of the 15th Tk Bn with the Div G-3 dashed into GRANVILLE at noon and captured the city and 100 prisoners without resistance. The Command advanced south along the coastal road from GRANVILLE to the vicinity of BACILLY. At approximately 2100 the Commanding Officer was called to Div and directed to effect the relief of troops at the bridge south of AVRANCHES. He was to use the following troops:

- 9th Armd Inf Bn
- 15th Tk Bn
- 231st Armd FA Bn
- 777th AAA Bn (—2 Btrys)
- Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

German planes attempted unsuccessfully to bomb the bridge at AVRANCHES and at the same time strafed the marching column.

At midnight 31 July—1 Aug, THIRD ARMY became operational and took over VIII Corps. Until this time, the directive to the Div had not contemplated an immediate advance beyond AVRANCHES. It was for this reason that the Res Comd, rather than one of the combat commands, had been given the mission of holding the bridges south of that city. Although the mission, as understood by the Division Commander on the night of 31 July, did not contemplate an immediate advance, plans were made to push the combat commands through the Res Comd bridgehead to the south.

There was only one road through AVRANCHES and PONT AUBAULT, and over this road it would be necessary to move all of the divisions of the VIII Corps. 6th Armd MPs took charge of this road on the night of 31 July and kept it open for Div traffic during the next 24 hours. The worst bottleneck encountered by the Div during the war, conditions were made increasingly difficult by the fact that the road was under German air attack, particularly at night.

BREST

1—12 August 1944

The VIII Corps mission under the THIRD ARMY was to capture the BRITTANY PENINSULA. The plan called for the 6th Armd to pass through AVRANCHES in the lead and drive straight up the peninsula on BREST, followed by the 4th Armd Div which was directed on RENNES and VANNES to cut off the peninsula. The armored divisions were to be followed closely by infantry divisions—the 79th was initially designated to follow the 6th Armd. A later change in plan placed the 83d Div in support of the 6th Armd, and finally, on 4 Aug, the Division Commander was informed that he would receive no infantry support.

Orders to resume the advance did not reach the Div until 0400 on 1 Aug. At this time, the Res Comd was still moving into position at PONTAUBAULT, and the bottleneck road through AVRANCHES would not permit passage of a combat command until Res Comd had cleared the town. Therefore, the Res Comd was directed to advance southwest at the head of the Div and secure a bridgehead at PONTORSON to enable the remainder of the Div to get through the bottleneck and develop on a broad front. Once the bridgehead at PONTORSON was secured, CCB was to move on the right (north) with the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz covering the front; Res Comd was to follow which ever combat command route proved most feasible. Order of march through AVRANCHES was: Res Comd, 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, CCA, CCB, Arty Comd, Div Hq (Fwd) and Trains.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
603d TD Bn (—)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry C 777th AAA Bn
Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Arty Comd (—)

Btry C 965th FA Bn
174th FA Bn (155mm SP Gun)
83d Armd FA Bn (155mm SP How)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
3916th QM Trk Co (Gasoline)
3398th QM Trk Co
990th Tdwy Br Co

Routes of Advance:

Route A (CCB): PONTAUBAULT—PONTORSON—LANNEHELIN—DINAN.

Route B (CCA): PONTAUBAULT—ANTRAIN—COMBOURG—ST DOMINEUC—EVRAN.

1 August 1944

CCA (Taylor): The advance continued towards AVRANCHES, north of which at 1530 the column was strafed; casualties were light and one German plane was knocked down by attached Btry A 777th AAA Bn. At 1635 forward elements received hostile fire just south of LA SELUNE River, but it did not hold up the advance. Between PONTAUBAULT and ANTRAIN SUR COUESNON the column was subjected to continuous sniper fire.

CCB (Read): Was ordered to assemble for the night under the protection of Res Comd and to pass through it at dawn 2 Aug. Btry B 777th AAA Bn was attached and directed to join the Command as soon as possible. At 1900 the head of the column passed through AVRANCHES, proceeded south through PONTAUBAULT, and assembled just east of PONTORSON at 2215. The column was strafed by 5 ME 109's at AVRANCHES but only two men were wounded.

Res Comd (Hanson): Instructions were received at 0445 through the Div Liaison Officer to regroup and proceed at once astride Route A to capture a bridgehead at PONTORSON. Although the advance guard encountered considerable small arms and sniper fire along the route, a message was received at 1100 from the advance guard commander, the Commanding Officer of the 9th Armd Inf Bn, that he had reached the objective and established a bridgehead. No heavy gunfire was met until the main body of the column reached BREE. There, it was struck by 88mm gun, mortar, bazooka and small arms fire. The enemy had allowed the advance guard to pass his well camouflaged positions. Three M7's of Btry A 231st Armd FA Bn were put out of action by 88s and mortars. The Command quickly deployed. The 15th Tk Bn and Hq Co of the 9th Armd Inf Bn took up positions and opened fire on the enemy strongpoint. After Companies A and C of the 9th Armd Inf Bn had dismounted and deployed to the right and left of the road, they pushed forward to eliminate bazooka and machine gun positions. The Commanding Officer of the 15th Tk Bn maneuvered a medium tank company around to the right flank in support of the advance infantry elements. Two batteries of the 231st Armd FA Bn quickly went into firing positions. The artillery forward observer and the Commanding Officer of Res Comd, with the assistance of a Cub Liaison Plane, located mortar positions and three batteries of horse-drawn field artillery which were taken under fire and destroyed. Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn, advancing along the left flank, destroyed one 88mm gun previously abandoned by its crew. Long-range enemy artillery and 88mm fire destroyed several of our vehicles in dispersal areas. At 1230 all resistance with the exception of occasional sniper fire was reduced. Companies A and C 9th

Armd Inf Bn had secured the crossroad at BREE. The main body arrived on the bridgehead southwest of PONTORSON near VILLE CHERE at 1715. The town of PONTORSON and the area in the immediate vicinity was cleaned by the advance guard reinforced by an additional company of infantry.

2 August 1944

CCA (Taylor): Proceeded southwest to COMBOURG—ST DOMINEUC—TINTENIAC and BECHEREL, bivouacing that night between MEDREAC and QUEDILIAC. All of the 603d TD Bn except the Reconnaissance Company and Company A was detached late in the day.

CCB (Read): Passed through Res Comd at 0600. The Div Arty including the 231st Armd FA Bn and 174th FA Bn joined the Command at this time. Little enemy resistance was encountered until the area just east of DINAN at LANVALLAY was reached. There the advance guard ran into strong enemy opposition. An outpost of about 25 enemy was defeated, 12 enemy were killed, and only one of our men was wounded. Continued artillery, AT, mortar, bazooka, machine gun and small arms fire substantiated the belief that this was the enemy OPLR for DINAN which was reported strongly held. Additional infantry was brought up to take LANVALLAY, the intermediate objective. Strong patrols were sent to either flank to probe the enemy position, the flanks of which were believed to rest on the RANCE River just east of DINAN. The main highway bridge into DINAN was reported heavily mined. Just as the attack was getting under way orders were received to by-pass DINAN and proceed to the vicinity of BECHEREL for the night. Since some elements had already been committed and it might have proved costly to break off the attack, it was decided to take the immediate objective. During this attack heavy artillery fire was placed on DINAN. The immediate objective was taken at approximately 1500. At approximately 1800 the Command started its movement, covered by a rear guard. Two enemy tanks moved in on our left (north) flank and opened fire. They were attacked by friendly air and by an M7 which took one under direct fire and destroyed it. The other tank withdrew without inflicting any damage. The Command, after marching east and then southwest, closed near BECHEREL at 2200.

Res Comd (Hanson): During the afternoon, at the request of a Navy officer, a platoon of light tanks and a platoon of Engrs were sent to DOL where after a short fight they rescued a party of some 50 sailors and news correspondents who were headed for ST MALO, not knowing it was held by the enemy. In the late afternoon the Command marched southwest switching to Route B to follow CCA.

3 August 1944

Leading troops of CCA missed their route at GAEL, where they should have turned west, and continued instead southwest where they ran into organized resistance at MAURON. It appeared more practicable to the commander to defeat the enemy force and then regain his route, by passing through MAURON, than to by-pass that place. This he accomplished by a coordinated attack in the afternoon. As a result of the delay to CCA, CCB got about 20 miles in the lead on its parallel route to the north. Therefore, the Res Comd was once again switched, this time back to the northern route to follow CCB. While watching the action of CCA at 1600, the Div Comdr received orders by courier from VIII Corps to stop all movement west and divert sufficient force north to capture DINAN. Since the majority of the Div was already well past DINAN, this meant a retrograde movement. It was not until 1900 that orders to halt could be gotten to the head of CCB. The column was then almost to LOUDEAC. In order to comply with Corps instructions, the Commander of CCA was directed to leave his infantry and tanks in place and, with his own artillery, pick up the Res Comd (at that time north of him and between him and DINAN) for a move on DINAN from the southwest early on 4 Aug. An effort was made to coordinate the attack on DINAN with General Ernst's Task Force "A", believed to be somewhere east of DINAN at this time. During the evening, the Div Command Post was moved forward to MERDRIGNAC.

CCA (Taylor): Continued its advance southwest against light resistance and during the afternoon made a coordinated attack on MAURON. This town contained a hostile force of approximately 250 men in a strong defensive position. At 1500 the attack was launched by the 44th Armd Inf Bn supported by the 212th Armd FA Bn. By 1830 the mission had been completed. The Combat Command then bivouaced west of GAEL.

CCB (Read): Continued the march west on BREST. At BROONS minor resistance was encountered when the advance guard ran into enemy elements apparently trying to escape to the south. Btry B of the 777th AAA Bn which had been ordered to join the Command at BROONS ran into some enemy resistance southeast of the town. Eight miles east of LOUDEAC the column was halted on

orders from the Div Comdr and instructed to go into an assembly area to await further orders. The Command closed at approximately 2100.

Res Comd (Hanson): Switched from the south to the north route following CCB.

4 August 1944

During the morning CCA, under the mission described above, reorganized and advanced north-east, reaching the vicinity of BROONS by noon when it was halted on Div order. The Army Commander arrived at the Div CP shortly before noon and directed that the advance on BREST be resumed at once.

CCA (Taylor): Temporary organization until 1200 4 Aug was:

9th Armd Inf Bn	83d Armd FA Bn
15th Tk Bn	Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Armd FA Bn	Rcn and A Cos 603d TD Bn
	Btry A 777th AAA Bn

The Command proceeded north to JOUAN de L'ISLE. While orders were being issued to attack a reported strong force of enemy tanks and infantry near BROONS and while waiting for newly attached troops to arrive, the Combat Command was ordered to resume the mission of advancing on BREST with its original composition. Earlier in the day the Rcn Co of the 603d TD Bn liberated a B-24 crew of 6 officers and 8 enlisted men who had been prisoners of the Germans. CCA with its original troops resumed its advance to the west. It was forced to cross the BLANET CANAL north of PONTIVY because of a blown bridge at the latter point.

CCB (Read): Resumed the march on BREST but was delayed by a blown bridge and mined fords at LOUDEAC. At 1800 the march was continued west of CARHAIX. It was halted at 050230 in march formation with the head of the column in the vicinity of LE MOUSTOIR. The Command was re-gassed at this time and resumed the march at dawn.

Res Comd (Hanson): Followed CCB.

5 August 1944

Based on information from F.F.I., it was learned that CARHAIX was held by a German force of about 2,000 paratroopers who had destroyed all local bridges and were prepared to defend themselves in the city. Therefore, the Div Comdr ordered both columns to by-pass CARHAIX—CCB to the east and north; CCA to the south and west. This city was evacuated by the Germans two days later, after the Div had passed it. Then enemy withdrew west and reached BREST by way of the CROZON PENINSULA.

CCA (Taylor): Having stopped early in the morning for maintenance, the Command resumed the march at 0800, turned north at GOURIN, and on Div orders by-passed CARHAIX to the south and west. The column continued toward HUELGOAT via LANDELEAU and PLOUVE.

HUELGOAT and the woods to the north and east were held by a German force of about 500 men, only a few of whom were in the city when the Rcn Tr at the head of the column reached it. After a brief skirmish, leading elements pushed through the town and turned west where they ran into an enemy position including a battery of artillery. Between the time that the Rcn Tr passed through the town and the time the advance guard arrived, a considerable German force moved back into HUELGOAT from the woods to the northeast. In a stiff fight infantry, tanks and artillery of the advance guard were employed to clear the town. During the evening, the Command passed through and halted for the night in the vicinity of KERBRANN. Unknown to CCA, the Res Comd, approaching HUELGOAT on another route from the southeast, encountered the same group of enemy in the woods and defile east of town.

CCB (Read): With orders to by-pass CARHAIX, the Command began reconnaissance for a suitable route. The march was resumed at 0830, passing east and north of CARHAIX. Enemy resistance was encountered east of LE CLOITRE at 1215 but it was reduced without difficulty. The Command lost several small vehicles but resumed the march at 1440. Information gained from prisoners disclosed that they were leading elements of the 851st Inf Regt, 343d Inf Div marching east to ST BRIEUC. The advance guard made contact again on reaching LE CLOITRE and received light artillery and heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Since resistance could not be cleared prior to darkness, the Command was ordered to assemble near LE CLOITRE.

Res Comd (Hanson): Resumed the westward march on BREST at 1404 from the vicinity of GOU-AREC. At 1451 Div Hq (forward) was positioned in column and the march continued. At 1652 the

advance guard reported that they had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of POULLAOUEN. After this resistance was rapidly overcome, the march continued towards HUELGOAT which switched the column from the rear of CCB to the rear of CCA. The route from POULLAOUEN through HUELGOAT was a defile and when advance elements reached the vicinity of the HUELGOAT WOODS, considerable small arms and mortar fire was received from enemy estimated at 200. The advance guard commander immediately employed the leading tank element and the 105mm assault gun platoon. The infantry company in the advance guard was deployed on the right flank. The entire highway along HUELGOAT WOODS was heavily mined.

6 August 1944

It was now apparent that MORLAIX was quite strongly held. Both combat commands moved out early 6 Aug, but the route followed by CCA was a devious one over very poor roads and caused extremely slow progress, both on the 6th and 7th of Aug. CCB, although on the outside flank, made a rapid march on better roads and was delayed only by enemy resistance south of MORLAIX in the morning and at LESNEVEN in the evening. The Res Comd, which on the previous day had swung left to get in rear of CCA at HUELGOAT, was once again rerouted to follow the faster moving CCB. The Div CP remained in place a second day for the first time since the campaign started.

CCA (Taylor): Resumed the march travelling by secondary routes in order to by-pass strong hostile forces reported ahead. At 1900, while halted, the column was shelled by light artillery and mortars which inflicted a few casualties. That night the Command made a difficult march over country roads not marked on any of the maps at hand. There were no vehicular casualties or stragglers. Troop D of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, reconnoitering for the Command, fought a severe engagement against superior forces at CHATEAUNEUF and finally withdrew to by-pass this resistance.

CCB (Read): The enemy withdrew from LE CLOITRE under cover of darkness and the Command resumed the march with the intention of by-passing MORLAIX to the south and PLEYBER CHRIST to the east. At approximately 1015 a strongly defended enemy roadblock was encountered in a defile six miles south of MORLAIX on Route No 169. Three beetle tanks sent out by the enemy were destroyed by tank fire. Several officers and men were wounded by grenades and small arms fire from the high ground on either side of the defile. After a new advance guard was constituted, the route through PLEYBER CHRIST was cleared and the march was resumed to the north. On reaching highway GC 19 near PENNHOAT the column turned west on LESNEVEN where enemy resistance was again encountered at approximately 2000. After artillery shelling and an attack by infantry and tanks the enemy was driven out and the town was taken at 2200. Three AT guns were destroyed and a large dump of enemy mines and explosives was demolished in the vicinity of the railroad station.

7 August 1944

Action on this date was to determine whether or not BREST could be captured by the Div. The plan contemplated an approach in three columns: CCB on the right (west), approaching south from BOURG-BLANC; Res Comd breaking off from the CCB column and approaching in the center from PLOUVIEN through GUESNOU; and CCA approaching from the northeast through ST THONAN and GUIPAVAS. Div CP was established two miles southwest of PLABENNEC.

CCA (Taylor): Marched from north of ST THEGONNEC to the west, by-passing LANDIVISIAU. During the day hostile resistance increased. Two of our artillery observation planes were shot down and the column received light artillery shelling south of ST THONAN and heavier fire west of KER-SAINTE. The Command bivouaced late that night on the PLABENNEC-GOUESNOU road just north of L'ORMEAU.

CCB (Read): Following a successful engagement at LESNEVEN during the late hours of 6 Aug, the Command resumed the march at 0100. More intense enemy activity was encountered beyond the town and a medium tank was knocked out by AT fire. A decision was made to halt and to resume the march at dawn. The Command assembled just east of LESNEVEN and resumed the march at 0800, by-passing PLABENNEC to the west. Considerable small arms fire was encountered south of LESNEVEN and enemy forces were cleared from PLOUVIEN, but otherwise the movement was uneventful until the column reached the intersection with GC 26 west of BOURG-BLANC. Elements of the advance guard were allowed to pass this crossroad before encountering just east of MILIZAC strong resistance in the form of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Near the crossroads a large AA warning system and observation post was discovered. When this installation was attacked and destroyed, enemy fire ceased and was not resumed again in that immediate area. The Command assembled just east of MILIZAC. Forward elements to the south, in view of an enemy observation post,

were badly shelled from the vicinity of BREST. When these units were withdrawn, the shelling ceased.
Res Comd (Hanson): Followed CCB to PLOUVIEN, thence south to an area northwest of GOUES-
NOU.

8 August 1944

Since the attack could not be made before 9 Aug, orders were issued early on 8 Aug calling for an attack generally in the direction GUIPAVAS—BREST to be made at daylight the following morning. This plan involved considerable shifting of troops, particularly artillery, and resulted in drawing counter-preparation fires from the German artillery. Numerous losses, heaviest in the 44th Infantry, were sustained.

In the early evening the situation, as known to the Div Comdr, appeared as follows: CCB, newly organized with troops formerly in Res Comd, and its direct support artillery were in position for the attack; CCA, which had been subjected to heavy shelling, was not in position and probably would be unable to be in position to attack by daylight.

1st Bn 28th Inf Regt of the 8th Inf Div was attached to the Div on this date but did not join until 9 Aug.

Composition of Troops:

CCA

44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Co A & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

Res Comd

50th Armd Inf Bn (—)
69th Tk Bn (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
1st Bn 28th Inf Regt 8th Inf Div

Added to Div Tns

Co D 15th Tk Bn
Co C 9th Armd
Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Btry C and D 777th AAA Bn

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
Co D 69th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Arty Comd

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
83d Armd FA Bn
174th FA Bn

Note: CCB and Res Comd exchanged troops.

CCA (Taylor): While still in bivouac, the Command commenced receiving heavy artillery shelling. The 44th Armd Inf Bn received the majority of the fire and suffered heavy casualties. All vehicular movement drew fire and after several attempts the battalion was forced to withdraw without its vehicles. Because of a lack of observation posts and observers' planes artillery was unable to deliver counter-battery fire. Later in the day the 212th and 83d Armd FA Bns delivered effective fire on the vicinity of GOUESNOU. During the day orders were received for an attack on BREST the following morning. In preparation for the attack the Command was organized into three combat teams, each consisting of an infantry company, three sections of tanks, a tank destroyer platoon, an engineer platoon and a section of anti-aircraft guns.

CCB (Read): With its new troop composition, the Command assembled near PENNHOAT east of GOUESNOU and prepared to launch an attack on BREST in conjunction with the rest of the Div at 090600.

Res Comd (Hanson): With its new composition of troops, the Command marched at 2200 to its new assembly area preparatory to the attack on BREST. At approximately 2230, however, orders were received through the Div liaison officer and by radio to halt the column for the purpose of carrying out a new mission. The Command was directed to march west and north to the vicinity of KERDALES and there to await further instructions.

Div Tns (Droste): Was attacked by the enemy as it entered PLOUVIEN from the east. The attack was beaten off by protective units with the trains and the Command proceeded into its bivouac area.

9 August 1944

As stated above the attack on BREST by the Div was temporarily called off. First, because of severe casualties inflicted on the troops of CCA who had received in their bivouac area heavy artillery fire which prevented them from reaching their line of departure and, secondly, because of the arrival of the 266th German Inf Div on the rear (north) of the Div.

The Commanding General decided to attack the 266th Div. To do this the Div completely reversed its direction and proceeded north in three columns, leaving an infantry screen to protect the rear. CCA marched on the east, CCB in the center, and Res Comd on the west. During the movement north the Div fought 3 major engagements, and the units which had been the advance guard were now a rear guard and engaged to the south.

CCA (Taylor): With the 44th Armd Inf Bn badly hurt by the severe shelling of the day before, the Command moved to attack in the direction of PLOUVIEN and assemble northwest of that town. While marching to the north, the column including installations in adjacent fields was taken under artillery and small arms fire which caused some casualties. PLOUVIEN was in German hands and a platoon of the 9th Armd Inf Bn was pinned down in the village. Units of the 44th Armd Inf Bn reinforced by a tank platoon of A Co 68th Tk Bn and supported by the 212th and 83d Armd FA Bns assaulted the village, cleared it and relieved the platoon of the 9th Armd Inf Bn. Considerable assistance was given by friendly air which smashed a German column coming down from the north. The Command then resumed the march and closed in bivouac northwest of PLOUVIEN.

CCB (Read): Received orders at 0300 cancelling the attack on BREST and ordering an attack north to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of LANANNEYEN. At 0600 the Command moved out. As the Command approached the crossroads at BESQUELN, about one mile south of LANANNEYEN, strong enemy opposition was encountered. An attack was launched at 0830 by B and C Companies of the 15th Tk Bn and B Co of the 9th Armd Inf Bn. Succeeding units cleared the road and the 231st Armd FA Bn (—) was placed in position with the mission of covering the rear of the Command just north of GOUESNOU while the 128th Armd FA Bn was put in position to support the 9th Armd Inf Bn. Co D of the 69th Tk Bn was committed with instructions to make a wide envelopment of the enemy position. Co A and one platoon of C Co of the 25th Armd Engr Bn were committed at 1100 and Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn was also brought forward at this time. The enemy, after sustaining severe casualties, surrendered his remaining force of some 800 men at 1530. This force was part of the 896th, 897th and 898th Regts of the 266th Inf Div. The Command then proceeded to its assembly area and closed at approximately 2000 hours.

Res Comd (Hanson): Following instructions received at 2230 the previous night, the Command marched north in the direction of KERDALES. At approximately 0315 leading elements of the 50th Armd Inf Bn reported heavy small arms and mortar fire from both flanks on the crossroad at BOURG-BLANC. Considerable firing could be heard to the west and northwest of BOURG-BLANC. The Commanding Officer of the 50th Armd Inf Bn was directed to attack BOURG-BLANC at daylight. The attack jumped off at approximately 0630 and after a short advance it encountered on the road a heavy weapons company of the 851st Inf Regt 266th German Inf Div. Outer security elements of the 50th Armd Inf Bn which consisted of the heavy machine guns and one 57mm AT gun practically annihilated the column. This action was short and its accomplishment permitted the Command to march again at 0830 and close near KERDALES at 1158.

Members of the DIVISION BAND which were guarding a gas dump at LESQUERN were attacked by 150 paratroopers and 5000 gallons of gas were burned, but the attackers were driven off. Throughout the remainder of the day the Trains were shelled, and some gasoline and ammunition were destroyed by an enemy column moving in from its north until P-51s strafed and bombed the enemy column to destruction.

10 August 1944

In assembly area west of PLOUVIEN, the main body of the Div was out of enemy observed artillery range and had an opportunity, for the first time since 27 July, for a day's rest and reservice. In the meantime the 1st Bn of the 28th RCT had been attached to the Div and joined it at PLABENNEC. It was given a reconnaissance mission to secure in force the line GOUSENOU—GUIPAVAS in order to cover positions for the artillery from which they could reach the center of BREST. The 86th Cav extended the reconnaissance screen to the flanks. Artillery surveyed positions during the day and moved in after dark. Later in the day the orders were amended to charge CCA with the mission of securing a strong jump-off position in the vicinity of GUIPAVAS.

The Commands were constituted as follows:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—3 Sects)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
1st Bn 28th Inf (Atchd)

Res Comd

44th Armd Inf Bn (—C Co)
69th Tk Bn (—D Co)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—A, B, C Cos)
603d TD Bn (—A, C, Rcn, Plat B Co)
777th AAA Bn (—A, B, C & D Tr adv CP)

1st Bn 28th Inf

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—3 Sect)

Arty Comd

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
83d Armd FA Bn
174th FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Div Tns: Reinf by

Co D 69th Tk Bn
Co C 44th Armd Inf Bn
Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Btrys C & D 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Taylor): Given the Div mission, CCA prepared for the attack on the Hill 95—Hill 105 line. Meanwhile a detachment of the Rcn Co and 2 tank destroyers of Co A 603d TD Bn, a forward observer from 83d Armd FA Bn and an interpreter from Command Hq approached a hostile battery in QUILLIFREOC which had been observed firing to the north. Negotiations were made with the German Commander to surrender 7 officers, 120 men, 9 field guns and 3 AA guns.

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Harris): Established a protective screen south of the Div area and instituted reconnaissance of eastern exits of BREST south of GUIPAVAS.

Arty Comd (Jesse): Moved under cover of darkness to positions to support the attack of CCA.

Div Tns (Droste): Effected the surrender of approximately 300 prisoners at LOCMARIA.

1st Bn 28th Inf Regt: Remained in assembly area prepared to attack to secure the GOUESNOU—GUIPAVAS road. At 102000 it was assigned to CCA.

11 August 1944

Delays incident to reorganization and redistribution of troops precluded a well-coordinated attack by CCA prior to 12 Aug. Reconnaissance was intensified and troop movement to assembly positions were completed during the day and evening. The remainder of the Div was inactive.

Dispersed elements of the 266th German Inf Div continued to surrender throughout the day.

CCA (Taylor): Exerted every effort to encourage further surrender of enemy troops. The same detachment that effected the surrender of the battery at QUILLIFREOC also negotiated the surrender of a number of officers and men with several field guns and 70 horses. At 1130 the detachment proceeded to the vicinity of LANDEDA where 194 men and officers surrendered. Their equipment included six 155mm guns and 32 other guns of varying caliber.

The Command was given the mission of seizing Hill 105 and the "nose" west of Hill 105. Troops A and E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) pushed south to gain artillery OPs and, with the 1st Bn 28th Inf Regt following, attacked south toward KERNHOAS. This force met stiff resistance and repeated counterattacks but by nightfall the reconnaissance elements held OPs southwest of GUIPAVAS and the infantry battalion held a line just north of the GOUESNOU—GUIPAVAS highway. The 50th Armd Inf Bn with a platoon of Co A 603d TD Bn attached moved under cover of darkness to a forward assembly area northeast of GUIPAVAS.

CCB (Read): Remained in assembly north of LANANNEYEN where it was joined by Co D 15th Tk Bn and Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn which had been released from their escort duties with Trains Command.

12 August 1944

The attack by CCA astride the GUIPAVAS—BREST Road had limited success. In the vicinity of GUIPAVAS it gained good observation points which protected artillery positions to the rear, but it failed to take the well defended strongpoints on Hill 105.

At 1900 on 12 Aug orders were received from the Corps to leave one combat command to contain BREST and move at once the remainder of the Div to the LORIENT area to relieve the 4th Armd Div. The VIII Corps began movement to the BREST area with 3 infantry divisions and Corps troops to undertake an assault on the fortress city. Corps assumed command of CCA in place on 18 Aug.

CCA (Taylor): Following Div orders of the previous day, the Command launched an attack at 0800 to gain the limited objective of Hill 105 and the "nose" west of it. CT 50 supported by Div Arty attacked Hill 105 from the east. The attack was made up hill over difficult terrain into a position of undertermined strength. The initial attack progressed about 400 yards when it was repulsed by extremely heavy small arms and automatic weapon fire of 20mm and 40mm caliber. A second attempt made with heavy artillery support gained a line 500 yards west of the line departure but was met with the same fierce resistance and the battalion withdrew. The 1st Bn 28th Inf Regt attacked south on Hill 95. This attack was over difficult terrain and was met by considerable resistance and repeated counterattacks from the front and the west flank. The attack was finally stopped some 200 yards south of the GOUESNOU—GUIPAVAS highway where positions were consolidated.

A detachment from the Command which had remained as a security force in its old assembly area at PLOUVIEN proceeded to ST PABU where it effected the surrender of an artillery battery of 9 officers and 309 men with 16 field guns and other military impedimenta. At this time the mission of the Command was changed to one of containing the enemy in BREST. It was estimated that there were 20,000 enemy troops in BREST.

CCB (Read): Received orders at 2045 to march to VANNES to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div.

Res Comd (Hanson): Remained in the vicinity of KERDALES prepared to move on LORIENT at 131200.

Although units of the Div were already on the march to take over a new mission, the battle of BREST was far from finished. Elements left behind added greatly to the already outstanding achievements of the 6th Armd Div. CT 50 fought many actions around BREST and assisted in cleaning out the DOUALAS and CROZON peninsulas opposite the fortress. In order to maintain a proper time sequence for Div activity, a description of this action which is actually a part of the BREST operation has been placed in the following section.

LORIENT

13 August—17 September 1944

In accordance with orders received on 12 Aug, the Div started redeployment of troops to carry out the new mission of containing BREST and to relieve the 4th Armd Div at LORIENT and VANNES.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
1st Bn 28th Inf Regt (Atchd)
83d Armd FA Bn (Atchd)
174th FA Bn (Atchd)
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Tr A & Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Res Comd

44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
777th AAA Bn (—)
969th FA Bn (Atchd in place at LORIENT)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
3398th QM Trk Co
3916th QM Gasoline Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn

Movement was made over the two following routes:

- A. North Route: LESNEVEN—MORLAIX—CARHAIX—RESTRENE—PONTIVY—VANNES.
- B. South Route: Southern edge LESNEVEN—LANDIVISIAU—HUELGOAT—GC No 17—GOURIN—PLOUAY—LORIENT.

CCA (Taylor): Continued the attack on the outer defenses of BREST with the 1st Bn 28th Inf and the 50th Armd Inf Bn. Heavy machine gun, mortar, and 40mm fire prevented the breaching of the enemy outpost line. At dark these battalions consolidated and held their positions.

CCB (Read): Following orders received at 2045 the day before, the Command marched on VANNES. Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz marched at 0635 to reconnoiter the route of advance through PLOUVIEN—LESNEVEN—MORLAIX—CARHAIX—ROSTRENE—PONTIVY—LOCMINE and VANNES. The advance guard followed at 0800. Tr B reached the road junction north of LOCMINE and established contact with elements of the 4th Armd Div at 1325. The Commander of the 4th Armd Div sent word to the Command not to move south of the east-west highway through LOCMINE prior to 140600. The Combat Command Commander went forward to 4th Armd Div Hq and made arrangements to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div in the area north and east of VANNES beginning at 140700. The Command closed in an assembly area about 2 miles north of LOCMINE at 2300. The move had been made without incident.

Res Comd (Hanson): On orders from Div, the Command marched toward LORIENT at 1200 with the mission of relieving 4th Armd Div troops containing the fortress there. The Command arrived in a temporary bivouac in the vicinity of Le FAQUET at 2045. Contact was made immediately with the Commanding General, 4th Armd Div to fulfill the mission of relieving 4th Armd Div units.

14 August 1944

The Div continued to contain BREST and commenced the relief of the 4th Armd Div at VANNES and LORIENT. Upon arrival at VANNES, at noon, the Div Comdr found that Hq 4th Armd Div and all troops in the VANNES area had departed during the morning. He further learned that the city of VANNES and the surrounding area had been entirely cleared of enemy forces and were under complete control of the French FFI. Since the German garrison had withdrawn into the defenses of LORIENT and onto the QUIBERON PENINSULA, it was apparent that no containing force was necessary at VANNES. Therefore, the CCA column approaching VANNES from the north was diverted north-west to PLOUAY and employed to strengthen the containing force of LORIENT itself. The relief of CCB 4th Armd Div, north of LORIENT, was completed during the day.

CCB 4th Armd Div was entirely west of the SCORFF River, leaving the sectors to the east covered by cavalry. When relief was made, CCB was given the west sector; 15th Tk Bn reinforced, the center sector (between the SCORFF and BLAVET Rivers); and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, the east sector. The latter two forces were directly under Div control. Two battalions from the Res Comd were transferred to CCB. The artillery was initially all in place west of the SCORFF River. Later, one battalion was shifted to the center sector.

CCA (Taylor): Reorganized and consolidated positions to contain the fortress of BREST, now estimated to be garrisoned by 40,000 men with great numbers of AT guns. Aggressive and constant patrolling became a part of the daily job of containing the enemy. Continuous activity on the flanks by reconnaissance units and 24-hours-a-day harassing interdiction and observed fire by the 83d and 174th FA Bns kept the enemy busy. Occasional counter battery by the enemy was increased in intensity toward the end of the commitment in the BREST area.

CCB (Read): Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz with one platoon of Co B 15th Tk Bn moved out at 0700 to relieve elements of the 25th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz near MILIZAC. Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn with one platoon Co B 15th Tk Bn moved to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div Res near AURAY. One platoon of Co B 15th Tk Bn relieved elements of the 4th Armd Div at MEUCON. The remainder of CCB moved at 1245 to assemble just east of VANNES. While the Command was enroute south from

LOCMINE, its mission was changed by the Div Comdr. The Command was ordered to proceed to the vicinity of ARZANO to take over from Res Comd, relieve elements of CCB of the 4th Armd Div between the SCORFF and LEITA Rivers, and contain the enemy in LORIENT within that zone. At this time the 15th Tk Bn with Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn attached and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (less Tr B) were given separate missions. The Command turned right through GRANDCHAMP and proceeded to an assembly area three miles south of ARZANO, closing at 2300. The Commanding Officers of the 44th Armd Inf Bn, Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn, and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn made contact with elements of the 4th Armd Div on the OPL and arranged to relieve them at 150600. Div Arty was in general support.

The Command was now composed of the following troops:

- 44th Armd Inf Bn
- 9th Armd Inf Bn (—A Co)
- 68th Tk Bn
- Cos A and C 25th Armd Engr Bn
- Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
- Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Hanson): (less 44th Armd Inf Bn, 68th Tk Bn and Co B 603d TD Bn) was relieved by CCB. Remaining elements of the Command went into bivouac north of ARZANO.

CT 15: Occupied the center sector south of PLOUAY between SCORFF and BLAVET Rivers, relieving the 4th Armd Div cavalry.

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—): Occupied the east sector from HENNEBONT to LANDEVANT and patrolled east to REDON.

15 August 1944

By 0600 the Div had completed the relief of the 4th Armd Div on the BRITTANY PENINSULA and was disposed in positions to contain the fortresses of BREST and LORIENT and to patrol the vicinity of VANNES.

CCA (Taylor): Continued to contain BREST; it received some sniper fire but the situation was generally quiet. A truce was called on the left flank to remove wounded and dead. Artillery placed unobserved fire on a reported CP and truck park.

16 August 1944

Activity of the Div was confined to vigorous patrolling on all fronts and continuous artillery fire which included harassing, observed and counterbattery missions.

Res Comd (Hanson): From its bivouac area north of ARZANO the Command sent to CONCARNEAU a combat team comprised of:

- 1 Light Tank Platoon
- 1 Plat C Engr
- 1 Sound Truck (Psychological Warfare Team)
- Russian-French Interpreter
- 8 Cargo Trucks
- 1 1/4-Ton with 3 Medical EM
- 1 CW Radio Half-Track
- 1 Sect TDs

This combat team was to attempt to effect the surrender of a German garrison there. The force arrived at CONCARNEAU about 1900. After several attempts were made to effect the surrender by means of a sound truck, an interpreter proceeded into the town under a white flag. The interpreter returned about 2030 with a German officer and negotiations were carried on until about 2300, but nothing further was accomplished.

17 August 1944

The Div continued its mission of containing enemy garrisons at BREST, LORIENT and QUIBERON and assumed responsibility for patrolling the area west as far as the base of the CROZON PENINSULA.

CCA (Taylor): Which was still in the BREST area, began operations to cut the water supply of the city. There was some small patrol activity, and attached artillery fired harassing and observed fires, destroying one AA battery.

CCB (Read): Continuing a further reorganization of its zone, the Command assigned to the 44th Armd Inf Bn with Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn attached an area on the OPL from the SCORFF River junction south of PONT SCORFF west to the stream junction southwest of KERVARSNOUEN. The 9th Armd Inf Bn (—) with Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn was given the additional mission of assisting 68th Tk Bn with mounted patrols west of the LEITA River extending south from QUIMPERLE to the ocean. The 231st Armd FA Bn was in direct support of the 9th Armd Inf Bn; the 212th Armd FA Bn was in direct support of the 44th Armd Inf Bn.

Res Comd (Hanson): Was still in tactical bivouac north of ARZANO. The Combat Team which was in the vicinity of CONCARNEAU was still attempting to get the German garrison there to surrender. A show of force and a few rounds fired over the city caused the surrender of 102 of the enemy. Further operations in this area on that day were of no avail, however, and reinforcing tanks and destroyers were sent to CONCARNEAU, closing at about 2115.

18 August 1944

Activities on the Div front were confined to vigorous patrolling by both enemy and friendly forces and exchanges of artillery fire.

CCA (Taylor): The 28th Regimental Combat Team joined Command and occupied the left part of the Command's sector. The 45th FA Bn of the 28th RCT reinforced those battalions present.

CCB (Read): The Assault Gun Platoon of the 68th Tk Bn moved into position along the west bank of the LEITA River and destroyed several gun and battery emplacements.

Res Comd (Hanson): The 69th Tk Bn was given a separate mission as part of the containing forces of LORIENT. It moved to its assigned sector between the BLAVET River and the line of River de l'ETEL—LANDEVANT—BAUD, relieving the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) which retained its reconnaissance mission to the east. Occupation of its zone was completed by 1200. The Combat Team in the vicinity of CONCARNEAU requested civilians to evacuate the town and at 1600 shelled definitely located military targets in the town. Remaining forces of the Command were in tactical bivouac north of ARZANO and had no contact with the enemy.

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Bridges): Established headquarters near CARHAIX in order to perform its mission of maintaining patrols on the assigned route: LE FAOUET—GOURIN—CHATEAUNEUF—CHATEAULIN.

19 August 1944

The Div continued its mission of containing BREST, LORIENT and QUIBERON.

The Div Comdr visited Corps Hq at LESNEVEN, at which time the relief of Hq CCA was arranged to take place the next day. All troops assigned to CCA remained in the BREST area under Corps control and were attached to the divisions operating there. These troops took part in the assault on BREST, all except the cavalry being employed on the DOUALAS PENINSULA until 10 September, when they were returned to Div control. The cavalry operated on the west flank under 29th Div.

CCA (Taylor): Received some counterbattery fire and sustained some casualties in its continued mission of containing BREST. The 28th FA Bn reinforced the Combat Command artillery on this day. Two platoons of the 50th Armd Inf Bn attacked a 100-man patrol at SPREM and drove it back.

CCB (Read): Activity was confined to patrolling which contained enemy forces in LORIENT. Co A of the 68th Tk Bn was attached to the 50th Armd Inf Bn and marched to the BREST area 21 Aug. The 969th FA Bn was detached, reverted to Corps control, and marched to the BREST area. Enemy patrols of 70 to 100 men were active in the vicinity of KERANANARE, KERDENOWTOLDER LA BOULAIE and KERVENOU.

Res Comd (Hanson): Was in bivouac north of ARZANO with one combat team in the vicinity of CONCARNEAU. This combat team again shelled the city. The German garrison was too strongly emplaced on inaccessible ground to warrant an assault. Therefore, when the enemy did not submit after being shelled, the Combat Team was recalled on Div order and the city was contained by FFI personnel.

20 August 1944

The Div continued to contain LORIENT and BREST and patrolled the flanks from CHATEAULIN to REDON.

CCA (Taylor): Elements of the VIII Corps began to effect relief of CCA.

21 August 1944

Upon the arrival of Hq CCA at LORIENT from BREST, the separate forces in the center and left sectors (15th CT and 69th CT) were assigned to CCA in place.

CCA (Taylor): Was relieved at BREST by six battalions of the 2d Inf Div and the supporting artillery. The Command Hq moved to the LORIENT area, leaving the following units attached to VIII Corps to remain at BREST:

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Trs A and E (—) 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Reinf)

The route of march was by way of LANDERNEAU—HEULGOAT—GOURIN—POLUAY to the vicinity of INZINZAC, a distance of approximately 100 miles. The Command now composed of:

15th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn

was given the mission of holding the center and east sectors at LORIENT between the SCORFF River and the line de l'ETEL River—LANDEVANT—BAUD.

CCB (Read): Continued activities necessary to contain the enemy garrison at LORIENT. Co A of the 68th Tk Bn moved out to join the 50th Armd Inf Bn still at BREST, and Cos B and C withdrew from the front lines to an area north of ARZANO to permit better maintenance and training.

22 August 1944

The Div responsibility now extended from the base of the CROZEN PENINSULA to REDON, although troops of the Div were being employed as far west as the tip of the BRITTANY PENINSULA to the west of BREST, where a troop of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to the 29th Div.

Composition of Troops:

CCA

15th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

Res Comd

25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)

Arty Comd

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn

CT 50 (AT BREST)

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Trs A and E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co A 68th Tk Bn

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn (—)
44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
Cos A & C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Rcn Tr 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
3398th QM Trk Co
3916th QM Gasoline Co
990th Engr Tdwy Br Co
777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Hq (Fwd)

1 Sect Btry B, 1 Sect Btry C and Adv CP 777th AAA Bn

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

23—27 August 1944

The various units of the Div were involved in minor engagements throughout this period. Probably the most important of these actions was that carried out by CT 50 (Wall) as part of Task Force

Van Fleet in cleaning up the DOUALAS PENINSULA opposite BREST. On the QUIBERON PENINSULA a cable was cut which broke communication between 1,500 German troops there and the garrison at LORIENT. Tr D of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz extended its reconnaissance activities to include enemy installations and movements on the CROZON PENINSULA.

CCB was alerted to move on 28 Aug to the vicinity of ORLEANS.

28 August 1944

With the departure of CCB for the east, CCA was given responsibility for the entire LORIENT front, from the LEITA River below QUIMPERLE to BELZ. It was also given the remaining troops of Res Comd.

CCA (Taylor): Relieved CCB on its front and assumed responsibility for the west sector of LORIENT from the coast west of LORIENT to the BLAVET River. Hq of the Command was moved to KERVASIE, approximately 1½ miles northwest of POINT SCORFF, and the Combat Command was reconstituted to include Res Comd and its attached units.

CCB (Read): Moved out, by units, with Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz departing at 1000 to reconnoiter the route to REDON. The 69th Tk Bn moved at 1045 and the remainder of the Command moved at 1200 by way of ARZANO—PLOUAY—BUBRY—BAUD—GRANDCHAMP—VANNES and REDON. The move was made without incident and the Command closed in bivouac 4 miles east of REDON at 2045.

Res Comd (Hanson): Was attached to CCA and reconstituted. With new troops, it was given the mission, under CCA, of containing the LORIENT sector between PONT SCORFF and HENNEBONT. At 1319 Res Comd with the Hq 15th Tk Bn moved from bivouac north of ARZANO to an area 2 miles due south of PLOUAY.

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Harris): Retained its responsibility for flank reconnaissance and took over the east sector to the east of the BLAVET River (formerly held by 69th CT).

