





186TH REGT. 167TH.
218TH AND 205TH FA BNS
LEFT SAN FRANCISCO
25 APRIL 1942:
ARRIVED AUSTRALIA
13 MAY 1942

163D REGT.
167TH FA BN. DIV. HQ
AND OTHER UNITS LEFT
SAN FRANCISCO
19 MARCH 1942.
ARRIVED AUSTRALIA
APRIL 6 1942

SAN FRANCISCO

INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

GILBERT IS.

162ND REGIMENT CONVOY

162ND REGT
AND 641ST TD BN
FROM FORT LEWIS
TO FORT DIX
IN FEB 1942;
LEFT BROOKLYN NAVY YARD
3 MARCH 1942
FOR BORO BORO
IN SOCIETY ISLANDS VIA
PANAMA CANAL.
ARRIVING 25 MARCH 1942

SOCIETY ISLANDS

CROSSED INTERNATIONAL
DATE LINE 31 MARCH 1942

CONVOY SPLITS:
PART TO AUCKLAND.
PART TO BRISBANE

ROUTE OF THE 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

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THE JUNGLEERS

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PAPUA



NEW GUINEA



SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES



AITAPE

BIAK

HOLLANDIA

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NASSAU BAY

WAKDE-ARARE-TOEM

PALAWAN

ZAMBOANGA


JOLO

SANGA SANGA ISLAND

SULU ARCHIPELAGO

THE JUNGLEERS

A History of The 41st Infantry Division



By
WILLIAM F. McCARTNEY

Edward Cockrell

World War Two Veterans.Org

WASHINGTON
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Edward Cockrell

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Edward Cockrell

We dedicate this book hesitantly. We feel that some of you expect us to recognize the dead, to lay a wreath upon the tomb and light another taper in remembrance. We sense that others will anticipate a healthy tribute to the living, a host of halleluiahs for the task accomplished. We shy from both. Those who died need no psalm from us; their sacrifice is its own dedication. Those of us who live have surely reaped our harvest of acclaim and now must look beyond such subsidy for something else.

We therefore dedicate this book to that for which—knowingly or unknowingly—the dead gave up their lives and for which the living now seek desperately, to the possibility of an unfettered peace, and to the hope the battle and terror and sudden death which fill these pages may never again be visited upon the world.

FRANK W. KERR, *President*
41st Infantry Division Association

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Major General Jens A. Doe

To the officers and men of the 41st Infantry Division, those who made the Sunset Division the most famous fighting outfit in the Southwest Pacific:

This book gives the history of your unprecedented accomplishments over a period of four years of combat in World War II. They were, for many of you, painful years through which you fought your way valiantly, step by step, from Australia to the distant final objective, Japan. The magnificent manner in which our Division relentlessly met, defeated, and pursued the enemy shall forever be an inspiration to all military men who believe in Democracy and Freedom.


Herein are transcribed names and events which will help those who were not there to understand; and will be for those of us who stood together a permanent record of some of the experiences we shared. It is not possible to set down the full story in writing. Only a hint of the real hardships, sufferings and anxieties which we experienced; of the courage, determination, and heroism demonstrated in all units, can be given. The full story can only be known by those who participated.

In the first operation at Sanananda and Salamaua our troops were inadequately clothed, fed, armed, and

equipped, but even so accomplished the incredible with barest essentials. Subsequently, as shipping improved, making more equipment and supplies available, and as units gained combat experience, our blows were struck with overwhelming speed and power. The operations in the Sulu Archipelago constitute the modern amphibious campaign; and at the conclusion of the Zamboanga operation the Division had reached its peak in combat efficiency. By that time battalion commanders were able to fight their commands independently with only general direction from higher headquarters. Junior leaders had acquired confidence and skill gained by repeated combat successes. The Division was ready and prepared for the invasion of the Japanese homeland.

The honor of having commanded this Division is, and will always remain with me, a matter of deepest, heartfelt pride.

Let us keep alive, through our association, the memory of those who did not return, and the comradeship fused in the fires of combat.



JENS A. DOE

Major General, U. S. Army

15 September 1945

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Foreword

THIS IS THE STORY of one of Uncle Sam's "fightingest" divisions. Technically, the 41st Infantry Division belongs to the States of the great Northwest. However, men from each State sooner or later found their way into the ranks of the Division and gave their blood, sweat, and their lives, to take the Sunset Division — MacArthur's Jungleers — from the States of the Northwest to Australia, through the cauldron of New Guinea, back to the Philippines, and then to the very threshold of Tokyo.

The story told in this book cannot be credited to any one person. The rifle-toting infantrymen, the cannoners of the field artillery and the men of the supply services coordinated their efforts to bring about the final crushing defeat of our enemies in the Pacific. All ranks—from the highest general to the lowest private—shared alike in achieving victory.

Just as these deeds were performed by many, so was the writing of this book an achievement of many. The idea was conceived in the Philippines at a time when the Jungleers were bending every effort to prepare for the invasion of Japan. Then came the unexpected—but most welcome—surrender of the enemy and what had been just an idea now began to materialize into a concrete product. The first research and writing was done in the very heart of the enemy homeland. With the inactivation of the 41st Division on 31 December 1945, the editor was transferred to Washington, D. C. to complete the task.