The composition of the commands at this time was:

CCA	CCB
Res Comd	44th Armd Inf Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn	69th Tk Bn
15th Tk Bn	212th Armd FA Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)	Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn w/Sect 990th Tdwy Br Co Atchd
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)	Co C & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
	Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
	Btry B 777th AAA Bn

29 August—16 September 1944

During this period, there was no major change in the disposition of troops at LORIENT. On 29 Aug General Taylor was relieved from the Div and Colonel Hanson was assigned to command CCA. On 12 Sept Colonel Harris was assigned to command the Res Comd. On the 6th of September Colonel Riley returned to duty and resumed command of Div Arty. Relief of the Div at LORIENT by the 94th Div was an extremely long, drawn-out process. The 94th Div Comdr arrived on 5 Sept, but leading troops of the Div did not reach the area until noon 10 Sept, and the complete relief was not effected until 16 Sept.

On 10 Sept the Div, with its mission of containing LORIENT and protecting the south flank of the THIRD and NINTH ARMIES, was extended 460 miles from the eastern edge of the BREST area and the DOUALAS PENINSULA where CT 50 was fighting to AUXERRE. The central section of approximately 220 miles from REDON to ORLEANS was covered by patrols of the 83d Inf Div.

The Div reconstituted the commands on the completion of the movement into the LORRIS area.

CCA	CCB
50th Armd Inf Bn	44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn	69th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)	212th Armd FA Bn
603d TD Bn (—)	Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr A & E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	Co C & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
	Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
	Btry B 777th AAA Bn
	1 Sect 990th Tdwy Br Co

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
 312th Armd FA BN
 Btry 777th AAA Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

1 Gun Sect & Adv CP 777th AAA Bn

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
 128th Ord Maint Bn
 777th AAA Bn (—)
 990th Tdwy Br Co (—)
 3398th QM Trk Co
 3803d QM Trk Co

Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) Reinf (Atchd to 94th Div)

1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
 1 Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn

On the 13th of Sept, before the Div could be completely assembled in the LORRIS area, CCB was ordered to move without delay to an area east of TROYES. From there the THIRD ARMY ordered the Command into an assembly area in the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU, the first step towards the next campaign.

CCA (Hanson): From this date to the 13th of Sept the Command continued to contain LORIENT and actively patrolled a line from QUIMPERLE to HENNEBONT and the BLAVET River. The outposts were frequently attacked by enemy patrols and artillery. At no time was ground lost.

On the 10th of Sept elements of the 301st Inf Regt arrived and began taking over the forward positions. Initial relief was accomplished on the 12th of Sept. Because this was to be the first combat experience for the relieving units, troops of the Command were left in the lines for 24 to 48 hours to accustom the newcomers to the situation. The Command was officially released from the LORIENT sector 13 Sept at 1200. All troops were detached and Hq of CCA moved to bivouac east of PLOUAY prior to movement to the Div assembly area near LORRIS.

Res Comd (Harris): Was withdrawn from CCA control 12 Sept and given a sector east of BLAVET River. The last unit of the Div to be relieved at LORIENT, it followed CCA to LORRIS on 16 Sept.

CCB (Read): 29 Aug—The Combat Command with an advance guard moved out at 0800 in one column through GUEMENE—NOZAY—CANDE—ANGERS—and BAUGE. Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz preceded the column by 1½ hours. At 1145 the Rcn Co 603d TD Bn was sent south through NOZAY—NORT and ANCENIS along the LOIRE River to ANGERS and rejoined the column there. No enemy were encountered enroute. The Command closed in an assembly area just north of PONTIGNE. Engineers were sent south to conduct bridge and road reconnaissance. Contact with elements of the 83d Inf Div was established. Liaison officers were sent to secure information on enemy at BLOIS and TOURS. A platoon of Rcn Co 603d TD Bn and a Rcn platoon of 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were dispatched south to secure information of enemy reported in the vicinity of SAUMUR.

30 Aug—Extensive reconnaissance was carried on to the east, particularly in the vicinity of SAUMUR and all along the LOIRE River. The Command remained in place. The north bank of the river near SAUMUR was evacuated the night of the 29th. This was verified by an infantry platoon and a platoon of Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz at 1500 when they entered LA CROIX VERTE dismounted and found all entrances mined. Two columns were composed as follows:

North Column:

44th Armd Inf Bn (—)
 1 Co 69th Tk Bn
 1 Btry 212th Armd FA Bn
 1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
 Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
 Co B 76th Med Bn
 Co A 128th Ord Maint Bn (—)
 Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—1 Plat)
 Attached Gas Trucks
 Ammunition trains of 69th Tk Bn & 212th Armd FA Bn

South Column:

69th Tk Bn (—1 Co)
 212th Armd FA Bn (—1 Btry)
 2 Cos 44th Armd Inf Bn
 1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
 Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
 Det A 128th Ord Maint Bn
 Hq & Hq Co CCB
 1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

31 Aug—At 0730 CCB marched east in two columns from the vicinity of PONTIGNE. Just east of BEAUGENCY, as the column arrived on the river road, small arms and AT fire was received from the south side of the river. Two half-tracks were knocked out, but no casualties resulted. The enemy

pulled out when tank fire was placed on his suspected position. The two vehicles were towed into bivouac and repaired. CCB closed in bivouac 2 miles south of BUCY at 2145. The following day the Command proceeded through ORLEANS to an assembly area in the vicinity of LORRIS.

2—16 September 1944

Having received orders to relieve the 35th Inf Div of the responsibility of protecting the south flank of the THIRD ARMY, the Div directed CCB, which closed in the LORRIS area at 1800 1 Sept, to carry out the mission. Contact was established with the 83d Inf Div on the west at ORLEANS and the 35th Inf Div on the east at MONTARGIS. The Div boundary was extended east to AUXERRE.

During CCB's attachment to the THIRD ARMY contact was established with the SEVENTH ARMY driving up from the south. This contact was made by patrols of Tr B of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz with the 2d Dragoons of the 2d French Armd Div at SAULIEU on 11 Sept.

CHAPTER II

SEILLE RIVER CAMPAIGN

17 September 1944 to 7 November 1944

17 September 1944

The Div continued its movement into the LORRIS assembly area and CCB effected the movement east which had been ordered by Army the previous day.

CCB (Read): Moved on the following route: LUSIGNY—VENDEUVRE SUR BARSE—JUZENNE-COURT—COLOGNE—ANDELOT—NEUFCHATEAU—to an assembly area southeast of MARTIGNY LES GERBONVAUX, closing at 2000.

18 September 1944

CCB made contact with the 4th Armd Div in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE. Res Comd arrived in the LORRIS area and verbal orders from the Commanding General, THIRD ARMY were received directing movement of the Div (less CCB) to an assembly area near COLOMBEY LES BELLES. In accordance with these orders, CCA moved out at 2200. The following composition of troops was to become effective upon arrival in the COLOMBEY LES BELLES area:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
603d TD Bn (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (—)
68th Tk Bn (—)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
Btry C (—1 Sect) and Hq (Rr) 777th AAA Bn
3398th QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (—1 Sect)

Div Hq (Fwd Ech)

2 Sects & Adv CP 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hanson): The 50th Armd Inf Bn, 603d TD Bn (—) and the 777th AAA Bn moved at 2200 on the following route: MONTARGIS—SENS—TROYES—BONNET—GONDRECOURT—VANNES LE CHATEAU—COLOMBEY LES BELLES.

CCB (Read): Moved at 0930 to an assembly area near SAULXURES LES NANCY. It had been attached to the XII Corps, assigned to "Task Force Sebree", and ordered to attack and seize AMANEE

HILL in conjunction with the 137th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div; but at 1800 these orders were rescinded by Corps. Instead, the Command was ordered to relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE. Accordingly, contact was made with the 4th Armd Div and arrangements were made to effect the relief at 190930.

Res Comd (Harris): Remaining units arrived in the LORRIS area at 1900.

19 September 1944

CCB (Read): Relief of elements of the 4th Armd Div was effected beginning at 0930. LUNEVILLE was occupied against sniper and light machine gun fire by two companies of the 44th Armd Inf Bn, and contact with the 6th Cav south of LA VEZOUSE RIVER was maintained by Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Bridges at ROSIERES, DAMELEVIERES and DOMBASLE over the MEURTHE River were guarded by Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn. One company of the 44th Armd Inf Bn was placed on the line north of LUNEVILLE and the Rcn Co 603d TD Bn with one platoon 691st TD Bn was sent to MAIZE to protect the bridge and reconnoiter north and east. All elements of the Command came under heavy enemy fire and many mines were encountered. During the night an enemy patrol attempted but failed to infiltrate through the lines of the 44th Armd Inf Bn. Our artillery fires destroyed 3 German Mark IV tanks. One of our medium tanks was lost to enemy anti-tank fire.

20 September 1944

In the LUNEVILLE area CCB pushed tentative fingers east and northeast of the town and continued to receive heavy artillery fire from the enemy for its pains. Late in the day the Command received orders under which it was to be relieved and moved north where the enemy had a dangerous salient thrusting down into the Corps MLR—a line that needed straightening. By now all of the Div had cleared LORRIS for COLOMBEY LES BELLES.

CCB (Read): Extended its outposts to the east and northeast of LUNEVILLE. Heavy artillery and mortar fire and some small arms fire was received during the day. A platoon of medium tanks from the 69th Tk Bn assisted and covered the withdrawal of an infantry battalion of the 79th Inf Div which had been cut off by the enemy. Late in the day the Command received orders from XII Corps directing relief by the 2d Cav Gp and 695th TD Gp and movement to an assembly area in the FORET DE GREMECEY near JALLAUCOURT.

21 September 1944

The Div (Less CCB) completed its move to COLOMBEY LES BELLES. CCB, in accordance with orders issued the previous day, pulled north into the salient which the 35th Inf Div had pushed toward the SAAR.

CCB (Read): Began a march at 0822 via DOMBASLE—VARANGEVILLE—HARAUCOURT—GELLONCOURT—REMEREVILLE—ERBEVILLER—SORNEVILLE—MONCEL SUR SEILLE—PETTONCOURT—GREMECEY to an assembly area in the FORET DE GREMECEY, closing at 1600. The CP was located in the west central portion of the woods. At 1030 a message was received from XII Corps assigning the Command to the 35th Inf Div. CCB was to move at daylight to attack positions southwest of LANFROICOURT, after which it was to drive south and capture AMANEE HILL in conjunction with an attack from the south and southeast by the 35th Inf Div and an attack from the west by the 80th Inf Div.

Res Comd (Harris): The following units, comprising the remainder of the Div (—CCB), closed in the assembly area at COLOMBEY LES BELLES:

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn

CCB jumped off early in the first phase of its swing to clear enemy from the rear of the 35th Inf Div positions. It stabbed across the SEILLE River and before the day had hardly begun was at grips with the Germans. Because there was only one available crossing the combat teams had to follow one another at first and then fan out to meet the enemy. Bitter fighting developed as the Germans, caught by the triple thrusts of the 6th Armd, 35th and 80th Inf Divs, tried first to delay and when that became impossible, attempted to extricate themselves from an untenable position. The Command pushed on, hurdling each successive obstacle, and reached its primary objectives south of LANFROICOURT.

22 September 1944

The Div (—CCB, 15th and 68th Tk Bns and Div Tns) moved by way of COLOMBEY LES BELLES—N404—VEZELISE—TANTONVILLE—HAROUÉ—BAYON—IC1—ROSIERES AUX SALINES—DOM-

BASLE—IC8—ERBEVILLER—MONCEL SUR SEILLE to the vicinity of JALLAUCOURT. A reconnaissance patrol of 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz moved north and northwest of LEMONCOURT and AULNOIS SUR SEILLE and made contact with the enemy.

CCB (Read): Commencing at 0700, the movement of CCB was to be made in three columns. The north column was to move northwest along the FOSSIEUX RIDGE to a point due north of HAN, thence across the SEILLE River at HAN to ARMAUCOURT and then to the vicinity of LANFROICOURT. It was to be followed by the reserve column. The south column was to move southwest to ALINCOURT, thence north to ABONCOURT SUR SEILLE and MANHOUE. At MANHOUE it was to cross the bridge over the SEILLE River and move to the vicinity of LANFROICOURT. From the crest of the FOSSIEUX RIDGE south to HAN is a steep hill about 160 feet high. There was no bridge at HAN but the SEILLE River could be forded there with difficulty. Fords across the SEILLE River are rare. It was decided to ford at HAN rather than sacrifice hours of delay in building a bridge. The column went down the hill and at the bottom forded the SEILLE River. At 0723, the north column established contact with the enemy at ARMAUCOURT. Stiff anti-tank, tank and infantry resistance was overcome and the column proceeded to its attack position, arriving at 1245. At noon the reserve column, which was following the north column, approached ARMAUCOURT where it was met by strong enemy resistance. The town was then held by approximately 1,000 Germans in defensive positions. The column attacked through the town and captured it after heavy street fighting. The south column moved out at 0700 and met stiff enemy resistance south of MANHOUE. Our attempt to block the main road with Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was unsuccessful and the troop was driven in by enemy infantry and tanks. A request for air was denied but Corps artillery interdicted the road.

23 September 1944

The Germans abandoned their positions on AMANEE HILL in the face of a frontal assault during the night by the 35th Inf Div and a flanking thrust by CCB. Consequently the planned attack on the high ground was cancelled and orders were issued to harass the enemy withdrawal and to cut him off. CCB was ordered to cut the road running north in two places and bottle the enemy.

The Div was ordered to hold a section of the Corps MLR in FORET DE GREMECEY, assist the 80th Inf Div and 35th Inf Div in case of counterattack, and send one combat command to XX Corps. To carry out these orders Div assigned troops as follows:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt 35th Inf Div
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
128th Armd FA Bn

Div Tns

76th Med Bn Armd
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Hq (—) and Btry C (—) 777th AAA Bn

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

15th Tk Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Rcn Co & Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Arty Comd

231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Hq (Fwd)

Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D and Adv CP 777th
AAA Bn

CO F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) Reinf (Atchd
to 94th Inf Div at LORIENT)

Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

CCB (Read): At 0715 information was received that the projected attack on AMANEE HILL was cancelled. Pressure caused by CCB moving down from the north had caused the enemy to withdraw and permitted the 35th Inf Div coming up from the south to occupy the hill. In accordance with new orders, CT 44 (McCorrison) was dispatched toward LEYR and by 1415 the town was captured and outposted. Another force consisting of Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, one medium tank company and one light tank platoon from the 69th Tk Bn, and one platoon Co C 603d TD Bn was ordered to move to the vicinity of ARRAYE ET HAN and block the highway west. Driven out of the town by intense artillery and mortar fire this force established a defensive line on the high ground between ARMAUCOURT and ARRAYE ET HAN. At 1845 an enemy counterattack on LEYR was repulsed without loss. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was placed on all our positions throughout the night.

Res Comd (Harris): Was ordered to XX Corps as a mobile reserve in the vicinity of JARNY.

24 September 1944

For the first time since the BREST Campaign, the Div (—Res Comd) now held a continuous sector. CCB, on the left, had units just north of ARMAUCOURT and the line ran from there northeast across the SEILLE, along FOSSIEUX RIDGE and down to the FORET DE GREMECEY. CCA maintained the line on the right. The enemy, who had been roughly thrust from his positions on the previous day, attempted for the second time to return but the Div held firm.

CCB (Read): At 1600 CT 44 in LEYR was relieved by elements of the 35th Inf Div and returned to an assembly area southwest of LANFROICOURT, leaving only a covering force north of ARMAUCOURT. A strong enemy counterattack was launched on this position late in the day and one company of infantry was brought up to help repulse the attack which was beaten off at 2000 hours. Enemy artillery remained active throughout the day and night.

Res Comd (Harris) (—68th Tk Bn): Moved via NANCY and TOUL to the vicinity of JARNY and became a mobile reserve in the XX Corps area. The 68th Tk Bn joined the Res Comd at JARNY.

15th Tk Bn: Closed in bivouac at FORET DE GREMECEY.

25 September 1944

For the third consecutive day the enemy tried to force his way back into positions wrested from him by CCB, but the Comd did not yield a foot of ground. This enemy attack was typical—tanks and infantry combined—but our concentrated fire of all types broke it up. CCA was relieved of its portion of the line by the 35th Inf Div.

CCA (Hanson): Continued to protect the northeast, north and northwest sectors of the FORET DE GREMECEY pending relief by elements of the 35th Inf Div which was effected during the day. The Command, in Corps reserve, moved to an assembly area near SAULZURES LES NANCY and prepared to counterattack any threat to the Corps bridgehead.

CCB (Read): At 0645 an enemy counterattack by three tanks and two hundred infantry on the position north of ARMAUCOURT was repulsed. At 1500 orders were received from XII Corps for an attack on MOIVRON in conjunction with the 317th Inf Regt, 80th Inf Div at 0800 the following day. CT 44 moved to the vicinity of LEYR to hold the north-south road and tie in with the 80th Inf Div on the left and the 134th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div on the right. This was accomplished at 1845.

26 September 1944

The enemy still held a small salient thrust down into the XXI Corps MLR in the vicinity of MOIVRON. It was from this area that he had been launching abortive attempts to get behind the FORET DE GREMECEY, so Corps orders were to eliminate the bulge. The 35th Inf Div, supported by CCB, was assigned the task. Plans called for the 317th Inf Regt to lead off, supported by CCB's tanks, and move from the southeast into MOIVRON. CCB was then to take over the new line. A combination of intense enemy artillery and deep mud stalled the attack soon after it started and the 317th came back, leaving the line as it was.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Rcn Co and Co C 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Arty Comd

231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn (—)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) (Reinf)
(Atchd to 94th Inf Div)

Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D & Adv CP 777th
AAA Bn

CCA (Hanson): Moved to the Div assembly area near SAULXURES LES NANCY as ordered.

CCB (Read): From 0745 until 0800 the 212th Armd FA Bn placed a concentration on MOIVRON while a medium tank company and a tank destroyer platoon placed direct fire on the town. At 0800 the attack jumped off with the 2d Bn 317th Inf Regt coming through LEYR and attacking MOIVRON from the southeast. A medium tank company of the 69th Tk Bn was to move up behind the infantry advance and be prepared to counterattack or support the attack with additional direct fire. The 44th Armd Inf Bn was to move up after the attack jumped off and extend the line from MOIVRON east to the road junction south of ARRAYE ET HAN.

It was necessary for the 44th Armd Inf Bn to take up a defensive position north of LEYR when the infantry of the 317th Inf Regt withdrew through our lines. Exceedingly boggy terrain prevented proper maneuver of tanks across country. Two medium tanks hit mines on the road just south of MOIVRON and four medium tanks mired down in the mud at the edge of town. All six tanks had to be abandoned when the infantry withdrew. These tanks were later destroyed by the enemy.

25th Armd Engr Bn: Constructed a 160-foot treadway bridge at BRIN SUR SEILLE.

27 September 1944

CCB continued to hold stubbornly in the face of heavy shelling.

CCA (Hanson): CT 15 (Lagrew) consisting of:

Rcn Plat 15th Tk Bn
AG Plat 15th Tk Bn
Co A 15th Tk Bn
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

was sent to vicinity of MAZERULLES on alert status to counterattack in case of enemy penetration and to establish a road block.

CCB (Read): The 44th Armd Inf Bn continued to hold ground north of LEYR awaiting resumption of the attack of the 80th Inf Div or relief by elements of that Div. Considerable enemy artillery and mortar fire with some small arms fire continued. The Rcn Co 603d TD Bn reverted to Battalion control except for one platoon which was attached to Co C 603d TD Bn. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was relieved except for one platoon which remained under Command control.

Div Arty (Riley): Hq Btry 212th Armd FA Bn received enemy artillery fire at three different times and was forced to displace to its alternate position.

Composition of troops:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (—)
231st Armd FA Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Reinf)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn

Res Comd (Atchd to XX Corps)

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
128th Armd FA Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
15th Tk Bn (—)

Tns Comd

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Hq Co (—) & Btry C (—) 777th AAA Bn

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
Co C with 3d Plat Rcn Co Atchd 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Atchd to XX Corps)

9th Armd Inf Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) Reinf (Atchd to

94th Div at LORIENT

Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

Tns Comd

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)

Arty Comd

Hq & Hq Co

Div Hq (Fwd)

Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D and Adv CP 777th
AAA Bn

28 September 1944

CT 15 was already at MAZERULLES and was to be absorbed by CCA upon the Command's arrival. When the Div was ordered to send a reconnaissance troop to Res Comd at XX Corps, Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was assigned the mission. CCB continued to hold.

29 September 1944

Ordered to carry out the plan of the previous day, CCA moved from assembly to the vicinity of MAZERULLES and prepared to cover withdrawal of the 35th Inf Div or to counterattack through that unit to restore Corps' Main Line of Resistance. The Res Comd reverted to Div control upon its arrival at 2020 from XX Corps where it had been in mobile reserve at JARNY and BRIEY. The Command prepared to move into the Div assembly area.

30 September 1944

General George S. Patton Jr with General Manton S. Eddy visited the Div CP at SAULZURES at 1725 and issued orders through General Eddy for the Div (less CCB) to attack through the 35th Inf Div to restore the Corps MLR.

Accordingly Div issued Field Order No 22 directing the attack at daylight, 1 October. Composition of troops:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (—)
Co B Reinf and 1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr A Reinf 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
Co A Reinf 603d TD Bn (—)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn

CCB

40th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz Reinf
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn Reinf
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Tns

128th Ord Maint Bn
76th Med Bn A
3803d QM Trk Co

Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) (Reinf) (at

LORIENT)

Co Hq: Co Hq Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat: 1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 15th Tk Bn
3d Plat: 1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

Div Tns

642d QM Trk Co
Btry C (—) 777th AAA Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

Sect Btry C, Sect Btry D and Adv CP 777th
AAA Bn

CCA (Hanson): Ordered to move to an assembly area east of the SEILLE River, the Command prepared to attack north of FORET DE GREMECEY on Div order to gain high ground between FRESNES EN SAULNOIS and LEMONCOURT.

CCB (Read): Was ordered to continue its present mission.

Res Comd (Harris): Was ordered to move to assembly area near PETTONCOURT, prepared to attack east on Div order to gain high ground north of CHAMBREY and south of FORET DE GREMECEY.

Div Arty (Riley): Was ordered to support the attack.

1 October 1944

As planned, the Div attacked east and northeast through units of the 35th Inf Div, with the mission of restoring the Corps Main Line of Resistance. CCA attacked to the north of the FORET DE GREMECEY with two combat teams abreast and one following, and by early morning the Command had reached and captured its objective: the high ground between FRESNES EN SAULNOIS and LEMONCOURT. One combat team was shifted to protect the left rear of the new area. Res Comd attacked east to the south of the FORET DE GREMECEY with two combat teams abreast and by early morning had captured its objective: the ridge north of CHAMBREY. Both Commands were relieved during the afternoon and evening by elements of the 35th Inf Div which had closely followed the attack. They then returned to the assembly area east of NANCY and, in Corps Reserve, prepared to move out to repel any counterattack. CCB continued its holding action in the sector between the 80th and 35th Inf Divs.

CCA (Hanson): Closed in an advanced assembly area near ALINCOURT by 0200. At 0620 the Command moved into the attack with CT 15 on the left and CT 50 on the right, closely supported by CT 15-A. CT 15 attacked north over terrain which included the rising ground near MALAUCOURT SUR SEILLE. CT 50 also attacked north but moved along the western edge of the FORET DE GREMECEY, flushing the enemy from his cover. Because of recent rain the small stream south and west of the MALAUCOURT SUR SEILLE—JALLAUCOURT area presented a temporary barrier, but prompt action by forward elements in throwing down log crossings enabled the attack to move forward with a minimum loss of time. Just north of FORET DE GREMECEY one such crossing was constructed under small arms fire from an enemy unit in the woods. Immediate action by our infantry neutralized this fire. About half-way to the objective the infantry dismounted from half-tracks and fought the remainder of the distance on foot. As the attack progressed CT 15-A was ordered to a position midway between the two leading combat teams. At 0900 CT 15 reached its objective and shortly thereafter CT 50 captured its part of the Command objective. At 1200 CT 15-A went into position to the left rear of the Command objective to protect that flank.

Res Comd (Harris): The Command divided its troops as follows:

CT 9 (Godfrey)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—1 Co)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
2 Plats Co A 603d TD Bn
3 Plats Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—)
1 Co 9th Armd Inf Bn
3 Plats Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777 AAA Bn

Comd Res

Co A 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—1 Plat)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

The Command launched its attack in conjunction with CCA at 0620 with CT 9 on the left and CT 68 on the right. Upon crossing the front line of the 35th Inf Div it encountered heavy artillery and small arms fire and mines. The objective was seized at 0942. At 1000 the Command's reserve troops were committed to hold the objective against strong enemy resistance. At 1045 the Command extended its operations south and seized the town of CHAMBREY which had been held in force by the enemy. Troops dug in on the objective and held against repeated enemy counterattacks and heavy artillery fire while the 35th Inf Div moved up and occupied that portion of the Corps Main Line of Resistance within its zone. When relieved by the 35th Inf Div the Command withdrew under cover of darkness to an assembly area west of PETTONCOURT.

Div Arty: Shortly before and during the attack Div Arty fired heavy concentrations on MALAUCOURT SUR SEILLE, JALLAUCOURT and FOSSIEUX.

CCB (Read): The 44th Armd Inf Bn with one medium tank company and one tank destroyer platoon attached continued to hold an east and west line north of LEYR between the 134th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div on the right and the 317th Inf Regt, 80th Inf Div on the left.

2—5 October 1944

After units of the Div were relieved by the 35th Inf Div they continued to withdraw to the Div assembly area east of NANCY on alert status in Corps reserve. The 128th and 231st Armd FA Bns were given the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 35th Inf Div Arty but remained under Div control. Res Comd completed its movement to the assembly area, leaving a covering force consisting of Hq and one company 9th Armd Inf Bn, one company 68th Tk Bn and one platoon 603d TD Bn west of MONCEL SUR SEILLE.

6 October 1944

Once again the Corps decided to attack north from the line held by CCB to eliminate the enemy salient in the vicinity of MOIVRON. This time it was to be mainly a 6th Armd operation with the two infantry divisions coming in on the flanks to consolidate and hold when the armor had driven through. The final objective was to be the high ground west of LETRICOURT. CCB was to lead off and CCA was to take over when the primary objectives were reached. D-Day was set for 8 October. On that day CCB was to move out and CCA was to come up to the vicinity of BOUXIERES, prepared to reinforce CCB and advance through on order.

The covering force left by CCA west of MONCEL was relieved by elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. CCB remained in position, receiving heavy artillery fire.

CCB continued reconnaissance for forward assembly areas and routes and organized four combat teams. CCA was organized into 3 combat teams. Composition of commands at 1300 follows:

CCA

44th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
Co A 603d TD Bn, Reinf
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Tns

128th Ord Maint Bn
76th Med Bn A
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (—)
69th Tk Bn
Cos A and C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Cos B and C 603d TD Bn, Reinf
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry C (— 1 Sect) & Btry D (—1 Sect)
777th AAA Bn
Co A 86th Cml Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

Sect Btry C & Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn

The four combat teams of CCB were composed as follows:

CT 69 (Forrest)

69th Tk Bn (—1 M Tk Co & 1 L Tk Plat)
Cos A & C 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
3 Sections Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—1 L Tk Plat)
Cos A & C 50th Armd Inf Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
1st Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—5 Sections)

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—2 Rifle Cos)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sections Btry B 777th AAA Bn
2d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 9 (Godfrey)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—2 Cos)
Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)

The plan of attack was as follows: CCB was to move out at dawn 8 October to seize ARRAYE ET HAN, AJONCOURT, JEANDELINCOURT, MOIVRON and to clear the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIL D'AJONCOURT. CT 69 was to attack on the right, seize and hold ARRAYE ET HAN and AJONCOURT until relieved by the 134th Inf Regt of the 35th Inf Div, and protect the northeast flank of the Command. CT 15 was to clear the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIS D'AJONCOURT, seize and hold JEANDELINCOURT until relieved by the 317th Inf Regt of the 80th Inf Div, and protect the north and northwest flank of the Command. CT 50 was to seize and hold MOIVRON until relieved by elements of the 317th Inf Regt, and CT 9 was to be prepared to move on Command order. Div Arty, reinforced, was to support the attack: 212th Armd FA Bn and Co A 86th Cml Bn were in direct support of CT 69; 231st Armd FA Bn was in direct support of CT 15; and 696th FA Bn was in direct support of CT 50. CCA was to stand by in the assembly area near BOUXIERES, prepared to pass through CCB.

8 October 1944

The three-pronged attack of CCB moved out on schedule and early in the day seized some of its primary objectives. In a quick thrust on the left flank CT 50 surrounded MOIVRON and forced its way into the town. On the right flank success was almost as rapid in spite of a heavy fog that complicated operations. ARRAYE ET HAN was the first town to fall to the Command.

Coordination of infantry, tank, artillery and plane maneuvers worked so smoothly in the center that enemy in the town of JEANDELINCOURT were completely disorganized and routed. The fighting on all fronts was bitter and at times desperate, and casualties on both sides were high. Objective after objective fell to the determined onslaught and by 1400 all objectives were seized and the stage was set for the second act—the attack of CCA on the BOIS DES TRAPPES. At the end of the day a tight defensive line was tied in between the 80th Inf Div on the west and the 35th Inf Div on the east.

CCB (Read): CT 50 advanced north through enemy resistance and attacked MOIVRON from the east, entering the town and beginning mopping-up operations at 0800. At 1323 the town was cleared and turned over to the 317th Inf Regt. CT 15 advanced north through enemy resistance consisting mainly of small arms and mortar fire. At 0845 units reached the edge of the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIS D'AJONCOURT while other units turned west to JEANDELINCOURT. JEANDELINCOURT was reached at 0920 and by 1130 the town was contained on the southeast and north. On the north the 80th Inf Div was firing into the town from MONT ST JEAN. The town was shelled heavily by artillery and bombed and strafed by air support. The enemy ran into the town from MONT ST JEAN and hid in a factory. Enroute he was subjected to severe machine gun fire by CT 15. CT 15 shelled the factory with direct fire and brought in a perfectly coordinated fighter-bomber strike which set the buildings afire. When the enemy ran back up the hill he was again subjected to heavy machine gun fire. Those who lived surrendered. The town was captured at 1300 and the Combat Team was relieved by the 319th Inf Regt. In the BOIS DE BRASQUIN and BOIS DE HANCOURT area CT 15 encountered heavy resistance, so Co B 9th Armd Inf Bn was relieved from CT 9 and moved forward to assist. At 1206 Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn was relieved from CT 69 and was sent forward. By 1400 both woods were clear of enemy. The advance of CT 69 was slowed by a very heavy fog which in one way was an advantage inasmuch as it served as a screen for the advance; however, at 0750 it was forced to halt about one mile south of ARRAYE ET HAN because of lack of observation. It resumed the ad-

vance at 0830 and closed in on the town on three sides and attacked by direct fire. At 1000 the town was occupied and later in the day turned over to the 134th Inf Regt. CT 69 then was given BOIS DE CHENICOURT and the town of CHENICOURT as additional objectives. By dark the woods had been cleared and the town was covered by fire. Because of extremely heavy anti-tank and artillery fire from high ground north and east of the town and the inadvisability of occupying a town located in the valley, this attack was not launched. The town continued to be covered by intense artillery and direct fire by CT 69.

CCA (Hanson): At 1320 CCA was ordered to assemble immediately in the vicinity of BOIS DU RAPPOUT. The Command closed in this area at 1645. Orders were issued for CCA to pass through CCB, pick up the 9th Armd Inf Bn, and seize the LETRICOURT area the following morning. CCB was to protect the flanks of CCA during this operation.

9 October 1944

With CCB firmly holding objectives it had seized on the previous day and aggressively protecting both flanks, CCA broke through the center of the line and fanned out for a triple thrust against the BOIS DES TRAPPES. The left and the center column found relatively light opposition, since the enemy was still reeling from the swift punches of the previous day. By mid-day CTs 68 and 9 had entered and outposted the western end of the BOIS DES TRAPPES.

On the right action was different. Enemy in the town of CHENICOURT defended stubbornly and poured heavy fire from all types of weapons into the flank of the right column. The advance of CT 44 was greatly slowed by this resistance. It was necessary for CCB to send up reinforcements and it was not until CHENICOURT was finally captured late in the day that pressure on this flank was relieved.

In two days the Div had captured four strongly-held villages and liquidated the MOIVRON salient through which the enemy was threatening the Corps front.

CCA (Hanson): Began its attack at 0615 with the following three combat teams abreast:

CT 68 (Davall) Left

68th Tk Bn (—)
Co 44th Armd Inf Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 44 (McCorrison) Right

44th Armd Inf Bn (—)
Co 68th Tk Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn

CT 9 (Godfrey) Center

9th Armd Inf Bn

Despite heavy enemy small arms and artillery fire CT 68 on the left made the most rapid headway, entering the BOIS DES TRAPPES at 1000 and at 1200 reaching the northern edge of the woods where it immediately reorganized and dug in. The greatest difficulty was getting heavy vehicles through the woods but by 1245 the Combat Team reported consolidation of its objective. In the center, CT 9 reached the northern edge of the woods shortly after CT 68, reorganized, and dug in. The advance of CT 44 on the right was constantly harassed by fire of all types from CHENICOURT and high ground beyond. Forward elements reached the east-west road on the northern edge of the BOIS D'AULNOIS at approximately 1130. This point was later designated as the final objective and it was necessary to send reinforcements to CT 44 in order to protect the right flank from aggressive enemy action. Heavy artillery fire caused many casualties in this team. At 1424 enemy tanks were reported moving into the vicinity from the north. Artillery fire was placed on the area and the tanks withdrew after a loss of three of seven tanks. Again at 1530 enemy tanks and infantry were observed in the vicinity of ABAUCOURT. This threat was neutralized by artillery fire from the 80th Inf Div. The 80th Inf Div was very efficient in its relief of the Command's forward positions, having followed closely behind the combat teams. Relief of Combat Teams 68 and 9 was effected later in the day but darkness prevented relief of CT 44 that night. Command units withdrew to assembly areas south of LEYR and went into Corps Reserve in support of 35th and 80th Inf Divs.

CCB (Read): CT 15 covered the left (northwest) flank and CT 69 the right (northeast) flank for the attack by CCA through the position held by CCB. The 9th Armd Inf Bn became part of CCA as the attack began. CTs 50 and 9, the remaining elements of the Combat Command, reverted to Res

Comd when elements of the 318th Inf Regt moved through the BOIS DU FOURASSE. As the 317th Inf Regt moved up behind CCA, CT 15 was relieved from the mission of covering the left flank. CT 50 (—Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn which was part of CT 69) was ordered to return to billet area east of NANCY. CTs 15 and 50 moved out at 1600 to return to billets.

10-11-12-13 October 1944

Relief of CTs 44 and 69 by elements of the 317th Inf Regt in the vicinity of CHENICOURT and the BOIS D'AULNOIS was effected and the units withdrew to assembly areas where the Div regrouped as follows:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn (—)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn Reinf
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

44th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
128th Armd FA Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C (—) 777th AAA Bn

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn Reinf
Tr B Reinf 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Ord Maint Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D (—) and 1st Plat Btry C 777th
AAA Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

Sect Btry C & Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hanson): Withdrew to an assembly area near LEYR.

CCB (Read): Relief of CT 69 was completed at 0900 by the 3d Bn, 317th Inf Regt, 80th Inf Div. Units moved to permanent type billets east of NANCY where the Command was on the alert to move on one hour's notice.

Div Arty (Riley): Div Arty remained in position, reinforcing fires of 35th and 80th Inf Div. Later it was given the mission of reinforcing Corps Arty. The 212th Armd FA Bn was prepared to move with CCB in the event that its mission took it out of supporting range of Div Arty. Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) was relieved from attachment to the 94th Inf Div, NINTH ARMY and reverted to 6th Armd Div, THIRD ARMY.

14—15 October 1944

During the night of the 13th—14th, between the hours of 0225 to 0515, Hq CCA was subjected to an enemy artillery barrage. A total of 13 rounds of estimated 280mm fell in the CP area. As a result the Command Post was moved to a new area approximately 1/2 mile south of BOUXIERES AUX CHENES. The 9th Armd Inf Bn also received heavy artillery fire for two hours and moved to a new bivouac area south of BOUXIERES AUX CHENES. On the 14th Div Arty fired one TOT at the request of XII Corps and 3 counterbattery missions, and on the next day fired concentrations upon enemy personnel and vehicles and one counterbattery mission. The 212th and 231st Armd FA Bns received light counterbattery fire. Enemy artillery fire increased. Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) moved from LORIENT to join the Div.

16 October 1944

The 15th Tk Bn, with a secondary mission of reinforcing Div Arty fires, relieved the 68th Tk Bn in its sector. This relief was effected at 1502. Oral orders were issued relieving units under CCA in the field and assigning other units to CCA under the Div rotation policy. CCA continued to maintain troops in the vicinity of LEYR, prepared for movement to meet any counterattack. Composition of troops:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
 15th Tk Bn
 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
 Co A Reinf 603d TD Bn
 Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

Res Comd

44th Armd Inf Bn
 69th Tk Bn
 Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
 603d TD Bn (—)

Div Hq (Fwd)

1 Sect Btry C and 1 Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
 68th Tk Bn
 Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
 Co A Reinf 603d TD Bn
 Btry B 777th AAA Bn
 Co B Reinf 603d TD Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
 212th Armd FA Bn
 231st Armd FA Bn
 Btry D 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
 128th Ord Maint Bn
 642d QM Trk Co
 3803d QM Trk Co

17—18 October 1944

To compensate for a shortage of 105mm ammunition and in preparation for resumption of the offensive on 8 November, XII Corps ordered that tanks and tank destroyers be used to reinforce fires of Div Arty.

Various changes in assignment among commands occurred.

CCA (Hanson): Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn and Co B 603d TD Bn were transferred to CCB. Btry C 777th AAA Bn was assigned to CCB at 1500. Co B 603d TD Bn was assigned to reinforce the fires of Div Arty.

CCB (Read): Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn and Co B 603d TD Bn were transferred to CCA. Btry B 777th AAA Bn was assigned to CCA at 1500.

CCA (Hines): Co B 603d TD Bn and Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn moved to the LEYR area. Colonel Hines arrived to assume command. The Command remained in Corps Reserve in immediate support of front line units.

CCB (Read): Co A 603d TD Bn and Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn moved into the assembly area.

Res Comd (Harris): Was ordered to guard crossing of the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers.

20—24 October 1944

Res Comd was assigned the additional mission of guarding the LIVERDUN bridge. Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz Command Post moved to BELLEVILLE to coordinate bridge guards. With the return on the 22d of Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) and reconnaissance platoons from tank battalions of the Div, the entire Div was together for the first time since 13 August.

24—25 October 1944

CCA (Hines): On Div request a patrol of four men was sent out at 2300 to investigate a reported enemy artillery piece north of LAY ST CHRISTOPHE. The patrol returned, reporting that only friendly troops were contacted.

Res Comd (Harris): The covering force west of the MONCEL SUR SEILLE was relieved at 0930 by Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz.

Div Arty (Riley): Hq Btry 231st Armd FA Bn displaced to the vicinity of LEYR after receiving 30 rounds of enemy artillery fire.

26 October 1944

As part of the Div policy of rotating troops on the line with units that had been resting, relief of CCA by Res Comd troops began shortly after daylight and was completed by 1300. Composition of forces under this transfer was as follows:

CCA

50th Armd Inf Bn
 15th Tk Bn
 Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
 Co B 603d TD Bn Reinf
 Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

Res Comd

44th Armd Inf Bn
 69th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
 603d TD Bn (—)
 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Hq (Fwd)

1 Sect Btry C and 1 Sect Btry D 777th AAA Bn

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
 68th Tk Bn
 Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
 Co A 603d TD Bn Reinf
 Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
 212th Armd FA Bn
 231st Armd FA Bn
 Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
 128th Ord Maint Bn
 642d QM Trk Co
 3803d QM Trk Co

CCA (Hines): Was assigned the mission of maintaining a covering force west of MONCEL SUR SEILLE. Elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were assigned this task. The Command was also to guard the 14 river crossings on the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers. Four of the bridges were assigned to the 25th Armd Engr Bn and the remainder to the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz.

Res Comd (Harris): Relieved CCA and disposed itself in the vicinity of LEYR in immediate support of front line units.

Div Arty (Riley): 69th Tk Bn relieved the 15th Tk Bn of the mission of reinforcing Div Arty fires.

27—28—29—30 October 1944

The 231st Armd FA Bn neutralized an enemy observation post. On 27 October XII Corps directed that tanks be relieved from the mission of reinforcing artillery fire because their fire was unnecessary. Accordingly the 69th Tk Bn was released from further fire missions. On 28 October CCA was ordered to guard the railroad bridge at POMPEY and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz effected relief at 2015. On 29 October Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—) was released from Res Comd and assigned to Div Tns the same day.

31 October—7 November 1944

On 31 October the 128th Armd FA Bn displaced from the vicinity of BRATTE to an area near PONT A MOUSSON where it registered fires from several alternate positions for support of the projected offensive of 8 November. On 2 November the 9th Armd Inf Bn and the 68th Tk Bn were attached to CCA and the 50th Armd Inf Bn and the 15th Tk Bn were attached to CCB. On 4 November CCB Command Post displaced from the vicinity of ESSEY LES NANCY to the vicinity of ST MAX, closing there at 1045, in order to make room for XII Corps' advance CP. On 6 November at 0800 the 25th Armd Engr Bn was relieved of maintenance responsibility on four of the MOZELLE River bridges.

On 7 November orders were issued by Div to all commands, alerting them for movement at 0800 the following day.

CHAPTER III
SAAR CAMPAIGN

8 November to 24 December 1944

The projected THIRD ARMY drive through the SAAR River valley and on to the RHINE gave the Div a major role. XII Corps with the 26th, 35th and 80th Inf Divs from right to left, followed by the 4th and 6th Armd Divs, was to advance generally east from the NANCY bridgehead and cross the SAAR south of SAARBRUCKEN.

Corps Mission: XII Corps was to attack on order to seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of FALQUEMONT and, in conjunction with XX Corps on the left, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ area.

Division Mission: The 6th Armd was to cross the SEILLE River on Corps order at PORT SUR SEILLE, CLEMERY and NOMENY to attack through the 80th Inf Div and secure the FALQUEMONT area until relieved by the 80th Div. In conjunction with XX Corps the Div was to destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ. It was also to be prepared to advance northeast.

The Div plan placed CCA on the right to cross the SEILLE River at either CLEMERY or NOMENY, or both, and attack south of the line RAUCOURT—LUPPY—REMILLY, striking the NIED River on a broad front. CCB on the left was to cross the SEILLE River at PORT SUR SEILLE, swing north and then east generally along the ridge through VIGNY and BUCHY and northeast, also striking the NIED on a broad front. The Div CP was at SAULZURES LES NANCY.

Composition of Troops:

CCA (Hanson)

68th Tk Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (2 Armd and 1
Truck Plats) plus (1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co)
Co B Reinf 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co D 69th Tk Bn

Res Comd (Harris)

69th Tk Bn (—Co D)
44th Armd Inf Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—) Co C:
(3 Truck Plats)
603d TD Bn (—)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
777th AAA Bn (—)
997th Tdwy Br Co (—2 Sects)

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCB (Read)

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (1 Armd and 1
Truck Plats) plus (1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co)
Co C Reinf 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty Comd (Riley)

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn Reinforced by:
183d FA Gp
276th FA Bn
696th FA Bn
752d FA Bn

Div Tns (Droste)

76th Med Bn A
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp

8 November 1944

Combat Commands, prepared to effect crossings of the SEILLE and exploit the 80th Div's attack, moved from the vicinity of NANCY to assembly areas near the proposed crossing sites and organized combat teams for the operation.

CCA (Hines): Moved at 0800 to the initial assembly area just west of DOMMARTIN and organized its combat teams. Plans were completed for passing through the 80th Inf Div and crossing the SEILLE River at CLEMERY or NOMENY.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 9 (Godfrey)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—)
Co D 69th Tk Bn (—)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
1st Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Btry A 777th AAA Bn
(—2 Sects)
1 Plat Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Res

Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co B 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)
(with Sect Tdwy Br Co Atchd)

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—)
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
3d Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
2 Sects 1st Plat Btry A 777th AAA
Bn
1 Plat Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)
Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn

CCB (Read): Completed plans for crossing the SEILLE River on the left of CCA and attacking northeast. The following combat teams were formed within the Div assembly area and they prepared to move to an initial Combat Command assembly area the following morning.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—1 Med Tk Co & 1 Lt
Tk Co)
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
(—)
3d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 86 (Brindle)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co D 15th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
(+)
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Sect Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—)
Co C 15th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
(+)
1st Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CCB Res

CCB (Hq only)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Engr Br Co (—)

Res Comd (Harris): Completed plans for carrying out its mission of being prepared to advance on Div order behind either Combat Command or to engage in a separate operation. The Command displaced to an assembly area in the vicinity east of ATTON, closing at 1120. The following Combat Teams were organized:

CT 69 (Forest)

69th Tk Bn (—Cos C & D)
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (+)
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat 997th Tdwy Br Co
Mine Roller Platoon

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—1 Co)
Co C 69th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—1 Plat)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—Cos A & B;
—1 Plat Co C)
603d TD Bn (—3 Lettered Cos)
Bridge Co (—1 Plat)

Div Arty (Riley): Separated into two groups and prepared to move on Div order. The Command supported the 80th Inf Div attack and fired 69 battalion concentrations and 5 battery concentrations.

Group No 1 (6th Armd Div Arty)

(Support CCB)

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn

Group No 2 (183d FA Gp) (Support

CCA)

231st Armd FA Bn
276th Armd FA Bn
752d FA Bn (155 How)

9 November 1944

CCB, delayed by flooded conditions along the MOSELLE River, had now come up and begun crossing the SEILLE at PORT SUR SEILLE. Since Res Comd was no longer needed on the north, it was scheduled to follow generally along the axis VIGNY—HAN-SUR-NIED, prepared to furnish reinforcement to either combat command or to operate as a separate force. The Div Adv CP moved to BONICOURT.

CCA (Hines): Marched from its initial assembly area to the vicinity of MANONCOURT SUR SEILLE where all combat teams went into bivouac. CT 9 sent a strong patrol into south NOMENY to clear it and protect the bridge construction crews.

CCB (Read): Displaced from the Div assembly area at NANCY north through ST MAX, LAY ST SHRISTOPHE, STE GENEVILLE, FORET DE FACO to PORT SUR SEILLE. From this initial assembly area CT 86 crossed the flooded SEILLE River with considerable difficulty. The Combat Team, after passing through EPLY, made first contact with the enemy when it encountered anti-tank guns west of ALEMONT. By 2000 all of CT 86 and CT15 had completed crossing the river; the remainder of CCB remained on the west side.

Res Comd (Harris): Remained during the day in its assembly area near ATTON where it was prepared to follow either CCA or CCB.

10 November 1944

CCA (Hines): Advanced northeast through the 80th Inf Div bridgehead to the vicinity of LUPPY and SECOURT. CT 9, in the lead, reached SECOURT at 0815 and continued in the direction of SOLGNE, passing through the 80th Inf Div. The Combat Team met increasingly sharp resistance in the outskirts of LUPPY but after a battle lasting all afternoon the town was captured and CT 9 went into bivouac for the night. CT 68 followed CT 9 to a crossroad just south of SOLGNE, turned right at that point, and proceeded to MONCHEUX which was then held by elements of the 80th Inf Div. Progress had been slow during the day because of muddy terrain and road blocks which the Germans had constructed of felled trees.

CCB (Read): The remainder of the Command commenced crossing the SEILLE River at PORT SUR SEILLE at 0500. Passage was slow because of heavy mud but by 0855 CT 15 had begun an attack on VIGNY across country. Reconstruction of a blown railroad overpass east of VIGNY delayed the Command three hours. At 1230 the force secured VIGNY and after a two-hour battle it seized BUCHY. After outposting BUCHY the unit bivouaced there for the night. Remaining elements of CCB moved into the area by 1700 and contact was established with CCA on the right at BEAZ by CT 86. The 2d Inf Regt of the 5th Inf Div closely followed the Command on the north flank and assisted greatly in securing ground gained. Preparations were made to continue the attack east the next day. The following reorganization was effected within the Command:

Co D 15th Tk Bn reverted from CT 86 to CT 15
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz from CT 86 to CT 50
Co D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz from CT 86 to CT 15
3d Plat Co C 25th Engrs from CT 15 to CCB Res
2d Plat Co A 25th Engrs from Res to CT 15

CT 86 was thus dissolved and its remaining elements passed to CCB reserve.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparations for the attack of the Div and began displacing forward. By midnight all of the Command had crossed the SEILLE River and moved to the vicinity of VIGNY.

11 November 1944

CCA (Hines): At 0700 a ten-minute artillery preparation was placed on the town of BECHY. At 0710 CT 9 continued its advance and at 0900 it was fighting for entry into this town. The road leading into town was blocked by a mine field that damaged two tanks. Dug-in enemy riflemen resisted

strongly in a brief but bitter fight and the Combat Team continued its advance. On the eastern side of BECHY CT 9 again met resistance but overcame it and continued toward the NIED River under heavy artillery fire.

The bridge at HAN SUR NIED was intact. Light and medium tanks and tank destroyers of the advance guard covered the bridge with fire and knocked out several enemy vehicles and guns which were trying to retreat across it. A hasty assault against the bridge was organized by the advance guard in conjunction with a battalion from the 80th Inf Div. A platoon of Co B 68th Tk Bn moved down the hill, followed by infantry and a detachment of 4 men of Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn. They were covered by fire of the tank destroyers and the remainder of the company of medium and light tanks. The medium tank platoon succeeded in crossing the bridge although one tank was knocked out and the platoon leader was killed. The Engineers, working under heavy fire of all types, succeeded in cutting the wires leading to prepared demolitions on and under the bridge. 80th Inf Div troops together with a few of the 9th Armd Inf Bn and a platoon of tanks of the 68th Tk Bn succeeded in holding the bridgehead the remainder of the day though under continuous fire. For this heroic action, Co B 68th Tk Bn and its attachments later received a Presidential citation.

At 1620 an organized assault to reinforce the bridgehead was initiated. Infantry advanced down the hill under supporting fires of all weapons and by dark some 100 men had crossed over the bridge. At dark the remainder of the medium tank company and the light tanks had crossed; after dark the remainder of CT 9 together with a regiment of the 80th Inf Div had entered HAN SUR NIED. During the night the town was mopped up and an attack by the 80th Inf Div gained the ridge beyond.

At 0730 CT 68 continued its advance moving northeast from MONCHEUX. Little enemy resistance was met but blown bridges and road blocks formed obstacles which at times considerably retarded its progress. The Combat Team ran into heavy resistance in the vicinity of TRAGNY, but by noon the town had been taken and CT 68 pushed on. Light resistance was overcome in the town of THIMONVILLE. The advance guard attacked and captured MORVILLE SUR NIED in cooperation with 80th Div troops. During the latter part of the afternoon they continued forward and after heavy fighting reached the river south of BAUDRECOURT. The main body moved to MORVILLE SUR NIED and bivouaced for the night after constructing a treadway bridge at TRAGNY.

CCB (Read): Moved out at 0700 in two columns. CT 15, on the left, advanced rapidly through BEUX to ANCERVILLE where the bridge over the NIED River was blown just as elements of the unit arrived. CT 15 then turned north toward LEMUD in an attempt to secure a crossing. Upon arrival in LEMUD, the Combat Team found the bridge intact but as infantry attempted to make a quick crossing this bridge was also blown. Elements of the team were rushed north again and after considerable difficulty secured intact a bridge just south of SANRY SUR NIED. Although the bridge was intact it was under 18 inches of water. Investigation disclosed that passage under the bridge was blocked by debris. When the debris was removed the river fell rapidly. This bridge also had been prepared for demolition but quick action by an Engineer officer in cutting wires under intense fire prevented the enemy from destroying the bridge. Enemy defenders on the south side of the river were caught completely by surprise and annihilated. The shallow bridgehead was immediately reinforced, although it was under constant fire from enemy fortifications on high ground near SORBIEY.

At 0700 CT 50 on the right moved out with the mission of securing a crossing at REMILLY. Enroute, it received heavy small arms and artillery fire and about 1 mile north of BECHY it ran into an extensive mine field which had to be by-passed crosscountry. Upon arrival at REMILLY at about 1030 the Combat Team found the bridge blown. The unit remained in position and directed heavy artillery fire on the town, prepared to support CT 15 if needed.


At 1445 one company of infantry from CT 50 and 1 reconnaissance troop from CT 86 were sent to reinforce CT 15.

Res Comd (Harris): Still in Div reserve, the Command displaced from its assembly area, crossed the SEILLE River, and went into a new assembly area near ALEMONT. CT 69 was assigned to CCA at 2100 and prepared to move forward.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparations for the attack of the Div and displaced forward to the vicinity of VIGNY, the last units closing at 0345.

12 November 1944

The Div succeeded in enlarging both bridgeheads across the NIED against bitter resistance, secured another bridgehead across the river at BAUDRECOURT, and constructed 3 bridges across the ROTTE River east of BAUDRECOURT for a basis of further operations. On the left CCB drove the enemy back from the river and consolidated its gains of the previous day. CCA on the right



Scale 1 inch equals approximately 16 miles
Yellow territory conquered by Prussian
Red: Main route of advance

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

fought its way east of the NIED River into positions from which it could continue the Div's advance.

CCA (Hines): At 0730 Corps Arty commenced firing on targets. CT 9 attacked VATIMONT from the northwest. The enemy held the town with a strong infantry force supported by artillery. The Combat Team split into two groups, one attacking from the north and one attacking from the south through heavy artillery fire against well-prepared positions. The two forces successfully executed the envelopment, capturing the town at 1500. Mopping-up continued until dark, after which the town was outposted. CT 69, which was assigned to the Command during the night, crossed the bridge at HAN SUR NIED and attacked toward HERNY against strong enemy resistance consisting of tanks, anti-tank guns, artillery and infantry. After heavy fighting the Combat Team moved to a position 100 yards west of HERNY, prepared to launch a coordinated attack against the enemy strong point there. The road into HERNY was interdicted by heavy artillery fire coming from the direction of CHEMERY and MAINVILLERS. Supported by tank and artillery fire, the infantry company of this force advanced on the town. It was captured and cleared of the enemy at 1700 after five hours of continuous fighting. CT 69 then continued east, establishing an outpost line 1000 yards beyond the town. During the night more than 100 rounds of enemy artillery fell in the area.

At 0700 CT 68 established a bridgehead across the NIED River at BAUDRECOURT, constructed a bridge, and moved northeast to the banks of the ROTTE River. Reconnaissance elements were sent east to find possible crossing sites. They found the low area south of the ROTTE impassable unless further bridges were constructed. During the remainder of the period 3 more bridges were constructed across the channels of the ROTTE River south of VATIMONT. By the end of the day the Combat Team had bridged its way across the lowlands and was moving north to follow CT 9 southeast from VATIMONT.

CCB (Read): The mission of the Command was changed to effect seizure of the high ground south and west of FAULQUEMONT in the vicinity of CHEMERY. The crossing of the NIED River at SANRY SUR NIED was organized so that the remainder of CT 15 was followed by Hq CCB, 212th Armd FA Bn and CT 50. Initially CT 86 was to establish road blocks and protect the north flank while the column passed.

Meeting strong resistance all the way, CT 15 attacked toward BAZONCOURT. Extensive minefields and adverse weather further hampered the attack, but by 1600 BAZONCOURT and VAUCREMENT had been taken. The Combat Team bivouaced for the night and outposted the road junction 1½ miles west of CHANVILLE. Because of craters and mines, Engineers from CT 50 assisted movement of the unit on the road to BAZONCOURT. Heavy enemy artillery fire continued throughout the period. The 2d Inf Regt, 5th Inf Div again assisted in mopping up operations and in posting security elements on the flanks.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the vicinity of LUPPY late in the night.

Composition of forces:

CCA

68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn (—Co C)
9th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (2 Armd &
1 Truck Plats plus 2 Br Sects 997th
Tdwy Br Co
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
(Truck Plat)
Co B Reinf 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CCB

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (1 Armd &
2 Truck Plats) plus 1 Br Sect 997th
Tdwy Br Co
Co C Reinf 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

44th Armd Inf Bn (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—) Co C (—):
(2 Truck Plats)
603d TD Bn (—)
Co C 69th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)
997th Tdwy Br Co (—3 Sects)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Reinforced by
183d FA Gp
276th FA Bn
752d FA Bn
696th FA Bn

CT 9 (Stablein)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—Co C)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Tr C 86 Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 69 (Forest)

69th Tk Bn (—Co C & 1 Plat Co D)
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
2d Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—1 M Tk Co & Lt Tk Co)
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Sects 1 & 2 Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 86 (Brindle)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—Trs A & C)
Co D 15th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Sects 5 & 6 Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—1 Co)
Co C 69th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—1 Plat)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—Cos A & B;—1 Plat Co C)
603d TD Bn (—3 lettered Cos)
Bridge Co (—1 Plat)
Mine Roller Platoon

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A plus 3d Plat 16th
Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C (—) 777th AAA Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCA

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—Co B)
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
3d Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sect 1st Plat Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co
1 Plat Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Res

603d TD Bn (—)
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)

CCB

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—1 Co)
Co C 15th Tk Bn
1st Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Sects 3 & 4 Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CCB Reserve

Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

Res Comd

Div Arty

Group No 1 (6th Armd Div Arty)

(Support CCB)
128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn

Group No 2 (183d FA Gp)

(Support CCA)
231st Armd FA Bn
276th Armd FA Bn
752d FA Bn (155 How)

13 November 1944

Despite a heavy snow which fell during the night the southern spearhead of CCA advanced farther east against bitter opposition and, in taking 6 towns by the end of the day, pushed a salient into enemy territory 5 miles deep and 2 miles wide. The elements of CCB which had secured a bridgehead over the NIED River at SANRY SUR NIED in the northern part of the Div zone and which were in position to thrust north of FAULQUEMONT were pulled south to consolidate and hold the new bridgehead at REMILLY in accordance with the change in Corps orders. The northern bridgehead was turned over to the 2d Inf Regt, 5th Inf Div.

CCA (Hines): The plan of the Command for the day was as follows: CT 9 was to attack from east of VATIMONT and seize ARRAINCOURT. At that point it was to go into reserve. CT 68 was to pass through at ARRAINCOURT and attack east by way of BRULANGE, SUISSE, LANDROFF, and BERIG-VINTRANGE. On the left CT 69 was to press east in a parallel column along the route MANY, BOUTSTROFF, EINCHEVILLE, and BISTROFF.

At 0830 CT 9 continued the attack southeast toward ARRAINCOURT. Fires were placed on the town by supporting artillery. The part of the force driving south attacked and captured the town of HOLACOURT after hard fighting. The attack continued east and ARRAINCOURT was taken at about 1500. Supporting infantry reported this town clear at 1730. CT 68 crossed the ROTTE River south of VATIMONT and turned east, passing through CT 9. At nightfall CT 68 organized defensive positions west of BRULANGE.

At 0900 CT 69 advanced on MANY, driving the enemy before it. By 1015 leading elements had reached the crossroad 500 yards beyond MANY. At 1025 the infantry, moving rapidly forward, cleared MANY and immediately commenced firing on THICOURT to the southeast. In this action 3 enemy anti-tank guns and 4 enemy artillery pieces were destroyed. During the attack on THICOURT heavy enemy artillery fire was directed on our troops from positions at CHEMERY and MAINVILLERS. The town was taken and secured and the Combat Team moved south and captured the town of THONVILLE by dark. Steep, muddy hills to the northeast were too slippery for tank operations.

CCB (Read): At approximately 0815 CT 86 received a strong counterattack from the vicinity of BERLIZE on its positions around BAZONCOURT. This attack accompanied by heavy artillery fire forced the unit to withdraw. The Combat Team was ordered to reestablish the road block and when the counterattack was finally repulsed, the enemy was driven back into BERLIZE.

Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn (with CT 15) was so depleted by losses that Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn was transferred to CT 15 from CT 50. The attack of CT 15 was still held up by large craters and mines in the road. Bridging operations by the 5th Inf Div were so slow at this point that the Division Commander decided to build a bridge at REMILLY. Operations were begun at once and the bridge was completed at about 1630. CT 15 moved down the east side of the river and CT 50 sent one company of infantry across at REMILLY to outpost the area and protect the bridging operations. The route of CT 15 was through ANCERVILLE south to the road junction east of REMILLY and then east to VOIMHAUT and VITTONCOURT. The latter two towns were taken and the area was secured for the night. At 1320 CT 86, at the road block on the northern bridgehead, received a second counterattack which it repulsed. CT 86 moved to the vicinity of BECHY after turning over the area to the 2d Inf Regt, 5th Inf Div.

Res Comd (Harris): Remained in Div reserve in the vicinity of LUPPY. CT 44 was ordered forward and transferred to the control of CCA. CT 9 was transferred from CCA to Res Comd.

Div Arty (Riley): Battalions fired preparations in support of the Combat Teams and on targets of opportunity. The 128th Armd FA Bn smoked the fort at SORBIEY for two hours and 45 minutes during the afternoon.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

68th Tk Bn
 69th Tk Bn
 44th Armd Inf Bn
 Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (2 Armd &
 1 Truck Plats) plus 1 Br Sect 997th
 Tdwy Br Co
 2 Plats Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
 (Truck Plats)
 Cos A & B Reinf 603d TD Bn
 Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
 212th Armd FA Bn
 231st Armd FA Bn
 Btry D 777th AAA Bn
 Reinforced by
 183d FA Gp:
 276th FA Bn
 752d FA Bn
 696th FA Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCB

15th Tk Bn
 50th Armd Inf Bn
 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
 Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (1 Armd &
 2 Truck Plats) plus 1 Br Sect 997th
 Tdwy Br Co
 Co C Reinf 603d TD Bn
 Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
 25th Armd Engr Bn (—) Including
 Co C (—) with 1 Truck Plat, 997th
 Tdwy Br Co (—2 Sects)
 603d TD Bn (—)
 777th AAA Bn (—)
 Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A plus 3d Plat 16th
 Field Hosp
 128th Ord Maint Bn
 642d QM Trk Co
 3803d QM Trk Co
 Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

14 November 1944

CCA bore the brunt of the day's fighting in its thrust eastward to LANDROFF where desperate enemy counterattacks were met. The remainder of the Div closed up behind the leading elements in preparation for a coordinated attack the next day. Three towns were taken in bitter fighting and 4 separate enemy counterattacks on LANDROFF were beaten off. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting continued in the town throughout the night but our troops held fast.

CCA (Hines): At 0910 CT 68, continuing the attack east, entered BRULANGE. During the engagement enemy artillery fire was received from the woods to the south. The Combat Team seized SUISSE at 1200. The attack then continued in the direction of LANDROFF against exceptionally strong enemy resistance. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was placed along a 2-mile strip between SUISSE and LANDROFF by the enemy. LANDROFF was taken at 1415 and by 1705 the town was secured and outposted. Elements of CT 44 which had come forward from Res Comd assisted in clearing and holding the town for the night. At 1825 enemy from the north launched a counterattack with 2 self-propelled assault guns supported by infantry. A second counterattack at midnight, stronger than the first, drove down from the north but was repulsed at the outskirts of town. At 0100 a third counterattack came from the north and was repulsed before reaching the town. An hour later the enemy launched a coordinated attack of approximately battalion strength preceded by a heavy artillery preparation. In spite of considerable losses the enemy continued his attack on the town and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Tank crews and infantry fought with bazookas, grenades and small arms in the dark. Fighting continued in the town until about 150400 when the attack was finally broken up and the majority of the enemy was destroyed. Mopping up continued until 0700.

CCB (Read): At 1400 CT 15 and CT 50, followed by CT 86, moved to the area south of HENRY. At 1645 the combat elements of the Command closed east of the NIED River. At 1605 CT 86 moved

east to the vicinity of BRULANGE and later in the evening was ordered forward in support of CCA. One unit participated in the street fighting in LANDROFF during the night and the remainder of the Combat Team held open a strip of about 400 yards astride the SUISSE—LANDROFF road for the evacuation of wounded and prisoners.

Res Comd (Harris): Co C of the 9th Armd Inf Bn was sent to the vicinity of LANDROFF to assist in mopping up remnants of the enemy counterattack force.

Div Arty (Riley): The entire Div Arty, including the 183d FA Gp less the 231st Armd FA Bn, displaced forward to support combat teams of CCA.

15 November 1944

Because of their exhausting battle in LANDROFF the night before, elements of CCA were forced to reorganize and rest during the day. The position of the Div along the line THICOURT—THONVILLE—LANDROFF, however, was secured and improved with a successful attack by one combat team toward the COTE DE SUISSE—the high ground southwest of EINCHEVILLE.

CCA (Hines): CT 44 moved out at 1515 in a coordinated infantry-tank assault on the COTE DE SUISSE, moving crosscountry from BRULANGE. Tanks moved up the steep, slippery grade firing on the ridge about 2500 yards away. After successfully gaining the northwest end of the ridge, the left flank secured the position. The objective was taken at approximately 1600. Capture of this position deprived the enemy of his forward observation posts and as a result, hostile fire on the BRULANGE—SUISSE—LANDROFF road was rendered ineffective.

CT 69 continued to defend the high ground northeast of THICOURT and THONVILLE. CT 68 continued to defend the town of LANDROFF.

CCB (Read): All combat teams remained in place.

Res Comd (Harris): Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn was detached from CCA and reverted to Res Comd.

16 November 1944

Two combat teams of CCA, each followed by a regiment of infantry from the 80th Inf Div, struck early in the day and by afternoon five enemy-held towns had been captured and cleared and the 80th Div stood on the slopes looking down into FAULQUEMONT while the 6th Armd turned east once more. The Div CP moved to BRULANGE.

CCA (Hines): Plans for the attack toward FAULQUEMONT directed that the 2d Bn of the 318th Inf Regt, 80th Inf Div move in conjunction with CT 69 on the left and that the 319th Inf Regt work with CTs 44 and 68 on the right. CT 69 was to employ tanks and the battalion supporting weapons on the north edge of the COTE DE SUISSE as a base of fire toward CHEMERY. The remainder of the Combat Team was to swing around to the right (southeast) and assault the town. Accordingly the base of fire moved up to the southwest of CHEMERY early in the morning and the encircling force moved out at 0900 north and east of the woods directly south of the town. Infantry moved in, cleared the town, and advanced north.

Meanwhile CT 44, from positions won the previous day on the COTE DE SUISSE, laid down a base of fire toward EINCHEVILLE. When CT 69 moved its base of fire forward, the encircling force of CT 44 also moved and crossed the northern part of the COTE DE SUISSE approaching EINCHEVILLE from the north. The infantry was riding on the tanks and, after the shelling of the town, dismounted and went in. The town was secured after a hard battle; 200 prisoners were taken and 200 of the enemy were killed. Tanks of both the base of fire and the encircling force then continued the attack toward high ground overlooking VILLER while the infantry cleared EINCHEVILLE. When the latter town was secured, the infantry moved on and took VILLER, inflicting serious casualties on retreating enemy.

CT 69, after shelling ADELANGE and BOUSTROFF, sent infantry forward and seized both towns.

CT 68, from its position in LANDROFF, moved up the valley of the ROTTE toward HARPRICH. Since the BOIS DE ZANTE on the high ground to the north had not been cleared and was held in force, the Combat Team did not push its attack farther than a point 100 yards east of LANDROFF.

CCB (Read): While waiting for orders to move forward, one troop of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was sent to guard the bridge at HAN SUR NIED and another was sent to guard the bridge at REMILLY. Contact was made with the 5th Inf Div (XX Corps) on the north.

Div Arty (Riley): Eighteen missions were fired as follows: 6 missions on towns, 4 on enemy infantry, 2 on mortar positions, 2 interdiction missions and individual missions on enemy OP, CP, tank column and artillery positions.

17 November 1944

While CCA consolidated and held positions won the previous day in the combined offensive, CCB prepared to wheel around to the south, cross the ROTTE River, and close into positions from which it could follow the 35th Inf Div eastward on Corps order.

CCA (Hines): Held its positions prepared to advance east behind CCB on the Corps left flank on Div order. Meanwhile, orders were issued to be prepared to attack the following day and assist the 317th Inf Regt in clearing out the woods northeast of HARPRICH.

CCB (Read): The 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) reverted to Reserve Command. Co A 167th Combat Engrs, which had been supporting the Command, was released to Corps at 1800. The Command was alerted to move to the development area near DESTRY and MORHANGE as soon as the 137th Inf Regt had cleared the roads.

Res Comd (Harris): The 9th Armd Inf Bn moved from ARRAINCOURT to establish a line ANCER-VILLE—VOIMHAUT—VITTONCOURT—ADAINCOURT, closing the gap between the 5th Inf Div, XX Corps and 80th Inf Div, XII Corps.

Composition of Troops:

CCA

68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
Co B, 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 303d TD Bn (Reinf)
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CCB

15th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (Reinf)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect 997th Tdwy Br Co

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
1 Plat 997th Tdwy Br Co (—2 Sects)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

18 November 1944

CCA (Hines): Held its positions of the previous day.

CCB (Read): Moved to the vicinity of MORHANGE, closing there at 1700 with the 15th Tk Bn on the east side of town and the remainder of the Command on the west side. Combat teams were composed as follows:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Plats Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—1 Co)
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB Res

Hq CCB
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
Rcn Plat 603d TD Bn
Security Plat 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—) with 1
Sect 997 Tdwy Br Co

Trains

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the vicinity of VATIMONT. Elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were at HERNY and the 9th Armd Inf Bn was at VOIMHAUT. The Command continued to protect the gap between the 5th and 80th Inf Divs.

The 128th and 696th Armd FA Bns were to be in direct support of CTs 15 and 50 respectively. The 212th Armd FA Bn was to be in general support.

19 November 1944

CCB attacked northeast from MORHANGE through the 137th Inf Regt and fought bitterly in four towns to overcome tank ditches, minefields, AT guns, heavy artillery and mud. At the end of the day the Command was 1½ miles east of GROS TENQUIN.

CCA (Hines): Remained in position prepared to follow CCB east. CT 69 was assigned to CCB as of 1630.

CCB (Read): CT 15 moved northeast toward GROS TENQUIN early in the morning, passing through the 137th Inf Regt near the town of BERIG-VINTRANGE. At 1130 the main body of CT 15 was still being held up by an anti-tank ditch. About this time 6 enemy tanks were located in the area and 2 were knocked out before the other 4 withdrew toward BERTRING. At 1255 two ME 109s came over the position but were driven off by strong anti-aircraft fire. The anti-tank ditch was finally bridged at 1400 and half an hour later one tank platoon was in BERTRING. About 1630 infantry elements of the Combat Team took Hill 265 southwest of BERTRING, thereby relieving great enemy pressure. Very little opposition was met in the town itself and the Combat Team pushed on to capture GROS TENQUIN by 1630. With the assistance of elements of the 137th Inf Regt which had closely followed the assault the town was outposted for the night. Knowing that there was another anti-tank ditch about 1 mile east of GROS TENQUIN, reconnaissance elements were sent forward and a crossing was secured before it could be blown. A strong bridgehead protected this crossing during the night. To reinforce the Combat Team the 69th Tk Bn with one platoon of TDs and two sections of AA was sent forward. The Combat Teams were reconstituted as follows:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
2 Plats Co C 603d TD Bn

CCB Res

Hq CCB
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—Co C)
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

CT 69 (Forest)

69th Tk Bn
Co B 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty (Riley): The 128th and 212th Armd FA Bns displaced forward to support CCB as did the 696th Armd FA Bn of the 183d FA Gp. The 696th destroyed an enemy 3-gun battery early in the day. Direct support missions were fired during the morning by the battalions supporting CCB.

20 November 1944

CCA (Hines): At 1500 hours the Command was alerted to move on Div order to the northeast and attack parallel to CCB.

CCB (Read): At 0910 CT 69 passed through CT 15 and moved up the road toward HELLIMER. After leading elements reached the road junction 2 miles east of GROS TENQUIN, direct anti-tank fire was encountered. The opposition was overcome and the column continued to advance east into the forest where an extensive minefield was encountered. This minefield was covered by direct enemy fire as well as artillery and mortar fire. The mines were cleared on the road and the column advanced about 2 miles. CT 50 was ordered forward to the vicinity of BERTRING and orders were issued for it to attack FREMESTROFF the following morning.

Div Arty (Riley): Destroyed 2 enemy tanks.

21 November 1944

With the idea of securing maneuver room for CCA around the headwaters of the GERMAN NIED, reconnaissance was sent northeast to LELLING. No passable routes were discovered in this area.

CCA (Hines): A reconnaissance force consisting of Co D 68th Tk Bn (less one platoon), one platoon of the 44th Armd Inf Bn and one platoon of Co D 25th Armd Engr Bn moved by way of LANDROFF—EINCHEVILLE—VILLER—GUESSLING—HEMMERING to the vicinity of LELLING. At 0900 the force reached HEMERING and found the bridge there had been blown. The engineers immediately commenced repairing the bridge while infantry (dismounted) was sent forward to the outskirts of LELLING. The infantry found that the bridge at LELLING had been blown, that road blocks were constructed in front of the bridge site, and that there were large craters in the road.

CCB (Read): CT 50 moved at 0800 from the vicinity of BERTRING, turning north at GROS TENQUIN. At about 0815 the force was 2 miles north of the town when it met strong anti-tank fire from high ground northeast of GROS TENQUIN. The advance was very slow but by 1230 CT 50 was in position to attack FREMESTROFF. At 1315 the Combat Team, with assistance from the 137th Inf Regt, moved out and advanced north, receiving mortar and artillery fire.

CT 69 moved out at 0800 meeting artillery, tank and small arms fire from the high ground northwest of HELLIMER. Hill 328 was strongly defended by dug-in infantry and direct fire weapons. At 1030 artillery fire was placed on the hill and the enemy started withdrawing. With extremely effective artillery fire, enemy pillboxes west of HELLIMER were reduced, after which fire was directed on the town at 1100. A battalion of the 137th Inf Regt took the town of FREYBOUSE by noon and CT 69 continued its attack toward HELLIMER which it captured and reported clear at 1635. The town was outposted for the night with assistance from the 137th Inf Regt.

Res Comd (Harris): Was given the mission of maintaining contact between the 5th and 80th Inf Divs and of protecting the north flank of the NIED River bridgehead. Patrols from the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were sent northwest to make contact with elements of the 5th Inf Div and also to maintain contact with the 80th Inf Div to the east. Work was initiated by engineers of the Command to open the roads on the patrol routes.

Div Arty (Riley): A 30-minute preparation was fired preceding the attack of CCB and during the attack fires were placed on call on enemy infantry, towns, AT guns and OPs. Battalions displaced several times to give close support to attacking troops.

22 November 1944

In a skillful flanking movement CCB swung around HELLIMER on the north and spearheaded through 2 towns to come within 4000 yards of the MADERBACH River on the main road to PUTTE-LANGE. The flanking maneuver, executed with two combat teams, apparently caught the enemy off guard and dealt him a severe blow. Corps now directed the 6th Armd to take over the 35th Inf Div zone (in which both Divs had been operating) and continue the attack east. An attempt to bring CCA across the GERMAN NIED at LELLING, where the lowlands were flooded, was halted by heavy enemy small arms and artillery fire.

CCA (Hines): Continuing its efforts to cross the GERMAN NIED, the Command sent one combat team forward along the route taken by the reconnaissance force the previous day. The bridge just east of HEMERING was completed at 1645. CT 44 arrived at GUESSELING during the afternoon and bivouaced between the latter town and HEMERING for the night. The 9th Armd Inf Bn was attached to the Command at 1145 and opened a CP at ARRINCOURT at 1815.

CCB (Read): Moved out in the following three columns: CT 15-south, which was to thrust up the road from HELLIMER to ST JEAN ROHRBACH; CT 15-north, which was to swing northeast of LEYVILLER and then east to ST JEAN ROHRBACH; and CT 50, which was to move along the north flank into LEYVILLER.

At 0900 the south column of CT 15 was held up by a blown bridge between HELLIMER and DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER. A by-pass was constructed and the column continued east to the road junction between the two towns where it came under direct AT fire from the woods 1 mile north of DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER. Enemy infantry and tanks in the town caused considerable difficulty until cleaned out. At 1045 the column had surrounded the town and knocked out 3 enemy tanks. Soon afterwards it took the town and the Combat Team moved toward the road junction east of DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER, but it was stopped by continued heavy fire from the woods.

By 1045 the north column was clearing the high ground north of HELLIMER and by 1100 it was 1000 yards north of HELLIMER. It moved forward and at 1140 passed the road junction south of ALTRIPPE and continued with light opposition toward LEYVILLER where contact was made with CT 50. By 1345 this town was cleared and the column thrust directly east toward ST JEAN ROHRBACH. Some AT and small arms fire was received as the column neared the town, but at 1700 the town as well as the bridge just beyond was reported clear.

CT 50, which had halted before the town of FREMESTROFF the night before, thrust into the village early in the morning. It held up temporarily to service vehicles but at 1015 it cleared the town and went east toward ALTRIPPE which it seized. As the north column of CT 15 came into LEYVILLER, CT 50 made contact with friendly elements and occupied and outposted the area while CT 15 moved on east.

Res Comd (Harris): The 9th Armd Inf Bn passed to the control of CCA at 1145.

23 November 1944

Since sufficient maneuver room east of the headwaters of the GERMAN NIED (in the vicinity of BISTROFF) had now been obtained and attempts to cross the stream at LELLING had failed, it was an opportune moment to bring CCA around behind CCB and deploy it on the north flank of the Div. This was done during the day, the Command being given the mission of outflanking PUTTELANGE from the north. CCA went into positions along the line FREMESTROFF—ALTRIPPE—LEYVILLER facing north. CCB consolidated its positions facing east.

CCA (Hines): Work parties and forward infantry and tank elements in the vicinity of the bridge at LELLING were subjected to intense artillery, mortar, anti-tank and small arms fire from the enemy-held high ground to the northeast. It was decided to abandon the bridge site and move the Command east along the axis of advance of CCB and thence northeast. CT 44 was to hold the bridge site with a light force employing fire to contain the enemy in LELLING while CT 68 moved behind them to BIDDING.

CT 69 occupied positions at LEYVILLER and ALTRIPPE and sent reconnaissance patrols north, east and northeast. CT 68, in the vicinity of HELLIMER, moved at 0800 and secured high ground northeast of FREMESTROFF but it was held up in its attack toward BIDDING by enemy minefields across the road at FREMESTROFF. CT 9 remained in position in the vicinity of BRULANGE.

CCB (Read): CT 50 moved southeast from LEYVILLER to clear the BOIS HABST at 0800. No opposition was met in the woods. The Command divided its units as follows:

CT 737 (Kroschel)

737th Tk Bn
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co B 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co A 60th Engr Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CCB Reserve

Security Plat Co C 603d TD Bn

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn
3d Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Sect Btry B 777th AAA Bn

The plan of CCA was to attack north and expand the Div zone of advance. The Command divided its forces as follows:

CT 69 (Forest)

69th Tk Bn
Co B 9th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—)
Co C 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—)
Co C 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (—)
1 Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2 Sects Btry A, 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co C, 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—)
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

24 November 1944

CCA (Hines): CT 9, moving up from the vicinity of BRULANGE, passed through CT 69 in the area around LEYVILLER and drove north. The Combat Team was halted by strongly defended enemy entrenchments in the woods between LEYVILLER and VALATE. CT 69 continued to hold in the positions in front of ALTRIPPE and LEYVILLER. CT 68 moved forward slightly to the high ground north of the woods beyond FREMESTROFF. This line was held and outposted for the night.

CT 44 began withdrawing from its positions in the vicinity of the bridge at LELLING to the town of BISTROFF where it would be in position to support the Command front.

CCB (Read): During the night the enemy drove elements of the 137th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div from HILSPRICH which caused the offensive to be delayed because the town had to be retaken before units could assemble for the initial jump-off. CT 737, ordered to move to positions from which it could attack HILSPRICH, moved out at 1030. By 1615 it had been cleared of enemy and outposted.

CT 15 moved down the road toward PUTTELANGE and by 1400 was just west of the crossroads in the woods, having received only moderate small arms fire. At 1520 the anti-tank ditch west of the crossroads had been crossed and the area was strongly outposted while bridging operations continued during the night.

Res Comd (Harris): Displaced to the vicinity of BERIGVINTRANGE.

25 November 1944

Over slippery and virtually impassable terrain both Commands made limited gains against the enemy. Infantry elements of CCB captured REMERING LES PUTTELANGE on the flooded MADERBACH River and CCA on the north flank clawed its way up slippery slopes to gain commanding ground near VALATTE. The Div CP moved to HELLIMER.

CCA (Hines): CT 9 advanced to LE GROSSENBUSCH WOODS with infantry spearheading the attack and artillery fire clearing the woods. After bitter hand-to-hand fighting the enemy was driven from the high ground and it was outposted for the night.

CCB (Read): The attack on PUTTELANGE and REMERING LES PUTTELANGE moved out at 1000. CT 737 ran into no difficulty after it had penetrated woods east of HILSPRICH until 1130 when it began receiving heavy artillery fire. The Combat Team pushed forward, and by 1305 had two companies of infantry in REMERING LES PUTTELANGE.

CT 15 was held up from the start by a large crater in the road east of the anti-tank ditch which had been bridged the night before. As the leading tank company deployed and started around the crater they came under exceptionally heavy artillery and mortar fire as well as direct fire from large caliber guns, believed to be 150mm. Two tanks received direct hits and three tanks became mired in the mud. The remainder of the tanks withdrew to defiladed position. Infantry could not advance east of the crossroads because of heavy fire and moved southeast to REMERING LES PUTTELANGE where they helped the other combat team capture the town.

Div Arty Comd (Riley): The 128th Armd FA Bn fired a heavy preparation in advance of the jump-off of CT 15 and, with the 212th Armd FA Bn, continued to support the attack throughout the day.

26 November 1944

Having reached the MADERBACH River the Div now busied itself in deploying along the west bank and occupying positions from which it could eventually launch an attack across the stream and on to the SAAR.

CCA (Hines): CT 69 moved to the vicinity of L'UNTERHOLTZ FOREST and attacked north through the woods toward the road junction on the north edge of the woods on the way to HOSTE-HAUT. Strong enemy resistance was encountered in this area. Leading elements encountered a road block about 800 yards from the edge of the woods but were able to push through it. By 1130 the team had reached the road junction and attempted to deploy around a road block there. This effort was met with fire from mortars, machine guns, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft and small arms. Unable to clear the road junction by dark the team withdrew from the woods to high ground northwest of ST JEAN ROHRBACH which it outposted for the night.

CT 68 continued holding positions before ALTRIPPE and CT 9 continued holding the position before VALATTE.

CT 44 was transferred to CCB.

CCB (Read): A combat team composed of elements of the 134th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div was organized for an attack south along the west bank of the MADERBACH River.

The composition of the Combat Teams was as follows:

CT 134 (Miltonberger)

2d Bn 134th Inf Regt
1 Plat 134th Inf AT Co
Mine Plat 134th Inf AT Co
1 Plat 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—2 Cos)
Co C 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 68th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)
1 Plat Co B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 134 moved out early and occupied MORSEBRONN and CUSTVILLER and early in the day had patrols in the town of HIRBACH.

CT 44, having displaced from the vicinity of BISTROFF, moved into the area around MORSEBRONN early in the afternoon. After proceeding only a short distance, however, tanks of the force bogged down and became entirely useless to supporting infantry. It was then decided not to sacrifice men and equipment needlessly by proceeding further, so the whole Combat Team went into bivouac for the night.

Div Arty Comd (Riley): 22 counterbattery missions were fired on 16 enemy batteries, 2 of which were destroyed and the remainder neutralized. One German Mk IV tank was destroyed. The Command supported CT 134 in its attack east.

27 November 1944

CCA (Hines): At 1245 the Command was ordered to attack north. CT 69, from its positions south of the FORET DE PUTTELANGE, thrust forward toward the PUTTELANGE—BIDING Highway and sent a detachment east toward HOSTE—HAUT. Both elements were seriously delayed by minefields, road blocks and craters, and it was necessary for the armored infantry to dismount and go forward on foot.

At 1245 CT 68 moved northwest toward LIXING, LES ST AVOLD and LANING and by evening both towns were cleared. Only sporadic enemy artillery fire was received. Patrols, sent north to the vicinity of VAHL—EBERSING, made contact with Engineer elements of the 80th Inf Div just before dark.

CT 9, from the area of ALTRIPPE, moved north toward MAXSTADT, entered the town at 1400, and occupied it for the night.

CCB (Read): Now held a front extending from DIFFEMBACH LES PUTTELANGE south through REMERING, LES PUTTELANGE, DIDERFING, HIRBACH and west to MORSEBRONN. CT 50 was on the left, astride the PUTTELANGE road, tying in with CCA on the left. CT 44 was on the right tying in with elements of the 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div on the south. The remainder of the Command remained in reserve in ST JEAN ROHRBACH.

Res Comd (Harris): A patrol from the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz moved north and entered the town of LELLING.

28 November 1944

The left wing of the Div continued to advance northeast, closing into positions facing the MADERBACH River as the enemy pulled out to the east bank of the stream. All of the area south of the PUTTELANGE—VAHL—EBERSING Highway was now clear of enemy. A continuous front was achieved when patrols of CCA tied in with the 80th Inf Div on the north at HENRIVOILE. The Div now faced generally east from HINSING on the south to ELLVILIER on the north and was confronted by a flooded stream impassable for vehicles and strongly defended on the east bank.

CCA (Hines): CT 69 continued its advance north, occupying CAPPEL at 1100 after overcoming road blocks and craters just south of the town. Other elements moved east, holding HOSTE—BAS and HOSTE—HAUT and tying in with CCB on their right.

CT 9 occupied BARST—MARIENTHAL and BIDDING and sent a patrol to the vicinity of HENRIVILLE where contact was made with the 80th Inf Div on the left. This contact was maintained.

CT 68 moved to the area between ALTRIPPE and LEYVILLER, leaving only a small holding force at LIXING LES ST AVOLD.

CCB (Read): Reorganization and maintenance continued throughout the Command. Patrols were sent north from DIFFEMBACH LES PUTTELANGE to maintain contact with CCA on the left.

29—30 November 1944

CCA (Hines): CT 69 established an observation post in a MAGINOT LINE fort 1½ miles southeast of HOSTE—BAS on the road to PUTTELANGE. Aggressive patrols northeast and east maintained contact with the 80th Inf Div. During the night 29—30 Nov, Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz sent a patrol to the north edge of the woods north of HOSTE—BAS. The patrol then worked northeast to FARSCHVILLER.

CCB (Read): On 29 Nov CT 50 extended the area of the Command north by sending one company to DIFFEMBACH—LES—PUTTELANGE after patrols had found the town free of enemy the night before.

1—2—3 December 1944

The Div opened the period in a defensive position along the west bank of the MADERBACH River with CCA on the left maintaining contact with the 80th Inf Div and CCB on the right maintaining contact with the 35th Inf Div. Res Comd remained in the vicinity of BERIG—VINTRANGE. Active patrol operations continued. On the evening of 2 Dec the Div zone was shifted north in preparation for a thrust across the MADERBACH to the SAAR on the 4th.

CCA (Hines): At 1700 on 2 Dec elements of the Command relieved units of the 80th Inf Div in the vicinity HENRIVILLE. The 44th and 50th Armd Inf Bns were transferred from CCB to CCA and the following composition of Combat Teams became effective at 2000 hours on 2 December:

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn
Cos C & D 68th Tk Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCA Reserve

68th Tk Bn (—)
9th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
1 Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 68th Tk Bn
Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co B 603d TD Bn
2d Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)
Rcn Plat 603d TD Bn

CT 50 reported at 1500 on 3 Dec that all elements had closed in the area east of CAPPEL and CT 44 reported at 1630 that all elements had closed southeast of HENRIVILLE.