The persons who gave so much to make this book

possible are far too numerous to mention by name, but the editor is most grateful to the following: The Board of Governors, 41st Infantry Division Association; Major General Jens A. Doe; Colonel O. P. Newman; Mr. Herman Edwards of the *Portland Oregonian*; Master Sergeant Frank W. Kerr; Lieutenant Leonard Jermain; Lieutenant Huldah Doron; Colonel Joseph I. Greene and the staff of the *Infantry Journal*; Colonel Frank Arthur; Chief Warrant Officer Charles C. Carver; Major Warren T. Hunt; Private Hargis Westerfield; Sergeant Mel Sterling; the small band of men who did the research while the Division was stationed in Japan; The Historical Division, War Department Special Staff; the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, War Department; the *Fort Lewis Sentinel*; and the countless others whose cooperation and contributions have added to the finished product.

Let it be a part of the record that we have always faced the fact that it would be impossible to please everyone with this book. The story undoubtedly could be told in as many different ways as there were men who saw it and lived through it. But some basis had to be chosen and the editor elected to rely upon records on file in the War Department, supplemented by newspaper stories, some eyewitness accounts, and diaries.

We sincerely hope that the men of the 41st Division and their loved ones will cherish this book through the years and that it will serve as a constant reminder that those who died did so that we might walk the face of the earth in everlasting peace and happiness.

WILLIAM F. MCCARTNEY
1st Lieut., Chemical Corps

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Everything is as I expected to see it, in splendid shape. This is one of my oldest and proudest divisions. Its achievements have been of the first order. I have the greatest affection for and pride in the 41st Division.

GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
AFTER AN INSPECTION OF THE DIVISION IN THE
PHILIPPINES, 15 JUNE 1945

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Chapter 1: We Begin Preparation

TWICE within the past quarter of a century the men of the great Northwestern States have left their families, homes and jobs and have sailed to the far corners of the world to fight for Democracy.

The familiar red-gold-and-blue shoulder insignia of the 41st Infantry Division first made its appearance in World War I. Then, as at the beginning of World War II, the 41st was composed of Northwestern States' National Guard units and was predominantly composed of National Guardsmen from Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Washington, supplemented by Selective Service enrollees from every state in the Union. But it was the destiny of the original Sunset Division, after it had reached Europe, to be broken up and to have its men used as replacements in other divisions. Consequently, the original 41st Division, the fifth division to go overseas, was denied the distinction of fighting as a unit.

When the American troops returned from France after World War I and began readjustment to civilian life, many members of the Division returned to their National Guard status. In addition to the infantry companies and artillery batteries the reorganized Guard included other units—signal, medical, quartermaster and engineer. The schedule consisted of weekly drill nights and summer encampments, which meant in nearly every case that the civilian-soldier had to give up his annual two-weeks vacation. Officers and men devoted thousands of hours at home to strictly military problems. Summer encampments found them at Camp Withycombe, Camp Clatsop, Medford, Vancouver Barracks, Camp Murray, Fort Lewis and Fort Harrison at Helena, Montana.

In 1929 the late George Ared White was promoted from Brigadier to Major General in the National Guard and took command of the 41st. He remained in command until his death on 23 November 1941. General White was a genius at military organization and was also a politician of great talents when the needs of his beloved Division demanded political leverage.

The training of the 41st broadened its scope year after year. In August 1937 the Northwest saw its greatest concentration of troops since 1917, when thousands converged on old Fort Lewis, in maneuvers involving some 14,000 men along the milky, glacier-fed Nisqually River. General White commanded a "Blue" Army of 41st Division soldiers 9,000 strong, charged with the task of crossing the Nisqually, defended by a "Red" Army of 5,000 under the command of Brigadier General George C. Marshall, then commanding the 5th Infantry Brigade at Vancouver Barracks, later Chief of Staff of the greatest army ever assembled on the face of the earth.

Finding a point on the Nisqually undefended by

the "Reds," probably because of the difficulties it offered, Brigadier General Thomas E. Rilea, commanding the 41st Division's 82d Infantry Brigade, sent his troops over the stream in a daring night crossing, and the maneuvers ended with the Division successfully accomplishing its mission—just as it was to do a short time later on the battlefields throughout the far-flung Pacific Theater.

Opposed to the 41st in those August 1937 maneuvers were troops of the Regular Army's 3d Infantry Division. From that time these two divisions were to be friendly, but earnest, rivals until the fortunes of war sent the Sunsetters to the Southwest Pacific while the 3d opposed the Axis in North Africa and later on Continental Europe. Rivalry was keen as to which division would depart first for overseas and when the time came the 41st received the nod.

War clouds had become darkly ominous in the summer of 1940 and the Division's summer encampment at Fort Lewis in July and August lengthened from the customary two weeks to three. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his message to Congress on 16 May, had spoken of the desirability of having authority to call out the National Guard. A new note of tenseness and realism was evident as the summer maneuvers progressed and everywhere there was talk that the unit would be back in camp before many weeks passed.

General White mentioned it to key officers and when Guardsmen returned to their homes they left much equipment, including tentage, at Camp Murray, the National Guard encampment adjacent to Fort Lewis proper. Around 27 August all officers of the Division received "immediate action" letters from General White instructing them to prepare for federal induction by 16 September. In towns and cities of Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana the Guard units intensified recruiting, determined to bring their outfit to full strength by the date set for federal induction. Some did report to Fort Lewis better than one hundred per cent strong.

Paperwork incident to federal induction proved to be tremendous, but long before the date arrived General White had the Division's key noncommissioned officers familiarize themselves with the induction program and the papers were ready long in advance of their need.

Federal induction meant that many men and officers had to be weeded out. Discharges were granted to men who had persons solely dependent upon them for financial support. Some were over age and a few were too young, having misrepresented their age in order to enlist. Vacancies were filled by new enlistments. Physical examinations resulted in some losses among



Scenes from a 41st Division review at Fort Lewis, Washington, in September 1941.

the officers, and Reservists were assigned in an effort to fill the gaps.

On 16 September 1940, the 41st got the inevitable call, and the Division was ready. On that same day in the Nation's capital, President Roosevelt affixed his signature to the Selective Service Act, providing for the first peacetime draft in the history of the United States. The country was girding itself for a war which everyone hoped would never come, but which many knew could not be averted.

The call for National Guardsmen and Selective Service enrollees was for a one-year period of military service. The Army at that time included but twenty-seven infantry divisions, nine being Regular Army while the remaining eighteen were National Guard divisions. The 41st was one of four National Guard divisions to be summoned on the original 16 September date. Units immediately reported to their home armories, from where they began an orderly process of movement to Camp Murray. On 23 September, one week after federal induction, the entire Division had closed in on the Washington camp.

The Division, with its friendly rival, the 3d Division, and some other troops, was activated as IX Corps, commanded by Major General Kenyon A. Joyce. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt commanded Fourth Army, the next higher echelon. Upon arrival at Camp Murray the Division numbered something in excess of 14,000 men and officers. The addition of draftees later brought it to wartime strength of 18,300.

The first and most vital job facing the Guardsmen was the organization and building of "Swamp" Murray into a livable, comfortable winter training camp. Head-



Headquarters of the 41st Division at Fort Lewis in 1941.

quarters of the 66th Artillery Brigade landed an enviable site, setting up its camp on the edge of blue, forest-bound American Lake, the only relatively dry and grassy spot in the entire area. The three artillery regiments were down the line, separated from headquarters by a large muddy parade ground, while the infantry brigades were scattered on either side of Highway 99, all the way from Tacoma to Tillicum. The now legendary khaki-colored pyramidal tents stretched over wooden frames served as home. There were some kitchens and showers in permanent buildings but the Sunsetters had the use of only temporary structures. Some people were indignant over living conditions but Division medical officers cited health records to disprove ever growing gossip that epidemics of respiratory diseases were numerous.

On the second day after induction, and from that day on, for almost six months, the 41st's Camp Murray was typical of hundreds of other tent camps which had sprung up over America. The men cursed the place for the mud, cold, and remoteness, then lauded it because it was built from almost nothing but their own ingenuity. Frigid, magnificent Mt. Rainier looked down over the Sunsetters on the clear sunny days while the men trained for war in the evergreen western forests, the peaceful valleys of the Nisqually River, the little



When the Japs struck at Pearl Harbor barbed-wire barricades were placed across bridge approaches.



(1) Field Artillery unit review in June 1941. (2) and (3) Units of the 41st Division pass in review while Army and civilian notables look on from the reviewing stand at Fort Lewis in September 1941. (4) The 163d Infantry Band stands inspection.

farming towns like Rainier, bound together by a web of country roads, the rolling quiet countryside that stretches from the shores of Puget Sound to the Cascade Mountains. Camp Murray lay about forty-five miles from Seattle, while 150 miles south from Murray was Portland, city of roses and charming girls. Between the camp and Seattle was grey, smoky Tacoma and, south again between Fort Lewis and Portland, lay Olympia, capital of Washington. Camp Murray grew cold, wet and lonely as winter fell, but it was not completely unendowed.

The government was busy building the huge Fort Lewis cantonment which later became "permanent" home to the men of the 41st. By October 1 Swamp Murray had been converted into decent living quarters except for the everlasting trimming which still would be going on if the unit had never left.

October saw the beginning of training. Basic training problems and teamwork were first on the agenda. Men learned to work together in squads, then by platoons, companies, regiments, brigades, and finally as a whole division. Basic training was rigid, the hours being long and the supervisors tough. From the very beginning at least one field problem a week was conducted and there were overnight bivouacs scheduled, mainly to practice the theory of communications preached in camp during the day. The vast Fort Lewis range offered hundreds of acres of every type of terrain for training and maneuver. By November the artillery range, centered around bleak Nisqually Lake, was in operation and each day the big guns rolled out of camp in the early morning mist, to return again by the chilly sunset light at the end of a fast, hard day. By December, in addition to stepped-up daily training schedules in the field, two-day problems were under way, with the infantry and artillery deployed over the range in tactical defensive and offensive operations.

General George C. Marshall, then Chief of Staff of the Army, injected new ideas into the training. Different arms and services were combined to form combat teams. A battalion of artillery joined forces with an infantry regiment and an engineer company so that the commanding officer could go into the field with a little army of his own, self-sufficient to live and fight for days and weeks at a time. This objective was to be fulfilled in later days of hard fighting in the jungles and islands of the Pacific Theater where Nature and terrain demanded the employment of small combat teams rather than full divisions or armies. This early and far-sighted training at Camp Murray and Fort Lewis made the formation of such combat teams much easier and more effective when needed under actual combat conditions.

Everything did not go smoothly during the early

days. Every man could not realize the necessity for this severe training with the hardships and sacrifices which it entailed. The story is told that one platoon of the 162d Infantry Regiment had to make two marches one day because some of the men filled their packs with pillows, making an impressive looking, but light load. Much to the chagrin of all, their company commander caught on.