CCB (Read): During the night of 2—3 Dec elements of the 134th and 320th Inf Regts relieved the Command of positions south of DIFFEMBACH—LES—PUTTELANGE. The Command, consisting of the 15th Tk Bn and Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—1 Plat), moved to barracks at ST JEAN ROHRBACH.

Div Arty Comd (Riley): Reinforced by 183d FA Gp and the 974th FA Bn, Div Arty was organized for the attack of 4 Dec as follows:

Div Arty (Riley)

128th Armd FA Bn—Direct Support CT 44
212th Armd FA Bn—Direct Support CT 50
231st Armd FA Bn—Direct Support CT 9
974th FA Bn—General Support

183d FA Gp (Bartlett)

276th Armd FA Bn—Reinforcing fires of 128th
696th Armd FA Bn—Reinforcing fires of 212th
191st FA Bn—General Support

4 December 1944

CCA, comprising most of the combat elements of the Div sliced through the enemy defense line at 3 points and forced deep penetrations east toward the Div objectives. At the end of the day the Command had captured 6 towns and vast amounts of enemy material, and the forward elements stood on the slopes of LA MONT DE CADENBRONN ready to seize the objective the following day.

CCA (Hines): The enemy held the position along the railroad track between FARBERSVILLER and a point halfway to FARSCHVILLER. From there to FARSCHVILLER he was dug in on a ridge about a hundred yards southwest of the town. CT 44 on the left of the Div zone attacked at 0730 with two infantry companies abreast supported by tanks. Before noon this attack had overrun the enemy main line of resistance and was pushing east through LE BUCHWALD. By noon the attack had passed this point and shortly afterward EBERING was seized. The Combat Team continued through the woods beyond the town, but it became apparent that CT 44 did not have sufficient weight to insure the capture of the objective. Consequently, Lt Col Davall was ordered to take CT 68 (—), pick up tank elements with CT 44, and with this force attack TENDELING in conjunction with the attack of CT 44. Troops of CT 44 which moved from EBERING lost their direction and disrupted operations of CT 50 somewhat when they passed through DIEBLING toward METZING. These troops, consisting of infantry and medium tanks, were assembled and attacked TENDELING from the direction of DIEBLING. A company of light tanks was sent directly from EBERING against TENDELING. This combined attack was launched late in the day and before dark TENDELING had been captured. Both CT 44 and CT 68 immediately moved east on CADENBRONN. A tank column was moved northeast to envelop the town from that direction. Enemy 88mm guns on the north outskirts of METZING fired on this column from the flank at a range of 2000 yards, destroying 3 tanks and disabling 5 more before the enemy guns were silenced. The attack of both Combat Teams continued however until the high ground approximately 400 yards west of CADENBRONN was seized. Darkness prevented further action and the troops were ordered to hold in place.

Launched at 0730, the attack of CT 50 promptly moved into FARSCHVILLER. One company of infantry enveloped the town from the northwest and advanced directly with the assault troops. Two hours were employed in cleaning out the town. At 1150 the Combat Team reported that leading elements were on the high ground overlooking DIEBLING. Enemy opposition in this sector was disorganized and at 1240 CT 50 was mopping up in the town. Following the seizure of this town, the Combat Team attempted to take METZING by frontal assault but failed. It was at this time that enemy guns on the north edge of METZING opened fire on CT 68, moving northeast to envelop CADENBRONN. Darkness prevented CT 50 from enveloping its objective and plans were made to attack the next morning. CT 69 (plus 1 company of the 9th Armd Inf Bn) attacked toward LOUPERSHOUSE. Following a heavy artillery, assault gun and tank fire concentration, the infantry jumped off at approximately 0830 and deployed under enemy fire across the flooded valley and stream approximately 400 yards from the town. The town was enveloped from the south and a bridgehead across the river was secured. The Combat Team then proceeded to seize and hold high ground east and south of the village. At 1230 the town was reported clear. Engineer units commenced building a new bridge at 1600 and it was completed by 2100.

Div Arty (Riley): Participated in a Corps counterbattery mission from 0645 to 0715. A preparation in support of the attack of CCA was fired from 0716 to 0730. Fire was continued in general support of the Combat Teams on known enemy installations and location of troops following that. Both time and impact fuzes were used. Battalion Commanders were ordered to reconnoiter for new positions in the FARSCHVILLER—THEDING area and the 212th, 276th, 974th, and 191st FA Bns displaced before dark.

5 December 1944

The Combat Teams of CCA overran the heights of LE MONT DE CADENBRONN and at the end of the day were on commanding ground above the SAAR River overlooking GERMANY and the SIEGFRIED LINE. The objective was seized through the combined thrusts of 4 combat teams and all units assisted in consolidating the ground at the end of the day. The Div CP opened at FARSCHVILLER at 1545.

CCA (Hines): The plan for the day was to have CTs 44 and 68 hold a line along the northwest flank of the Command, maintaining contact with the 80th Inf Div. CT 9 was to continue the attack northeast toward ROUHLING and CT 50 was to operate against the towns of METZING, MOUSVILLER, HUNDLING and IPLING. CT 9 was composed as follows:

9th Armd In fBn (-1 Co)
Cos C & D 68th Tk Bn

Co A 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

At 1030 CT 9 effected a passage through the lines of CT 44, picking up tank destroyer elements enroute, and launched an envelopment from the north on CADENBRONN. By 1100 it was reported that the town was in our hands and the Combat Team pushed on toward ROUHLING. The town was enveloped from both the north and the south and by dark the envelopment had been completed and the town and high ground in that vicinity were captured. Troops were withdrawn at dark, on Command order, to the high ground west of ROUHLING.

CT 50 resumed the attack on METZING at 0950, enveloping the town with two forces, one from the north and the other from the west. The envelopment from the north proved successful and the town was captured at 1015. A tank-infantry team was ordered north toward NOUSVILLER (which was then outflanked by CT 9) and the town was quickly captured. One company of infantry enveloped the town from the northwest and advanced jointly with the direct assault troops. CT 50 next attacked HUNDLING and at 1425 word was received that mopping up operations were in progress and that the town was in our hands. In conjunction with this attack the forces of CT 50 advanced toward IPPLING from the north, occupying and clearing that town. When this operation was completed, the Combat Team was withdrawn to high ground north of IPPLING for the night.

CCB (Read): The Command Headquarters with Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-1 Plat) moved from ST JEAN ROHRBACH through DIFFEMBACH-LES-HELLIMER north through LEYVILLER, VALATTE and west to BARST-MARIENTHAL, closing there at 1300. The 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to the Command and began making reconnaissance preparatory to relief of elements of the 2d Cav Gp on the north of the XII Corps zone.

6 December 1944

All enemy territory from SAARGUEMINES north along the SAAR River to the vicinity of GROSBLIEDERSTROFF was cleared by the end of the day and the Div objective was consolidated. Elements of CCA thrust southeast into SAARGUEMINES and were the first American troops in that town. The area was turned over to Res Comd at 1500.

CCA (Hines): CT 50 moved out late in the day in two columns, one to travel by way of NOUSVILLER to WELFERDING and the other by way of IPPLING to WELFERDING. The NOUSVILLER column took the wrong route and went into ROUHLING, receiving heavy enemy artillery fire which forced it to withdraw. The south column moved forward and by noon WELFERDING had been occupied and cleared of the enemy. Contact with the 35th Inf Div on the right flank was made in the vicinity of SAARGUEMINES by a light tank patrol from Headquarters CCA. Members of this patrol were the first American troops in SAARGUEMINES. CCA was relieved of command in this sector at 1500 and withdrew to VALATTE where the CP was opened at 1535. The Command was placed in Div Reserve until further orders with the following troops under its command:

69th Tk Bn
603d TD Bn

25th Armd Engr Bn
777th AAA Bn (-)

CCB (Read): The 15th Tk Bn moved from ST JEAN ROHRBACH to HENRIVILLE and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz continued reconnaissance of the area for further movement to relieve elements of the 2d Cav Gp the following day.

Res Comd (Harris): Headquarters Res Comd cleared BERIG-VINTRANGE at 1009 and closed in DIEBLING at 1158. The mission of the Command was to hold the line from GAUBIVING on the west to WELFERDING on the east.

7-13 December 1944

Res Comd took over positions which had been won by CCA during the three previous days and CCB relieved the 80th Inf Div, extending the line northwest.

The period was marked by vigorous patrol activity and constant artillery fire. On several days psychological warfare was attempted with fair results.

The following was the composition of Commands:

CCA

69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn
603d TD Bn
777th AAA Bn (-)

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C & 2 Rcn Plats of Hq Co 691st
TD Bn

Res Comd

50th Armd Inf Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
691st TD Bn (—)

Div Arty

Group Riley (Supporting Res Comd)

128th Armd FA Bn—direct support 9th Armd Inf Bn
212th Armd FA Bn—direct support 50th Armd Inf Bn
231st Armd FA Bn—direct support 68th Tk Bn
191st FA Bn in general support

Group Bartlett (Supporting CCB)

276th Armd FA Bn—direct support of 86th Cav Rcn Sq
696th Armd FA Bn—direct support of 44th Armd Inf Bn

CCA (Hines): Relieved by Res Comd the Command displaced to VALATTE where it went into Div reserve, prepared to support either of the units on the line.

CCB (Read): The mission of the Command was to hold the north half of the Div sector and to contain SAARBRUCKEN. The 44th Armd Inf Bn relieved elements of the 80th Inf Div in the area of FOLCKLING and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz relieved elements of the 2d Cav Gp in the area of MORSBACH. These reliefs were effected by 1500 on 7 Dec. The Command extended from the tie-in point with Res Comd on the right about half-way between FOLCKLING and BOUSHACH to the tie-in point with the 6th Cav Gp (XX Corps) just inside the German border directly north of ROSBRUCK.

CCB Hq moved to FARBERSVILLER on 8 Dec, closing there at 1000. The 15th Tk Bn (plus Co C 691st TD Bn) had moved to that village on the previous day. A minimum number of men were to be on the line and a maximum number were to be in billets. Maintenance of vehicles and training of new men were to be stressed.

Res Comd (Harris): The mission of the Command was to hold the southeast half of the Div sector and to maintain contact with the 35th Inf Div on the right, the tie-in point to be in the vicinity of WELFERDING. Hq Res Comd was located in DIEBLING. The 50th Armd Inf Bn was holding the right half of the Command sector and the 9th Armd Inf Bn was holding the left half.

At 1215 of 9 Dec a loudspeaker was set up in the vicinity of the enemy held town of LIXING LES ROUHLING and the garrison was addressed in an attempt to procure their surrender. The enemy was given 15 minutes to surrender, after which the town was to be shelled. The enemy immediately answered with 10 rounds of mortar fire in the vicinity of the loudspeaker. The town was shelled at the expiration of 15 minutes. Eight enemy surrendered later in the day. The attempt was repeated again the following day.

Div Arty (Riley): Ground and air OPs enabled the Command to inflict a heavy toll on enemy personnel and vehicles during the period. Harassing and interdictory fires were employed on a 24-hour basis. On 10 Dec, for example, the following targets were fired upon: 10 groups of enemy infantry, 1 mortar position, 1 machine gun position, 4 OPs, 2 groups of enemy vehicles, 5 TOTs on LIXING LES ROUHLING (including 10 rounds of propaganda leaflets), 7 concentrations on towns, including FORBACH, and 5 counterbattery missions.

14—15—16 December 1944

The composition of commands as of 15 Dec was as follows:

CCA	CCB	Res Comd
50th Armd Inf Bn	68th Tk Bn	9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn	15th Tk Bn	86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
25th Armd Engr Bn		69th Tk Bn
777th AAA Bn		691st TD Bn (Towed)
603d TD Bn		

CCA (Hines): Remained in the vicinity of VALATTE, prepared to support other elements of the Div on order. On 15 Dec the 44th Armd Inf Bn was relieved in its sector on the line by the 86th Cav

Rcn Sq Mecz and moved to LELLIN. The 50th Armd Inf Bn was relieved in its sector by elements of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 9th Armd Inf Bn and moved to DIFFEMBACH LES HELLIMER.

CCB (Read): The Command was relieved of responsibility in its sector by Res Comd on 15 Dec. Upon being relieved by the 69th Tk Bn, the 68th Tk Bn moved to the vicinity of LANING, MAXSTADT and VAHL—EBERSING and the 15th Tk Bn moved to MACHEREN. The following day order for the above relief was rescinded and a new realignment of units placed the 44th Inf Bn in the Command from CCA and shifted the 68th Tk Bn to CCA. The 44th did not enter the line.

Res Comd (Harris): On the 15th the Command was assigned the mission of protecting and holding the entire Div front. The relieving elements—the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 69th Tk Bn—moved into positions on the line on the left during the day and relief was effected by 1200. The 9th Armd Inf and the 691st TD Bn continued to hold the right half of the line. On the 16th a patrol of Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was ambushed and two men were killed.

Div Arty (Riley): Reinforced by 183d FA Gp, the Command continued to support CCB and the Res Comd in the Div sector.

17—20 December 1944

On the morning of 16 Dec, far to the north in the forests of the ARDENNES, German tanks and infantry crept through the mists to attempt a breakthrough. Thus began the "Battle of the Bulge" into which the 6th Armd was to plunge within ten days.

In the meantime the 35th and 87th Inf Divs on the right of the 6th Armd attacked across the SAAR River south of SAARGUEMINES and were making headway in a northeasterly direction against stubborn enemy resistance. Consequently, the 6th Armd was alerted to watch for any hint of withdrawal on the part of the enemy in its sector. Patrols were doubled, observation posts were increased, and all troops were alerted to maintain pressure and exploit any breakthrough.

On 18 Dec the Div reverted to XII Corps. The Div CP opened at HOMBOURG HAUT at 191030. The composition of commands was as follows:

CCA	CCB	Res Comd
68th Tk Bn	15th Tk Bn	9th Armd Inf Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn	44th Armd Inf Bn	69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)	86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)	Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
603d TD Bn	Co C & 2 Rcn Plats 691st TD Bn	1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
777th AAA Bn (—)	1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn	Co B 603d TD Bn (Reinf)

CCA (Hines): During the entire period 17—20 Dec the Command remained in Div reserve. At 1600 on 18 Dec the 50th Armd Inf Bn closed in bivouac in MERLEBACH and the 68th Tk Bn closed in the same town at 1430. On the 19th CCA Hq was moved from VALATTE to HOMBOURG—HAUT, closing in the new location at 1300.

CCB (Read): Held the northwest half of the Div sector and continued actively to patrol the area. The 44th Armd Inf Bn, reinforced by 1 platoon Co C 691st TD Bn and a reconnaissance platoon from the same battalion, went into the line 17 Dec, occupying the right part with the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz on the left and the 15th Tk Bn in support. During the night of the 18th, 1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn relieved 1 Plat Co C 691st TD Bn (with the 44th) and the remainder of the company was attached to the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Engineers of the Command established a series of booby traps in the vicinity of FLOCKLING. Patrols were dispatched daily.

Toward the end of the period heavy vehicular traffic was reported in the vicinity of OETTING and MORSBACH. When the area was heavily shelled, the traffic ceased.

Res Comd (Harris): Throughout the period the Command held and protected the south and east parts of the Div sector and patrolled actively. On the 18th Co B 603d TD Bn relieved the 691st TD Bn which reverted to Corps. The relief was effected by 0900. On the 20th Co D 69th Tk Bn reported hearing track laying vehicles moving in the vicinity of GAUBIVING. All elements were alerted for possible counterattack.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div and answered calls from units for harassing fires. On the 18th harassing and interdiction fires at the rate of 12 rounds per hour over a 24-hour period were placed on the following towns: KLEIN BLITTERSTROFF, GROSS BLIEDERSTROFF, ZINZING, ALSTING, ETZLING, BEHREN, LES FORBACH, SPICHEREN and FORBACH.

21—24 December 1944

On the 21st the 6th Armd was transferred from the XII Corps to the XX Corps. Coincident with this transfer, the 6th Cav Gp reinforced, known as "Task Force Fickett", was placed under the command of the Div. The 6th Cav Gp was holding a defensive sector to the left of the 6th Armd, so this addition extended the Div sector north to the vicinity of WALDASSEN. The 6th Cav Gp was composed as follows:

6th Cav Rcn Sq
5th Ranger Bn
Co C 602d TD Bn
Co B 293d Engr C Bn
Tr E 28th Cav Rcn Sq

In the north the German counterattack in the ARDENNES was becoming more serious each day and all available assistance was being rushed to the hard pressed divisions. On 23 Dec the 6th Armd was ordered to move to an assembly area near METZ in preparation for movement north to the ARDENNES. Relief of Div units on the line was to be made by the 103d Inf Div; relief of the 6th Cav Gp was to be made by 106th Cav Gp. Accordingly CCA, in Div Reserve, began movement to METZ on 23 Dec and the following day the remainder of the Div left the SAAR area.

CCA (Hines): Co A 603d TD Bn moved to the vicinity of BETTING LES ST AVOLD, closing there at 1250 on 21 Dec. The following day the 50th Armd Inf Bn was sent to Res Comd and entered the line. The 9th Armd Inf Bn was transferred to CCA and closed in the vicinity of MERLEBACH at 1455. On the 23d the Command was ordered to move to METZ by the following route: ST AVOLD, BOINVILLE SUR NIED, COURCELLES—CHAUSSY, METZ. Command Hq closed at HOMBURG—HAUT at 1900 and opened in METZ at 2230. The last elements of the Command arrived in METZ at 0045 the night of 23—24 Dec.

CCB (Read): Patrols were sent out by the 86th Cav Rcn Sq on the night of 21—22 Dec to determine enemy strength in the vicinity of FORBACH. On the 23d plans were completed for relief on the following day of the Command by the 411th Inf Regt of the 103d Inf Div. The 15th Tk Bn was to remain in its present position in Div reserve until released. Relief took place on the 24th as scheduled. Command Hq left FAREBERSVILLER at 1200, the 44th Armd Inf Bn was completely relieved by 1410, and the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz by 1500. The last of the units closed in METZ at 2030.

Res Comd (Harris): At 0915 on 21 Dec when an enemy patrol of about 30 men surrounded an outpost of the 9th Armd Inf Bn, a platoon was immediately dispatched to the area. The enemy patrol was routed and retreated into a woods where it was heavily shelled. On 22 Dec the 50th Armd Inf Bn relieved the 9th Armd Inf Bn on the line. The relief was effected by 1430. Relief of the Command by the 410th Inf Regt, 103d Inf Div began on the morning of 24 Dec. The 69th Tk Bn was relieved at 1006, the 50th Armd Inf Bn 1455, and the 410th Inf Regt accepted responsibility for the sector at 1545. Headquarters remained in place at DIEBLING.

6th Cav Gp (Fickett): The unit held the north part of the Div sector for the first three days of the period, maintaining aggressive patrols in its area. On 24 Dec it was relieved by the 106th Cav Gp at 1440 and reverted to III Corps. The 5th Ranger Bn was attached to 6th Armd and prepared to move to METZ the following day.

Div Arty (Riley): On 22 Dec the Command was reinforced by the 282d Armd FA Bn on the north and supported by XV Corps Arty on the south and central part of the sector. On 24 Dec the Command was in the process of being relieved by the 103d Div Arty for movement to METZ with the Div.

CHAPTER IV
ARDENNES CAMPAIGN

25 December 1944 to 26 January 1945

When the 6th Armd was relieved from the line before SAARGUEMINES on 23—24 Dec by the 103d Inf Div, it had completed its mission of thrusting the enemy back to the defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE. Spearheading the attack of the XII Corps, the Div had fought continuously from the SEILLE River across LORRAINE to the border of GERMANY. Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy despite completely unfavorable weather, and plans were in progress for a resumption of the offensive through the WESTWALL, when German armor staged its ARDENNES offensive.

By 21 Dec enemy Panzer units had penetrated to SAMREE, LAROCHE and MARCOURT. The BASTOGNE—ARLON road had been cut and heavy attacks were being launched by the 116th Panzer Div against the 101st AB Div in BASTOGNE. In LUXEMBOURG PROVINCE the Germans had captured ETTTELBRUCK but were held slightly to the south of that town. The enemy now turned to night attacks, particularly around BASTOGNE where a frenzy of effort to take the city was stepped up as 4th Armd began its drive north from ARLON toward the encircled city. The fighting was particularly bitter around BASTOGNE on Christmas Day. The 6th Armd, now coming into METZ, was preparing to enter the battle.

25 December 1944

The 6th Armd was ordered to move to METZ in strategic reserve under XX Corps. On commitment, it came under the orders of XII Corps.

XII Corps Mission: To attack north from a bridgehead over the SAUER River at DIEKIRCH and follow the high ground along the west bank of the OUR River toward ST VITH, thus severing the salient at its base. This high ground came to be known as the "Skyline Drive".

Div Mission: Orders were received to relieve elements of the 9th and 10th Armd Divs, then occupying a sector north of LUXEMBOURG CITY on the flank of the salient. The Div was ordered to move to MERSCH where it would be under control of XII Corps. Combat Commands were reorganized and alerted for movement.

The Div less the 15th Tk Bn closed in METZ at 1300. Composition of commands at that time was:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn (Reinf)
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Btry A 777th AAA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn

Res Comd

15th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

CCB

44th Armd Inf Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (Reinf)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines): Departed from METZ at 2300, going through THIONVILLE, LUXEMBOURG CITY to MERSCH. The bivouac area one mile east of FELS was reached at 0430. The Command was prepared to relieve CCA, 9th Armd Div and Res Comd, 10th Armd Div.

CCB (Read): Was alerted for movement into the line on the following day to relieve elements of the 10th Armd. At 1445 Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, which had been attached to Res Comd, closed at METZ.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved from DIEBLING to METZ, closing in the new location at 1434. The Command was alerted to move north the following day.

Div Arty (Riley): Was placed in general support and prepared to move to the vicinity of MERSCH.

26 December 1944

The 6th Armd entered the "Battle of the Bulge" taking over a sector on the south flank facing north along the bank of the SAUER River. CCA went into position on the right (east) and CCB on the

left. Contact was established with the 5th Inf Div on the east and the 80th Inf Div on the west. The Div now was ready to thrust north across the very base of the enemy salient. The front extended from a point 1000 yards east of ETTTELBRUCK west to MOSTROFF and then south to PLETSCHETTE.

CCA (Hines): While awaiting the withdrawal of CCA 9th Armd Div, vehicles of CCA 6th Armd infiltrated to FELS and the advance Command Post section reached its new location approximately 1 mile south of MEDERNACH. Official relief of the 9th Armd Div in this sector was effective at 1400 when Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 9th Armd Inf Bn took positions facing east along the front line formerly held by the 9th Armd Div. At 0730 the 68th Tk Bn joined XII Corps' mobile reserve force at LINTGEN but remained under 6th Armd control.

CCB (Read): Left METZ at 0745, moving north through LUXEMBOURG CITY. Orders were received from the Commanding General that CCB would relieve the 109th Inf Regt of the 28th Inf Div and the 90th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz of the 10th Armd Div. Liaison was established and the Command closed in its area at 1830, establishing a forward CP at STEGEN. The 44th Armd Inf Bn and the 50th Armd Inf Bn with elements of 86th Cav tanks and tank destroyers attached were placed on the line during the night. The 44th Armd Inf Bn was on the left and the 50th Armd Inf Bn was on the right. Enemy artillery fell in STEGEN during the night causing several vehicular casualties.

Res Comd (Harris): In assembly near METZ, the Command prepared to move to the MERSCH area.

Div Arty (Riley): Moved at 0800 to the MERSCH area. The 231st Armd FA Bn was placed in direct support of CCA and marched over the CCA route to the vicinity of MEDERNACH. Upon the arrival of Div Arty in the NOMMEN area, the 231st Armd FA Bn reverted to control of Div Arty.

27 December 1944

CCA (Hines): At the time CCA assumed responsibility in its sector, the front line extended approximately north and south, joining with the 5th Inf Div on the right flank. Consequently, the 11th Regt of the 5th Inf Div pushed north toward the SAUER River and at the end of the day, the sector of the 9th Armd Inf Bn had been pinched out and the front had been straightened into an east-west line. What remained of the Command's part of the line was held by Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Mecz.

CCB (Read): Completed relief of the 109th Inf Regt and the 90th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and assumed responsibility for the sector at 0745. The sector was reorganized as follows: the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—Tr D) with one platoon of Co C 603d TD Bn attached was on the left; the 44th Armd Inf Bn with one medium tank company of the 69th Tk Bn and one platoon of Co C 603d TD Bn was in the center; and the 50th Armd Inf Bn with one medium tank company attached was on the right flank.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved from METZ at 1330 and closed near EISENBORN at 1815. The 15th Tk Bn closed at MERSCH at 1815. Not being assigned a sector, the Command remained in Div reserve.

Arty Comd (Riley): Completed registration and fired harassing and interdiction missions at the rate of 3 rounds per hour on DIEKIRCH, BASTENDORF and roads in that vicinity. The 231st Armd FA Bn reverted to control of Div Arty. The 128th Armd FA Bn was placed in support of the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and the 44th Armd Inf Bn while the 212th Armd FA Bn was in support of the 50th Armd Inf Bn. Fires of these two armored field artillery battalions were reinforced by the 183d FA Gp.

Composition of troops:

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn

231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn

28 December 1944

The Div was to be shifted over to the BASTOGNE area where the enemy had been fruitlessly trying to force the surrender of beleaguered American troops. A narrow corridor had been punched through to the city on 26 Dec and the opportunity now existed to bite deeply into the German flank from that area. This was the role now slated for the 6th Armd.

CCA (Hines): During the early part of the day representatives of the 5th Inf Div arrived to discuss the planned relief, and later that afternoon the 10th Inf Regt 5th Inf Div began the relief of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Responsibility for the sector officially passed to the 10th Regt at 2400. Earlier in the evening, the 9th Armd Inf Bn had been withdrawn from its defensive positions.

CCB (Read): During the morning harassing artillery fire continued to fall in the sector occupied by the 50th Armd Inf Bn. Liaison was established with the 5th and 80th Inf Divs and plans were made to effect a relief of the Command on the line. Two battalions of the 10th Inf Regt were to relieve elements on the right sector. One battalion of the 2d Inf Regt was to relieve the 44th Armd Inf Bn. Reconnaissance elements of the 80th Inf Div were to relieve the left sector which was held by the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz.

Div Arty (Riley): Reinforced by the 183d FA Gp, the Command continued to support the Div in its sector. During the day the 107th and 108th FA Bns were relieved of attachment to the 183d FA Gp; the 276th Armd FA Bn was attached and given the mission of reinforcing the 128th Armd FA Bn. Missions during the period consisted of harassing fires on the towns of DIEKIRCH, BASTENDORF, TANDEL, LONGSDORF, GETTENDORF, HOSDORF and AMMELDINGEN. These missions were fired at the rate of three rounds per hour. The 231st and 212th Armd FA Bns fired on possible enemy batteries and gun positions.

29 December 1944

The Div was relieved at 0230 and assigned to III Corps. The plan given the Div Comdr 28 Dec and later modified in conference among Army, Corps and Div Comdrs was as follows: III Corps was to attack 31 Dec through the 101st AB Div toward ST VITH (6th Armd) and HOUFFALIZE (4th Armd—later changed to 11th Armd). A number of modifications were made in the plan on 29 and 30 Dec so that on 31 Dec only the 6th Armd attacked northeast while the 11th Armd, under VIII Corps, attacked considerably southwest of BASTOGNE. No attack was made toward HOUFFALIZE except a limited objective attack by a regiment of the 101st AB Div on the left flank of the 6th Armd. Commands were reorganized as follows:

CCA

69th Tk Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
128th Armd FA Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

15th Tk Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn
2 th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCB

68th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Arty Comd

231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 60th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co

CCA (Hines): March orders were issued for movement to an assembly area north of ARLON. The route of march was: MEDERNACH, COLMAR, BISSEN, BOWINGEN, USELDANGE, REDANGE SUR ATTERT, ELL and ATTERT. At 1700 all troops of the Command closed in the new assembly area.

CCB (Read): On receipt of March Orders, the Command moved to its new assembly area at LEGLISE, BELGIUM, by way of STEGEN, MEDERNACH, MERSCH, ARLON, HABAY LA NEUVE, BEHEME and LEGLISE, closing at 1750.

Res Comd (Harris): Remained in its assembly area, reorganized, and moved to the vicinity of ETALLE, following the same route as CCB.

Div Arty (Riley): Relieved by the 5th Inf Div Arty, the Command reorganized and moved to an assembly area west of HABAY LA NEUVE, following CCB's route of march.

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Brindle): Relieved from assignment to CCB and CCA, the 86th reorganized and moved to an assembly area near VLESSART, following the same route of march as CCA.

30 December 1944

The 6th Armd, having closed in the new assembly area, prepared to attack northeast on the night of 30—31 Dec through the 4th Armd Div. Div Arty of the 4th Armd Div was prepared to reinforce the fires of the 6th Armd Arty within the limit of its present range. The 35th Inf Div was on the right flank and VIII Corps elements were on the left.

CCA (Hines): Sent reconnaissance parties into the BASTOGNE area to determine routes and forward assembly area.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—Co B)
Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
3d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
2d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Co A 777th AAA Bn
Supported by 253d FA Bn

Reserve

Hq CCA
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Co A 603d TD Bn (—)
Security Sect 603d TD Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—Co A)
Co B 69th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Supported by 128th Armd FA Bn

Trains

Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Rcn Sect 603d TD Bn

CCB (Read): Plans were made to attack northeast on 31 Dec through elements of the 101st AB Inf Div with combat teams abreast, CT 68 on the right and CT 50 on the left. CCB was to attack on the left of CCA.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—Co B)
Co B 50th Armd Inf Bn
1st Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
3d Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

Reserve

Hq CCB
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—Co B)
Co B 68th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1st Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

Trains

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

31 December 1944

CCA of the 6th Armd was in position to attack on schedule early in the morning but heavy traffic, coupled with ice and snow on the key roads, delayed CCB until late afternoon. CCA made a limited objective attack, therefore, and advanced approximately 1½ miles to await CCB. The 35th Inf Div launched its attack on schedule but was unable to make any progress against an enemy who fought bitterly.

CCA (Hines): Arrived on the outskirts of BASTOGNE on schedule but time of attack was postponed pending the arrival of CCB. When it appeared that CCB would be considerably delayed, a limited objective attack was launched at 1230 to secure high ground near WARDIN and north to the BASTOGNE—LONGVILLY road. CT 69, on the left, advanced in this attack against heavy small arms and artillery fire. Div Arty of the 101st AB Inf Div brought fire down on this resistance and aided the Combat Team in securing its objective. The town of NEFFE and the stream and railroad crossing leading into town were captured, and the Combat Team then cleaned out a heavy wooded area nearby.

Meanwhile CT 44, on the right flank, was encountering the same sort of stiff resistance. Although numerous casualties were sustained during its advance, the Combat Team continued through heavy woods to take some of the high ground and make contact with the 1st Bn, 134th Regt of the 35th Inf Div.

CCB (Read): Ice and snow delayed leading elements of CT 50 on the NEUFCHATEAU—BASTOGNE road and the IP was not reached on time. After clearing the IP, these elements were blocked by vehicles of the 11th Armd Div and the Command was unable to proceed to the development area. This delay prevented the Command from attacking in coordination with CCA. Combat Teams of the Command assembled in the vicinity of CLOCHIMONT and by the end of the day elements of the Command were infiltrating under the cover of darkness into the final assembly area northeast of BASTOGNE.

Div Arty (Riley): Supported CCA in its attack by firing on enemy tanks, artillery and infantry.
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Brindle): Guarded bridges along the routes of march and prepared to protect the Div's left flank.

1 January 1945

The 6th Armd resumed the attack north and northeast at 0800 with CCA on the right and CCB on the left. The Commands advanced northeast against determined enemy resistance, clearing the towns of NEFFE and BIZORY and occupying the town of MAGERET. Contact was maintained with the 101st AB Inf Div on the left and the 80th Inf Div on the right. This drive represented the first real offensive thrust into the flank of the ARDENNES salient. BASTOGNE, now safe, was never seriously threatened again. In the late afternoon Corps orders broadened the zone to the right in the direction of BRAS, still retaining the railroad to BOUCRY as the left flank boundary. Such a broad objective forced the commitment of all reserves.

CCA (Hines): At 1300 the enemy launched a strong counterattack along the sector between WARDIN and NEFFE. He was stopped, however, and by 1330 the situation was stable. CT 69 on the left moved out from the vicinity of NEFFE at 1400 and passed through CT 68 (CCB) near MAGERET. The part of MAGERET south of the road was cleared and the high ground to the east, up to the edge of the woods, was taken. The Combat Team then had control of the dominating terrain. After CT 69 commenced its attack, CT 44 on the right attacked the woods northwest of WARDIN. Strong enemy small arms and automatic weapons resistance prevented CT 44 from reaching its objective, although heavy friendly artillery concentrations had been placed on the woods. At the end of the period CT 44 held approximately the same line as at the beginning. At the end of the day, combat teams had consolidated their positions along a line running approximately southwest for 4000 yards from the high ground east of MAGERET.

At 1900 CT 69 was released to CCB and the line of the railroad was made the boundary between the combat commands. The 15th Tk Bn and the 9th Armd Inf Bn were relieved from attachment to Res Comd and assigned to CCA as well as Tr C and the 1st Plat of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. Two platoons of Co B 603d TD Bn were also attached to CCA.

CCB (Read): Made its attack as scheduled at 0800 and at 0910 leading elements were passing through the 101st AB Inf Div. CT 50 initially met no difficulty, but CT 68 encountered machine gun fire near BIZORY, which by 0940 had been overcome. At 1000 CT 50 was receiving small arms fire from the woods south of the railroad. At 1030 CT 68 had cleared BIZORY and both combat teams began receiving direct fire from the woods northwest of MAGERET. CT 68 jumped off and attacked the town at 1100. By noon MAGERET was taken and CT 68 was reorganizing to push on. Reorganization was hampered by direct anti-tank fire from northeast of the town. As CT 50 passed through the woods about one mile northeast of BIZORY, it encountered exceedingly stiff resistance consisting of small arms, mortar and artillery fire. CT 50 continued to press the attack but made very little progress. At dusk it withdrew to the edge of the woods and consolidated its positions for the night.

CT 68 completed reorganization of its forces on the outskirts of MAGERET. CT 68 and CT 50 established mutual defenses for the night.

That evening, CT 69 was assigned to the Command and plans were made to resume the attack as soon as combat team commanders had completed reorganization. The plan of attack was coordinated with the 101st AB Inf Div and CCA. Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was assigned to the Command at 1800 but was not committed.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the vicinity of COBREVILLE at 1245 and in the evening transferred the majority of the Command to CCA. Thereafter the Res Comd consisted of only a few odd companies and battalion headquarters which were kept alerted to meet any emergency.

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) (Brindle): Displaced to a new assembly area near TRAIMONT. At 1045 the Squadron was ordered to attach one troop to each combat command. Tr C went to CCA; Tr A to CCB.

Div Arty (Riley): The Command, with the 193d FA Gp attached, supported CCA and CCB. It fired upon a large concentration of vehicles at HEMROVILLE, tanks and infantry east of WARDIN, and two guns east of ARLONCOURT. ARLONCOURT was also shelled by Arty of the 6th Armd and 101st AB Inf Div.

2 January 1945

Orders from III Corps, broadening the Div zone to include BRAS, necessitated a reorganization of combat commands. The 6th Armd Div attacked at 0925 and advanced along its entire front for a gain of approximately 6 square miles. Throughout the day savage resistance was encountered. Later, enemy counterattacks of powerful infantry and tank formations were successful in driving our

forces out of MICHAMPS and repulsing an attack on ARLONCOURT. WARDIN was entered at the end of the period, however, and the Div held firmly on the high ground generally west of the line MICHAMPS—ARLONCOURT—WARDIN for the night.

Composition of Commands following reorganization:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
 44th Armd Inf Bn (—Co A)
 15th Tk Bn
 Co B 69th Tk Bn
 Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 1 Plat Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—2d Plat)
 1 Sect 996th Tdwy Br Co
 Co A 603d TD Bn (—3d Plat)
 2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
 Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)
 Co C 178th Engr C Bn (Direct Support)

Res Comd

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
 996th Tdwy Br Co (—)
 603d TD Bn (—)
 777th AAA Bn (—)
 Co A 178th Engr C Bn (Direct Support)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
 3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
 128th Ord Maint Bn
 642d QM Trk Co
 3803d QM Trk Co
 Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
 68th Tk Bn
 69th Tk Bn (—Co B)
 Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
 Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
 2d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
 1 Sect 996th Tdwy Br Co
 Co C 603d TD Bn
 3d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
 Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
 2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
 Co B 178th Engr C Bn (Direct Support)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
 212th Armd FA Bn
 231st Armd FA Bn
 Btry D 777th AAA Bn
 1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
 193d FA Gp (atchd)
 177th FA Bn (155 How)
 253d Armd FA Bn (—1 Btry)
 696th Armd FA Bn
 776th FA Bn (155 How)

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCA (Hines): After regrouping the Command as indicated, CCA was prepared to attack in its zone as soon as possible. Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—Co A)
 Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
 696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—Co A)
 Co B 69th Tk Bn
 2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
 3d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
 2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—Co C)
 Co A 15th Tk Bn
 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
 1st Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
 2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
 128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

Reserve

1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
 Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 1 Plat Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 Sect 996th Tdwy Br Co

Moving out at 1135, CT 15 with CT 9 began the attack.

CT 15 passed through CT 44, cleared the woods to the northwest of WARDIN with infantry assisted by tanks, and took the high ground north and northwest of WARDIN after overcoming strong enemy resistance. CT 44 maintained its line during the early part of the day and when CT 15 and CT 9 passed through this zone it withdrew to an assembly area east of BASTOGNE in CCA reserve.

CT 9 advanced slowly through the woods southwest of WARDIN and cleared enemy from the area late in the afternoon. Heavy enemy resistance was encountered in the form of small arms, anti-tank and artillery fire. At the close of the period CT 9 occupied all except the northeast corner of the woods west of WARDIN and north of the stream.

At 1630 an attack was launched by CT 15 from the high ground northwest of WARDIN. A company of infantry, supported by tanks from positions on the high ground, attacked down the hill to the town after heavy artillery and air preparations and smoke were placed on the opposite ridge. Before the infantry reached the town, eight tanks were sent down to provide close support for the attack. This attack received heavy machine gun and anti-tank fire which destroyed four tanks. The remaining four were withdrawn. Infantry pressed the attack, however, and captured WARDIN, destroying three anti-tank guns and capturing 38 prisoners. A platoon was left to outpost WARDIN and the remaining infantry troops withdrawn. At 0500 the next morning enemy entered the town in strength with self-propelled guns and forced the outpost platoon to withdraw to the hill behind the town.

CCB (Read): Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 50 (Root)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—)
 Med Tk Co 68th Tk Bn
 2d Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
 2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
 Sect Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
 212th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—)
 Co 50th Armd Inf Bn
 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
 Sect Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
 2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn
 231st Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—Co B)
 Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn
 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
 2d Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
 2 Sects 777th AAA Bn
 253d Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

During the night of 1 Jan enemy air was active and the 50th Armd Inf Bn, the 68th Tk Bn and the 212th Armd FA Bn were bombed and strafed. At 0400 the enemy launched a counterattack against the 68th Tk Bn in MAGERET. Some enemy troops succeeded in infiltrating into town but the attack was successfully repulsed with the assistance of supporting artillery (and with the cooperation of the German Air Force which bombed and strafed its own troops). Strength of the counterattack was estimated to be a reinforced company, later revealed to be the 1st Co 340th Fusileer Bn, 340th VG Div reinforced by a heavy weapons platoon and one assault platoon. The 50th Armd Inf Bn received a minor counterattack early in the morning. Prisoners of war from these two attacks were the first indication that a new division had come into the line against the Combat Command.

CT 50 attacked at 1000 and made good progress until the latter part of the day. The town of OUBOURCY was captured and MICHAMPS was entered at 1500. About this time CT 50 received considerable anti-tank, artillery and mortar fire from the general vicinity of BOURCY and from the railroad embankment southwest of the town and the woods due east. Prisoners revealed that CT 50 was opposed by remnants of the 26th VG Div supported by an assault gun from the 3d Pz Regt, 2d Pz Div as well as the 695th Regt of the 340th VG Div. During the attack CT 68 gave direct fire support to the right flank of CT 50. Meanwhile CT 69 cleaned out the large woods east of MAGERET without much difficulty.

CT 68 advanced toward ARLONCOURT but as leading elements reached the outskirts of the town, they were subjected to intense direct fire from enemy tanks and anti-tank guns (which were well camouflaged with paint) as well as small arms fire from enemy infantry in white snow capes. The leading elements took severe punishment and, although supporting artillery put heavy concentrations on the town, they were unable to secure a foothold and were forced to withdraw to the high ground west of town.

At dusk, CT 69 outposted the ground gained during the day and tied in with CCA on the right and CT 68 on the left. CT 68 (on the high ground west of ARLONCOURT) established an outpost line for the night with CT 50 on the left. CT 50 withdrew from the area in the vicinity of MICHAMPS

and OUBOURCY and established contact with the 501st Para Regt, 101st AB Inf Div. Excellent air support was very effective.

Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq was attached to CT 50 to reinforce the left flank and maintain contact with the 101st AB Inf Div.

Div Arty (Riley): Composition of Groups:

Group RILEY Supporting CCB

6th Armd Div Arty Comd
212 h Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (-1 Btry)
776th FA Bn (155 How)

Group COONEY Supporting CCA

128th Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
177th FA Bn (155 How)

Artillery fired on enemy infantry, tanks, assault guns, artillery and observation posts. Nine battalions were massed to fire on enemy troops attempting a counterattack near MAGERET at 0100 and again from 0300 to 0600 on troops forming in the vicinity of WARDIN. During the attack Artillery fired TOTs on ARLONCOURT and massed fires of 12 battalions on MICHAMPS. Heavy concentrations were placed on WARDIN throughout the day.

3 January 1945

At a conference at the 35th Div CP the Corps CG outlined his plans for the Corps (26th and 35th Inf and 6th Armd Divs from right to left) to clear the large wooded pocket southeast of BASTOGNE and destroy the large enemy concentration sheltered therein. The key to the area was BRAS toward which the 26th Div was attacking from the south, the 35th from the southwest and the 6th Armd from the west, while at the same time the 6th Armd was to continue the attack to the northeast toward LONGVILLY.

CCA (Hines): During the night of 2—3 Jan patrols were sent out along CT 9's front but no contact was made with the enemy and aside from occasional harassing artillery fire, no other activity was reported.

CT 15 on the left continued to consolidate its position east of NEFFE and to clear the woods along the railroad in this vicinity.

CT 9 now in the center continued the attack east, taking the road junction and high ground south of WARDIN.

CT 44 moved from its assembly area at 0830 and by 1000 was in position on the right of CT 9. CT 44 moved out and encountered the enemy at approximately 1030. Heavy small arms fire was received from the woods to the southeast. After a slow start, good progress was made, a position on the high ground southwest of WARDIN was established by dark, and contact was made on both flanks.

The remainder of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was taken from Res Comd, attached to CCA during the day, and placed in position on the right of CT 44. The troop relieved elements of the 101st AB Inf Div and took over a part of the line at MARVIE, tying in this flank with the 134th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div. At 2145, Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and elements of the 134th Inf Regt fought off strong aggressive patrols.

CCB (Read): Other than sporadic artillery and mortar fire, there was no enemy action during the night. About 1600 enemy artillery increased very considerably. CT 50 was subjected to Nebelwerfer fire. At the same time the 501st Para-Regt was subjected to a counterattack which drove in its right flank and caused Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn to withdraw. The counterattack was beaten off and Co A restored its original position.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired on infantry, tanks and vehicles throughout the period and, in conjunction with the 101st AB Inf Div Arty, fired on and stopped a counterattack. Heavy concentrations were placed on MICHAMPS, ARLONCOURT and BOURCY.