While the majority of the Division was hard at work on a training program, hundreds of officers and men were sent to special schools: Infantry, Artillery, Ordnance, Cooks and Bakers, and many others. Successful completion of these highly concentrated courses meant qualified officers and men to do a better job, and in many cases promotions.

The men trained diligently and by Christmas they were acclimated, eager troops. Never did they lose sight of the date, 16 September 1941, the day of release, the end of the government's one year military training program. Some men were soldiers preparing for war, but the mass of junior officers and enlisted men were "play" soldiers, thinking in terms of continuing peace, even while they marched, drilled, fired on the ranges, operated communications and donned the old service gas mask to walk through heavy concentrations of chloracetophenone and adamsite. The dormant threat of the Rising Sun in the Far East and the threat of Hitler's hordes in Europe did not bother most of them. There were only a few who anticipated the day of battle, and recognized on the horizons to the east and west the roar of guns mightier than their own.

As a reward for the fine job done by all, General White announced on 1 December that an eleven-day furlough would be granted at Christmas time to all members of the Division. Homesick GIs loudly cheered the news but when the long-awaited day arrived some members of the Grants Pass company couldn't keep their furlough dates because some of the men had contracted measles and the unit was quarantined. However, between 10,000 and 11,000 men did get home for the holidays and appropriate entertainment was provided for those remaining behind.

Back from the well deserved rest the Sunsetters dug into their training with a new vigor. Three months of the twelve had been put behind them. Only nine months remained—if nothing went wrong.

A new problem was at hand. The Division must increase its strength from 14,000 to 18,300. In February the first of 7,000 Selective Service men began to arrive. Actually, they were to boost the Division's strength to around 21,000. The problem was to conduct basic training for these green men, and at the same time continue advanced training for the Guardsmen. General



Left: A convoy on an Oregon highway en route to Hunter Liggett with Mount Hood in the background. Right: The convoy halts in Pacheco Pass, California.

White selected 3,000 of his best officers and noncoms to form a training cadre to get the selectees into shape.

Work at North Fort Lewis cantonment had been progressing slowly but some of the heated frame barracks were ready for occupancy. In February 1941 the men began the trek a mile down the road to the new 41st Division cantonment, two square miles of gleaming white barracks, warehouses, theaters, messhalls, orderly rooms and service clubs. Just before the men had departed for the holiday season, General White had trucked the entire Division's personnel down to see the sprawling new area. Now, two months later, the men moved into the area for a stay of twelve months, though at that time they didn't realize it would be that long. Priority for the new quarters was given to the draftees who were fresh from civilian life and less able than the seasoned Guardsmen to stand the rigors of living in the tents of Swamp Murray. General White continued to live in his tent at Camp Murray, directing the separate training efforts. By mid-April, however, the entire Division was housed in the newly constructed comfortable barracks.

The regiments still were training as combat teams and the men were learning new battle problems in the Rainier-Roy region along the banks of the Nisqually River. By now seven months of hard training had been completed and the men had learned their lessons well. They were ready to perform as a division. At the close of April and early in May they were scheduled to go through a series of three division field exercises which were to be the largest, and the most difficult, of the large-scale training assignments yet given them. These exercises also were to bring an end to the division maneuvers for the 41st in the Fort Lewis area.


The men had drilled long for this assignment. The drivers, especially, had developed cats' eyes as they

moved over the forested plains, threaded narrow tortuous roads, crossed streams, advancing, attacking and withdrawing under cover of total darkness, every vehicle, every light blacked out. How well this training was to pay off a short time later! On the night of 28 April, the Division moved into defensive positions for the start of maneuvers which were to have their climax on 3 May with a smashing coordinated attack.

The maneuvers had drawn "McNair's Flying Circus," headed by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, who, as Chief of Staff of GHQ, had direct supervision of all training. On his staff was a promising young lieutenant colonel by the name of Mark W. Clark. Also present was Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff of IX Corps. It was at the conclusion of this inspection that the discerning McNair rated the 41st as the top-ranking National Guard division and one of the three top divisions of the whole Army.

Following this problem Corps Headquarters authorized a vacation and a tired but happy group of men with a month's pay burning holes in their pockets headed for home. When they returned to Fort Lewis they were ready for their part in the "biggest show of military might ever seen on the Pacific Coast." With high-ranking Army and Navy officers, Governor Charles A. Sprague of Oregon and Governor Arthur B. Langlie of Washington in the reviewing stand, and 15,000 spectators massed on the parade ground, the 41st Division, 3d Division and other units, 45,000 strong, passed in review while planes roared overhead.

Spring and summer brought garrison life of the highest traditional plane, and with it rumors that the 41st would "fight" for six weeks on the dry, scorched, sun-baked hills of California's hinterland. Next was the long march to Hunter Liggett Military Reservation for the long-planned Fourth Army maneuvers.



Entertainment during the 1941 maneuvers in California was largely a matter of providing your own. Here men of the 162d Infantry get together for a songfest.

Beginning 19 May 1941, the Division departed by rumbling truck convoys and trains for the 1,100-mile march from Fort Lewis to Jolon, California, where the next two months found 65,000 troops engaged in the largest and one of the most realistic war games ever to be conducted on the Pacific Coast.

The first of four long motor columns started south and made its first stop at Vancouver Barracks. Early the next morning the column moved across the Interstate Bridge, eastward through Portland, Gresham and over the Wapinita Highway to Bend for the second night's bivouac. Twenty-five hundred officers and men, in four hundred vehicles, comprising troops of the 81st Infantry Brigade and detachments from the 116th Quartermaster, 116th Medical and 116th Engineer Regiments, made up this first column. On the third day it moved from Bend to Klamath Falls; on the fourth day to Red Bluff, California; the following day to Marysville; the sixth day to Modesto. On the seventh day it reached Jolon, the destination.