4 January 1945

The Div withstood and dispersed 3 counterattacks during the period, inflicting severe losses on the enemy. At this time, because of several salients, the Div front measured almost 14,000 yards and was held by 3 Inf and 3 tank battalions with some cavalry, engineer and destroyer support—much too long a line against a stronger and aggressive enemy. During the day orders were issued fragmentarily for withdrawal from the most advanced salients in order to straighten and shorten the line and thereby create some local reserves. Unfortunately the enemy attacked strongly during the readjustment, but our troops turned in place to beat off the attacks.

During the latter part of the period, while he maintained continuous pressure on the Div's left flank, the enemy launched a major counterattack against the right flank. At the time front line units were displacing to newly assigned positions which were occupied under heavy pressure until after dark when the enemy ceased his attack because of severe punishment. This day marked the only withdrawal of any consequence by the Div under enemy pressure during the war, and even this would not have been forced had the line not been over-extended.

CCA (Hines): The south sector of the Combat Command line was to be withdrawn to the shorter position occupied on 1 Jan by CT 44, approximately 1000 yards north of the present position. This withdrawal and reorganization was to be completed immediately after dark.

At 1600 an enemy attack was launched east of the road junction south of WARDIN. Friendly light and medium artillery concentrations were fired and a counterattack by tanks of CT 44 was launched. Enemy troops were dispersed, but four of our tanks were destroyed and the headquarters of Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn was cut off and captured.

At 1700, preceded by a 20-minute concentration of 150mm artillery and Nebelwerfer fire, the enemy launched a major counterattack. It hit along the boundary between CT 9 and CT 44 and a force of SS troops came from WARDIN into the woods behind CT 9's position. Smoke was placed between the woods and CT 15. This enemy action struck our troops as they were in the midst of withdrawing to the readjusted line. Enemy tanks and other vehicles were observed at the same time heading toward our positions along the main road from BRAS. A strong force estimated at a regiment, spearheaded by ten Tiger Royal tanks and ten self-propelled guns, drove in against our lines. One company of CT 44 which had not withdrawn was ordered to hold its position at the bend of the road to allow CT 9 to occupy the new line. It maintained this position until 1800 and with artillery and machine gun fire broke the force of the enemy attack as it came through the woods toward WARDIN. Five tanks of CT 9 were lost to bazooka fire while withdrawing through the woods. CT 9, however, promptly and strongly organized a defensive line. While at times the situation was precarious, at no point was the enemy successful in making a breakthrough. The 3d Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn held its position stubbornly and covered the withdrawal of the infantry units. For this heroic stand and later for leading other troops in establishing a vital bridgehead over the PRUM River on 27 Feb the platoon received a Presidential Citation.

CT 9 and part of CT 44 occupied the new line and after dark the remaining company of CT 44 pulled back in order to preserve a strong front on favorable terrain. CT 86 was constituted and placed on the right flank of CT 44. This unit consisted of Trs C and D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and one section of Co A 603d TD Bn. Its line ran south from MARVIE approximately one mile to a point where contact was made with the 134th Inf Regt.

CCB (Read): With the exception of sporadic artillery and mortar fire, the enemy was inactive until about 0730 when he attacked with an estimated two companies of infantry, supported by six tanks, from the vicinity of BOURCY astride the railroad and hit our lines at the juncture with the 101st AB Inf Div. The attack was beaten off and had subsided by 0800. A large number of casualties were inflicted upon the enemy.

After a slight withdrawal the enemy returned with an estimated battalion of infantry supported by eight tanks and continued to exert strong pressure at the same point. The brunt of this attack was borne by the 501st Para Regt. The enemy subjected the front line troops, especially those of CT 50, to heavy artillery and Nebelwerfer fire. Under orders to eliminate the salient on the left and shorten the line, this CT was withdrawn to a better and more secure position. The 101st AB Inf Div conformed to the new line which ran generally from FOY southeast to the railroad, then just east of BIZORY and along the high ground west of MAGERET, thence south to tie into the CCA sector.

Elements of the 101st AB Inf Div assisted in covering the withdrawal of the infantry elements of CT 50 while the tank elements, also assisting, completed their withdrawal at dusk. This placed the Command's front line generally in the same area as when it jumped off, except for a much more favorable position in the vicinity of MAGERET.

Div Arty (Riley): With the 193d FA Gp attached, the Command continued to support the Div in its sector. Gp Riley supported CCB by firing on enemy counterattacks, troop concentrations, vehicles, observation posts and fired counterbattery fires during the period with excellent results. The withdrawal of CCB to its new position was covered with fire, forcing the enemy to keep under cover for the entire operation. Gp Cooney continued in support of CCA. The withdrawal of CCA was covered by continuous fire of the entire Group.

5 January 1945

CCA (Hines): Co B 69th Tk Bn was attached to CT 9. At 0500 an attack by 150 enemy infantrymen was broken up at the junction between CT 15 and CT 9.

Enemy troop concentrations continued to be reported during the day and small groups of enemy tanks were also active along the front. These targets were engaged by the supporting artillery. At 1725 CT 15 reported that an enemy armored column was moving from MAGERET to NEFFE. This column was fired upon by CT 15 and forced to withdraw.

On the south flank of the Combat Command, Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attacked by enemy infantry at approximately 1725. A heavy artillery concentration was placed on the woods south of our position and on MARVIE, and the approach to the woods was smoked in the direction of the high ground occupied by CT 15.

Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, attached to the 9th Armd Inf Bn at 1750, went into position on the left flank of CT 9.

One platoon Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn was assigned from Res Comd to CCA, and one platoon Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn was assigned from CCB to CCA. One platoon Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and one platoon Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz were assigned to CCA from Res Comd.

CCB (Read): Other than sporadic shelling, the sector was comparatively quiet until about 1700. At this time enemy infantry accompanied by tanks were observed coming through the woods south of OUBOURCY and northeast of BIZORY, turning south and thence along our front lines. CT 69's tanks fired at the column, knocked out two tanks, and inflicted severe casualties on enemy infantry. Artillery fire was highly effective in knocking out two more tanks and inflicted additional personnel casualties which caused the enemy to withdraw. Later a prisoner stated this attack was made by the 3d Bn 26th PG Regt 12 SS (Hitler Jugend) Division.

About 1820 another enemy column of tanks, half tracks, and infantry (approximately two companies) was observed moving on the west side of MAGERET, going southwest along our front. Tanks took them under fire and Artillery placed concentrations on the column. Heavy casualties were inflicted and several vehicles were set afire. At 1950 the situation was reasonably quiet except for enemy patrols and artillery activity.

There seemed to be a general build up of enemy troops and armor on a line from BIZORY to ARLONCOURT. The town of BIZORY, occupied by CT 50, received intense artillery and mortar fire all afternoon. Meanwhile, CTs 68 and 69 reported enemy patrol activity until about 0115. At that time strong aggressive thrusts on the left of CT 68 were followed by thrusts on the right flank. After these initial thrusts, the entire front was engaged in warding off attempted penetrations. Finally these patrols moved towards the right flank of CT 69 where their objective seemed to be Hill 513. All units were engaged in fighting throughout the night and all reserves were committed in order to hold their positions.

CT 15 sent one engineer platoon through CCA to the assistance of CT 69 and also covered the right flank with direct tank fire. At 0800 in the morning the enemy withdrew while CCB mopped up.

Res Comd (Harris): The Command headquarters and Res Comd Alert Force moved to a new assembly area north of ASSENOIS, prepared to assist either combat command. The 1st platoon, Hq Btry 777th AAA Bn relieved Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz as bridge guard in the Div area.

Composition of Res Comd:

- 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
- 777th AAA Bn (—)
- 603d TD Bn (—)
- 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)

Composition of Alert Force:

- Hq Res Comd
- Hq & Hq Co 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
- Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—1 Plat)
- Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—2 Plats)
- Co B 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)
- Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (—1 Plat + 1 Plat Co C)

Div Arty (Riley): Heavy concentrations were placed in the woods south and southwest of WAR-DIN and critical points were interdicted.

6 January 1945

The Div again successfully repulsed enemy attacks of tank-infantry assault teams committed piecemeal from dark 5 Jan until daylight 6 Jan, killed many enemy personnel, and destroyed much enemy equipment. A final attack was successfully repulsed just before dark 6 Jan. The weather continued to be bitter cold, making any sort of operation difficult. The 3d Bn 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div was attached to the Div at 1645 and Co B 3d Cml Bn at 1150. Since the 320th Inf had been engaged for several days with its Div it was billeted in BASTOGNE for a 24-hour rest.

CCA (Hines): Enemy activity was observed along the entire front during the day and numerous concentrations were fired by supporting artillery. From statements made by prisoners, this fire was very effective. Large numbers of enemy troops were either killed or wounded and many tanks and other vehicles were destroyed.

Co A 44th Armd Inf Bn was released from its attachment and returned to the 44th Armd Inf Bn, and Co A 69th Tk Bn was released to the 69th Tk Bn.

CCB (Read): The 3d Bn 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div was assigned to the Command. By 1200 the units on the line had completed consolidation of their positions and necessary readjustments. Other than sporadic artillery and Nebelwerfer harassing fires, the sector was generally quiet.

At 1600 when air observation spotted enemy infantry assembling in the northeast sector of BOIS DE JACQUES, supporting artillery placed a TOT on the area. At about 2000 a night patrol from the 69th Tk Bn picked up two prisoners who stated that the 694th Regt had planned to attack that afternoon, but that our TOT had inflicted such heavy casualties the attack was canceled.

7 January 1945

The 6th Armd maintained contact with elements of the VIII Corps on the left and the 35th Inf Div on the right and held its line in the north sector of III Corps zone except in the salient of CT 15 where a strong enemy attack late in the day forced a withdrawal from the wooded area east of NEFFE. An unusually strong enemy attack of four columns which came out of WARDIN and hit the center of the 6th Armd Div zone with infantry, tanks, and self propelled guns was repulsed.

CCA (Hines): Enemy vehicular activity was heard during the night 6—7 Jan and a small amount of artillery fire was received.

At 1720 an enemy force consisting of infantry, supported by tanks, attacked CT 15 on its left flank and hostile tanks were also seen moving toward the center of CT 15. A sharp engagement followed and continued during the night. The enemy tanks were driven off by tank fire, but the infantry on the left forced its way into the woods along the front of the sector. A company of the 9th Armd Inf Bn was sent to support CT 15 as it fell back and by 1950 the attack was checked and the infantry was holding south of the woods. An estimate as to the strength of this attacking force was 700 infantry and 22 tanks.

Co B of the 44th Armd Inf Bn was sent to provide additional support for CT 15 at 2030.

CCB (Read): At 1630 CT 69 reported about 100 enemy infantrymen assembling in a small woods northeast of BIZORY. Thirty minutes later, supported by several tanks, they began to move toward the high ground southwest of MAGERET. Artillery, tank and automatic weapons fire dispersed the attack and drove it back. At about the same time another attack was launched by the enemy at the juncture between CT 69 and CT 15. This attack came along the railroad towards NEFFE. The penetration in CT 15's sector presented a dangerous threat to CT 69's right flank. With darkness approaching, it was decided to contain the enemy in these woods until dawn when CCA could attack and reestablish its line.

In the meantime, elements of CT 69 were being harassed by several Tiger tanks which had worked up near their forward positions and were shooting direct fire into our lines. The 68th Tk Bn cooperated with the 69th Tk Bn in trying to stalk down these tanks and destroy them. Finally, tank destroyers attached to the 69th Tk Bn succeeded in knocking out one enemy tank and driving the rest away, but not until the Germans had destroyed three tanks from the 68th Tk Bn.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired TOTs on MAGERET and the woods northeast of FOY. During the day considerable counterbattery fire was received.

8 January 1945

The 6th Armd swung back early in the morning in a strong counterattack by elements of CCA and quickly reestablished the line from which it had been driven the previous day. A weak enemy attack in another sector was successfully repulsed and at the end of the day the Div held its former line in even greater strength than before. The 2d Bn 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div was attached to the Div during the day and attached to CCA.

CCA (Hines): At 0845 CT 15 attacked on its left flank with infantry and tanks to recapture the bitterly contested woods east of NEFFE. Large numbers of prisoners were taken. By 0945 CT 15 had reestablished its old line and positions were being consolidated.

CCB (Read): At 0825 the 69th Tk Bn reported a tank attack of unknown strength which was broken up by artillery and tank fire.

The CCB sector was reorganized as follows:

CT 69 (Kennedy) on the right

69th Tk Bn (—Cos A & B)
Co K 3d Bn 320th Inf Regt
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 3, 320 Inf (Alexander) on the left

3d Bn 320th Inf Regt (—Co K)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCB Reserve

Co B 69th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
776th FA Bn (General Support of CCB)

Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—) was given missions as follows:

2 Sects with CCB trains
Btry B (—) to guard bridges.

By 1715 relief of the 68th Tk Bn and the 50th Armd Inf Bn was completed and both were placed in Div reserve.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the 6th Armd Div in its zone. All battalions were constantly engaged in firing on observed enemy troop concentrations and movements. Direct support was given CT 15 in its attack.

9 January 1945

The turning point in the ARDENNES campaign had now arrived. After its initial gains which relieved pressure on BASTOGNE, the 6th Armd absorbed bitter punishment as the enemy launched the heaviest attacks of which he was capable. In an attempt to retake BASTOGNE the Germans exhausted themselves in unavailing and constant assaults. Now the Div was ready to punch back and while the enemy was able to put up stubborn resistance he was never able to stop the 6th Armd.

Under a new Corps plan tied in with VIII Corps and coordinated in conference at the 101st AB Div CP at 1100, the 4th Armd was to pass through the left half of our zone 10 Jan and attack south of the railroad toward BOURCY; the 6th Armd was to continue the attack on the right. CCA lent the 35th Div a company of tanks from the 68th Tk Bn which greatly helped the 134th Inf on our right in its fight through woods southeast of MARVIE and protected our flank.

Late in the afternoon a conference was held with commanders of the 4th Armd Div and arrangements were made for their elements to attack through our lines the following day. Combat commanders and battalion commanders from the 4th Armd Div met our CT commanders and conducted a reconnaissance of the front lines. CT 69 was to assist CCA 4th Armd Div in protecting its right flank by direct fire.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
68th Tk Bn
2d Bn 320 Inf Regt (atcd)
Cannon Co 320th Inf Regt (atcd)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co

CCB

69th Tk Bn
3d Bn 320th Inf Regt (atcd)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (reinf)
Btry B (—1 Plat) 777th AAA Bn

CCA

Trs B, C, D, Plat Tr E and 2 Plats Co F
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn Reinf
2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—3 Sects)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn (—1 Btry)
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (atchd)

CCA (Hines): Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 2, 320th (Hannun)

2d Bn 320th Inf Regt
Co C 68th Tk Bn
Regtl Cannon Co 328th Inf
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
231st Armd FA Bn and Co B 3d Cml
Bn in direct support

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—A & C Cos)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

The 128th Armd FA Bn was in direct support of CTs 44, 9 and 86. Group COONEY was in general support of CCA.

CCA Reserve

Co A 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
68th Tk Bn (—Co C)

Res Comd

50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
996th Tdwy Br Co (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

320th Inf Hq

AT Co 320th Inf Regt

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—1 Co)
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 86 (Bridges)

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—Co A)
Cos A & C 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn

CCA Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)

CCA's plan for the day was to attack in its zone with the main effort on the right flank, closely coordinated with the attack of the 35th Inf Div, to seize the high ground and parts of the woods to the southeast along the main road south of WARDIN. CT 2, 320th Inf Regt was to make the attack, supported on the left flank by the fires of CTs 9 and 44. CT 15 was to make a demonstration and cover the enemy lines of communications by fire.

The attack began at 1000, preceded by smoke laid by the chemical company, artillery and the supporting weapons of CTs 44 and 9. The attack moved along rapidly meeting little resistance other than some mortar and artillery fire. CT 15 created a diversion by moving tanks, shooting flares and laying a smoke screen southwest of WARDIN. It supported the operations of the attacking CT by fire on all enemy movement that could be taken under observation. CT 2, 320th Inf Regt continued to make good progress and by noon the objective was reached with the new line extending along the high ground to the southeast of MARVIE.

At 1300, Co B 68th Tk Bn was sent to assist 134th Inf Regt of the 35th Inf Div in their zone in reducing strong points east of LUTREGOIS which had held up the 35th Inf Div for several days.

CCB (Read): The sector remained quiet during the night of 8—9 Jan. By approximately 1340 readjustment of the line was completed and all elements of the 68th Tk Bn had been taken out of the line.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 3, 320th (Aleander)

3d Bn 320th Inf Regt (—Co K)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—Cos A & B)
Co K 320th Inf Regt
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB Reserve

Co B 69th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Arty (Riley): With the 193d FA Gp attached, the Command supported CCA in its attack, and fired two missions for the 101st AB Inf Div attack. Fires were also placed on BOURCY, COBRU and NOVILLE for the 101st AB Inf Div. Two TOTs were fired on MAGERET.

10 January 1945

The attack of the 4th Armd with combat commands abreast passed through CCB's front at 0900 and advanced about 1000 yards before resistance stiffened. At 1345 orders from Corps directed the 6th Armd not to advance but to continue to hold its present front. The 4th Armd was withdrawn rapidly through our lines and sent on another mission out of the BASTOGNE area. The front as it existed at 0900 was held. CCB which was ready to advance on MAGERET cancelled its attack and instead set up an OPL. No advance was planned for the next day and flank security was strengthened to repel any possible enemy threat. The 320th Inf Regt (less 1st Bn) was attached to the Div. The 2d Bn remained attached to CCA; the 3d Bn, to CCB.

CCA (Hines): Considerable artillery was received during the day along the entire front. CT 2, 320th adjusted its positions and established contact on both flanks, having released Co C 68th Tk Bn to battalion control. Co D 68th Tk Bn was attached in place of Co C.

Co B 68th Tk Bn continued operations with the 35th Inf Div and succeeded in blasting the enemy from his positions by dark.

CCB (Read): With the exception of harassing Nebelwerfer, artillery and 120mm mortar fire, the night of 9—10 Jan was relatively quiet. The 4th Armd Div passed through CCB at 0900 and launched an attack toward BOURCY. In conjunction with this attack it was planned to attack and seize MAGERET and the woods east thereof. Meanwhile CCB was to re-occupy its former positions, with the exception of maintaining an OPL 800 meters farther to the front and tying in with the 501st Para Regt, 101st AB Div.

CTs 3, 320th and 69 were given orders to re-establish their lines and effect a tie-in with the 501st Para Regt. One rifle company from the 50th Armd Inf Bn was attached to CT 3, 320th.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparatory and supporting missions for the 4th Armd and the 101st AB Inf Divs. Usual counterbattery, TOT, harassing and interdictory missions were fired with excellent results.

11 January 1945

Plans to maintain defensive positions for the day were cancelled when patrols reported that the enemy was making a partial withdrawal along the front of CCA. The Command attacked at once and drove forward taking key terrain in its zone.

CCA (Hines):

Composition of combat teams:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—Co A)
Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 86 (Bridges)

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

CCA Reserve

68th Tk Bn (—Co B)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—3 Plats)
Co A 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—Co A)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—Co B)
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCA Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CT 9 attacked at 1220 and advanced steadily through the woods southwest of WARDIN, clearing them of the enemy. CT 44 pushed out at 1300, maintained contact with the left flank of CT 9, and advanced through the woods along the highway southwest of WARDIN. Heavy small arms fire was encountered and many enemy were killed or taken prisoner in the advance through these areas. By 1600 the woods were clear and reorganization was started.

Throughout the day CT 15 employed tank fire against enemy personnel and vehicles which were frequently observed at MAGERET and vicinity. At 1635 this CT attacked through the small woods to the left front and by 1710 cleared it of the enemy.

At dark Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to CT 86 and Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was attached to CT 9. CT 44 went into command reserve.

CCB (Read): During the day, eight enemy tanks appeared on the left of the Combat Command's front. Supporting artillery knocked out two of these tanks and the remainder withdrew.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired harassing and interdiction fires during the night of 10—11 Jan on road junctions and towns to the front. One hundred rounds of propaganda shells were fired on BENON-CHAMPS, MICHAMPS, ARLONCOURT, and WARDIN during the day.


12 January 1945

Enemy defenses in the Corps zone weakened and crumbled on the 4th day of the offensive. The Div attacked east, captured WARDIN and the high ground south and east of the town, and advanced to a point only a few hundred yards west of BRAS. Between the 6th Armd and the 90th Inf Div there remained only one infantry battalion from the 35th Inf Div—the pocket had been completely eliminated with terrible losses to the enemy. In the late afternoon the balance of the 320th Inf was attached to the Div and set up as a separate RCT on the left flank with tank and other elements. It took over its zone on 13 Jan.

CCA (Hines): At 0925 CT 44 and CT 9 began the attack, meeting slight resistance. The two main obstacles to the advance were difficult terrain and heavy snow. By 1345 CT 44 held the ridge south from WARDIN and CT 9 held its line prior to the counterattack of 4 Jan.

CT 86 attacked WARDIN from the high ground west of town and at 1515 WARDIN was in our hands.

CT 15 remained in position during the day, holding its line, and assisting the remainder of the Combat Command with supporting fires. Co D 68th Tk Bn was released to the 68th Tk Bn from CCA and one platoon Co A 603d TD Bn went to CCA reserve. The 68th Tk Bn was attached to 320th Inf Regt at 1830.



Scale: 1 inch equals 4 miles.
Yellow: Territory conquered by Division
Red: Main route of advance

532

530

560

505

479

414

Honfleur

Bastogne

Martelange

Forêt

Adelic

Halsy

Halsy

Halsy

Diekirch

Eupen

Steggen

Solferino

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

St. Vith

Echternach

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Contact between the Combat Command's right flank and elements of the 35th Inf Div was made and relief of troops began.

CCB (Read): Received an order at 1130 from the Div Comdr to attack on our left flank to the immediate front and maintain contact with the 501st Para Regt on the left. CT 50 was reassigned to the Command and 1 Company of the 50th Armd Inf Bn was added to CT 3, 320th. Two platoons of Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn were detached from the Command.

CT 3, 320th attacked at 1400 against small arms and automatic weapons fire. By 1800 the unit had secured the high ground, making contact with the 501st Inf Regt. CTs 50 and 69 supported this attack and aided in the consolidation of gains by maintaining contact with the 501st and securing CT 3, 320th's rear.

Div Arty (Riley): Fires were conducted against an enemy infantry assembly area, an enemy CP, artillery batteries, entrenched infantry and AT guns which were harassing CCA.

13 January 1945

The Div with 3 commands abreast resumed its attack meeting considerably heavier resistance than on the previous day. The direction of attack was shifted toward the north. MAGERET, originally taken and lost on 1 Jan, was retaken by CCB but intensive street fighting continued in the town throughout the night and it was not finally secured until the following morning.

The general plan of the Div was to push the attack in the center (MAGERET) and north at first to secure commanding ground and then to drive northeast with CCA on LONGVILLY while CCB and RCT 320 pushed through MICHAMPS and ARLONCOURT and the woods beyond to the LONGVILLY—BOURCY road. In the meantime the 101st AB Div was granted permission to put one regiment through CT 320 in its attack on BOURCY. It later developed that this maneuver greatly delayed CT 320 which finally had to pass through the 502d Inf to make its attack.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

RCT 320 (Byrne)

1st Bn 320th Inf Regt 35th Inf Div
3d Bn 320th Inf Regt 35th Inf Div
Co C 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
68th Tk Bn

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn
(—2 Sects)

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCB

69th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat each Cos A & C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—1 Plat)

Res Comd

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)
2d Bn 320 Inf Regt (atchd)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
216th FA Bn (atchd)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (atchd)

RCT 320 (Byrne): Awaiting the attack of the 502d Para Regt, 101st AB Inf Div. When leading elements of the 502d cleared the forward areas, the Combat Team attacked at 1100 and by the end of the period had gained a strong foothold in the southeastern edge of the woods north of MAGERET.

CCA (Hines): Remained in its position and consolidated its installations while forces on the north captured the high ground around MAGERET and straightened out the line. Aside from receiving the usual harassing artillery fire, no contact was made with the enemy. Numerous targets were observed and fired upon by supporting artillery.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 86 (Brindle)

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—Co B)
Co A 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—)
Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCA Reserve

Co A 603d TD Bn (—)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)

CCA Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)

CCA (Read): At 1245 CT 50 moved out when CT 1, 320th was clear of the MLR. By 1415 CT 50 was receiving heavy artillery fire, but upon reaching MAGERET two hours later this artillery fire was greatly intensified. At 1930 the unit assaulted the town and was still engaged in mopping up a formidable infantry force armed with bazookas in cleverly concealed positions. Stubborn resistance by the enemy caused heavy casualties to our infantry and tanks and the town was not cleared until the following morning.

CT 69 on the right flank furnished supporting fire for CT 50 and also for CT 15 of CCA on the south flank.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—Co A)
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
253d Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCB Reserve

Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—Co C)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
231st Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCB Tns

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

14 January 1945

The Div continued its advance, clearing the towns of MAGERET and BENONCHAMPS and the woods due east of WARDIN and MAGERET. Elements of the 6th Armd made physical contact with the 90th Inf Div, thus pinching out the 35th Inf Div on the right. Although resistance was still quite heavy, the 6th Armd was gaining momentum in its drive toward the "Skyline Drive" and the OUR River.

RCT 320 (Byrnes): Attacked at 0800 and cleared the southern section of the woods northeast of BIZORY during the morning. At 1330 it attacked through and cleaned the woods north of MAGERET and by dark had consolidated its positions and made contact with elements on its flanks.

CCA (Hines): The plan for the day was to attack north and northeast with CT 44, clearing the woods to the east of WARDIN and attacking the town of BENONCHAMPS. CT 15 was to attack the high ground approximately 1500 meters northeast of BENONCHAMPS. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, one plat of Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and one Sect Co A 603d TD Bn reverted to control of CCA Reserve; and Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz reverted to Squadron control after CT 44 passed through. By 1155 CT 44 reached and entered the edge of the woods. Within an hour this wooded area had been cleared and CT 44 moved north in the direction of BENONCHAMPS.

CT 15 made good progress, meeting light resistance, and occupied the high ground northeast of BENONCHAMPS. This town was taken at 1330 and CT 44 moved on toward the high ground beyond. This high ground north and northeast of BENONCHAMPS was reached during the afternoon by both CT 44 and CT 15 where positions were consolidated. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz held a small sector on the right flank of CCA, maintaining contact with the 2d Bn 358th Inf Regt, 90th Inf Div.

CCB (Read): Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn reverted from CT 69 to CT 50 because of the heavy losses sustained during the attack on MAGERET the previous night.

CT 50 jumped off at 1035 to clear the BOIS ST LAMBERT and secure the high ground directly east of MAGERET. Initially the CT met very little resistance but as the attack progressed, opposition increased. CT 50's attack was supported by fire from CT 69. CT 69 remained in position and tied in with RCT 320 for the night.

XIX Tac: Fighter Bombers hit MICHAMPS, OUBOURCY and LONGVILLY with Napalm and Fragmentation bombs and bombed and strafed a motorized column estimated at 50 vehicles.

15 January 1945

The 6th Armd gained momentum in its drive eastward, smashing into OUBOURCY and ARLON-COURT and thrusting as far as the high ground southwest of LONGVILLY. The number of prisoners being taken increased, but deep snow and continuing cold weather made operations extremely difficult. The 1st Bn, 134th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div joined the Div and was assembled near MARVIE in Res Comd.

Composition of Commands after reorganization for the attack of 15 Jan:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co (Direct Support)
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn (-1 Plat)
2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (-3 Sects)

RCT 320

320th Inf Regt
68th Tk Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co

CCB

69th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co (Direct Support)
1 Plat each Cos A & C 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (-1 Plat)

Res Comd

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-)
25th Armd Engr Bn (-)
996th Tdwy Br C (-)
603d TD Bn (-)
777th AAA Bn (-)
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt (Atchd)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn

3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

193d FA Gp (Atchd)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn (155 How)
216th FA Bn (Atchd)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

CCA (Hines):

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—Co C)
Cos B and C 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sec Co A 603d TD Bn
Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—Cos B and C)
Co C 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCA Reserve

Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat & 1 Sect)

The Command's plan was for CT 15 to attack LONGVILLY, followed in column by CT 44 which was to cover the right flank of CT 15. CT 9 was to follow CT 44, occupy the latter's position, and protect the right flank of CCA.

CT 15 continued the attack northeast, moving out at 0900. CT 15 moved very rapidly, making it difficult to maintain contact with flank elements. Many prisoners were taken during the advance and at 0955 CT 15 had reached its objective on the high ground south of ARLONCOURT and on the high ground overlooking LONGVILLY.

CT 44 remained in position near BENONCHAMPS to protect CCA's right flank. At 1000 CT 44 advanced to the high ground to the northeast, a distance of 600 yards. The final position of CT 44 was on the general line along the high ground 600 yards north of BENONCHAMPS.

CT 9 moved to an assembly area near WARDIN and BENONCHAMPS, prepared to support either CT 15 or CT 44.

CCB (Read):

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—Co A)
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—Co A)
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

The objective for the day was to cut the north-south highway from BOURCY to LONGVILLY, with CT 69 on the north and CT 50 on the south. CT 69 was to maintain contact with RCT 320 on the north and CT 50 was to maintain contact with CCA on the south.

CT 50 jumped off at 0830 and met light opposition until reaching the woods about 1 mile east of MAGERET, where the CT was stopped by direct fire, artillery and small arms.

CT 69 jumped off at 0920 and by 1130 was well into the woods south of ARLONCOURT. At 1230 CT 69 had taken ARLONCOURT.

RCT 320 (Byrnes):

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 1, 320th (Walton)

1st Bn 320th Inf Regt
Co C 68th Tk Bn
2d Plat Co C 603d TD Bn

CT 2, 320th (Hannun)

2d Bn 320th Inf Regt

CT 3, 320th (Alexander)

3d Bn 320th Inf Regt

RCT Reserve

68th Tk Bn (—)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)

At 0630 the RCT resumed the attack with CTs 1 and 2. CT 1, 320th secured OUBOURCY after bitter house-to-house fighting; made contact with CCB by patrols to the south of OUBOURCY. CT 2, 320th moved northeast and secured the quarry area due north of OUBOURCY and made contact with elements of the 101st AB Div in the vicinity.

362d Fighter-Bomber Gp, XIX TAC: Flew close support missions on MICHAMPS and armored reconnaissance on the road northeast of LONGVILLY. Flak, emplaced guns, tanks and motor vehicles were located in the HAMIVILLE—LULLANGE—TROINE area. Targets were bombed and strafed continuously during the late morning and afternoon.

16 January 1945

Across rough and wooded terrain, heavily drifted with snow, the Div forced an advance of 1500 yards along its entire front. Enemy resistance was stubborn. The Div objective was secured on the right (LONGVILLY) but the advance on the left ended in the dense woods a few hundred yards short. In a skillfull double envelopment CT 15 surrounded the town of LONGVILLY while infantry cleared it. The town of MICHAMPS was also added to the advance.

CCA (Hines): The mission of CCA was the secondary road south and southeast of MOINET. CT 9 attacked at 0945 along the left flank of CCA and succeeded in taking its first objective along the rising ground northwest of LONGVILLY and northeast of RAU DE MICHAMPS by 1045. CT 9 was assisted in this phase by Co D 15th Tk Bn. When the 1st objective fell, Co D reverted to 15th Tk Bn control. After cleaning out the woods northwest of LONGVILLY, one company of CT 9 became separated and lost its direction. Some delay in the continuation of the attack was caused, but by 1245 the Combat Team launched another attack for the final objective. This attack was met by heavy fire from tanks, SP guns and small arms coming from the woods north and northeast. The Combat Teams captured and cleaned out the woods northeast of LONGVILLY and consolidated positions along the high ground west of the objective. Outposts were placed just short of the crossroad and contact was made with CT 15 on the right and elements of Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz on the left. Tr D established contact with CCB.

CT 15 attacked at 1010 and was passing LONGVILLY by 1145 with tanks on both sides of the town. This attack was coordinated with the attack of the 90th Inf Div on its right. CT 15 continued to advance and reached the objective in the early afternoon. Heavy anti-tank and small arms fire was received from the woods north and east. Artillery fire placed on these targets neutralized them. CT 15 consolidated its positions and strengthened contact with both flanks.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Co C 15th Tk Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn (—Cos B & C)
Co D 15th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCA Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—Cos C & D)
Cos B & C 44th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCA Reserve

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Sect Co A 603d TD Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (—1 Plat)
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Co A 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat & 1 Sect)

CCB (Read): Augmented by the 1st Bn 134th Inf Regt (CT 1, 134th) the Command attacked at 0930 to seize the objective astride the BOURCY—LONGVILLY Road. CT 50 jumped off at 0930, cleared the woods, and consolidated the new position about one mile northeast of ARLONCOURT by 1330, prepared to attack further. CT 1, 134th moved up into position, prepared to continue the attack, and jumped off at 1445 against small arms and direct AT fire to a point about a mile short of RAU DE MICHAMPS. There the Battalion halted for the night and consolidated the position on the right of CT 50. The Command CP moved to ARLONCOURT during the morning. Elements of the 10th Pz G Regt, 10th Pz Div were identified on the Div front.

RCT 320 (Byrne): Attacked at 0800 with CTs 2 & 3, captured MICHAMPS at 1010 and advanced east over 200 yards through the dense woods northwest of MOINET. It received heavy AT fire from the south edge of BOURCY and small arms fire from the woods.

17 January 1945

Having failed to stop the advance of the Div for several days by determined defensive measures, the enemy threw a counterattack against elements of CCA which had enveloped LONGVILLY the previous day. The counterattack, which included armored units, was thrown back and less than an hour after it was launched was fully under control. The Div held fast on the right and gained its objective, the LONGVILLY—BOURCY road, on the left where RCT 320 crossed the road and CCB reached it. Plans were made to relieve the 320th Inf with the 134th Inf (the 35th Div had been pinched out) which would also take over the CCB zone leaving CCA on the right and RCT 134 on the left with CCB in reserve, pending resumption of the attack.

CCA (Hines): CT 15 supported by heavy artillery fire threw back a strong counterattack consisting of tanks, SP guns and infantry. Launched from high ground east of LONGVILLY, it also hit on the front of CT 9. By 1030, hardly more than an hour after it started, the attack was fully under control.

CCB (Read): Continued to attack to take its objective astride the BOURCY—LONGVILLY Road. CT 50 and CT 1, 134th (Craig) jumped off at 0830. CT 1, 134th on the right encountered considerable difficulty in the way of direct AT, tank, and small arms fire and sporadic artillery. Contact was maintained with CCA on the right. At 1015, about a mile from the objective, contact was established on the left with RCT 320. At 1130 both CTs were about 500 yards from the final objective. Both CTs received fire support from CT 69. At 1500, just short of the objective, positions were dug in and consolidated for the night.

The CTs lined up as follows:

CT 50 (Wall)

50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
1 Plat (Med) 69th Tk Bn
231st Armd FA Bn in direct support

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—)
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)

CT 1, 134th (Craig)

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
1 Plat Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
1 Plat (Med) 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
253d Armd FA Bn direct support

CCB Res

Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

RCT 320 (Byrne): Jumped off at 0830 and continued to work slowly through the woods delayed as much by snow and fallen trees as by the enemy rear guard. Late in the afternoon the LONGVILLY—BOURCY road was crossed and outposted.

18 January 1945

RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Relieved CT 320 (Byrne) and CCB in the forenoon during a heavy fog followed by snow squalls. This took care of the left of the Div zone. On the right, CCA held lightly with a reinforced battalion. The relieved troops were pulled back to rest, refit, and get warm and dry.

Composition of Commands:

CCA (Hines):

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Trs C & D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—3 Sects)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
3 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
193d FA Gp (Atchd)
 177th FA Bn (155 How)
 253d Armd FA Bn
 776th FA Bn (155 How)
696th Armd FA Bn (Atchd)
161st FA Bn (Atchd)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

Div Hq (Fwd)

2 Sects Btry C 777th AAA Bn

CCB (Read):

50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—1 Plat)

Res Comd

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
996th Tdwy Br Co
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

RCT 134 (Miltonberger)

134th Inf Regt
68th Tk Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (—1 Plat)
Plat Co A 60th C Engr Bn (Atchd)

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
 Co A 110th Med Bn
 3d Plat 16th Field Hosp
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)

CCA (Hines): Spent most of the day relieving front line units and consolidating positions in the area northeast of LONGVILLY. CT 44 relieved CTs 9 and 15, accomplishing the relief by 1810. Both of the relieved combat teams released their attachments which then reverted to their parent organizations except Co D 15th Tk Bn which was attached to CT 44. CT 44 made contact with friendly elements on both flanks. CT 44 composed of

44th Armd Inf Bn
Co C & D 15th Tk Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st and 2d Plats Co A 603d TD Bn
AG Plat 15th Tk Bn
1 Sq, Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

was supported, directly, by CT 86 consisting of

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat Tr E 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

The enemy, who was not aggressive during the day, threw in some artillery and mortar fire. Activity was observed in MOINET during the morning.

CCB (Read): Was relieved at 1100 by CT 3, 134th Inf. Attached troops reverted to parent organizations except the 69th Tk Bn and 50th Armd Inf Bn which went into bivouac southwest of BASTOGNE for refitting and reconditioning. The advance CP returned to BASTOGNE.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger)

Composition of Troops:

CT 1, 134th (Craig)

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co B 68th Tk Bn

CT 3, 134th (McDaniel)

3d Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co D 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat 603d TD Bn

CT 2, 134th (Wood)

2d Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co A 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

CT 3, 134th relieved CT 320 in its zone by 0930 and carried on active patrolling throughout the remainder of the day. At the end of the period plans were being made to advance the line to a position northeast of the BOURCY—LONGVILLY road and maintain contact with CT 2, 134th on the right and elements of 11th Armd on the left. CT 2, 134th relieved CCB by 1110 and carried on active patrolling throughout the period, at the end of which 3 outposts were established northeast of the BOURCY—LONGVILLY road.

19 January 1945

The day was marked by a regular North Dakota blizzard which drifted the snow several feet deep. All engineer equipment was on road maintenance and yet only a few routes could be kept open for wheeled vehicles.

CCA (Hines): Closed the CP in BASTOGNE and, moving by infiltration, opened the new CP in MAGERET at 1300. CT 44 generally supported by CTs 86 and 15 was the only unit actually in the front lines. Aggressive patrols were sent north and an OP was established on high ground about a mile north of LONGVILLY. Later in the day the front lines were pushed to the crossroads between LONGVILLY and MOINET.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Conducted vigorous patrolling through the woods to its front.

20 January 1945

Two days of little activity on the Div front came to an abrupt end late in the day when it became obvious that the enemy was withdrawing. CT 44 attacked against light opposition and took MOINET. The outpost line was pushed forward 1½ miles on the left. Plans were at once drawn up for a continuation of the attack the following day, and elements were regrouped. The plan of attack for the Div was for CCB to advance between CCA on the right and CT 134 on the left to seize the high ground north of TROINE and thus take over the left half of the zone. CCA on the right was to attack parallel to seize objectives in the area around TROINE; CT 134 was to attack through the woods about 2 miles and then be pinched out into reserve.

CCA (Hines): Held positions during the early part of the day but on receiving information from patrols north and east that the enemy was withdrawing hastily issued orders to CT 44 to attack as soon as possible. The objectives were MOINET and Hill 510 east of the town. The CT attacked at 1703 and moved forward with slight opposition. A few prisoners were taken as the troops entered MOINET. By 1920 the lines were well established in MOINET and south of Hill 510 from which heavy fire had been received. The main difficulties attending this operation were deep snow on all roads and the fire from Hill 510.

CCB (Read): Plans were made for an attack northeast. The troops attached to the Command were formed into the following combat teams:

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—Co B)
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CCB Res

Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—2 Sq)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)
Co B 603d TD Bn (—2 Plats)

CT 50 (Root)

50th Armd Inf Bn (—Co A)
Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 1, 134th (Craig)

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
CCB Tns
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

On Div order, the plan of attack was by columns of CTs to pass between RCT 134 (Miltonberger) and CCA to seize the objective in zone. CT 69 on the right of the Command zone was to attack on order and seize the objective. CT 50, initially to follow CT 69, was to move to left and seize the objective. CT 1, 134th initially in reserve, was to move on order. The 253d Armd FA Bn was in direct support of CT 69, and the 231st Armd FA Bn was in direct support of CT 50.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger) (less 1st Bn 134th Inf and plus Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq): Patrols found the woods to the front abandoned for a distance of 1½ miles where the outpost was established late in the day. Preparations were made to push through to the objective on 21 Jan.

21 January 1945

The Div, following the plans drawn up the previous day, thrust swiftly northeast in the largest advance yet made in the campaign. The enemy was now admittedly withdrawing but the powerful thrust of the 6th Armd overran his rear guards, inflicted heavy casualties, and seized six towns. By evening the Combat Commands stood on the high ground looking toward ASSELBORN and TROIS VIERGÈS.

CCA (Hines): Regrouped as follows:

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn
Co D 15th Tk Bn
Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1st Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
128th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn (—Cos B & D)
Co B 9th Armd Inf Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
696th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—B Co)
Co B 15th Tk Bn
Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Sq Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
212th Armd FA Bn (Direct Support)

CCA Res

Co A 603d TD Bn (—3 Plats)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn (—3 Sqds)

CCA Tns

Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)

CT 15 on the left jumped off at 0830, meeting no opposition at first but encountering some small arms fire at about 1030 when tanks reached the high ground beyond TROINE. CT 15 picked up Co D of the 15th Tk Bn as it passed through CT 44. CT 15 was then ordered to send light tanks and infantry to capture HACHIVILLE and HOFFELT. As the tank team approached HOFFELT, small arms and AT fire was received. CT 9 on the right jumped off at 0840 abreast of CT 15, but because of unfavorable terrain it was necessary to go outside the Combat Command's right boundary and take the towns of CRENDAL and LULLANGE before proceeding to the objective. Little resistance was met until reaching the cross roads northwest of LULLANGE where heavy small arms and AT fire was received from the high ground to the northeast. Tr C of 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was ordered early to pass through CTs 15 and 9 to gain contact with the enemy, but the difficult road conditions delayed this action. The platoon in the vicinity of CT 9 gained contact on the high ground north of LULLANGE while the platoon in advance of CT 15 outposted the zone northeast of HOFFELT. BARAQUES DE TROINE, CRENDAL, TROINE, HOFFELT, HACHIVILLE and LULLANGE fell to the Command. The CP moved from MAGERET at 1600, opening at TROINE at 1635.

CCB (Read): Early in the morning the advance CP was moved to MICHAMPS. CT 69 jumped off at 0930 and shortly after ran into a minefield which, in addition to terrain and weather difficulties, slowed the attack. By 1245 the CT was on the objective, however, and it continued the push to the vicinity of HOFFELT where defensive positions were set up for the night. CT 50 moved out at 1030, initially in rear of CT 69. Likewise slowed by weather and terrain conditions, CT 50 gained the high ground north of TROINE and then went on to take the high ground to the north of HACHIVILLE, tying in with the 11th Armd Div on the left rear and CT 69 on the right. CT 69 tied in with CT 15 on its right flank. CT 1, 134th, held in reserve, moved up to TROINE where the CP was now located. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was assigned to the Command.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to BASTOGNE from ASSENOIS.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Cleared the remainder of the woods to its front, assembled, and followed in Div reserve to TROINE.

The Div CP displaced to TROINE at 1700.

22 January 1945

Continuing its thrust northeast, the Div advanced 5500 yards to seize three key towns: ASSELBORN, WEILER and BASBELLAIN. Enemy resistance was moderate as CCB on the left thrust deep into enemy held territory to enter BASBELLAIN. The attack of CCA toward TROIS VIERGES was halted by minefields, blown bridges and unsuitable terrain, but important terrain was seized from which the next day's attack could be launched.