The second column of 41st troops to cover the route was 4,000 men of the 66th Field Artillery Brigade. The third convoy of 2,500 troops included what remained of the 116th Engineer, 116th Quartermaster, 116th Medical Regiments, 41st Signal Company and 41st Ordnance Company. The final convoy was composed of the 82d Infantry Brigade and numbered about

2,000 officers and men. Other troops of the 41st Division, 3d Division and IX Corps travelled in twenty-seven troop trains, which left Fort Lewis on 22 May, their arrival coinciding with that of the motor columns.

As the last motor column reached Bend the townspeople turned out to cheer. The reason was that Company I, 162d Infantry, was a Bend National Guard unit. In celebration of the homecoming a parade was staged and General Rilea granted overnight passes to the men.

Men will long remember the hospitality of the people of Marysville, California. City after city vied with one another to make the visiting troops welcome but Marysville outdid all others.

The final column reached the reservation on 28 May. Columns of the 41st had only one major accident during the trip and this did not involve any loss of life. Health of the command was excellent and only sixteen of the Division's 18,000 men were hospitalized. California sunshine had tanned the Northwesterners to the tint of their Indian comrades of Montana's 163d Infantry, giving them their first taste of the heat they were soon to encounter in the far-off Southwest Pacific. Division training and maneuvers took place during the first three weeks of the period while the last ten days, beginning 23 June, consisted of operations pitting a Blue army of 34,000 troops of the 41st Division and



(1) Partial view of North Fort Lewis. (2) Group singing in the 186th Infantry area during the Hunter Liggett maneuvers. (3) and (4) Scenes from the "Yardbird Review," presented by the 144th Field Artillery at Fort Lewis.



The 116th Engineers build a bridge over the San Antonio River at Hunter Liggett.

3d Division against opposing Red forces of Major General Joseph W. Stilwell's 7th Division and the 40th Division. The Blues were charged with the task of defending the California section against the numerically inferior Red force. All that day the Northerners moved northwestward across the sun-baked Hunter Liggett expanse, up gulches and through tree-filled meadows, raising columns of dust, pausing to cool their feet as they walked through shallow streams. Outnumbered, Stilwell's Reds were pushed back fifteen miles in three days of heavy "fighting" and another phase of the Sunset Division's training was history.

Jolon, the one-house, no-bar community that stood guard over the Hunter Liggett vastness, still is a password among veterans of those early days. It is symbolic of two months of fast maneuvering over snake-infested, parboiled hills and droughty valleys of California's hellish southeastern reaches. But like all distasteful things, the Jolon stay had both its week-end silver linings in visits to San Francisco, Carmel and Los Angeles, and its end.

The long journey back to Fort Lewis started during the first week of July and the men were in high spirits since a ten-day furlough was in store for them. Nearly three thousand tired, but happy, California Selective Service men already were wending their way home, having been screened out at Jolon. The return trip was eventful in that dysentery hit the ranks in Red Bluff and plagued the convoy the remainder of the way. Oregon men got a break as motor columns of former National Guard units were permitted to break away from the convoys for visits to home towns. Such units visited Milwaukie, Hillsboro, Newberg, Medford, Grants Pass, Roseburg, Eugene, Woodburn, Oregon City, Forest Grove, St. Helens, Silverton, McMinnville, Salem, Dallas, Corvallis and Lebanon. Thousands of Portland citizens swarmed to Swan Island airport to

greet the suntanned veterans of the "California wars." Pits were dug at Swan Island and civilians and uniformed men alike shared barbecued lamb, venison, beef and baked Chinook salmon. That same evening Mayor Earl Riley of Portland reviewed some 3,500 parading troops.

At 0500 Sunday, 13 July, the troops were on the last leg of their journey to Fort Lewis where training was resumed. Furloughs and leaves were arranged so that all men and officers might get time off and still leave enough behind to continue training. All were to be back on duty by 1 August.

On 2 August a new name was given to the Division. Following issuance of a War Department directive which said that henceforth a division would be designated by the arm of its major combat element, the Sunsetters became officially the "41st Infantry Division."

At the end of ten days of freedom members of the Division straggled back and brought normalcy with them. Fourth Army maneuvers, on an even larger scale than the California games, were to be held on the Olympia Peninsula of Washington, chiefly in the area between Olympia and Shelton. The latter half of August and part of September found the 41st Division participating in these war games, which became a battle against rain and mud. The maneuver almost was washed away by continued summer rains and developed into a back-breaking effort to keep vehicles from miring down and to keep the men in dry socks.

These maneuvers differed as much in their character from those at Hunter Liggett as the western Washington climate differed from that of the parched California hills. At the Hunter Liggett games large forces of men and artillery opposed each other in great clashes. It had been a realistic war, so realistic, in fact, that on one occasion men of opposing forces discarded their



(1) A 116th Medical Battalion convoy. (2) Staff officers of Fourth Army, including Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower (fourth from left), at a critique following a field problem. (3) 41st Division Artillery personnel working in a command post. (4) A 41st Division Artillery unit in the field.

arms and resorted to fists to settle the issue. The western Washington maneuvers lacked this realism. In brief the plan for the maneuvers was:

A great Oriental army and navy was approaching the west coast. Seattle, Portland and Tacoma were certain objectives of attack. The enemy surely would strike at the harbor defenses and defense plants. Defending American forces were not to know where, how or when the enemy would strike. The maneuver was to test the troops' ability to mobilize and move from a cantonment, ready to fight after an unexpected attack.