CCA (Hines): Resumed the advance at 0830 employing reconnaissance in force along two routes. The northern route was east from HACHIVILLE through WEILER towards TROIS VIERGES. CT 15 advanced to high ground 1 mile northeast of WEILER where positions were taken in readiness for an attack. The southern route was along the main highway northeast towards TROIS VIERGES. It was covered by Tr C (-1 Plat) plus 1 platoon of Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. This team was held up initially by a blown bridge at STOCKEM, but foot elements were pushed across and a by-pass was found. The reconnaissance unit proceeded to the road junction 1 mile southwest of TROIS VIERGES where it met the northern units. CT 9, meeting little resistance, captured the town of ASSELBORN, cleared a minefield, and proceeded to organize the high ground northeast. It made contact with elements of the 90th Inf Div on their arrival in the town of ASSELBORN.

Reconnaissance patrols were sent to the vicinity of TROIS VIERGES to locate possible tank crossings over the HOFFENBACH River and observe the damage to the bridges that had been blown.

CCB (Read): Continued to push northeast early in the morning. CTs 50 and 69 moving out at 0815. Progress was slow and difficult because of snow, streams, and minefields. At 1115 CT 50 reported that it had met with a dead-end trail and was hunting for a suitable by-pass. Having found one by 1235, the Combat Team moved up to give support to CT 69. CT 69 made fair progress but ran into a minefield 1500 yards southwest of the objective and at 1145 encountered enemy infantry. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was sent north to make contact with elements of the 11th Armd Div and the 17th AB Div. Both CTs were advancing on BASBELLAIN by 1600. An infantry company from each CT moved in on the objective and took it by 1730 but because stream crossings and terrain made it impossible to get sufficient tanks and TDs across to give the infantry the proper support, the infantry was withdrawn with the exception of patrols left to report enemy action. Booby traps and mines were encountered in BASBELLAIN. Reconnaissance elements of CT 69 were sent south to make contact with CT 15 of CCA on the right. CT 1, 134th, still in reserve, moved to HACHIVILLE where the Command's CP had been set up during the afternoon.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to TROINE.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Advanced to the HACHIVILLE area. CT 2, 134th moved to assembly area near HACHIVILLE, closing at 1530. CT 3, 134th moved to an assembly area near HOFFELT and WEILER, closing at 1200. CT 68 moved from BASTOGNE to the old assembly areas of CTs 2 & 3, 134th and transported them to the new assembly areas near HACHIVILLE.

23 January 1945

The Div zone boundary on the right (south) split TROIS VIERGES. A mutual arrangement was made with the 90th Div for a temporary boundary giving all of the city to the 6th Armd which was leading at the time and in a better position to attack, while the 90th Div was to cross the river further south and take the town of BINSFELD.

The Div finally blasted its way into TROIS VIERGES and the high ground surrounding that village and came in virtual sight of its final objective—the "Skyline Drive". The attack of CCA was delayed by many enemy-made obstacles, blown bridges and culverts, and minefields.

CCA (Hines): At 1255 CT 9 attacked the high ground south of TROIS VIERGES and was met by heavy artillery fire between ASSELBORN and the road junction about 1 mile southwest of TROIS VIERGES. The objective was seized and consolidated by 1340. The Combat Team then supported CT 15 by fire. CT 15 pushed out a force of light tanks and infantry at 1400 which captured the town of BIWISCH. The CT then proceeded east toward TROIS VIERGES but was held up by minefields and blown bridges. In conjunction with CT 15, CT 44 jumped off at 1400 with the mission of crossing the HOFFENBACH River, securing the high ground north of TROIS VIERGES, and clearing the town. Two companies, supported by tank fire from BIWISCH, attacked TROIS VIERGES and obtained a crossing. Heavy fire of all types was received during this action but by 1830 most of the enemy had been cleared from the town. One company of CT 44 which had advanced to capture the high ground north of BIWISCH was pinned down in a draw northwest of TROIS VIERGES. Under cover of darkness, this company was pulled back into TROIS VIERGES and outposted the town. Engineer crossings started at dark over the HOFFENBACH River were completed by 0100 the following morning.

CCB (Read): Held its positions prepared to attack on order. During the morning the CO of the 1st Bn 134th Inf Regt with his Co Comdrs and the COs of the 69th Tk Bn and 50th Armd Inf Bn reconnoitered terrain on the enemy's front. Construction of a treadway bridge over the stream south of BASBELLAIN was completed by 1600 and another bridge was found.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger): At 1300 the Command passed through CCB, resumed the attack east, and secured the town of BASBELLAIN and the high ground south and east. CT 2, 134th advanced northeast from its assembly area, meeting slight opposition. At the end of the period Co K occupied BASBELLAIN; Co I outposted the area. Co L remained in CT reserve on high ground southeast of BASBELLAIN. CT 3, 134th followed CT 2, 134th, passing through and occupying the high ground southeast of BASBELLAIN. Co A 68th Tk Bn attached to CT 2, 134th crossed the water barrier near BASBELLAIN and moved to support positions.

24 January 1945

On Corps order the zone of the 6th Armd advance was shifted from northeast to due east toward the town of WEISWAMPACH. Accordingly, elements of CCB on the left were shifted south and behind CCA. While the balance of the Div was shifted south to pass through TROIS VIERGES, CCA continued the attack.

CCA (Hines): At 0830 CT 44 pushed out from TROIS VIERGES with the mission of seizing high ground north of the town. This mission was accomplished by mid-afternoon, after overcoming light resistance. CT 15 also jumped off at 0830 to capture DRINKLANGE and WILWERDANGE. Heavy artillery and AT fire was received from the towns and from the woods south of HULDANGE. Heavy concentrations of our artillery neutralized this fire and our tanks enveloped the objectives from the east.

At 0800 CT 9 moved through TROIS VIERGES to BINSFELD and prepared to attack at night to seize HOLLER and BREIDFELD. Heavy artillery fire was received during the movement, but it was neutralized by artillery smoke placed on the high ground to the east. The 1st Bn 134th Inf was attached to the Command from CCB which, assisted by tanks of CT 15, attacked east from TROIS VIERGES at 0930 with the mission of clearing the woods and trail leading from WILWERDANGE to BINSFELD. Overpowering moderate resistance, CT 1, 134th accomplished this mission by 1507. A platoon of tanks from CT 9 was attached to attack on the right where the greatest resistance had developed.

At 2245 CT 9 attacked HOLLER and BREIDFELD. HOLLER was cleared and occupied by 2350 and by 0200 25 Jan the CT had cleared, occupied, and outposted BREIDFELD. The Combat Command CP opened at TROIS VIERGES at 1235.

CCB (Read): Released CT 1, 134th to CCA for the day's operation. Recalled from its contact mission with the 17th AB Div, the platoon of Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz rejoined its troop. CTs 50 and 69 pulled back from their positions to an assembly area in the vicinity of HACHIVILLE, prepared to attack east in the morning through CCA. Co C of the 50th Armd Inf Bn and one Co from the 69th Tk Bn were sent to relieve elements of CCA in the vicinity of WILWERDANGE and ordered to be in position when other elements of the Command moved up to launch the attack. The advance CP moved to TROIS VIERGES, opening at 2100.

RCT 134 (Miltonberger): Remained in place and held positions gained the previous day. By 2000 CTs 2 & 3, 134th were in the process of being relieved by elements of the 17th AB Div. This relief was necessary because of the change in Div zone and objectives. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was relieved and attached to CCB.

25 January 1945

Constant pressure on the rear of the withdrawing enemy brought the Div up against strong defenses in the area of WEISWAMPACH as an attempt was made to reach high ground on the west bank of the OUR River. The attack of CCA toward the high ground ran into the flank of a strong enemy troop movement and in the resulting battle the Combat Teams were unable to enter the key village.

CCA (Hines): Released CT 1, 134th at 0800 which then rejoined CCB. At 0930 CT 44 attacked through CT 9 with the mission of taking the high ground north of LAUSDORN and cutting the highway at that point. Heavy artillery and AT fire from WEISWAMPACH and the high ground east of LAUSDORN slowed the attack considerably, but by 1745 the objective was gained and consolidated for the night. CT 9 remained in the vicinity of HOLLER and BREIDFELD prepared to assist the attack on order. CT 15 was relieved at 1335 in its zone by CT 69 of CCB, whereupon CT 15 withdrew to an assembly area near TROIS VIERGES.

CCB (Read): CT 1, 134th rejoined the Command at 0800. Some changes were made in the composition of the CTs. CT 50 gained a platoon of tanks from Co D 69th Tk Bn plus the direct support of the 231st Armd FA Bn. CT 1, 134th was reinforced to include:

1st Bn 134th Inf Regt
Co A 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn
Plat Co D 69th Tk Bn
Sqd Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Plat Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
253d and 161st Armd FA Bns (Direct Support)

CCB Res was left with:

69th Tk Bn (—)
Co B 603d TD Bn (—)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)

The attack to seize WEISWAMPACH and to cut the "Skyline Drive" highway east of town was launched at 0900. CT 50 on the left moved to the development area in the vicinity of WILWERDANGE during the darkness of early morning. At 0900 with CT 1, 134th on the right, the attack was launched. Both CTs were on line approximately one mile east of the jump off point by 0950. At 1650 CT 1, 134th ran into moderate to intense mortar, small arms, AT and direct artillery fire about 1000 yards short of the objective. By dark CT 1, 134th had tanks within 400 yards of the town and CT 50 was on a north-south line approximately abreast of CT 1, 134th, also halted by intense mortar fire. CT 1, 134th pulled back about 1000 yards and consolidated positions for the night, tying in with CT 50 on the left (north) and with CCA elements on the right. CT 69 made contact on the left with elements of the 17th AB Div.

26 January 1945

A complete reshuffling of divisions preparatory to resumption of the attack by VIII Corps was started. To throw infantry weight to the north flank, the 90th Div switched zones with the 6th Armd and the latter took over part of the 26th Div zone still farther south while the 17th AB Div switched to our south from the VIII Corps on our north to the III Corps. The relief and movement of units began with CCA and then CCB was relieved later in the day after it had secured its objective.

Through a short early morning thrust, CCB firmly seized the area about WEISWAMPACH and at last stood on its final objective. The last of the enemy had been driven back behind the SIEGFIRE LINE; the ARDENNES salient was completely collapsed.

CT 134 (Miltonberger): Which had been in reserve for several days, relieved the 90th Div while reserve troops of the latter were relieving CCA and CCB.

CCA (Hines): During the morning CT 44 was relieved by elements of 1st Bn 358 Regt, 90th Inf Div. At 1330 the Command was relieved in its sector by the 90th Div and went into Div reserve. The CTs moved to rear assembly areas: CT 9 to NIEDERWAMPACH, CT 44 to SELSCHEID, and CT 15 to OBERWAMPACH.

CCB (Read): Attacked at 0600 to secure WEISWAMPACH and the area north and east with CT 50 on the left and CT 1, 134th on the right. The town in which only a rear guard was left was taken by 0900 and the high ground and area east and north was secured. CT 69 established contact by patrols between CT 50 and 17th AB Div. The Command was relieved on the objective by the 2d Bn 358th Regt, 90th Inf Div and displaced to assembly areas in the vicinity of LULLANGE, DONNANGE and DEIFFELT.

CT 134 (Miltonberger): The 1st Bn remained attached to CCB and was relieved by elements of the 90th Inf Div from positions in WEISWAMPACH. At the end of the relief the Bn was to relieve elements of the 26th Inf Div near FISCHBACH. CT 3, 134th moved on tanks and trucks and effected the relief of the 3d Bn 357th Inf near HEINERSCHEID at 2055. CT 2, 134th moved on tanks and trucks to the vicinity of HUPPERDANGE and GRINDHAUSER and by 1650 completed relief of the 2d and 3d Bns 359th Inf. CT 68 (—Co A) assembled near HUPPERDANGE.

CHAPTER V
DASBURG—PRUM RIVER CAMPAIGN

27 January to 8 March 1945

The enemy, who was now operating only patrols west of the OUR, had gradually been driven into SIEGFRIED LINE defenses from which he had launched his ARDENNES offensive 6 weeks earlier. Although he was revealing definite signs of strain and his defenses were believed inadequately manned, his skillfully prepared positions were situated in mountainous terrain ideally suited for defense and the OUR to his front afforded a natural protection. Flowing at the rate of 10 to 15 MPH, it was about ten feet deep and swollen to several times its normal width. The approaches were steep and the terrain was very rough, permitting vehicular movement only on primary and secondary roads.

Corps Mission: (1) Continue attack to clear enemy from the west bank of the OUR, (2) maintain an "aggressive defense", and (3) prepare to attack to the east on Army order.

Division Mission: (1) Patrol to and across the OUR River, (2) prevent enemy infiltration across the OUR, (3) prepare plans to cross the OUR, and (4) be prepared to attack northeast or east to the KYLL River.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)

CT Miltonberger (Atchd)

134th Inf Regt (—)
68th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
1 Plat Co A 60th C Engr Bn

Div Tns

76th Med Bn A
Co A 110th Med Bn (Atchd)
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp (Atchd)
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Maint Bn
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
1st Bn 134th Inf Regt (Atchd)
Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co B 603d TD Bn (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co

Res Comd

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)
996th Tdwy Br Co (—) (D/S)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Plat Btry A 777th AAA Bn
Plat Btry B 777th AAA Bn
183d FA Gp (Reinf)
177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
161st FA Bn (Atchd)
Co B 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

27 January 1945

The Div CP opened at BOEVANGE LES CLERVAUX at 1530.

CCA (Hines): Remained in assembly areas. Headquarters CCA displaced from the vicinity of TROIS VIERGES to OBERWAMPACH, closing at 1200.

CCB (Read): Displaced to LULLANGE and commenced relief of elements of the 328th Inf Regt, 26th Inf Div.

CTM (Miltonberger): Occupied the left (north) sector, actively patrolling.

Res Comd (Harris): Elements of the Command displaced from VIII Corps to III Corps zone, prepared to support other elements of the Div.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued firing normal harassing and interdictory fires; then displaced to new locations to continue its support of the 6th Armd.

28 January 1945

CCB (Read): Maintained a defensive set-up, sending active patrols to its immediate front. The 69th Tk Bn displaced to ESELBORN, closing at 1700. Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz displaced to CLERVAUX, closing at 1700.

CT M (Miltonberger): Continued to hold within its sector and sent active patrols to its front.

Res Comd (Harris): Headquarters moved from temporary quarters in BOEVANGE LES CLERVAUX to permanent quarters in the same town at 1048. 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—) left BASTOGNE for WEICHERDANGE and MECHEP at 1130 and closed at 1600. Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn left TROINE at 1100, closing in BOEVANGE LES CLERVAUX at 1400. 777th AAA Bn (—) left BASTOGNE at 1130, closing in BENONCHAMPS at 1345.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued support of the Div, with its fires reinforced by the 183d FA Gp.

29 January 1945

CCB (Read): Continued to hold within its sector and sent aggressive combat patrols along its front, but encountered no enemy.

CT M (Miltonberger): Attacked at 0530 to secure the town of KALBORN. Supported by tanks, the Combat Team advanced rapidly across open terrain against light enemy resistance, and by 0750 the town was taken with negligible losses and positions were consolidated.

Res Comd (Harris): Remained in position prepared to support other elements of the Div. The 603d TD Bn (—) moved to KLEINHOSCHEID, closing at 2015.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued support of Div elements, with the 161st FA Bn and Co C 3d Cml Bn attached and the 183d FA Gp in general support.

30 January 1945

The Div held its line, continued aggressive patrolling action, and prepared for future operations by pushing its rehabilitation program.

CCB (Read): Held within the south sector and aggressive patrols to its front met no resistance. The OUR was reconnoitered and reported to be 100 feet wide and very shallow with a soft, muddy bottom which would not permit vehicles to ford without considerable engineer work.

CT M (Miltonberger): Held within its sector and continued patrol action.

Res Comd (Harris): Commanders made reconnaissance of front lines.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired harassing and interdictory fires during the night on the town of DAHNEN and the road junction to the northeast.

31 January 1945

The 6th Armd reorganized its Commands. CT M (Miltonberger) and CCB were relieved on the line by Res Comd; Co C 15th Tk Bn was attached to 17th AB Div, departing for MUNCHAUSEN at 1655.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn (—)

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
1st Plat Rcn Co 603d Bn

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
996th Tdwy Br Co (—)
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
183d FA Gp (Reinf)

Div Tns

76th Armd Med Bn
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp (Atchd)
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

177th FA Bn (155 How)
253d Armd FA Bn
696th Armd FA Bn
Co C 3d Cml Bn (Atchd)

CT Miltonberger (Atchd)

134th Inf Regt
161st FA Bn
Co A 110th Med Bn

CCA (Hines): Continued its extensive program of training and rehabilitation and prepared to support Res Comd.

CCB (Read): Held the southern part of the Div sector until relieved by CT 9 at 1650. Upon relief the Command prepared to support Res Comd.

CT M (Miltonberger): Held the northern part of the Div sector until relieved by CT 86 at 1600.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to the line and relieved CT M with CT 86 at 1600, and CCB at 1650 with CT 9 in place. At 1650 the Command assumed responsibility for the Div sector and prepared to send patrols and establish observation posts along the entire front.

Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 86 (Brindle)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
68th Tk Bn (D/S)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn (D/S)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
1st Plat Rcn Co 603d TD Bn

Arty Support

128th Armd FA Bn

Div Arty (Riley): Fired preparatory fires for friendly patrols and harassing and interdiction fire missions on enemy tanks, infantry, observation posts and vehicular activity.

1 February 1945

The Div held within its sector, sent aggressive patrols to its front, continued clearing enemy from the west bank of the OUR, and prepared for future operations. CT (Miltonberger), 134th Inf Regt Combat Team of the 35th Inf Div was relieved from attachment to the 6th Armd at 0800 and commenced movement to rejoin its parent unit.

Res Comd (Harris): Sent active patrols to its front and defended the Div sector. Light enemy mortar and artillery fire were received.

Div Arty (Riley): Supported the Res Comd. Propaganda shells were fired on the town of DAHNEN and enemy troop shelters along the SIEGFRIED LINE.

2—3 February 1945

The 6th Armd held within its sector, maintaining contact with flank elements, and sent aggressive patrols to the west bank of the OUR.

4 February 1945

Orders were received from III Corps to extend the 6th Armd sector approximately one mile to the north beyond LIELER. This increase in sector was caused by movement of the VIII Corps to the north in order to permit them to assault frontally SIEGFRIED defenses after crossing the OUR. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz of Res Comd relieved the Rcn Tr 90th Inf Div. Co C 3d Cml Bn was released from attachment to the Div. At 0900 the 183d FA Gp, consisting of 253d Armd FA Bn, 696th Armd FA Bn, and 177th FA Bn, was relieved of mission of reinforcing Div Arty. Considerable flare activity during darkness was observed.

5 February 1945

The Div continued to improve its defensive positions. Preliminary patrolling and reconnaissance for a crossing of the OUR began the night of 6—7 Feb on Corps order. It appeared that the SIEG-

FRIED LINE was inadequately manned on the Corps front. The Res Comd was to be used to establish a bridgehead since it was familiar with the terrain. Propaganda leaflets were fired into the towns of DAHNEN, DALEIDEN, and LANGFUHR by Div Arty.

Composition of Res Comd:

44th Armd Inf Bn	50th Armd Inf Bn (D/S)
9th Armd Inf Bn	212th Armd FA Bn (D/S to 44th Armd Inf Bn)
68th Tk Bn	231st Armd FA Bn (D/S to 9th Armd Inf Bn)
69th Tk Bn	128th Armd FA Bn (G/S)
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	Co A 603d TD Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn	Co C 76th Armd Med Bn
777th AAA Bn (—)	

6 February 1945

The 6th Armd continued to hold positions west of the OUR. Planning and reconnaissance were maintained in accordance with orders issued 5 Feb. Beginning the night of 6—7 Feb the Res Comd was to cross with two infantry battalions and establish a bridgehead on the high ground north of DAHNEN.

Construction of a Bailey bridge across the OUR on the KALBORN-DAHNNEN road was to be completed in order to enlarge and make permanent the bridgehead by using the entire Res Comd. Crossing sites Nos 1 and 2 were found on the north in the vicinity of KALBORN and Site No 3 was located on the south near DAHNEN. Assault boats were obtained for the after-dark crossings and Bailey bridging material was made available upon order. Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn, assisted by the 1123d C Engr Gp, was assigned the task of constructing the bridge. Co A was to support CT 9, crossing on the south; Co C was to support CT 44 on the north. Footbridges were constructed at all sites to facilitate crossing.

The 128th Armd FA Bn moved to GRINDHAUSEN and the 212th Armd FA Bn moved to BREIDFELD to support the crossings. The 231st Armd FA Bn remained in position between URSPELT and CLERVAUX. Enemy artillery fire fell intermittently in the 6th Armd zone.

Crossing operations started at 1900 when CT 9, with supporting engineers, moved to Site No 3. By midnight no troops had succeeded in crossing the river. Troops of CT 44, after carrying heavy assault boats 2 miles by hand through the hills to the river bank, fared no better at Sites 1 and 2. Site No 1 was abandoned early in the evening as unsuitable. Repeated attempts to launch boats failed and by midnight no troops were across the river. No enemy were met but the river was at a flood stage, caused by heavy rains and melting snows of the past few days, and made crossing operations unusually difficult.

7 February 1945

In successful crossings on 7 Feb the 6th Armd encountered little resistance since dense fogs assisted in achieving surprise. In an exceptionally well conducted operation, the difficult stream was crossed at two places, above and below the KALBORN—DAHNNEN road by two reinforced companies, followed by other companies prepared to cross and exploit any ground gained. During the day 18 assault teams consisting of engineers equipped with flame throwers to reduce pillboxes were formed. Work was being rushed on footbridges behind the two shallow bridgeheads, and troops were held in readiness on the west shore to render assistance to troops east of the river in the event of a major counterattack by the enemy from the SIEGFRIED LINE. Co C 15th Tk Bn of CCA was detached from the 17th AB Div; Co B 603d TD Bn of CCB was attached to the 17th AB Div.

Work on footbridges progressed very slowly due to loss of equipment. The 603d TD Bn (—) was attached to Res Comd.

Res Comd (Harris): Sent a reconnaissance in force across the OUR to secure a permanent bridgehead. At 0345 the first man of the 6th Armd to enter Germany on a tactical mission reached the east bank and by 0650 a company of CT 9 had been ferried across the river at Site No 3 and pushed to a point 800 yards west of DAHNEN. At this time the crossing ceased to be a secret and the crossing site was subjected to heavy fire. At site No 2 two men from CT 44 who capsized in one of the boats landed on the enemy shore at 0400 and at 0715 a boatload of ten men was across. A cable was strung across the river and a footbridge was built.

CT 44 crossed the river at Site No 2 with one reinforced infantry company. These elements received no enemy fire but experienced extreme difficulty because of the swiftness of the river current and the steepness of the banks.

Div Arty (Riley): Fired upon mortars, machine guns, enemy pillboxes and personnel and continued harassing and interdiction missions during the hours of darkness. Enemy artillery activity was light.

8 February 1945

Although rising waters hampered bridging operations—at midnight 7 Feb the river had increased 15 feet in width during 24 hours—three footbridges, two pontoon, and one suspension bridge were established. The suspension bridge was short-lived, however, for enemy mortar fire knocked it out shortly after it had been placed in operation. Work was under way on the Bailey bridge.

Orders were received from Corps to take over the entire zone of the 17th AB Div on 11 Feb, giving the 6th Armd a sector of approximately 20,000 yards. The 1252d C Engr Bn was attached to the Div.

CCA (Hines): Continued operations to take over the 17th AB Div zone when it moved out on the 10th, leaving no other combat troops in the Corps except the 6th Armd and the 6th Cav Gp.

CCB (Read): Prepared to assume command of troops east of the OUR after a firm bridgehead had been established by elements of the Res Comd.

Res Comd (Harris): Continued to enlarge the bridgehead across the OUR. By 1030 the entire CT 44 had crossed the river, enlarged its bridgehead to a depth of about 1½ miles with a width of 2 miles, and secured the west bank of the Bailey site. Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz took up a position on the north flank. By midnight the battalion had completed organization of its bridgehead in front of the two sites. One company of CT 44 attempted, without success, to break open an occupied pillbox with flame throwers and bazookas. After dark the enemy laid formidable machine gun, mortar and artillery fire on the company, causing serious casualties.

Late in the afternoon CT 9 completed its crossing at Site No 3 in the southern zone, but because of darkness no attempt was made to enlarge the bridgehead.

Div Arty (Riley): Supported the Res Comd in its crossing and fired upon enemy artillery locations. Propaganda leaflets were fired on enemy troop shelters. Enemy artillery activity increased considerably.

9 February 1944

The Div continued to enlarge and strengthen its bridgeheads and made plans to relieve the 17th AB Div. Four foot bridges and a Bailey bridge across the OUR were completed as the stream decreased in width about 35 percent. A juncture was made with the 17th AB Div at 0300 by CT 9 and the troops east of the river were reinforced with tank and tank destroyers. A small counterattack was repulsed on the south flank. The 161st Cml SG Co and the 284th C Engr Bn were attached to the Div.

CCA (Hines): Prepared to relieve elements of the 17th AB Div in its zone. The 1252d C Engr Bn was assigned to the Command.

CCB (Read): Made preparations to assume command of the bridgehead east of the OUR. The 284th C Engr Bn was attached to the command. CT 50 moved to the vicinity of HEINERSCHIED after dark, prepared to move across the OUR before dawn to relieve CT 44.

Res Comd (Harris): Continued to enlarge and strengthen its bridgehead. Co B 68th Tk Bn, Tr B 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, 1 Plat Co A and 1 Plat Co B 603d TD Bn moved across the river. At 1800 CT 9 repulsed a small counterattack which caused no damage. Moving north along the east side of the river, CT 9 joined CT 44 which had extended south and west to cover the road from KALBORN, and by midnight the consolidated bridgehead was firmly established.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support elements of the Div by firing harassing and interdiction fires during the night on enemy gun locations, road intersections and the towns of DALEIDEN and REIPELDINGEN. At 1335 a TOT was placed on DAHNEN.

10 February 1945

The 6th Armd held its bridgehead over the OUR, protected the north flank of the III Corps zone, and started relief of the 17th AB Div with elements of CCA. CCB relieved Res Comd and assumed responsibility for the bridgehead zone at 1545. Res Comd assembled and prepared to support CCB. The 161st Cml SG Co was relieved from attachment.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
184th C Engr Bn (Atchd)

CCB

50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

1252d C Engr Bn (Atchd)
Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

9th Armd Inf Bn
69th Tk Bn
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Det 996th Tdwy Br Co
603d TD Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

284th C Engr Bn (Atchd)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Sect Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Div Tns

76th Armd Med Bn
3d Plat 16th Field Hosp (Atchd)
128th Ord Maint Bn
642d QM Trk Co
3803d QM Trk Co
Btry C 777th AAA Bn (—)

CCA (Hines): Was in process of relieving the 17th AB Div in the southern part of the Div's new zone.

CCB (Read): Relieved the Res Comd at 1545. The Command CP opened at HUPPERDINGE at 1000. CT 44 was relieved by CT 50 at 1300 and assigned to CCA. Under control of CCB CT 9 remained in position to revert to Res Comd upon relief. CT 86 established contact with the 11th Armd Div on the north flank at the junction of LUXEMBOURG and German border just west of the OUR.

Res Comd (Harris): Prior to relief of the Command, the Bailey bridge, weakened by mortar fire and heavy loads, gave way but reconstruction was started immediately.

11 February 1945

With its southern boundary changed to include the new zone, the 6th Armd continued its relief of the 17th AB Div and at 0950 assumed responsibility for its zone. Co B 603d TD Bn was detached from the 17th AB and assigned to CCA.

The very small bridgehead north of DASBURG, established by the 17th AB, was abandoned since it had never been expanded sufficiently to include an approach. The Div bridgehead, however, was further consolidated and at 1024 VIII Corps assumed control of the Div and attached units. The 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, 11th Armd Div and the 184th C Engr Bn were attached at 1800.

CCA (Hines): CT 44 shifted from KALBORN to MARNACH and started relief of the 507th Prcht Regt. The 184th C Engr Bn was attached at 0945 in place.

CCB (Read): Continued to hold within its zone and maintained contact with flank elements. The 110 foot Bailey bridge was rebuilt by the 178th C Engr Bn and was opened for traffic at 1500 although the bridge site and vicinity were subjected to indirect machine gun fire. Enemy reaction was negligible during the day.

Res Comd (Harris): Remained in its present location and prepared to support either CCA or CCB.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support elements of the Div holding the bridgehead. The 212th Armd FA Bn moved to the vicinity of BOCKHOLZ to give direct support to CCA. All Bns were re-organized as follows:

128th Armd FA Bn—D/S CCB
212th Armd FA Bn—D/S CCA
231st Armd FA Bn—General Support—reinforcing fires of 6th Armd Div Arty

The 193d FA Gp, in general support of Corps, reinforced the fires of the Bns with the following elements:

179th FA Bn) 212th Armd FA Bn
776th FA Bn)
256th FA Bn 128th Armd FA Bn

12 February 1945

Reinforced with the 1252d, 284th and 184th C Engr Bns and the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, the Div held within its sector and continued to improve defensive positions. Relief of elements of the 17th AB Div within the 6th's sector was completed during the night 11—12 Feb. CCB 11th Armd Div relieved the 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz north of the bridgehead at 2300. The Div CP opened at CLERVAUX at 1300. CT 9 was assigned to CCA as of 0900.

CCA (Hines): CT 44 completed relief of the 507th Prcht Regt at 0230. The 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, 11th Armd Div was attached to the command and closed at KNAPHOSCHEID.

CCB (Read): At 1420 CT 9 was relieved in place by the 284th C Engr Bn and assembled in the vicinity of WEICHERDANGE. Elements of CT 86 west of the OUR River and north of the Div bridgehead were relieved by elements of CCB 11th Armd Div at 2300.

13 February 1945

CT 44 was relieved from CCA and assigned to CCB. Enemy activity was negligible.

CCA (Hines): CT 69 closed at NEIDHAUSEN at 1100. At 1600 the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz relieved part of CT 44; CT 69 relieved part of the 184th C Engr Bn and the remainder of CT 44; while CT 15 relieved half the sector of the 184th C Engr Bn within its zone.

CCB (Read): Continued to hold and defend its bridgehead east of the OUR.

Res Comd (Harris): Command headquarters displaced to CLERVAUX, closing at 1130.

14 February 1945

The Div continued its defensive activities and reorganized its commands. Enemy activity consisted of harassing artillery and scattered small arms fire.

Composition of Commands:

CCA

15th Tk Bn
69th Tk Bn
41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Atchd)
603d TD Bn (—)
1252d C Engr Bn
184th C Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Div Arty

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn

CCB

9th Armd Inf Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
68th Tk Bn
284th C Engr Bn
Co A 603d TD Bn
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd

25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

CCA (Hines): Consolidated and improved defensive positions all along the sector. Upon relief by the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz and CT 69 at 0415, CT 44 moved to BOXHORN, closing at 1200. After being relieved by CT 15 and CT 69, the 184th C Engr Bn displaced to TROIS PONTS in the FIRST ARMY area.

CCB (Read): Continued to hold its bridgehead east of the OUR with no enemy contact. CT 9 was enroute from WEICHERDANGE to relieve the 284th C Engr Bn which was detached and sent to the FIRST ARMY. CT 44 was attached to the Command and remained in Command Reserve. Construction of a footbridge across the OUR 1000 yards north of Site No 3 was completed at 1800.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div in the defense of its sector. Assault guns of CT 15 were functioning as a fourth battery for the 212th Armd FA Bn. Missions were fired on enemy mortars and machine gun positions and upon pillboxes.

15—16 February 1945

The 6th Armd continued to hold within its sector and consolidate its positions. Contact was maintained with the 11th Armd Div on its left and the 6th Cav Gp on its right flank. The 184th and 284th C Engr Bns were relieved from attachment at 1425. Planning was begun for an VIII Corps

attack by the 6th Armd Div and the 6th Cav Gp. This attack which was to be launched on 18 Feb was designed to clear enemy west of the PRUM River and effect a junction with XII Corps at MAUEL. Air OPs were active during daylight hours.

17 February 1945

Rotation of troops in the defensive line continued to be carried out. After extensive reconnaissance throughout the day, Commanders and General Staff Officers held a conference for planning and estimates. Harassing Nebelwerfer, artillery and mortar fire continued throughout the day with little effect.

CCA (Hines): Continued to hold and defend its assigned sector as several small enemy patrols were broken up by friendly artillery.

CCB (Read): At 0830 CT 44 completed relief of CT 50 in place and CT 50 then moved to the vicinity of DEIFELT—DONNAGE—LULLANGE, closing at 1215.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div in defense of its sector. Air OPs were grounded because of a heavy haze. Harassing and interdiction fires were maintained, and missions were fired on enemy infantry, mortars, artillery positions and vehicles.

18 February 1945

The 6th Armd continued to hold and defend its bridgehead and prepared for future operations. Oral orders for an attack at H-hour 20 February on the SIEGFRIED LINE were issued by the Div Comdr. Task forces and assault teams were organized and instructed, and reconnaissance continued. The 16th Cml Smk Gen Co was attached to CCA as of 1200.

19 February 1945

The Div held and defended its bridgehead and made final preparations for the attack on 20 Feb. By taking advantage of the bridgehead held by CCB on the left flank, an assault could be made against the SIEGFRIED LINE defense without the necessity of forcing a crossing of the OUR in the face of pillboxes that lined its bank from north of DASBURG to the south boundary. The plan called for an initial penetration by CCB and an envelopment from the north. In the meantime, two of the Corps Engr Bns had been detached, and orders from higher authority prohibited the use of the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz east of the OUR. This left CCA too weak to effect a crossing on its front until the line had been turned.

CCA (Hines): Continued preparation for the attack. The 161st Cml Gen Co was moved into position to smoke the river floor to create diversion. Co C 1252d C Engr Bn was attached to the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz assault teams for the pending mission of neutralizing pillboxes east of the river.

CCB (Read): Continued reconnaissance for and instruction of all combat and assault teams. Troops were positioned for the attack, as enemy artillery and mortar fire increased. Composition of Combat Teams:

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn
Co A 68th Tk Bn (—)
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 50 (Ward)

50th Armd Inf Bn
Co C 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 68 (Davall)

68th Tk Bn (—)
Co A 603d TD Bn (—)
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn Reinf (—)
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)

CT 44 (Brown)

44th Armd Inf Bn
Co B 68th Tk Bn (—)
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn
1 Plat Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 86 (Brindle)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co A 68th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co B 68th Tk Bn
1 Engr Sqd Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

Supporting Arty (Gp Bruce)

128th Armd FA Bn (D/S CTs 44 & 86)
231st Armd FA Bn (D/S CTs 9 & 50)
257th FA Bn (G/S)
VIII Corps Arty reinforcing

CCB Trains

2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Harris): Remained in assembly areas prepared to support combat commands.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued its mission of defense in the Div sector. Plans were prepared for supporting artillery fire in the coming attack.

20 February 1945

CCB made the main effort on the north flank with Combat Teams 9, 44 and 86. CT 50 prepared to exploit the gains, while the remainder of the Command constituted the reserve. CCA, reinforced by the 161st Cml Smk Gen Co, made a diversionary attack by fire, smoke and movement on the south flank.

At 0645 Artillery laid an intensive preparation over the entire front for 20 minutes, then lifted for 10 minutes to allow the enemy to come out of their pillboxes and man their outside defenses to meet a probable attack. Then for one minute all of the artillery concentrated on the small area of the first objective with a terrific TOT which was the signal for the assault parties to attack. The diversion by CCA served its purpose by attracting much of the enemy artillery and mortar reaction.

Assaulting troops found their greatest obstacles to be mines, wire and booby traps and the physical difficulty of breaking into pillboxes. Enemy fire was comparatively light. The first pillbox fell by 0830, and by noon the first two objectives had been taken. Then Combat Teams 9 and 44 fanned out to the right and left to clean up the remainder of the line from DAHNEN to the northern edge of the zone. In the meantime CT 86 on the north flank captured the pillboxes on its front and sliced through to secure high ground along the Div boundary.

Initial gains against the SIEGRIED LINE were approximately 2 miles in depth and 2 miles in width. A total of 40 pillboxes was taken with a loss of only two of our troops killed. One pillbox (No 9) held out all day and night and was finally blown 21 February when 450 pounds of TNT were placed against the door. One officer and 11 EM were dragged out in a stunned condition.

CCA (Hines): Commenced its diversionary attack at 0700 west of the OUR in support of CCB's attack to the east. After the area had been sufficiently screened, one platoon of tanks from CT 69 created diversion by movement along the MARBURG—DASBURG road. The remaining tanks of CTs 15 and 69 were displaced through the area to simulate attack. This attack drew considerable small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. A combat patrol entered UNTER EISENBACH at 1130 where it was pinned down by machine gun fire but withdrew under cover of darkness. The scheduled fires continued until 1700, when normal defensive fires were resumed.

CCB (Read): Launched its attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses at 0715, preceded by an artillery preparation over the entire front. The attack made good progress meeting light opposition from pillboxes. The first pillbox was seized by CT 9 at 0830, and supporting tanks and tank destroyers were brought up to cover the advance of the assault parties.

By 1200 objectives 1 and 2 had been taken with only about two thirds of the pillboxes found to be manned. CT 9 drew up 300 yards north of DAHNEN and sent a strong patrol into the town. CT 86 on the north placed a tank fire on pillboxes in its zone and moved up assault parties to assist in clearing the northern part of the Combat Command's zone. Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn began clearing the main supply route behind the advancing troops. By 1800 CCB had successfully forced through the heaviest portion of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses in this zone.

CT 44 pushed east and northeast to the vicinity of LANGFUHR, halted and dug in for the night. Patrols were sent to the northeast and later its lines were readjusted to occupy evacuated pillboxes. CT 50 infiltrated units through KALBORN and across the bridge to the reverse slope of the hill just west of the line of pillboxes during the night. CT 9 tied in with CCA and CT 44 north of LANGFUHR as CT 86 tied in with CCB 11th Armd Div east of KALBORN and with CT 44 on the south near LANGFUHR. Plans were made to continue the attack on the following day.

Div Arty (Riley): Supported the attack of CCB and participated in the "attack by fire" of CCA. Preparation for the attack lasted for 20 minutes over the entire front, then a lull of 10 minutes, followed by an intense one-minute TOT by every available artillery piece. All Corps artillery in the sector fired a counterbattery program during the preparation.

21 February 1945

The Div resumed its advance at 0400 and DAHNEN, the first town in Germany to be captured by the 6th Armd, was cleared at 0745. An hour later, the Civil Affairs Officer of CCB had posted

his first military government proclamation in an enemy town. CT 86 and CT 44 continued to mop up and secure the north boundary, awaiting the arrival of the 11th Armd Div attacking from the north. The 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was relieved from attachment at 1200.

CCA (Hines): Continued preparations for operations across the OUR at DASBURG. CT 69 relieved the 41st Cav Rcn Sq Mecz as of 1200, and at 1220 was ordered to move tanks to positions overlooking DASBURG. Co C 1252d C Engr Bn was attached to the Combat Team in place.

CCB (Read): Continued its determined onslaught against SIEGFRIED LINE defenses. CT 9 resumed the attack at 0400, captured DAHNEN, and drove rapidly south to smash into DASBURG from the rear, by-passing the pillboxes facing the river between the town. The town was secured by 1700. The bridge with the Div sign welcoming visitors into Germany was erected beginning that night. CT 50 jumped off at 0845 to the east and seized REIPELDINGEN against light opposition about 1200. Continuing the attack south to DALEIDEN, the Command captured the town at 1600. The bridge on the main highway from DASBURG to DALEIDEN had been blown by the enemy. This cut the main road east of DASBURG and placed CT 50 well east of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses and in a position to outflank the important crossing at DASBURG. CT 44 sent its reserve rifle company to REIPELDINGEN to relieve elements of CT 50. CT 86 relieved CT 44 which then sideslipped down to the area of REIPELDINGEN. 208 PWs were taken during the day.

Res Comd (Harris): Remained in assembly area prepared to support either combat command.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div attack. "On Call" fires were placed on enemy personnel, pillboxes, gun positions, mortars and OPs. Harassing and interdiction fires were continued.

22 February 1945

The Div continued its attack against the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses, advanced east and southwest in the north part of its zone, and enlarged its bridgehead in the south part. Contact with the 11th Armd Div was made north of LANGFUHR and south of ERIFF, and later with the 90th Inf Div east of IRRHAUSEN. 45 pillboxes were taken during the day.

CCA (Hines): Composition of CTs:

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn

Co C 1252d C Engr Bn

Co C 603d TD Bn

CCA Reserve

603d TD Bn (—)

1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn

2 Plats Co B 603d TD Bn

CT 1252 (Costinet)

1252d C Engr Bn (—)

CCA Trains

Btry A 777th AAA Bn

212th Armd FA Bn in direct support

By 0145 CT 15 completed relief of CT 1252 which then prepared for operations across the river. Elements of CT 69 followed by CT 1252 crossed the footbridge at DASBURG and relieved elements of CCB in the town. CT 15 initially supported the operations by fire from its positions along the west side of the river. Elements of CT 69 crossed the OUR over the Bailey bridge and moved south to DASBURG. There it combined with CT 1252 and pushed south with the engineers mounted on light tanks and covered by fire from medium tanks. PREISCHEID was captured by 1500. The two Combat Teams then swept south to seize AFFLER at 1700. CT 15 crossed the river and made contact with CT 69, then swung south to clear UBER EISENBACH by 1800, thus securing the whole of the SIEGFRIED LINE positions on the 6th Armd front. Enemy resistance and artillery fire during the day's operation were moderate and only about half of the pillboxes encountered were manned.

CCB (Read): Patrolled during the night 21—22 Feb and cleared the area to the west, pushing just south of the DASBURG—DALEIDEN road and consolidating positions gained the previous day. CT 9 was relieved at DASBURG at 0330 by CCA. CT 50 spearheaded east and seized a bridgehead at 1100 across the IRSEN River southeast of DALEIDEN. CT 44 jumped off at 1300 to the east, capturing intact the bridge at IRRHAUSEN by 1530. In the meantime CT 50 drove south and southwest to clear the main supply route. In heavy fighting two enemy tanks were knocked out and others were

driven off, and by 2000 OLMSCHIED was occupied. CT 44 forced a bridgehead east of IRRHAUSEN and by 2100 was smashing on southeast to the final objective. CT 86 cleared the woods southwest of REIPELDINGEN and made contact with the 11th Armd Div northwest of IRRHAUSEN at 2315. 269 PWs were taken by the Command.

23 February 1945

The 6th Armd continued its advance to the east and occupied its final objective, the high ground in the vicinity of JUCKEN and OLMSCHIED. The bridgehead in the southern part of its zone was strengthened, and new operations were started to the southeast. The advance CP opened at DASBURG at 1400.

CCA (Hines): Elements of CTs 69 and 1252 continued clearing scattered enemy from the area taken the previous day and sent patrols to reconnoiter bridges spanning the IRSEN. CT 15 crossed the OUR over a Bailey bridge at UBER EISENBACH and proceeded to clear the area south between the IRSEN and OUR Rivers. At 1600 a patrol sent to secure SEVENIG encountered no opposition. The advance CP closed at PREISCHILD at 1245. 81 pillboxes were taken during the day's operation.