The maneuvers got under way at midnight on 10 August when the mythical invading force was reported somewhere off the West Coast under cover of a dense fog bank. For two days the "invaders" waged a "war of nerves" and then struck at the mouth of the Columbia River, at the Puget Sound forts and McChord Field. The 41st deployed south and west, spreading out over the heavily wooded lower peninsula. Making a record run from California, the 7th and 40th Divisions swung into line beside the 3d and 41st Divisions and the maneuvers ended.

Opposing the defending forces was a handful of California Regulars, already stationed in chosen spots along the Washington coastline, awaiting the orders of the umpires. These Red forces were magically transformed by the umpires into sizable forces to suit the needs of the maneuvers. A squad of Reds became a battalion or regiment and captured Blues but could not be captured. Near McCleary, members of a 41st patrol ran into a dozen jeeps, thought they could handle the situation easily and attacked. They were surprised to discover that these twelve jeeps represented forty-eight tanks. At Montesano, the umpires created two hundred tanks out of thin air, to the consternation of the realistic Sunsetters. Artillerymen standing by silent guns and fighting a paper war whose front was far away over the hills, welcomed the opportunity to fire several blank rounds for the benefit of news photographers.

Blacked-out troop movements through the dark, dripping forests, breaking camp at midnight to move men and ponderous equipment over long unused logging roads, the transportation of supplies in a never-ending procession of trucks, all of these were realistic.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and General Marshall had been among those witnessing the final phases of the maneuvers. At a later press conference both expressed satisfaction with the improvement shown. Meanwhile, the halls of Congress were reverberating with talk of continuing service beyond the one-year period and the whispers of an American entry into the war were growing more loud and distinct. Yet, in August 1941—less than four months before Pearl Harbor—the 41st still was short of weapons, using *Ersatz* machine guns made of wood, tanks so designated by placards on truck windshields, and an odd assortment of other innovations. War, not in months, but in the hopes and prayers of Americans, still was far away.

As soon as the Division returned to garrison, the sun came out maliciously to shine almost uninterrupted through another perfect Indian summer. Talk in Congress had materialized into action and the raw National Guard outfit federalized just one year ago was a veteran force facing at least another winter and spring of soldiering. But spirits remained high because there was another furlough, this time fifteen days, in the offing. And in September 1941, after a full military review before General DeWitt, held on the dusty 3d Division parade ground, the men scattered throughout the country for another two-week sojourn of civilian life. Little did they realize that their next furloughs would see them walking the streets of such far-off places as Melbourne, Sydney and Rockhampton, Australia, nor that those furloughs would come only after the 41st had received its baptism of fire and its hallowed dead had been counted and buried, after the bays and villages of an island called New Guinea were to be as familiar to them as the rivers, lakes, towns and cities of the United States.

Chapter 2: The Fallen Commander

SADLY, men of the 41st learned of the death of their beloved commander, Major General George A. White, who died at his home in Clackamas, Oregon, 23 November 1941. Illness had overtaken the Division commander during the last days of the Hunter Liggett maneuvers but he refused the advice of physicians, who urged him to rest, and went through the trying western Washington war games. Only those closest to him realized he was a very sick man, but a man determined to carry on until he could relinquish command for perhaps a brief period of treatment and recuperation. The night of the Division's review he went to his residence on the post, unable to attend a function for which he had made plans. His passing marked the end of the first phase of military life for the Division.

General White was more to his men than the two-star commander who controlled their destiny and much of their everyday lives. He was a man who lived with and as a soldier among soldiers. With him, the enlisted man came first. Many were the stories told to illustrate that side of his character. One had its setting in the fir woods of western Washington during the August maneuvers of 1941. Everything in the maneuver was supposed to simulate battle conditions as nearly as possible. Two "must" rules were that troops carry gas masks and wear steel helmets at all times. The helmets were far from comfortable. Every man knew better, but occasionally a soldier would ditch the heavy headgear. That's what a noncom in the signal truck had done when General White, walking alone from his tent, came upon the soldier unexpectedly.

"Haven't you got a helmet?" the General asked.

"Yes, sir," replied the noncom apprehensively.

"Get it on," said the General, without raising his voice, and added, "Do you think I like to wear the damned thing any more than you do?"

For that offense a commissioned officer would have drawn a rebuke that would have stung him for a week. The General had his own method of dealing with enlisted men. His formula was sternness tempered with a sympathetic understanding of the soldier's makeup. Men in the ranks swore by him.

During the long march through California to the Hunter Liggett maneuvers entertainment programs were offered the troops in virtually every town. All too often this entertainment took the form of dinners for high-ranking officers and dances to which only commissioned officers were invited. Some towns extended themselves to entertain the enlisted men but most feted the officers royally and virtually left the soldiers to fend for themselves.

General White shuttled back and forth along the

line of march, observing the troop movements, watching the columns roll through towns and cities. At one particular town he arrived at the bivouac area just as a civic delegation began to discuss plans for the entertainment of troops that night with the commanding officer of the column. The delegation was introduced to the General and he invited them to continue with their plans. He stood listening. Finally he interrupted:

"Do I understand you are planning these parties for the officers?" he asked.