CCB (Read): Continued its attack east and south. At 0045 CT 86 made contact with elements of the 90th Inf Div east of IRRHAUSEN. CT 9 drove east from DAHNEN toward OLMSCHIED and passed through CT 50 at 0220. CT 50 ploughed through light opposition to take the high ground southeast of DALEIDEN, opening the DALEIDEN-DASBURG highway which was to be the VIII Corps main supply line. CT 9, after crossing the IRSEN River on foot, surrounded JUCKEN before daylight and in conjunction with CT 44, which was dug in on the final objective, consolidated on the Div objective by 0740. CT 68 raced south at 1630, by-passing KARLSHAUSEN to the east, and headed for OBERGECKLER to contact the left flank of the XII Corps. A force was dropped off to contain KARLSHAUSEN. Contact was made with elements of the 6th Cav Gp at KARLSHAUSEN at 1900. CCB's CP moved from DAHNEN to DALEIDEN, closing at 1700. 252 PWs were taken during the day.

24 February 1945

The Div continued clearing its zone and contact was established with elements of the XII Corps north of OBERGECKLER. The towns of NEUERBERG, KARLSHAUSEN, LEIMBACH and MUXERATH were cleared. Pinched out in its present zone by the 90th Inf Div and the 6th Cav Gp, the 6th Armd prepared to take over its new zone. The 1252d C Engr Bn and 161st Cml Smk Gen Co were relieved of attachment.

During the period 20—24 Feb the 6th Armd captured 32 towns and 253 pillboxes, took 1033 prisoners, and inflicted heavy personnel and material losses upon the enemy. Brig Gen Read was assigned as Asst Div Comdr and Col Hanson became CO of CCB.

CCA (Hines): Continued clearing enemy from its zone. At 1450 the 1252d C Engr Bn was relieved from the Command. A strong patrol of light tanks and combat engineers entered and cleared the town of SEVENIG at 2230, completing the mission of the Command.

CCB (Read): CT 68 swung south to contact elements of the left flank of the XII Corps at OBERGECKLER. Elements advancing on LEIMBACH swept through the town after a small fire fight and headed southeast to KREUZDORF where a patrol was sent to KOXHAUSEN to contact the 6th Cav Gp. Another patrol to the southwest secured the town of MUXERATH. Continuing southeast, the Command established contact at 0740 with elements of the 80th Inf Div, 1200 yards north of OBERGECKLER. CT 44 raced from JUCKEN to relieve elements of CT 68 at KARLSHAUSEN and LEIMBACH. At 1300 NEUERBURG was taken by CT 69 which turned the entire area over to the 6th Cav Gp and assembled near LEIMBACH awaiting further orders. 61 PWs were taken during the day, making a total of 939 prisoners taken by the Command during the past five days.

25 February 1945

The 6th Armd reorganized its command and, in compliance with VIII Corps order, relieved the 357th and 359th Inf Regts, 90th Inf Div within its new zone west of the PRUM. CCB on the north and CCA on the south assumed responsibility at 2225. The Div CP closed in ARZFELD at 1030. Aggressive patrolling was continued.

Composition of Commands:

CCA	CCB	Res Comd
9th Armd Inf Bn	50th Armd Inf Bn	44th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn	69th Tk Bn	68th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (—)	603d TD Bn (—)

Co C 603d TD Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn

Co A 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
777th AAA Bn (—)

CCA (Hines): Reorganized its Command. CT 15 completed relief by 2130 of the 357th Inf Regt along the PRUM between MERLSCHIED and MANDERSCHIED. CT 9 remained in place at OLMSCHEID. The Command CP closed at LICHTENBORN at 1600.

Composition of CTs:

CT 15 (Lagrew)

15th Tk Bn
Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn
Co C 9th Armd Inf Bn
Mort Plat 9th Armd Inf Bn

CT 9 (Britton)

9th Armd Inf Bn (—)
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co C 603d TD Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecq

CCA Trains

Btry A 777th AAA Bn

CCB (Hanson): Reorganized its command and completed the relief of the 359th Inf Regt along the PRUM at 2230. CT 86 moved by infiltration to the northwest of MASTHORN, completing its relief by 2045. Contact was maintained with the 4th Inf Div on the north flank. CT 50 assembled near EUSCHIED and completed relief of the 359th on the south flank of CCB at 2230. CT 69 remained in its present positions and prepared to move to the Command's new sector early 26 Feb.

Composition of CTs:

CT 86 (Brindle)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecq (—)
1 Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 50 (Ward)

50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—)
Co A 603d TD Bn (—)
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn

Res Comd (Harris): Prepared to move east of the OUR to PREISCHEID.

Div Arty (Riley): Moved to new positions with the CP at ARZFELD to take over artillery support in the old sector of the 90th Inf Div.

26 February 1945

The Div maintained its line in its new defensive sector, conducted aggressive patrolling and raids to locate crossings on the PRUM, and prepared for operations to the east. The Div CP opened at ARZFELD at 1030.

CCA (Hines): Held its line and sent 3 combat patrols across the PRUM. Contact was maintained with the 6th Cav Gp on the south.

CCB (Hanson): Held its line and maintained contact with the 4th Inf Div on the north. CT 69 moved from PREISCHEID to BINSCHIED without enemy interference and closed at 1500. At 1800 a combat patrol from CT 50 went into LUNEBACH but was forced to withdraw under formidable enemy pressure. The patrol crossed the PRUM at KINZERBURG, ran into booby traps, heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fire, and withdrew after suffering heavy casualties. The bridge there was completely destroyed.

Res Comd (Harris): Moved to PREISCHEID, closing at 1030.

Div Arty (Riley): Firing was very light during the period. Wire communication was improved and liaison with the 4th Inf Div was established.

27 February 1945

Shortly before midnight, three patrols of 15 men each from Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecq crossed the river with the mission of securing the high ground to the east. Supported by Co A 9th Armd Inf Bn, the objectives were seized and consolidated. Though depleted by heavy casualties the Troop withstood heavy artillery and mortar fire, wiped out enemy patrols, and defeated counterattacks by numerically superior forces.

For forty hours without food and water they held the most advance point of the bridgehead, enabling other forces to cross the river and secure the bridgehead. For this action Troop A was given a Presidential citation.

Elements of CT 86 were moved north to relieve elements of the 4th Inf Div.

CCA (Hines): Elements of CT 9 crossed the river shortly before midnight, followed by the remainder of the force, and at 0545 seized the high ground northeast on the crossing site near MANDERSCHIED. Smoke was laid on the crossing by the 212th Armd FA Bn, and by 1630 Combat Teams

9 and 15 began their coordinated drive to the south. At 2000 they had advanced beyond HEILHAUSEN against light resistance. All bridges in the Combat Command zone were found to be blown, so arrangements were made with the 6th Cav Gp to use their crossing in the vicinity of WAXWEILER.

CCB (Hanson): Elements of CT 50 crossed the PRUM south of LUNEBACH at 0105 but were forced to withdraw because of heavy enemy artillery and small arms fire. During the day the Combat Command boundary was extended north approximately 2 miles along the west bank of the PRUM to MATZERATH inclusive. Tr E and Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz dismounted and pushed north, relieving elements of the 12th Regt 4th Inf Div by 2230.

Res Comd (Harris): Took over bridge guards near FALKEN, DASBURG, UBER EISENBACH and GEMUND.

Div Arty (Riley): Supported the Div in its crossing, firing upon enemy strongpoints, gun locations, and suspected installation with TOTs and defensive fires.

28 February 1945

The 6th Armd continued its attack, enlarging the bridgehead across the PRUM and capturing six towns. CT 44 was attached to CCA from the Res Comd and the 161st Cml SG Co was attached to Res Comd.

CCA (Hines): CT 9 continued the attack, seizing high ground to the east of the crossing site by 1630. The light tanks of CT 15 had started crossing the river at the 6th Cav Gp crossing, but because of the poor condition of the ford and the fact that one of the lead tanks had thrown a track and blocked the crossing, they were held up until noon.

The Bailey bridge near MANDERSCHEID was finished at 1630 and CT 44 commenced its attack. Passing through Combat Teams 9 and 15, it shifted southeast and swept through DACKSCHEID by 1930, reorganized and captured EILSCHEID at 2200. The Combat Team consolidated its position for the night and prepared to resume the attack east at daybreak. CT 15, upon being passed through by CT 44, remained in place ready to support either the bridgehead or CT 44. CT 9 assumed command of the bridgehead. Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was released to Squadron control.

CT 44 (Brown)	CT 15 (Lagrew)	CCA Res
44th Armd Inf Bn	15th Tk Bn (—)	Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn (—)
Co A 15th Tk Bn		Co C 603d TD Bn (—)
1 Plat Co C 603d TD Bn	CT 9 (Morse)	Btry A 777th AAA Bn
1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn		
128th Armd FA Bn (D/S)	9th Armd Inf Bn	

CCB (Hanson): CT 50 jumped off at 0430, forded the river south of LUNEBACH and raced to the east, securing MERLSCHIED by 0810 and LIERFELD by 0955. Opposition was light, consisting mostly of small arms and artillery fire, and the Combat Team had taken LUNEBACH by 1220. On the north flank CT 86 met fairly stiff opposition in capturing the high ground northeast of LUNEBACH, then outposted the town of PRONSFELD to be cleared of mines and booby traps the next morning. Construction of a Bailey bridge at LUNEBACH was started at 1400.

1 March 1945

The bridgehead across the PRUM was enlarged and strengthened in preparation for a coordinated attack to seize the Div's first objective—a bridgehead across the NIMS River.

CCA (Hines): CT 44 continued vigorous patrolling to the east and further strengthened the bridgehead. Contact was made with the 6th Cav Gp on the right near PINTESFELD. CT 9 and CT 15 remained in reserve, but a force of light tanks from CT 15 cleared enemy infantry from the high ground east of MERLSCHIED by 0800. These same enemy troops had earlier forced CCT's OP east of the town to withdraw. The CP opened at MANDERSCHEID at 1200.

CCB (Hanson): The Bailey bridge at LUNEBACH was completed at 0500 without any enemy reaction. CT 86 jumped off at 0630 and was just short of the proposed extent of the Div bridgehead when pinned down by very heavy machine gun fire. About 1515 the Combat Team was ordered to improve its position, dig in for the night, and keep probing enemy positions.

CT 50, with tank and TD support, jumped off at 0700 against moderate small arms and mortar fire. At 1605 MATZERATH was captured and strong combat patrols drove to the south. CT 69 moved from BINSCHIED to the vicinity of MERLSCHIED, closing at 1940. During the day Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz which was relieved by CT 9 moved into CCB's area, rejoining CT 86.

Res Comd (Harris): Elements of CT 68 relieved elements of CT 86 in its defensive positions north of PRONSFELD and maintained contact with CCB on the right and the 4th Inf Div on the left.

Div Arty (Riley): TOTs were fired on Nebelwerfer positions, enemy batteries and areas of activity. Heavy harassing and interdiction fires were executed during the night.

2 March 1945

The 6th Armd after further patrolling and preparation, attacked to the east in its zone against light and disorganized resistance, seizing five towns and a crossing site on the NIMS River. The 161st Cml Smk Gen Co was attached to CCB.

CCA (Hines): During the early morning, patrols from CT 44 reconnoitered the road net 1 mile to the northeast of DACKSCHEID and found dug-in infantry, machine guns, a tank and mines. At 1300 the artillery supporting the Command smoked the high ground just south of HEISDORF and at 1310 CT 44 attacked to the east. By 1400 the objective on the high ground northeast of DACKSCHEID was reached where positions were consolidated. Elements of CT 44 then by-passed HEISDORF. Other elements of the Combat Team captured HEISDORF by 2300.

CCB (Hanson): During the night and morning strong patrols were active. At 1430 CCB attacked with CT 69 on the left (north) and CT 50 on the right. CT 69, against light opposition, jumped off from MATZERATH and seized its objective, WINRINGEN, and high ground just to the northeast. CT 50 captured its objective, the high ground east of MATZERATH, and against little opposition took DINGDORF at 1725. Probing into the dense woods east of PRONSFELD, CT 86 advanced to capture OBERLAUCH at 1700.

CT 69 continued its attack, capturing the town of NIEDERLAUCH, while CT 50 improved its positions.

Composition of CTs:

CT 50 (Ward)

50th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

CT 69 (Kennedy)

69th Tk Bn (—)
Co A 603d TD Bn (—)

CT 86 (Kennon)

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
1 Plat Co B 69th Tk Bn
1 Plat Co A 603d TD Bn

CCB Reserve

Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn

Res Comd (Harris): CP opened at PREISCHEID at 1200. The 603d TD Bn was relieved of bridge guard at UBER EISENBACH and GEMUND and given the mission of guarding the bridges at LUNEBACH and HEILHAUSEN.

3 March 1945

The Div continued its attack to the east and captured five towns and two bridges intact across the NIMS. At the end of the day the 90th Inf Div was in the process of relieving the 6th Armd.

CCA (Hines): Attacked at 0416 with CT 44 leading to capture WETTELDORF by 0830. Elements of CT 44 crossed the ANNA River and seized the high ground west of SCHONECKEN. CT 9 followed CT 44 across the NIMS and captured the high ground to the east and southeast. CT 44, supported by the fires of CT 69, drove the enemy from SCHONECKEN to capture the town by 1200.

A force of light tanks dashed from west of the NIMS to secure the SCHONECKEN bridge intact, as disorganized enemy streamed to the east to escape. Two flights of fighter-bombers were called in to strafe and bomb enemy columns of tanks and vehicles with excellent results. Having attained its objective, CCA consolidated its positions and awaited relief by the 90th Inf Div.

CCB (Hanson): During the early morning CT 69 moved to take up tank defilade firing positions on the high ground west of SCHONECKEN and support by fire the attack on the flanks of both combat commands throughout the day. CT 50 spearheaded east, crossing the NIMS at its junction with the SCHOLKEN River, and captured the high ground to the east, encountering heavy artillery and rocket fire.

CT 86 blocked to the north and captured the town of GIESDORF by 1700 against stubborn resistance. Other elements of the Combat Team cleared the dense woods in the northern zone by 1230 and made contact with the 128th Inf Regt 4th Inf Div on the north at ELLWERATH. At the end of the day the Command was relieved by elements of the 90th Inf Div.

Res Comd (Harris): Elements of CT 68 held and patrolled west of the PRUM between CCB and the 4th Inf Div until relieved at 1700. PINTESFELD was entered and occupied during the morning.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div by firing on targets of opportunity. Harassing and interdiction missions were fired during the night.

4 March 1945

At 0600 the 90th Inf Div assumed responsibility for the Div zone and the 6th Armd assembled in the ARZFELD area north of LUXEMBOURG, passing to SHAEF Reserve. For the first time since it entered combat 27 July 1944, the entire Div was out of the front lines. From COUTANCES to AVRANCHEX (spearheading the breakthrough) and the 230-mile race alone to BREST; at LORIENT; from the NANCY bridgehead to the SIEGFRIED defenses of SAARBRUCKEN; and from BASTOGNE through the SIEGFRIED LINE to SCHONECKEN on the NIMS River, the 6th Armd had continuously faced the enemy.

5—8 March 1945

The 6th Armd remained in its assembly area in SHAEF Reserve and prepared for future operations. An extensive program of training, maintenance of equipment and rehabilitation of personnel was carried on. The 161st Cml Smk Gen Co was relieved from attachment, effective 5 March.

On 8 March the Div received orders that it had been attached to the SEVENTH ARMY and would march, commencing at 091000, to the SEVENTH ARMY zone. Advance parties departed immediately for SEVENTH ARMY Hq to make arrangements for and selection of assembly areas prior to the movement.

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY CAMPAIGN

9 March to 8 May 1945

In March the entire Div was pulled out of the front lines for the first time since it entered combat on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA 27 July 1944. For over seven months (221 consecutive days) the 6th Armd had engaged in continuous action which covered hundreds of miles of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany. From the beginning the enemy had fought stubbornly to stabilize his front, sometimes almost succeeding before added Allied strength created another breach. At the time of the 6th Armd's relief new penetrations had been made in the enemy's lines and he was again retreating.

After a week in SHAEF reserve the 6th Armd received orders on 8 March 1945 assigning it to the SEVENTH ARMY and directing it to move to an assembly area in the SEVENTH ARMY zone.

These plans gave the 6th Armd about a week to rest and refit, some 50 miles in rear of the line, and then to move forward to be ready to jump off on Corps order.

RHINELAND

9 March—24 March 1945

9—11 March 1945

Attached to the XV Corps and placed in reserve, the Div began marching to its assigned assembly area at 090900. Headquarters was to be at VIC SUR SEILLE (FRANCE). Shoulder patches and all vehicle markings were removed; radio silence was imposed. With the exception of one Ordnance company and the Administrative Center, the 6th Armd closed in its assigned assembly area at 110200.

Route of March: ARZFELD—DASBURG to junction N16, N16 to junction No 27, to junction No 7, to LUXEMBOURG, N3 and N53 to THIONVILLE to junction GC 2 to junction N52 to PONT-A-MOUSON, N410 to N399 to assembly area. The average distance traveled by the units was 165 miles.

12 March 1945

The Div assembled by battalion in the area surrounding CHATEAU SALINS. Combat commands and combat teams were not assembled in their tactical groupings until the 6th Armd moved forward on March 18. This disposition facilitated maintenance and administration and enabled a proper grouping to be made after the detailed plan was completed. Shortly after arrival in the rear area, Div Arty was committed to reinforce the artillery of the 3d Div in its assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE. The artillery remained with the 3d Div until the 6th Armd passed through and picked it up.

13—17 March 1945

The Div received orders to be prepared to move to a forward assembly area from which it would exploit the attack of the XV Corps through the SIEGFRIED LINE and secure exits to the RHINE Plain at BAD DURKHEIM, GRUNSTADT and DREISEN. On Corps order, it was also to seize the west bank of the Rhine and secure a bridgehead across the River. The 3d and 45th Divs were to jump off at 150100 to penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE.

The 6th Armd made meticulous plans to initiate and execute its orders. CCA, followed by the 86th CC, was to move on the left (west); CCB, followed by the Res Comd, was to move on the right (east).

Div Arty (Riley): Moved from an assembly area near CHATEAU VOE to positions near ACHEN to reinforce the artillery of the 3d Inf Div. The 128th Armd FA Bn moved to the vicinity of ACHEN, the 212th Armd FA Bn to the vicinity of ETTING, and the 231st Armd FA Bn to the vicinity of KULHAUSEN. All units closed by 142315 and completed registration at 1745.

On 15 March the Div, less artillery, assembled dismounted on the COTE DE DELME. This hill offered a splendid view of the SEILLE River valley in which the 6th Armd had fought from the middle of September until the beginning of the SAAR Campaign in November. Following a memorial service on this vantage point, the general plan of operation for the forthcoming campaign was outlined by means of a big chart for the benefit of all personnel. This was the first time during the war that an opportunity had occurred to explain the big picture to everyone in the Div prior to a battle.

18 March 1945

The 6th Armd, less Div Arty, displaced from its assembly area near VIC SUR SEILLE to a forward assembly area near OERMINGEN. The Div CP opened at OERMINGEN at 1415. Div Arty continued to support the attack of the 3d Inf Div by reinforcing its artillery fire.

CCA (Hines): Cleared the IP at DIEUZE at 0655 and closed in a forward assembly area at 1300. The CP was located near KULHAUSEN.

CCB (Hanson): Commenced movement at 0900 and closed in the vicinity of DEHLINGEN at 1415.

Res Comd (Harris): Commenced movement at 1142 and closed in the vicinity of VOELLERDINGEN.

86th CC (Brindle): Commenced movement at 1000 by the north route and closed in bivouac near HERBITZHEIM.

Div Arty (Riley): Participated in a harassing, preparatory and post-preparatory program in support of the attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE.

19 March 1945

The attack of the 3d and 45th Inf Divs of XV Corps met considerable resistance; however, the XXI Corps of the SEVENTH ARMY appeared to be approaching a breakthrough, due in part to pressure by THIRD ARMY units moving south. By SEVENTH ARMY order, CCA with the 212th Armd FA Bn was attached to XXI Corps at 1530 and moved northeast at once to the vicinity of SAARGUEMINES. After the breakthrough the Command was to revert to Div control in the vicinity of HOMBURG.

20 March 1945

When the "Break" came at about 1000, Corps ordered the 6th Armd to begin its exploitation. News that the THIRD ARMY was advancing south across the SEVENTH ARMY front caused no change in plan except direction for greater speed. There was no opportunity to effect coordination with THIRD ARMY units. Although the SIEGFRIED LINE south of ZWEIBRUCKEN had been completely broken, the second line north of ZWEIBRUCKEN was still manned and had not been reached by the 3d Div when the 6th Armd passed through. However, the line was not held solidly and resistance, while determined in spots, was not coordinated. In the HOMBURG area to the west—in front of XXI Corps—CCA found practically no resistance.

The Div, less CCA, passed through the 3d and 45th Inf Divs during the afternoon in the vicinity of ZWEIBRUCKEN and EINOD and advanced approximately 12 miles to the northeast. CCA attached to XXI Corps advanced at 1215 and reverted to Div control at 2000. The Div CP opened at ZWEIBRUCKEN at 2000.

21 March 1945

The 6th Armd continued its advance east against light to moderate resistance, reached the west bank of the RHINE River at WORMS at 0900, and captured RHEIN-DURKHEIM on the RHINE at 1200. Leading elements of the Div drove 60 miles in 18 hours and were the first elements of the XV Corps to reach the RHINE. The Div CP opened at EBERTSHEIM at 2100.

Although WORMS had been entered by THIRD ARMY troops prior to the time CCA patrols reached it, the town of RHEIN-DURKHEIM to the north had been by-passed by THIRD ARMY and offered sharp resistance before it was captured by CCA. The same situation occurred in a number of towns in the GRUNSTADT area.

22 March 1945

The Div, less CT 9 and CF Berg of CCA which were on the west bank of the RHINE River near RHEIN-DURKHEIM, assembled in the vicinity of EBERTSHEIM.

23 March 1945

The 6th Armd was reassigned to TWELFTH ARMY GROUP, THIRD ARMY, and XX Corps effective at 1800. CCA (Hines): now including the 86th CC, operated a counter-reconnaissance screen from RHEIN-DURKHEIM through WORMS to the Autobahn on the south.

24 March 1945

Elements conducting the counter-reconnaissance screen along the west bank of the RHINE River were relieved by elements of the 3d and 45th Inf Divs. At 1800 the Div was assigned to XII Corps.

CCA (Hines): CT 9, holding the line from RHEIN-DURKHEIM to WORMS, was relieved at 1300 by elements of the 45th Inf Div.

86th CC (Brindle): Holding the line from WORMS south to the Autobahn, the Combat Command was relieved by elements of the 3d Inf Div.

FRANKFURT—DRESDEN

25 March—9 May 1945

The XII Corps had established two bridges across the RHINE River at OPPENHEIM and was holding a bridgehead with elements of the 5th and 90th Inf Divs. The 6th Armd remained west of WORMS in the vicinity of GRUNSTADT. Composition of Commands remained unchanged.

Corps Mission: XII Corps was to exploit the breakthrough across the RHINE River with armor, using the 6th Armd on the left (north) and the 4th Armd Div on the right (south).

Division Mission: Cross the RHINE River in one column, following the 4th Armd Div, and drive northeast to cross the MAIN River at or just east of FRANKFURT.

25 March 1945

The 6th Armd assembled near DEXHEIM and then crossed the RHINE River at OPPENHEIM. Order of the single column which passed through the 5th and 90th Divs' bridgehead was: CCB, CCA, Div Hq, Div Arty, 86th Reserve and Tns.

Although plans called for CCA to operate abreast of and to the left of CCB, crossing of the RHINE in one column placed CCA to the rear initially. When CCB passed through the infantry bridgehead near GROSS GERAU and was slowed by enemy resistance, it developed toward the right (east). This enabled CCA to develop to the left (northwest) and come up abreast CCB. Both Commands used the main road through GROSS GERAU and MORFELDEN for part of their forces.

CCA (Hines): Reached the vicinity of DEXHEIM at 0900, crossed the RHINE behind CCB and then swung northeast to drive through the infantry bridgehead northwest of GROSS GERAU. Continuing on, CT 9 seized MORFELDEN. CT 15 raced north to the MAIN River between RUSSELSHEIM and RAUNHEIM. The most formidable resistance was offered by the anti-aircraft defenses of FRANKFURT. With command of the roads, these weapons were quickly sighted for ground fire which forced all movement on trails through an extensive wooded area south of the city.

CCB (Hanson): Moved at 0030, closed in the vicinity of DEXHEIM at 0700, and started across the RHINE at 0920 to pass through the infantry bridgehead. CT 69 made first contact with the enemy just west of MORFELDEN when it encountered artillery, small arms and bazooka fire. By-passing this resistance, the Combat Team sliced northeast and halted for the night just south of WALLDORF in contact with CCA on the left and elements of the 90th Inf Div on the right. CT 44 followed the route of CT 69 to GROSS GERAU, east to WIXHAUSEN, then north to establish contact with elements of the 90th Inf Div west of LANGEN.

Res Comd (Harris): Followed the route of CCA and assembled in the vicinity of GROSS GERAU. The Div CP opened at GROSS GERAU at 2000.
86th CC (Brindle): Followed the route of CCB and assembled northeast of GROSS GERAU.

26 March 1945

The Div continued its attack northeast, seized a partially destroyed bridge in FRANKFURT, and forced a bridgehead across the MAIN River against extremely heavy resistance. This was the first bridgehead to be established in FRANKFURT. Later the 5th Inf Div crossed through the bridgehead to complete the capture of FRANKFURT. The 6th Armd's crossing was accomplished under the heaviest artillery fire the Div had encountered since entering FRANCE 27 July 1944. The nearby city of OFFENBACH was captured by CCB. At 1345 the Div CP opened at MORFELDEN, and at the end of the day Combat Commands A and B were each reinforced by a battalion from the Reserve Command. Although the original plan gave the Div the option of securing a crossing east of FRANKFURT as far as HANAU, the 4th Armd and the 90th Inf Divs, meeting less resistance to the east, had already captured HANAU and the area west as far as OFFENBACH. This caused Corps to change its instructions to the 6th Armd, limiting the Div front to OFFENBACH and FRANKFURT, a particularly difficult front for an armored division. All bridges over the MAIN River, in the Div area, were partially or completely destroyed. Only the one bridge referred to above was sufficiently intact to permit the crossing of dismounted men. Considerable repair was necessary before even 1/4 ton vehicles could cross.

CCA (Harris): Continued its attack at 0400 and forced a bridgehead across the MAIN River. At 0400 CT 9 jumped off to the north, encountered stiff resistance in the form of small arms and artillery fire, and by-passed on the north the enemy airfield southwest of FRANKFURT. CT 15 ploughed northeast through heavy forests along the MAIN River and reached SACHSENHAUSEN during the afternoon. Finding a partially destroyed bridge in the vicinity of NIEDERRAD, a company of infantry was immediately pushed across to secure a bridgehead. Two additional companies of CT 9 followed to strengthen the bridgehead as intense artillery fire continued to fall on the site. CT 68 was attached to the Command at 2030.

CCB (Hanson): CT 44 smashed northeast to capture LANGER in conjunction with elements of the 359th Inf Regt. The Combat Team raced on to capture SPRENDLINGEN and was then met by heavy AT fire from the woods to the north. CT 44 split into two columns. One force (Roth) attacked along the SPRENDLINGEN—NEU-ISENBURG road; the other force (Tillman) drove northeast on OFFENBACH. A reconnaissance force sent east from LANGEN by-passed resistance at GOTZENHAIN, then shifted to DIETZENBACH, and returned to the main axis via HEUSENSTAMM. The Combat Team captured OFFENBACH against light resistance and drew up before the MAIN River at 1530. CT 69 pushed generally northeast against scattered resistance, reaching the Main near SACHSENHAUSEN. CT 50 was detached from Res Comd and attached to CCB at 2030.

Res Comd (Lagrew): Closed in bivouac 2 miles south of NIEDERRAD at 2030. CT 50 was attached to CCB, CT 68 to CCA.

86th CC (Brindle): In a swift enveloping move to the east through OBER RODEN and JUGESHEIM, the Command approached from the southeast. Upon reaching the MAIN, it conducted reconnaissance for possible routes and crossing sites.

Div Arty (Riley): Continued to support the Div, concentrating on counterbattery fire.

27 March 1945

The Div continued to protect its bridgehead at FRANKFURT against increased enemy resistance. Intense artillery fire prevented repair of the bridge. Elements in the bridgehead were relieved by the 5th Inf Div which assumed control of the bridgehead at 1300. The Div CP opened at NEU-ISENBURG at 1340.

CCA (Harris): Continued to hold its bridgehead at FRANKFURT against increased enemy resistance. At 0900 construction of a Bailey bridge was started, but intense artillery fire prevented its continuance. It was estimated that approximately 4,000 rounds of artillery fire fell on the construction site during the morning, the rounds falling 5 to 6 yards apart. At 1300 Companies A, B and C of the 9th Armd Inf Bn were relieved by the 2d and 3d Inf Bns of the 10th Inf Regt and the 3d Bn of the 11th Inf Regt. At this time the 5th Inf Div assumed control of the bridgehead. By 1630 all elements of the Command had assembled south of the MAIN and were prepared to pass through the 5th Inf Div upon completion of a bridge.

CCB (Hanson): Patrols of CT 44 made contact with the 359th Inf Regt, 90th Inf Div near BURGEL. The Combat Team also sent patrols to reconnoiter the south bank of the MAIN. CT 69 remained in assembly south of NIEDERRAD and prepared for future operations.

86th CC (Brindle): Displaced to NEU-ISENBURG and prepared to cross the MAIN.

Div Arty (Riley): Was active with counterbattery fire and continued to support the 5th Inf Div bridgehead after the 6th Armd Div was relieved.

28 March 1945

The 6th Armd moved from its assembly area south of the MAIN to cross the 90th Inf Div bridge near DORNIGHEIM and advance north and northwest. Resistance was light and scattered, and the rapidly moving columns seized many towns and prisoners before reaching the southwest vicinity of FRIEDBERG near the end of the day. At 1800 the Div was relieved from attachment to the XII Corps and attached to XX Corps. The Div CP opened south of HOCHSTADT at 2200.

29 March 1945

The Div continued its relentless drive north, the Cavalry leading and Combat Commands abreast slashing through unorganized resistance to capture many towns and many prisoners. Numerous Allied prisoners were liberated as the 6th Armd drove approximately 32 miles to overrun enemy rear installations.

CCA (Harris): Advanced north rapidly against disorganized enemy resistance. CT 15 moved out at 0545, passing through OCKSTADT at 0810. GROSSEN-LINDEN was captured at 1250. CT 68 sliced through FRIEDBERG, met some opposition which was quickly dealt with, and then continued through GARBENTEICH. CT 9 followed CT 68 through FRIEDBERG and then pressed on to capture BAD NAUHEIM. Both CT 9 and CT 68 halted in the vicinity of BURKHARDSFELDEN at approximately 1900.

CCB (Hanson): Continued its drive northward and by 0605 leading elements had raced through NIEDER WOLLSTADT. At 0845 CT 50 was in the vicinity of OCKSTADT. Upon reaching the Autobahn the Combat Team sped north against no opposition. The Command liberated 800 Allied prisoners of war in HATTENROD, where it halted at 1730. CT 44 stormed through NIEDER WEISEL and continued to meet little organized resistance as it drove northeast of STEINBACH. CT 69 met some resistance at FRIEDBERG but overran it to move on to the Command's objective for the day northeast of STEINBACH.

86th CC (Brindle): Elements of the Command, spearheading the 6th Armd advance, by-passed resistance when possible and split into columns to pass through WILSSESHEIM and DORF GULL. At 0915 its leading elements swept through STEINBACH and GARBENTEICH. Fleeing enemy columns with artillery were overrun and destroyed or captured. By late evening the leading elements had driven northeast to ROMROD, smashing light resistance.

Div Arty (Riley): The 193d FA Gp with the 689th and 176th FA Bns and the 274th Armd FA Bn was attached to the Div and closed in the Div assembly area near REISKIRCHEN. The Div CP opened at STEINBACH at 1645.

30 March 1945

The Div received new orders to exploit its breakthrough northeast toward KASSEL. Gains of approximately 47 miles were made since only scattered enemy resistance was encountered by all leading elements, the heaviest being in the vicinity of ALSFELD and WABERN. The day's action was marked by an exceptionally large number of German prisoners and a large number of uncovered Allied prisoners. The 261st Regimental Combat Team of the 65th Inf Div, attached to the 6th Armd at 0100, was further assigned so that the 3d Bn went to CCA, the 2d Bn to CCB, and the remainder to Res Comd. The Div CP opened at HOMBERG at 1900.

CCA (Harris): Composition of Troops:

15th Tk Bn	Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn
68th Tk Bn (—Cos A & D)	Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
9th Armd Inf Bn	Co B 603d TD Bn
3d Bn 261st Inf Regt (Atchd)	Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—1 Sect)
Co A 50th Armd Inf Bn	

At 0600 the Command continued its attack north. CT 15 attacked for ALSFELD, the Div's initial objective, from their assembly area at ALBACH. CT 9 moved down the Autobahn to the road junction north of EHRINGSHAUSEN where it turned north and seized the towns of HEIMERTSHAUSEN, BILLERTSHAUSEN and ANGENROD. At 0840 CT 15 had to reduce a road block protected by AT guns before entering and capturing ALSFELD. This action caused some delay, so the Command later followed CT 9 to the north. CT 9 initially followed CT 15, but at ANGENROD CT 9 whipped rapidly to the north. The following towns were entered and secured: HEIDELBACH, SCHRECKSBACH, NEUKIRCHEN, NIEDER GRENZEBACH, OBER GRENZEBACH, FRIEDLENDORF, HOMBERG, UNS-

HAUSEN and HARTE. The Combat Team then halted east of HARTE. CT 9 found a bridge blown at NIDER MOLLRICH and another at ALTENBURG. CT 68, moving abreast and to the left flank of CT 9, seized and secured the following towns: BEUREN, GEILSHAUSEN, WEITERSHAIN, OBER GLENN, SEIPELSDORF, TREYSA, BORKEN, ZIEGENHAIN, UNDEBORN and ZENNERN. In the vicinity of KAPPEL a bridge was captured intact. Light resistance in the CCA sector centered mostly in towns and along the EDER River. At the river a bridgehead was formed by Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz. The 3d Bn of RCT 261 was attached to the Command early in the morning and gathered up prisoners to the rear.

CCB (Hanson):

Composition of Troops:

69th Tk Bn	Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn	Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn (—Cos A and C)	Co C 603d TD Bn and Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
2d Bn 261st Inf Regt (Atchd)	Btry B 777th AAA Bn
Co A 68th Tk Bn	

At 0600 the Command moved from its assembly area near BURKHARDSFELDEN. CT 44 advanced by the south route; CT 50 in rear of CT 44; CT 69 by the north route. Enemy resistance consisting of small arms and bazooka fire was cleared. CCB moved on the Autobahn to the vicinity of ALSFELD where it was held up by a blown bridge. When the road was cleared, the Command moved on against scattered resistance and halted near OBER BEISHEIM. The 2d Bn, RCT 261 was attached to CCB early in the day and followed to pick up prisoners.

Res Comd (Lagrew): Marched via KERZENHEIM—KONGERNHEIM—GROSS GERAU—FRIEDBERG to REMSFELD, closing at 0145. Composition of Troops:

25th Armd Engr Bn (—)	Btry D 546th AAA Bn
603d TD Bn (—)	Co A 691st TD Bn
777th AAA Bn (—)	Rcn Tr 65th Inf Div
261st CT 75th Inf Div (Atchd)	Co C 81st Cml Bn
261st Inf Regt (—)	1st Plat Co C 265th Engr C Bn
869th FA Bn (T)	Co C 365th Med Bn
Cannon Co 261st Inf Regt	318th CT 80th Inf Div (Atchd)

86th CC (Brindle): At 0630 CC Brindle moved down the Autobahn to ROMROD where the column met resistance from ground troops and was bombed and strafed. The Combat Command bypassed ROMROD to the north and kept on minor roads to HOMBERG, meeting scattered resistance along the route. After leaving HOMBERG, resistance increased until at WABERN all types of small arms, mortar and artillery fire were received. CT 9 relieved pressure on the right flank and CT 68 came up on the left. A heavy fire fight lasted for several hours.

Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (Reinf) led the advance on WABERN and SENNERN. Resistance became fanatical, but realizing that the only remaining bridge across the now swollen EDER River was between ZENNERN and NIEDER MOLLRICH the platoon plunged recklessly across. Enemy fire of all types was concentrated on the column but it drove on in spite of the murderous fire and took its toll of enemy personnel, guns and vehicles as it blasted its way into NIEDER MOLLRICH. The enemy had no opportunity to set off the prepared demolitions on the bridge and it was thus saved. Other 6th Armd forces continued to pour across the bridge to establish a bridgehead for the attack on KASSEL. For this gallant action Tr D and its attachments of infantry, engineers and tank destroyers were given a unit citation.


Composition of Troops:

86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	Co A 603d TD Bn
Co C 50th Armd Inf Bn	1 Plat Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn
Co D 68th Tk Bn	

Div Arty (Riley): The 128th Armd FA Bn moved from BURKHARDSFELDER to NIEDERBEISHEIM, closing at 2030. Marching north on the Autobahn, the 212th Armd FA Bn moved via ALSFELD—HOMBERG to UNSHAUSEN, after it fired a mission on enemy in ALSFELD. The 231st Armd FA Bn fired on targets of opportunity at OLRAU. Then it displaced to OBERSHEIM in support of CCB.

Composition of troops:

128th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCB)	193d FA Gp (Reinf)
212th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCA)	274th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCA)
231st Armd FA Bn (D/S CCB)	689th FA Bn (155 How Trac/D)
Btry D 777th AAA Bn	176th FA Bn (4.5 Gun Trac/D)
Sect Btry A 777th AAA Bn	



31 March 1945

On this date it became apparent that KASSEL was strongly defended. To capture it would mean a serious delay for the Div. Therefore, operations of the 6th Armd on 31 March had two objectives. The first was to attack and capture KASSEL with CCA and use the town as a jump-off point for further advance east. The second, in the event KASSEL proved too strongly defended, was to secure a crossing of the FULDA River, south of KASSEL and generally east of HOMBERG, by-pass KASSEL, and move the entire Div east. Reconnaissance during the day revealed that all bridges except one on the FULDA River were destroyed. Over this railroad bridge north of MALSFELD, though it was partially destroyed, the 86th Cav was eventually routed. It was necessary, however, to select a bridge site and build a bridge for other units. MALFELD was chosen and construction of a bridge was started during the night of 31 March.

At 1800 the Corps Commander changed the objective from LEIPZIG to WEIMAR, adding a particular mission of capturing Nazi Government Agencies which were believed to have moved to WEIMAR. The directive did not change the immediate Div plan since, in either case, the initial objective was MUHLHAUSEN.

1 April 1945

It was apparent after an all-night fight that it would be impossible to capture KASSEL quickly. When the bridge at MALSFELD was completed during the morning, the Commanding General of the 80th Div was notified that no further attack would be made to the north against KASSEL and that the 6th Armd would move east, crossing the FULDA River at MALSFELD. Whereupon the 80th Div undertook the capture of KASSEL, moving up the remainder of its forces to reinforce the 318th Inf which had been operating with CCA.

To the east the Div expanded its bridgehead over the FULDA River, passing CCB across the bridge at MALSFELD and the 86th CC across the railroad bridge just north of MALSFELD. By darkness the Div bridgehead across the FULDA River extended approximately 6 miles. At 1030 318 RCT reverted to control of the 80th Inf Div.

2 April 1945

The 6th Armd completed crossing the FULDA at MALSFELD and resumed its advance east with CCB on the right and CCA on the left. Advances north met heavy resistance, particularly at HESS LICHTENAU and QUENTEL which were cleared during the afternoon after heavy fighting. Resistance came from small groups of infantry supported by self-propelled guns and bazooka fire. In a day marked by the greatest enemy air activity of Div history, all units were subjected to bombing and strafing attacks. There were 3 raids by about 20 aircraft and many small raids by single planes. These attacks were directed against forward troop concentrations and artillery, not against rear installations. At the end of the day the Div had a small bridgehead across the WEHRE River near REICHENSACHSEN. The Div CP opened at FRIEMEN at 1500.

3 April 1945

The Div continued its attack east, crossed the WERRA River and its tributary the WEHRE, and advanced approximately 16 miles against moderate resistance. Because of blown bridges, all traffic had to be funneled across one bridge just southwest of REICHENSACHSEN and another over the WERRA River at GROSS BURSCHLA. CCB led the advance northeast. The Div CP opened at ESCHWEGE at 1645.

CCA (Harris): Throughout the day, the Command conducted unsuccessful patrolling for bridge sites along the WERRA River, particularly in the vicinity of BAD SOODEN, and it was finally decided to move across bridges at REICHENSACHSEN and GROSS BURSCHLA behind CCB.

CCB (Hanson): Crossed the WEHRE River through its bridgehead near REICHENSACHSEN to attack east. ESCHWEGE and REICHENSACHSEN were cleared and a large airport on the west side of ESCHWEGE was captured. CT 44, from its bridgehead across the WEHRE River, attacked and secured REICHENSACHSEN and ESCHWEGE after moderate resistance. It then pushed east. At 1400 CT 44, assembled in the vicinity of WANFRIED and reconnoitered for crossings on the WERRA River. CT 69 drove south, crossing through the infantry bridgehead at REICHENSACHSEN, and assisted the 44th in clearing ESCHWEGE. Afterwards it moved southeast to a bridge at GROSS BURSCHLA which had been captured intact by CT 50. From the bridge CT 69 continued north and east. CT 50 passed through the 44th's bridgehead near REICHENSACHSEN and advanced east against moderate resistance to the WERRA River. At GROSS BURSCHLA it captured a bridge intact and continued northeast. By nightfall the Command had passed through WENDEHAUSEN and

DIEDORF and halted 2 miles north of the latter town. By this time CT 69 had closed up behind CT 50 near FAULUNGEN. CT 44, having found no other crossing on the WERRA, passed across the bridge at GROSS BURSCHLA and advanced east to HEYERODE with Combat Command Headquarters.

Res Comd (Lagrew): Sent forces to guard the river line between WANFRIED and HELDRA. WANFRIED was captured and cleared by the 2d Bn 261st Inf Regt. Part of the Command remained in ESCHWEGE to protect Div installations.

86th CC (Brindle): Continued reconnaissance along the WERRA River near BAD SOODEN and as far north as ELLERSHAUSEN but was unable to secure a crossing on the WERRA River.

Div Arty (Riley): With 193d FA Gp, the Command continued to displace forward and support the Div.

4 April 1945

Having secured a bridge across the WERRA River at GROSS BURSCHLA, the Div continued east to encircle and enter the city of MUHLHAUSEN. CCB entered the city from the southwest, the south and southeast; CCA entered the city from the west, the north and northeast. Other elements of CCB spearheaded east to capture SCHLOTHEIM. In its advance the 6th Armd encountered scattered enemy resistance consisting of small arms, bazooka and anti-tank fire. Enemy air was active but ineffective throughout the day. Friendly supporting fighter-bombers gave cover and performed bombing and strafing missions during which 6 enemy aircraft were shot down. The 777th AAA Bn accounted for 14 enemy aircraft during the operation. At 1910 the Div CP opened at STRUTH.

5 April 1945

The 6th Armd, after having blocked all exits to the city of MUHLHAUSEN, cleared the city of enemy resistance by 0905. The 86th CC raced north and northeast to screen the Div's north flank, and Combat Commands A and B, now holding sectors to the east, prepared to assemble. Res Comd was given the task of maintaining law and order and guarding all installations and supply stores in MUHLHAUSEN. Corps orders stopped further advance pending arrival of FIRST ARMY troops on the north flank. They were now 40 to 50 miles to the rear. At 1400 the Div CP opened at MUHLHAUSEN.

CCA (Harris): Blocked roads leading into MUHLHAUSEN from the north and west and in conjunction with CCB cleared the town. CT 68 advanced from the northwest and west to enter and assist in the capture of the city. CT 9 entered from the west and CT 15 pushed in from the east, and after the city was cleared they moved southeast of MUHLHAUSEN to attack and enter the town of LANCENSALZA. Other elements of CCA assembled in the vicinity of GROSENGOTTERN.

CCB (Hanson): Blocked the main roads leading into MUHLHAUSEN from the south and east and together with CCA continued the attack to clear the town. CT 44 attacked from the southeast in force and assisted by CT 50 entered the city from the northwest. All elements of CCB then began to move to the vicinity of SCHLOTHEIM.

Res Comd (Lagrew): Moved into MUHLHAUSEN and put all utilities, supply installations and transportation facilities under guard. CTs 50 and 68 were assigned to the Command to assist in the task of maintaining law and order.

86th CC (Brindle): Maintained its screening mission to the north and cleared KEULA, HOLZTHALEBERN, GROSSBRUCHTER, WEIDERMUTH and EBELEBEN. After clearing the towns along this line, the Squadron maintained the line with Headquarters at URBACH. Tr C 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was with CCA; Co F 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz which was with CCB reverted to Squadron control.

6 April 1945

The Div cleared the city of LANCENSALZA, maintained law and order, guarded supplies in MUHLHAUSEN, and prepared for future operations. Now holding approximately a 38 mile front north and east of MUHLHAUSEN, the 6th Armd patrolled actively. As a result of operations near the city, CCA and CCB had been reversed so that the former was now on the right (south) flank. The Res Comd was reinforced for its task in MUHLHAUSEN while CCA and CCB on the east and the Cavalry on the north protected the front pending resumption of the advance on Corps order.

Later in the day, orders were received from the Corps to assist the 76th Inf Div in clearing the area east of BAD SOODEN and north of ESCHWEGE. In view of the extensive front to the east and north, the only troops available for this mission was Reserve Command; therefore, it was ordered to move early 7 April. Advantage was to be taken of the favorable ground northwest through DINGELSTADT, after which the Command was to swing south toward ESCHWEGE to clear rough, hilly country east of BAD SOODEN where a considerable enemy force was holding up the 76th Inf Div and the 3d Cavalry.

7 April 1945

Holding a front of approximately 40 miles, the 6th Armd continued to defend the MUHLHAUSEN area. The Res Comd, consisting of two combat teams, moved northwest in two columns to clear the area east of BAD SOODEN and north of ESCHWEGE and to make contact with elements of the 76th Inf Div near RUSTUNGEN. One column passed through DINGELSTADT and on to KEFFERSHAUSEN; the other passed through KULLSTEDT and on to WACHSTEDT. Both columns advanced rapidly against light resistance. Upon reaching KEFFERHAUSEN and KULLSTEDT, however, the Combat Teams established contact with enemy retreating from the west. Enemy who had been opposing the 76th Inf Div along the WERRA River began withdrawal during the night 6—7 April in the direction of MUHLHAUSEN. Before daylight, this enemy force of considerable strength attacked the 3d Battalion, 261st Infantry at STRUTH and threatened to defeat it. Information that 86th CC Trains in STRUTH were overrun reached Div Hq at 0730. Fortunately the 3d Battalion, 304th Infantry, mounted in trucks, was on the road just southeast of MUHLHAUSEN. Reinforced by a company combat team of the 69th Tk Bn, the battalion was rushed west through MUHLHAUSEN to EIGENRIEDEN to attack northwest, restore the situation at STRUTH, and contact and cooperate with the Res Comd further to the northwest. This action advanced three columns northwest, all commanded by the Commanding Officer of Res Comd. The enemy force of about 1,500 troops reinforced by tanks and self-propelled guns was completely destroyed and the area west and southwest was later found evacuated. At the end of the period all elements made contact in the KULLSTEDT—DINGELSTADT area. At approximately 1700 the 86th CC passed to control of CCB.

CCB (Hanson): Composition of Command:

69th Tk Bn (—Co) (To Div control at 0830)	Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn
44th Armd Inf Bn (—Co)	Cos B, C & Rcn Co 603d TD Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz	Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)

At 0830 CT 69, less a company with Res Comd, was ordered to move to the eastern exits of MUHLHAUSEN in Div Reserve, prepared to operate to the north.

After CT 69 had been released to 6th Armd control, the Combat Command moved CT 44 back to SCHLOTHEIM and regrouped to cover the Div front to the east and northeast against obviously increasing enemy activity. There were two counterattacks during the morning and both were repulsed.

Res Comd (Lagrew): Composition of Command:

68th Tk Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
Co C 25th Armd Engr Bn

Combat Teams 68 and 50 attacked northwest at 0730. CT 68 pushed through AMMERN, following the main road to DINGELSTADT. The column met light opposition until approximately 1015 when it established contact with enemy at KEFFERHAUSEN, believed withdrawing from the STRUTH area. The Combat Team was forced to deploy and fight. While thus engaged, enemy troops from the north entered DINGELSTADT and made it necessary for the Combat Team to reenter the town. It engaged in clearing the town and vicinity until 1800. The 3d Bn 304th Inf Regt Reinforced passed through KULLSTEDT and continued north to DINGELSTADT where it aided CT 68 in outpostting DINGELSTADT and KEFFERHAUSEN. CT 50 raced through HOLLENBACH, BICKENRIEDE and BUTTSTEDT without opposition, but it met enemy in the vicinity of KULLSTEDT at about 1015. There the Combat Team received considerable small arms and some anti-tank fire. Many prisoners were taken and by 1630 the situation was well under control. CT 50 then pushed on to WACHSTEDT. By 1655 the Combat Team had secured the town where it consolidated its positions and prepared to continue northwest in conjunction with CT 68. The 231st Armd FA Bn was assigned to the Command and at 2000 was moving into position on Hill 424 southwest of DINGELSTADT.

86th CC (Brindle): Continued to screen the north flank of the Div zone. Aggressive patrols reported that the entire front showed increased enemy activity and vehicular movement. Fire was received from the wooded area north of the Command's sector near HOLTZTHALEBEN. Tr B met considerable heavy fire at ABTSBESSINGEN. By the end of the period, however, the situation was well under control and the Squadron continued to hold its line. All elements were prepared to fall back to the main defense line KEULA—URBACH—SCHLOTHEIM, should it be deemed necessary in the face of an overwhelming enemy attack.

Div Arty (Riley): Composition of Command:

128th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCB)	193d FA Gp (reinf)
212th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCA)	274th Armd FA Bn (D/S CCA)

231st Amrd FA Bn (D/S Res Comd)
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
Sect Btry A 777th AAA Bn

689th FA Bn (155 How Trac/D)
176th FA Bn (4.5 Gun Trac/D)

Div Arty reinforced by the 193d FA Gp continued to support the 6th Armd in both its defensive and offensive operations.

3d Bn 304th Inf Regt, 65th Inf Div Reinf by Co B 44th Armd Inf Bn and Co B 69th Tk Bn:

The Battalion, reinforced by Co B 69th Tk Bn and two Platoons 44th Armd Inf Bn, moved north from EIGENRIEDEN on the axis EIGENRIEDEN—STRUTH—KULLSTEDT, assisted in the relief of the 3d Bn 261st Inf Regt which was almost surrounded in STRUTH, and cleared out the enemy along the axis from STRUTH to KULLSTEDT. At 1800 it pushed in two columns from KULLSTEDT to DINGELSTADT and KEFFERHAUSEN to clear enemy in this zone. It then outposted the north flank of the Res Comd north of DINGELSTADT and KEFFERHAUSEN. The Battalion and Co B 69th Tk Bn were attached to Res Comd at 1730.

CT 69 (Downs): Under Div control, elements of the Combat Team displaced to the vicinity of MUHLHAUSEN and went into position to support the Res Comd on short notice. Major Downs, CCB, S—3, was put in command.

Air Support: The Div was supported by numerous fighter-bomber squadrons from XIX TAC on missions that destroyed enemy tanks, motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and infantry. Communication and control were excellent and all requested targets were dealt with effectively. Continuous air cover was provided throughout the day.

8 April 1945

The 6th Armd front to the east, from south of LANCENSALZA through SCHLOTHEIM to KEULA west through DINGELSTADT, was held without change except that the 76th and 80th Inf Divs, coming up along the southern flank, took over the LANCENSALZA front in the late afternoon. To the west, Res Comd completed its mission of clearing out the pocket north of ESCHWEGE. By the time contact had been made with friendly elements northwest of MUHLHAUSEN, the Div front measured 50 miles. Upon its relief on the right flank, CCA assembled in the LANCENSALZA area.

9 April 1945

The mission for Res Comd, based on new orders from Corps, was extended to clear the entire area up to the WERRA River, if necessary, until contact with the 3d Cav Gp and FIRST ARMY troops was established. There proved to be no enemy resistance left in this area and contact was made with elements of the 69th Inf Div near UDER at 1500 and the 3d Cav Gp at approximately 1400. The Command then continued to clear enemy within the zone. Late in the afternoon, Corps orders for continuation of the advance were received. The 6th Armd, placed initially in Corps Reserve, prepared to pass through the 76th Inf Div after its attack 10 April and break resistance on the immediate front. The Div CP opened at LANCENSALZA at 1115.

10 April 1945

Troops spent the day in preparation for continuation of the exploitation, orders for which were received from XX Corps at 1930. These orders called for the Div to pass through the 76th Div on the morning of 11 April to secure a bridgehead over the ELBE River in the vicinity of DRESDEN, unless the Russian Army was met first.

11 April 1945

The 6th Armd advanced rapidly from its assembly area to pass through the 76th Inf Div in four columns. By nightfall it had raced east approximately 60 miles against only moderate and spotty resistance to seize and secure three bridgeheads across the SAALE River. Resistance was mainly from small groups of infantry attempting to defend some of the towns in the zone; blown bridges somewhat impeded the movement. Many enemy installations were captured. 3,000 Allied prisoners were liberated and the infamous concentration camp at BUCHENWALD was overrun. The Div CP opened at BAD SULZA at 2300.

CCA (Harris): Composition of Command:

9th Amrd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Tr A 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
Co B 25th Armd Engr Bn

Det 993d Tdwy Br Co
Co B 603d TD Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)

The Command advanced east in its zone, encountering only moderate resistance. Small arms fire was met in towns and villages. In its rapid advance on the southern route CT 9 overran the large concentration camp at BUCHENWALD where 21,000 political prisoners were being held. It then continued east to assemble at CAMBURG just west of the SAALE River. CT 15 on the northern route advanced rapidly against light resistance, captured a bridge at CAMBURG, and established a small bridgehead on the other side. During its advance a large Allied prisoner of war camp near BAD SULZA was liberated. Enemy air was active with numerous attacks, but friendly fighter-bombers, in addition to assisting the advance, drove off the enemy aircraft.

CCB (Hanson): Composition of Command:

44th Armd Inf Bn	Det 993d Tdwy Br Co
69th Tk Bn	Co C 603d TD Bn
Co A 25th Armd Engr Bn	Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—2 Sects)

The Command moved out at 0700 and, passing through the 304th Inf Regt, 76th Inf Div, continued its rapid advance east against moderate resistance. Many enemy installations were captured and many Allied prisoners of war were released. CT 69, moving on the south route, pushed rapidly to the east and secured a road bridge west of KLEONHERINGEN over the SAALE River. By 2200 the Combat Team had one medium tank and one infantry company across the river. CT 44, marching parallel to CT 69 on the north route, also advanced rapidly east, sweeping through moderate resistance in villages. A bridge across the SAALE at KOSEN was secured and by 2200 the majority of the Command had crossed the river.

Res Comd (Lagrew): Composition of Command:

50th Armd Inf Bn	603d TD Bn (—)
68th Tk Bn	(Co A atchd 3d Cav Gp)
25th Armd Engr Bn (—)	777th AAA Bn (—)

The Command advanced east behind CCA and CCB, protecting Div Tns and the Div flanks. CT 68 moved behind CCA, CT 50 behind CCB.

86th CC (Brindle): Advanced on the Div left (north) as flank protection.

12 April 1945

Having secured three bridgeheads across the SAALE, the Div continued its advance east against stiffening resistance. House-to-house fighting was reported in several towns. The enemy utilized anti-aircraft defenses for direct fire. Bridgeheads were secured on the WEISSE-ELSTER River approximately 28 miles to the east. On the south, CCA crossed the bridge at ROSSENDORF while elements of CCB on the north captured a bridge intact at PEGAU. The Div CP opened at OSTERFELD at 1900.

13 April 1945

The 6th Armd continued its attack to establish four bridgeheads across the WEISSE-ELSTER. Stubborn resistance was in the form of light and heavy anti-aircraft fire, small arms and mortar fire. Four bridgeheads were secured and expanded as all elements of the Div crossed to the eastern side. In the ZEITZ area resistance was particularly stiff and construction on a bridge was interrupted many times by direct anti-aircraft fire. Elements already across continued their advance to knock out those enemy batteries. Under Corps instructions, the 6th Armd was expected to make all possible speed and to by-pass strong resistance. The area in the vicinity of ZEITZ was heavily defended by large caliber anti-aircraft batteries which were sited for ground fire and constituted formidable strong points. The large number of these batteries (about 150 88mm and larger guns were destroyed by the Div) made them practically mutually supporting with the result that envelopment was impossible. However, attempts to envelop the ZEITZ defenses by CCB resulted in the Command's swinging well to the north and entering the FIRST ARMY zone. There was no confusion on this day since FIRST ARMY troops had not advanced that far, but the delay caused by crossing the river and knocking out enemy resistance enabled the 9th Armd Div to close on CCB. XX Corps thereupon directed that elements of the Div in the V Corps zone would come under orders of V Corps (9th Armd Div). Actually, no serious confusion resulted, and after penetrating the enemy defenses and destroying them, CCB advanced rapidly southeast and regained its position in its own zone on 14 April. Thus the Div cleared not only some 25 miles of FIRST ARMY zone in the vicinity of MUHLHAUSEN but also made a bridgehead north of ZEITZ for the 9th Armd Div which materially assisted its advance.

14 April 1945

All elements in the V Corps zone were subject to V Corps orders until they cleared the zone. This resulted in direct orders being given CCB and the 86th CC but actually did not alter any plans and these orders ceased to be effective as soon as the troops returned to the Div zone.

The 6th Armd broke the WEISSE-ELSTER River defense line and continued its attack, advancing approximately 28 miles. Since resistance was stiff in towns and small villages, a great many were by-passed as CCB advanced to reach the ZWICK-MULDE River at ROCHLITZ. Other elements of the Div met heavy resistance in the form of light and heavy anti-aircraft fire used as artillery. At 2100 the Div CP opened at ZEITZ.

CCA (Harris): Attacked at 0700 with CT 15 on the north and CT 9 on the south. Strong resistance consisted chiefly of light and heavy anti-aircraft fire. CT 15 met stiffening resistance along its route to SPORA and in one locality thirty-five 88mm guns were destroyed. CT 9 encountered heavy enemy resistance in the vicinity of WILDENBORN but by-passed it to the south to LINDENBERG, then east to KAYNA before being held up by anti-tank defense. CT 9 swung further south in its endeavor to by-pass heavy enemy resistance and by nightfall had reached OBER KOSSA where it halted prepared to continue the attack east the following morning.

CCB (Hanson): Moved southeast and then advanced east in its zone, by-passing all heavy resistance. Enemy opposition was mostly in towns which were by-passed. CT 44 began movement southeast at 0500, and by 0900 closed into a combat command assembly area northeast of LUCKA. At 1200 the Command drove southeast until it came within the Div zone near LEHMA. It then raced east on the north (left) flank of the Div zone and reached the ZWICK-MULDE at ROCHLITZ. Advances were bold and aggressive and during the night, against stubborn resistance, a bridge across the river at ROCHLITZ was secured by the Command. Infantry and tanks were sent across the river to establish a bridgehead. CT 69 moved southeast at 1000 and met enemy bazooka teams and small arms fire at LEHMA and WINDISCHLEUBA. CT 69 continued its speedy advance east, passing through many towns and villages. It then halted for the night near CARSDORF.

Res Comd (Lagrew): CT 50 completed crossing the WEISSE-ELSTER and pushed southeast through ZEITZ to destroy many enemy anti-aircraft batteries and capture numerous prisoners. When these batteries were destroyed, pressure was relieved from the ZEITZ area where the 76th Inf Div had taken over responsibility. CT 68, finding it impossible for the remainder of its tanks to cross in the vicinity of ZEITZ, moved southwest to cross the WEISSE-ELSTER near ROSSENDORF. It then advanced northeast as far as WILDEN before nightfall, and established contact with CT 50. CT 68 then continued its advance to the outskirts of ALTENBURG and waited infantry reinforcement to attack the city.

86th CC (Brindle): Moved southeast on the left flank of CT 44, complying with instructions from V Corps under whose control it had temporarily come. Within the 6th Armd zone, it then advanced along the north route of CCB, maintained contact with the 9th Armd Div, and protected the Div's left (north) flank.

15 April 1945

The Div continued its rapid advance east and not only established bridgeheads across the MULDE river with three combat commands abreast but also seized three bridges across the ZACHOPAU River east of MITTWEIDA. The 6th Armd stopped at the limiting line established by higher headquarters and opened its CP at ROCHLITZ at 151700.

CCA (Harris): Met heavy resistance north of GROSS RODA, particularly 88mm AA guns, but after destroying 33 of these flak guns and sideslipping to the south it advanced very rapidly against light resistance. CT 9 seized a bridge intact across the MULDE River at LUNZENAU and three bridges across the ZACHOPAU River. When elements of the Combat Team reached LUNZENAU, sirens were turned on and leading elements plunged through the town to the bridge. The enemy scattered before them and the bridge was captured intact.

CCB (Hanson): Cleared the town of ROCHLITZ and secured a bridgehead across the MULDE River against heavy anti-aircraft and bazooka fire. Both CT 44 and CT 69 pushed out to the limiting line.

Res Comd (Lagrew): While waiting for the battalion from the 76th Inf Div to arrive and attack ALTENBURG, the Res Comd sent patrols into the city where it was learned that practically all enemy troops had left. The Burgomeister surrendered the city unconditionally and the Command moved through with no opposition. CT 50 advanced without resistance along the axis: ROSITZ—ALTENBURG—NEUENMORBITZ—PENIG—LUNZENAU—WIEDERAU—THALHEIM, and assembled at 2030 near LAUENHAIN. CT 68 advanced without resistance from the vicinity of ALTENBURG along the

general axis: WINDISCHLEUBA—KOHREN—RATHENDF—LUNZENAR—WIEDERAU—THALHEIM—ERLAU. The Command assembled near ERLAU.

86th CC (Brindle): Troop A on the north flank was to establish contact with the 9th Armd Div and the troop on the south flank was to establish contact with the 4th Armd Div. Contact was established with the 9th Armd Div near LASTAU.

Div Arty (Riley): Displaced forward and continued to support the 6th Armd advance east.

16 April 1945

The Div, with the exception of outposts on a line generally ALTERGINGSWALDE—HOYERS-DORF—REINS DORF supported by Div Arty, was in assembly area. A program of maintenance, rehabilitation, and refitting was started. On the south, elements of the 76th Inf Div took over part of the Div sector. The 689th FA Bn was relieved of general support of the 6th Armd Div.

Corps orders prohibited advance beyond the MULDE River and directed that the present front line be held pending arrival of the Russian Army. The front reached by the Div on this date was the farthest advance made during the campaign and, with limited readjustment as ordered from time to time by higher authority, remained static until the termination of the war. The 6th Armd had no further serious combat, the only action being a few shots exchanged by patrols operating in front of the line. The principal mission of the Div automatically became military government which was initiated informally and became more formal from day to day as it became apparent that military operations in this zone were terminated.

CCA (Harris): The CP was opened at ZOLINITZ at 1730. CT 9 was relieved by the 1st Bn 304th Inf Regt at 1510. CT 15 was relieved by the 2d Bn 304th Inf Regt at 1700. Tr D 86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz reverted to Squadron control at 1600, after having been relieved by elements of the 304th Inf Regt at 1515. The Command prepared to reservice and refit.

CCB (Hanson): CT 69 dispatched combat patrols to establish an outpost line and contact was made with the 417th Inf Regt. CT 44 continued patrolling to the northeast.

Res Comd (Lagrew): The CP was opened at SEELITZ. CT 50 and CT 68 were relieved by the 1st Bn 417th Inf Regt at 1300. CT 50 opened its CP south of KLEIN MILKAU with the Combat Team in bivouac there. At 1630 a small force was sent to clear the woods north of CARSDORF and by 1915 had completed the operation. CT 68 opened its CP at GROSS STADTEN with the battalion in bivouac in that general vicinity.

Div Arty (Riley): Hq Div Arty opened its CP at ZSCHOPPELSHAIN at 1730.

86th CC (Brindle): Continued to make contact with the 9th Armd Div and closed in an assembly area to begin a refitting program.

17 April 1945

Having been given a new sector, the Div relieved those elements of the 76th Inf Div therein. Its program of Military Government, maintenance, and rehabilitation was continued.

18 April 1945

At 1200 the 6th Armd passed from control of XX Corps to the VIII Corps. Contact was maintained with the 9th Armd Div on the left flank and the 76th Inf Div on the right flank. The 603d TD Bn, 25th Armd Engr Bn and 777th AAA Bn reverted to Div control in place. When CCB was ordered to take over the Div rear area west to the SAALE River in order to maintain law and order, the 603d TD Bn was later placed under CCB's control.

19—23 April 1945

The Div maintained its line in the north sector of the VIII Corps zone and continued aggressive patrolling to its front. Res Comd relieved CCB in place on the front line; CCB moved to the Div rear area to maintain law and order, opening its CP at ZEITZ. The 6th Armd as a whole carried on an intensive maintenance program. The CP of Res Comd was at GERINGSWALDE.

The 11th Armd Gp, Hq and Hq Co was attached to the Div and placed in charge of Military Government in CCB's and 25th Armd Engr Bn's sectors.

Composition of Commands:

CCA (Harris)

9th Armd Inf Bn
15th Tk Bn
Btry A 777th AAA Bn (—)

Res Comd (McKee)

44th Armd Inf Bn
50th Armd Inf Bn
68th Tk Bn
Btry B 777th AAA Bn (—)
25th Armd Engr Bn
777th AAA Bn (—)

CCB (Lagrew)

69th Tk Bn
86th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz
603d TD Bn

Div Arty (Riley)

128th Armd FA Bn
212th Armd FA Bn
231st Armd FA Bn
191st FA Bn (Atchd)
Btry D 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects Btry A 777th AAA Bn
2 Sects Btry B 777th AAA Bn

24 April 1945

The Div, together with the 2d Inf Div and the 76th Inf Div on its flanks, was ordered to withdraw to positions west of the MULDE River. This movement was in accordance with letter VIII Corps 23 April 1945. Res Comd lost 2 men killed and 5 wounded from a patrol ambushed in HARTHA. Artillery and tank fire was placed upon the town. The 6th Armd was given a new rear boundary effective at 1700 with the 7th TD Gp to take over the area west of ALTENBURG. Cub plane and ground patrols continued a determined effort to contact the Russians to the east but were unsuccessful.

25—30 April 1945

The 6th Armd, with the exception of ground and cub plane patrols and bridge guards, withdrew its forward elements to positions west of the MULDE River. The two shallow bridgeheads left east of the MULDE River after the general withdrawal to positions west of the MULDE River were maintained in order to protect the Div front and facilitate patrolling. Elements of CCB patrolling from the new rear boundary west to the SAALE River were being relieved by the 7th TD Gp.

28—30 APRIL 1945

The Div held defensive positions along the west bank of the MULDE River and in its two bridgeheads east of the MULDE River and patrolled aggressively to the east. At the same time a schedule of maintenance and rehabilitation was maintained.

1—9 May 1945

The Div held defensive positions along the west bank of MULDE River and in its two bridgeheads east of the MULDE River. CCA and Res Comd were on the line. CCA in the south part maintained contact with the 304th Inf Regt, 76th Inf Div, Res Comd in north part maintained contact with the 271st Inf Regt, 69th Inf Div. CCB maintained law and order in the Div rear area. Div Arty supported the 6th Armd in its defensive mission and sent out air patrols. The 25th Armd Engr Bn remained in assembly and policed its sector. The 11th Armd Gp continued to be charged with military governmental control.

Contact with the enemy was maintained by aggressive patrolling to the east. Cub planes were used in close liaison with ground patrols. Minor skirmishes occurred, especially near ERLAU. Both artillery and assault gun fire were placed on the town.

First contact with Russian forces was made by the CT 50 of Res Comd when one of its patrols met a Russian patrol from the 117th Russian Div at WALDHEIM at 062200. Later, elements of the 147th Russian Inf Div were contacted as they moved south through the Div sector towards PRAGUE.

At 061800 the 6th Armd, under VIII Corps, passed from the FIRST ARMY to operational control of the NINTH ARMY.

Active operations in the European Theatre of Operations ceased at 090001 May 1945 under terms of unconditional surrender signed by the German High Command. The 6th Armd remained in position and continued its program of rehabilitation, maintenance and military government.

BALLAD FOR YANKS

by Kenneth McCaleb

When the poet sings of the warrior kings
 And the deeds of arms and man,
Of Macedon's son and Attila the Hun,
 Of Caesar and Kubla Khan;
When the martial bard finds it pressing hard
 These ancient ones to match,
Let him limn the power of an Eisenhower,
 Of Hodges and Patton and Patch.

When the books are writ and the lamps are lit,
 And the stories are told again
Of the Lion's Heart and of Bonaparte
 And the mad six hundred men,
When they give a cheer for the Iron Peer
 Or the boy with the Ghent dispatch,
There are tales as bold which will yet be told
 Of Hodges and Patton and Patch.

In the tales they tell of a soldier's hell
 In the wars that we fought to be free,
Of the ragged few in Washington's crew,
 Of Grant and the Jacksons and Lee,
Of the Alamo and of "Westward ho!"
 And Pershing's magnificent batch,
Let Bradley be named on the list of the famed—
 With Hodges and Patton and Patch.

Sing loud the praise of remembered days,
 Of Stalingrad, Tunis and Cannes,
Of Montgomery's gain from El Alamein
 And MacArthur's stand at Bataan.
For the big shells whine in the Siegfried Line,
 And the boys who started from scratch
Make the Nazi cower before Eisenhower—
 And Hodges and Patton and Patch.

In Paris and Rome and the streets at home
 And in hearts on land and sea,
Let the song ring out in a rising shout
 In the voices of men who are free.
As the Yanks storm in on the road to Berlin,
 Shout the song of the Eagle's hatch,
Singing "Long may it wave o'er the home of the brave"
 —And o'er Hodges and Patton and Patch.

" . . . For Outstanding

PRESIDENTIAL CITATIONS AWARDED DIVISION UNITS . . .

Company B, 68th Tank Battalion

The following citation refers to action at HAN-SUR-NIED, FRANCE, "For extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy on November 11, 1944".

"Despite boggy ground that mired their tanks, strong enemy anti-tank fire, a numerically superior enemy force that fought fiercely to protect its route of escape, the company crossed the swollen NIED FRANCAISE River on a bridge that was wired for demolition, cut the wires and established a bridgehead.

"By their undaunted courage, dogged determination, and unwavering tenacity and under a withering hail of fire of every type, they held and enlarged this vital bridgehead through which troops of the 6th Armored Division poured in their drive to the SAAR River and the GERMAN border.

"The grim determination, outstanding skill and unhesitating courage of the officers and men who fought through the heaviest of enemy opposition to the successful accomplishment of this vital mission exemplifies the highest standards of the armed forces of the United States."

Co. A, 44th Armored Infantry Battalion, was also on this mission.



Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized

This second citation refers to the Cavalry Troop cited for their extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy in effecting a crossing of the PRUM River at HEILHAUSEN, GERMANY, during the period from 26-28 February, 1945.

"Braving enemy minefields and icy waters, Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized, captured and held vital ground which led to the successful establishment of a bridgehead on the east bank of the PRUM River.

"With its strength depleted by heavy casualties, the Troop withstood constant and intense artillery and defeated counterattacks by numerically superior forces.

"For forty hours, the Troop was without food and water and was isolated from friendly forces. Despite heavy losses and adverse conditions, they held the most advance point in the bridgehead, enabling other forces to cross the river, secure the bridgehead, build a bridge, and continue the attack to the RHINE River and CENTRAL GERMANY.

"The gallantry, grim determination and aggressiveness displayed by the officers and enlisted men of Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized in the face of overwhelming odds were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service."



3rd Platoon Company C, 25th Armored Engineer Battalion

Copy of Citation not available.

Performance of Duty . . . ”

COMMENDATIONS OF DIVISION DURING OPERATIONS

To The Commanding General, 6th Armored Division—

18 December 1944

“The 6th Armored Division, on transferring from this Corps, takes with it the respect and admiration of this Corps. The record of your combat service has been in the highest tradition of the Army.

From the arrival of the division in mid-September in the Corps bridgehead over the Meurthe River, through the initial attacks beyond the Foret de Gremecy and from Leyr to Letricourt, to the jumpoff for the Corps attack on 8 November, the 6th showed unsurpassed confidence and competence, and quick and cheerful cooperation under all circumstances. Your brilliant actions at Han sur Nied and at Lemud-Sorbey in seizing the vital and bitterly contested crossings were followed by the fierce fighting in the Foret de Puttelange, the capture of Landroff, Hellimer, and St Jean Rohrbach, and the seizure of the Cadenbronn height commanding the Saare River on the German border.

Your achievements have been outstanding, the more so because of the overcoming of weather and terrain conditions which might well have stopped armored operations completely. I wish to express to all members of your command my sincere appreciation of the heroic achievements of the 6th Armored Division.”

—Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy
Commanding XII Corps

28 February 1945

“I desire to express my appreciation for the fine performance of the officers and men of the 6th Armored Division during the attack of the III Corps against the south flank of the enemy Ardennes Salient.

The dogged determination under intelligent leadership displayed by all ranks, particularly during the critical period of January 1—8 in the area east of Bastogne, merits high commendation. The repulse of those repeated furious counterattacks, as a determined enemy attempted to re-isolate the forces in Bastogne, was responsible in a large measure for the continued success of the Corps operation.”

—Maj. Gen. John Millikin
Commanding III Corps

25 April 1945

“I deeply regret that the exigencies of battle have again removed your splendid Division from the Third Army.

Much of the glory which the Third Army has achieved has resulted from the gallantry and energy you and your Division have displayed from Avranches to the Mulde River.

Please express to the officers and men of your command my sincere thanks and appreciation for their continued gallantry and effectiveness in combat.”

—Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
Commanding Third Army

TRAINS

"There's nothing glamorous about changing a final drive in an M-4 tank," someone once said, and it's true. It is just hard, tedious, unpraised, necessary work. Doing the glamorless jobs that keep an armored division on the roll is the mission of Division Trains. The work of the service elements of the division, grouped together as the Division Trains, must be done smoothly, efficiently and with a minimum of interruptions, for if Trains should stop working the great, roaring, rampaging armored columns would come to a meek halt.

Col. Elmer Droste, commander, and Maj. Phillip Shoemaker, Executive officer, were confronted with the problem, during combat, of giving close support and yet remain far enough back so as not to require additional combat elements for protection.

One element of the Division Trains, the Division Quartermaster, usually functioned as an independent command so that supplies were always available to the combat troops. Lt. Col. Walter A. Boyle's mobile Division Quartermaster Office with its stocks, records and attached trucks from the Quartermaster Truck Company maintained its supply dump between the division's combat elements and the army depots.

Division Trains Headquarters Company and the Division Band, which had laid aside its musical instruments during combat, reconnoitered for bivouac areas, furnished guards far out of proportion to their strength, and supplied guides along the route of each advance.

The Military Police Platoon, attached to Trains, had its members assigned to combat commands and other units throughout the division, to traffic control points, and occasionally as bridge guards. Those men serving in combat commands collected and received prisoners and evacuated them to the Division Prisoner of War enclosure at Trains where other MP's prepared the PW's for questioning and guarded them until they could be evacuated. The supervision of these difficult jobs fell to Major Eugene J. White, Division Provost Marshal.

The remaining elements of Division Trains—the personnel sections, Special Staff sections, Army Post Office, signal, ordnance, supply and maintenance sections were prepared to function immediately after entering a bivouac area.



COL. ELMER H. DROSTE
Trains Commander
(BS w/C, Legion d'Honneur,
Croix de Guerre, PH)

ORDNANCE

Whether it's dismantling a 32-ton tank or repairing a delicate watch, it's all in the day's work for the 128th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion. They have the huge job of keeping the division's 2039 vehicles and hundreds of trailers in ship-shape running order. In addition, they keep in repair and



adjustment the division's thousands of carbines and rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, tank guns and artillery pieces, including other assorted weapons in the division. They top this off with watch repairing, fixing stoves, modifying tanks and other vehicles, repairing fire control optical instruments and ordering, issuing and installing astronomical amounts of spare parts.

During the division's rushing breakthrough in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, the 128th Ordnance worked under terrible handicaps of time, often setting up in open fields in deep mud and snow, but the work went on and the fighting equipment was delivered to the front in time.

Even under fire the ordnance men had to work with exacting measurements and nothing left their hands until it was perfect.

When the 6th Armored crossed the Rhine and fanned out for its spectacular push that didn't stop until it met the Russians, ordnance followed as closely as it could, repairing tanks and equipment on the side of the road, in fields, under any conditions.

During more than nine months of combat, the 128th repaired 2,375 tanks and other armored vehicles and 2,086 general purpose vehicles, including trailers. During that time more than 5,297 tons of spare parts were handled and issued.

Lt. Col. Raymond B. Graeves is the battalion commander.

SIGNAL

Two men grope in the darkness, not daring to show a light, trying to find the broken ends of a black, muddy wire beside a road.

"Damn those tanks; why don't they stay on the road?"

When you hear that brief, but to the point statement, you know that the 146th Armored Signal Company is on the job, following the fast-rolling tank columns as they link combat command communications to the nerve centers of the division.

Bustling peeps, trailing wire from spinning reels, going up virgin roads without benefit of reassuring "Roads and Shoulders Clear of Mines" signs; harrassed, tired switchboard operators struggling with scrambled boards with too many lines; message center men running the wheels off their peeps to deliver the goods; CW radio men hunched over their keys, pounding out messages throughout the night—all are part of the 146th Armored Signal Company that gets the messages through.

The signal company had its fingers in every part of the division. The line crews laid and maintained over 1,400 miles of field wire and rehabilitated and put into use for the division several times that many more miles of open wire. Over these lines the switchboard operators handled an average of 1,500 calls daily while the teletype operators hammered away to compile a monthly average of 374 messages cleared.

Among the most-traveled men in Europe, messengers of the division message center handled 73,743 messages through Division Forward and Rear message centers during the first four months of 1945. It is estimated that to handle the full total of 152,340 messages, fourteen peeps traveled a total of 208,544 miles, an average of 2,128 miles per vehicle per month in servicing the division.

Radio Maintenance section repaired a total of 5,005 items of radio equipment during operations.

The Radio Platoon, trained and used as radio operators, compose the largest section in the 146th Armored Signal Company. It was due to the work of these men that communications remained uninterrupted on the fast moves which were made by the 6th Armored Division. Radio sets and crews were dispatched to operate for the higher echelons of command within the division, staying with the commands to insure that communications were maintained.

Patient, skilled, persistent radio operators have given the radio nets of the division a magnificent record in clearing radio traffic. Often the total per radio set passed the hundred mark for messages enciphered, sent, decoded and delivered in one day.

Company commander of the 146th Signal is Captain Thomas E. Fisher. The Division Signal Officer is Lt. Col. William J. Given.



LT. COL. WILLIAM J. GIVEN
Division Signal Officer
(BS w/C)

ENGINEERS

Most versatile troops of the 6th Armored Division are the men of the 25th Armored Engineer battalion. They build the bridges, clear minefields, maintain roads, demolish pillboxes, provide drinking water for the division and even fight as infantrymen.

Commanded by Lt. Col. Donald G. Williams, the 25th Engineers operate in combat with the three combat commands, ordinarily with one company assigned to both Combat Command A and Combat Command B, with the rest of the battalion with Reserve Command.

During the fighting in Europe, the engineers made history, constructing 52 treadway bridges with a total footage of 2,070 feet. The Battalion constructed two Bailey bridges of 60 and 160 feet respectively, and many hundreds of feet of timber, foot, and suspension bridges; 42 culverts, and 58 fords.

Frank, Clyde
T.A.R.



In the Division's dash across the continent, the 25th cleared 110 major road blocks, repaired 154 major road craters, and constructed 610 feet of corduroy road.

Mine sweeping was another slow, non-glamorous job. In France, the 25th swept 221 miles of roads; in Belgium, 113; in Luxembourg, 87; and Germany, 128, totaling 549 miles.

On demolitions, mines and booby traps, the Engineers were experts. Here is their record on this subject: 110 demolition charges removed from bridges or culverts; 15 friendly mine fields laid; 815 friendly mines laid; 95 enemy mine fields discovered; 2,108 enemy mines removed; 650 friendly booby traps set; and 152 enemy booby traps neutralized.

This work represents major tasks done by the Engineers. The Division Engineer troops did only that work necessary to insure the advance of the combat elements and to assure resupply, leaving all other tasks to Corps or Army Engineers. Most work on bridging, obstacle reduction and mine sweeping necessary to permit the advance of the division was done under enemy fire, often at night, and frequently under extremely adverse weather conditions.

Maintaining muddy, overworked roads kept engineer crews and bulldozers busy in every part of the division area. Through their efforts the main supply route and important arteries were kept open at all times. Many obstacles were brushed aside or by-passed by tank and infantry elements to be reduced later by engineers. Anti-tank ditches were crossed and road blocks removed by tank dozers with the tank battalions. Units laid hasty minefields and booby traps for their own security.

When the combat teams were stopped by obstacles, engineers were always on the job to get them moving again.

THE MEDICS

Whenever the 6th Armored Division stuck its nose arrogantly into more than it could handle with safety, the sound of "Medics! Medics!" could be heard.

Tankers sounded that cry when an 88 crashed through their armor. When mortars or machine guns caught an infantryman, engineer or artilleryman, it was "Medics! Medics!"

Trained enlisted men or medical officers ran to the vehicle, ditch or foxhole from which the cry came. Out of special pouches on each hip they pulled life-saving, pain relieving supplies—tourniquets, bandages, morphine. As the noises of battle blared all around, they stopped the bleed-



ing, splintered the fractures, eased the pain. Gently they lifted the wounded men onto litters and into ambulances attached to each column. The ambulances speedily carried the wounded back to the 76th Medical Battalion, Armored, and the 76th took them farther to evacuation hospitals.

Sometimes, through France and Germany, the advance was so fast that ambulances of the 76th could not start back immediately to hospitals and they became a rolling hospital on the road. Plasma bottles swung from the tops of ambulances, pouring life-giving fluid into the veins of the wounded. At the first opportunity the ambulances raced to the rear, drivers making round trips totaling scores of miles.

Artillery boomed and screamed around the vehicles marked with the Red Cross, rattling shrapnel through surgical trucks and ambulances. Yet the casualties had their wounds bound and the ambulances and the peeps fitted with the new type stretcher bearers rolled back on their life-saving journeys. In some sections that were exposed to enemy observation and artillery fire, ambulances could not make the trip by day, but carried their wounded at night, churning steadily back to the 76th clearing stations. Here the men were treated and their pain eased. At Bastogne, the men with trench foot had their shoes cut off their purplish, swollen feet. A few minutes later they were on the move again, rolling back in ambulances to the comfort of an evacuation hospital.

Medical service was always adequate, and was improved when the Battalion commander, Major Leonard E. Rothman and Division Surgeon, Lt. Col. Roosevelt Carafelli, established a holding company which reduced the strain on higher echelons of evacuation. This policy resulted in many men being returned to duty much more quickly when they were so badly needed.

Dentists of the Battalion extracted 1,305 teeth, and filled 5,262, during operations.

From July, when the division landed in France, until V-E Day, the 76th Medical Battalion evacuated 10,325 patients, battle and non-battle casualties, including many wounded Germans.

CUBS AND ARTILLERY OBSERVERS

Forward observers on the ground and Cub pilots and observers in the air work together as eyes of the artillery. From those on the ground and those who fly the division's 8 planes comes the information that sends the division's artillery crashing down on the enemy, clearing the way for the tankers and infantrymen.


Although the Cub pilots wear wings, and received their basic flying training from the Air Corps, they are first, last and always artillerymen. When aerial observers are not available the Cub pilots take off in their tiny planes to act as both pilot and observer. Utterly without protection, the pilots and observers are at the mercy of enemy small arms, and when they are attacked by enemy planes, their only hope is to outfly them. Often, they do, but four planes were destroyed during operations.

Flying column cover for the speeding combat commands is one of their big jobs and often they have spotted strong enemy positions and reported them in time for the column to bypass or better prepare to attack the position. Often the Cubs spot and destroy targets before the tankers and infantrymen ever see them, and upon one occasion the capture of several enemy soldiers was accomplished by observers pelting the troops with hand grenades from the planes, and upon their signals of surrender being guided back to friendly troops, has been reported.

The forward observers on the ground are always in front. Sometimes they operate from tanks or peeps in the lead platoon. Sometimes they go forward on foot and relay commands back, but they are always with the lead troops.

The forward observer must always know exactly where he is at all times on his map. On him rests the terrible responsibility of firing within a few hundred yards of his own troops and even a small mistake could mean the death of his own men.

The tankers and infantrymen of the 6th Armored could always find their artillery observer in the front lines when the going was toughest.



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THE END OF THE RO...
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At the end of the war in Europe, the 6th Armored Division moved from the line held on 8 May, 1945, in the ROCHLITZ, GERMANY area, and pulled back into the state of THURINGIA, with Division Headquarters established in APOLDA. In the surrounding area troops assumed army of occupation and military government duties, remaining in the sector throughout the month of June, 1945, where the following duties were performed under the direction of Major Royce S. Weisenberger, established as AC of S, G-5, of the Division after hostilities ceased; posting of 21,694 proclamations, laws, and notices; cared for 96,698 displaced persons; and established 4 hospitals. Division troops governed more than 1,100,685 German civilians up to 15 June, and established military government in 1,803 places.

1 July 1945 saw the Division on the move west again, and Russian troops moved into the territory that was vacated. In the new area South of FRANKFURT, Division Headquarters was established at GROSSOSTHEIM, with the units of the Division scattered over an area that placed another million Germans under their control.

The 6th Armored Division had been placed in category IV, for demobilization, and assigned as a vehicle for returning men who had Army Adjusted Service Rating Scores of 85 points to the United States. This caused several thousand of the original troops of the Division to be transferred to the 2nd and 3rd Armored, and 28th and 71st Infantry Divisions for return to the United States at a later date. During this period the Commanding General, Major General Robert W. Grow, had been placed in command of the 3rd Armored Division. Troops with high point scores replaced Division troops transferred.

Preceded by some units of the Division, the Division Headquarters ceased operation as a whole and moved from the occupation zone on 1 September 1945. Three days later troops closed into the Staging Area known as Camp Philip Morris in the LE HAVRE, FRANCE area, where final processing was performed for return to the United States.

On 9 September Division Headquarters, followed by a steady stream of Division troops, sailed from LE HAVRE, FRANCE, arriving in NEW YORK Harbor on 17 September and proceeding to CAMP SHANKS, where the Division had sailed from 19 months before. Other units of the Division landed at BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, and NORFOLK, VIRGINIA.

From these ports, Division Troops proceeded to Separation Centers throughout the United States for discharge from the Armed Forces.

On 18 September, 1945, at CAMP SHANKS, N. Y. Brigadier General George W. Read Jr. and the Division Staff turned over to the camp quartermaster the Division records, its flags, and the battle standards and pennants it carried in its battles from BREST through GERMANY, and with the completion of the deactivation procedure, the 6th Armored Division ceased to exist—three years, seven months, and three days after it was activated at FORT KNOX, KY. It was the first category IV division to be deactivated in a debarkation camp in World War II.

The show had closed. The actors went their separate ways.