"Yes, sir," one of the delegates replied.

"That's fine," said the General. "What are you doing for the enlisted men?"

"Why, we haven't—we were thinking about——"

It was evident they hadn't gotten to that stage of the planning.

"Gentlemen," said the General, very firmly and quietly, "we appreciate your hospitality. It's fine of you to entertain us. But the officers have money. They can entertain themselves. The enlisted men are the ones who need to be entertained, and they have been overlooked too many times while the officers were wine and dined. Now if you want to entertain, take care of the enlisted men first. If there is anything left, then you can take care of the officers. Otherwise, by God, I'll restrict every officer to the bivouac area."

General White was intensely proud of the 41st Division. During the western Washington maneuvers he was irked when news stories spoke of the rival 3d Division as the "crack 3d Division" and spoke of the 41st simply as "the 41st Division." One day he called two offending wire service correspondents to his tent and asked:

"How is it that when you write about the 3d Division you call it the 'crack 3d Division' but always speak of us only as the '41st Division'? Can't you think up some nickname or adjective for us? Or don't we deserve one? Call us the 'lousy 41st Division,' if you want, but call us something."

General White's unflagging efforts to better the living conditions of his command, his ceaseless and successful efforts to train as thoroughly as possible in those days of peace, a combat division of National Guardsmen and civilian soldiers, and his own dominant and completely just administration of his command endeared him personally to the legions under him. By his own strong acceptance of responsibility he brought upon himself an untimely death that left the men of the 41st visibly shocked.

In a solemn funeral cortège Oregon troops bore the body of their commanding general over crowded streets to its final resting place in Riverview Cemetery. Portland had never witnessed such a procession.

War Two Veterans Org



Major General George Ared White

HEADQUARTERS 41st INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON

MD/h (AG)
November 25, 1941

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 31

1. It is with sorrow and a feeling of inconsolable loss that announcement is made of the death of Major General GEORGE A. WHITE, the Commanding General of the 41st Division, the Commanding General of the Oregon National Guard and the Adjutant General of Oregon, at Clackamas, Oregon, on November 23, 1941.

2. Born July 18, 1880, in Long Branch, Illinois, General White began nearly a half century of service to his country by enlistment in the Utah National Guard August 1, 1895. He served in the Infantry to June 28, 1898, and was discharged to enlist the following day in the Utah Artillery for service in the Spanish-American War. He remained in Federal service from June 29, 1898, to December 21, 1898. Following that war he again enlisted as an infantryman in the Utah National Guard, serving as private, sergeant and first sergeant during the period July 15, 1899, to May 3, 1903. Following his removal to Oregon he enlisted in the Third Infantry, Oregon National Guard, August 4, 1907, and was commissioned first lieutenant, Infantry, August 5, 1907. He was promoted to captain March 21, 1911. On February 1, 1915, he was appointed to the post of Adjutant General of Oregon and entered upon a full time military career which was to end only with his death. When National Guard troops were called into Federal service for duty on the Mexican border in 1916 he obtained leave of absence from his post of adjutant general to accept command of Troop A, Oregon Cavalry, with the rank of captain. He remained in Federal service on the Mexican border from June 27, 1916, to February 22, 1917, and resumed his duties of Adjutant General on February 23, 1917. Under his supervision the Third Infantry, Oregon National Guard, was mobilized overnight in answer to the President's call of March 25, 1917, and was the first National Guard regiment in the nation to be ready for duty. He also directed efforts that resulted in the Third Infantry being the first National Guard regiment to be recruited to war strength and in the state of Oregon being the first to complete a war census of all males of military age and first to complete organization of state draft machinery. Effective September 10, 1917, he entered Federal service as Major, A. G. D., with assignment as assistant adjutant general of the newly organized 41st Division but at the request of the Governor of Oregon was not required to report until October 25, 1917, so that he might supervise operation of the state draft machinery. After reporting for duty with the 41st Division he sailed for France and served overseas from January 10, 1918, to June 18, 1919, receiving promotion to lieutenant colonel November 13, 1918, and serving with both the 41st Division and General Headquarters of the A. E. F. Following his return to the United States he was mustered out of Federal service July 23, 1919, and resumed duties of the Adjutant General of Oregon on April 15, 1920. He immediately began the reconstruction of the Oregon National Guard and was promoted to Colonel, A. G. D., June 23, 1920. He completed organization of the 82d Infantry Brigade, composed of Oregon National Guard troops, and was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Brigadier General of the Line, July 23, 1923. On January 3, 1930, he was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Major General of the Line, and was assigned to command the 41st Division, comprised of National Guard troops of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. When the President declared a limited emergency and authorized increase of the National Guard strength in September 1939, General White recruited the Oregon National Guard to its new strength within a week and was notified that the Oregon National Guard was the first in the nation to obtain its quota. When the 41st Division was ordered into Federal service, September 16, 1940, General White rapidly brought the Division to Regular Army strength and established it in camp within a week after the date of induction. Under his leadership the 41st Division became the No. 1 National Guard Division of the country and despite an illness that began early in the summer he led his troops successfully through maneuvers in California and the Fourth Army war games in western Washington. Only when those tasks were completed did he allow himself to be persuaded to leave his beloved Division for a rest intended to allow him to recuperate from his illness.

3. An illustrious military career was accompanied by an illustrious civilian career. General White was one of the four officers credited with founding the American Legion in France and became its first national vice-commander and adjutant while the troops were still overseas. He founded the American Legion magazine and was its first editor,

a task for which he was well fitted by a short but brilliant newspaper career that found him associate editor of the Oregonian when he accepted the post of Adjutant General of Oregon. He was an author of many short stories and novels based on military life and three years ago tried to arouse the nation to its ever-increasing danger by writing "Attack on America".

4. A graduate of the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1926, and of the Army War College, Washington, D. C., 1928, General White numbered among his decorations the Cross of the Black Star, awarded by decree of the President of the French Republic, September 24, 1919, and the Cross of the Legion of Honor, awarded by decree of the President of the French Republic, July 9, 1934. The latter decoration was awarded in gratefulness of the French Republic for the feeling of amity he had helped to promote between this country and France, and in recognition of his efforts in founding the American Legion.

5. An officer and gentleman who had few equals, General White nevertheless preferred to be regarded as a soldier and lived up to the highest standards of a soldier. His first thought was of the welfare of the men in his command and he never asked any man to carry out a task which he would hesitate to perform himself. He demanded discipline but the discipline he demanded was that of a father who wanted to bring out the best in his sons.

6. General White possessed, as few men did, an ever abiding love of his fellow men and an unflagging devotion to his country. In his latter years he centered his affection and his life in the 41st Division, and he regarded his final illness not so much as a personal affliction but more as a barrier that separated him from his men. Wherever the 41st Division may go there also will he go in spirit. His memory is forever engraved on the minds of the men he commanded and his name is an unwritten symbol on every regimental flag. Though dead he shall live in those of us who remain.

By command of Brigadier General RILEA:

JOHN T. MURRAY,

Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

GEORGE L. DUTTON,

Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Actg. Adj. Gen.



The great review of the 41st Division at Fort Lewis on 20 September 1941 was its first appearance as a division since its induction into federal service. A crowd of 15,000 witnessed the impressive spectacle.

It was also in November that the 218th Field Artillery Regiment, less one battalion, left Fort Lewis for San Francisco, bound for the Philippines. Meanwhile the rest of the Division trained night and day. New methods constantly were being added to the program, and for the first time the artillery conducted a fire problem with the use of an airborne observer-spotter. Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Meyer, brigade S-3, borrowed a Piper Cub from nearby McChord Field, and before the assembled Division brass demonstrated the idea, which later made the artillery so effective against the Japs in the Pacific and the Germans and Italians in the European Theater. It was during this month that talk of streamlining the square division was being tossed back and forth, but at this time the GI was concerned mainly with the approaching Christmas season and the furlough which it had heretofore brought.

On 2 December Brigadier General (later Major General) Horace H. Fuller, Commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was appointed General White's successor. This West Point graduate, who formerly had commanded the 3d Division Artillery, was already in Tacoma when the announcement was made. He was met the following

day and escorted to Fort Lewis by General Rilea, where he assumed command of the Division with the words:

"I have watched the progress of this Division since its induction into federal service. Its record is one of achievement and it is recognized as one of the topflight divisions of the Army. I feel highly honored in assuming command of this fine organization."

General Fuller was destined to lead the Sunsetters through the depressing days after Pearl Harbor, through months of arduous training in Australia, and finally into New Guinea—Salamaua, Hollandia, and bloody, awful Biak.

World War II began for the United States in the skies over Pearl Harbor in the early morning hours of Sunday, 7 December 1941. While the Jap was carrying out his attack, men of the 41st were enjoying weekend passes in Seattle, Portland, Olympia, Tacoma; sleeping late after Saturday night's relaxation, skiing on Mt. Rainier's snow-covered passes, or just sitting around a late breakfast table listening to Sunday morning's radio programs and reading the funny papers. Some men were in church, singing the old hymns and the first Christmas carols of the season, praying for world peace, their very hopes being blasted even while they knelt in prayer. This day had been set aside for special observance by the Division. It was the occasion of the dedication of the chapel for the 162d Infantry, the first formal chapel dedication in the Division cantonment.

In cities and towns throughout the northwest, as soon as the news had been flashed over the radio and across theater screens, and when the first black headlines hit the streets, hundreds of soldiers began filling bus terminals. By 1300 that afternoon, the big Greyhounds were rolling toward Lewis with shouting, excited and bewildered soldiers. By 1700 the Division cantonment area was swarming with men. Office buildings and barracks were blacked out; literally thousands of soldiers still were pouring through the main gate, leaving friends and parents in cars outside the now off-limits area; pure rumor and official orders contested



Soldiers of the 41st Division try out their cameras on the CG, General White, who is at the wheel of his jeep.



Soldiers of the 41st Division enjoy soft drinks during a stopover at Bend, Oregon, while en route to summer maneuvers in California.

one another and no one seemed to know just what to do that night. After being told that the air alert was to be the continuous blowing of the Fort Lewis fire alarm, almost two miles away, many hopped into bed for a try at a good night's sleep. Others were carrying out orders to take up defensive positions guarding the Oregon and Washington coasts. Quiet coastal communities miles from the nearest Army cantonment, apprehensive that night as the flood of reports on the Pearl Harbor disaster poured in, were startled as columns of trucks and ponderous guns rumbled through their streets and disappeared into the darkness.

Within a week the Division was scattered thinly from the Canadian border south, from Port Angeles on the inner side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca to Aberdeen and Camp Clatsop, 150 miles south of Fort Lewis. With the 115th Cavalry, a former Wyoming National Guard regiment, on the Division's left, it had thrown up a fairly formidable bulwark all the way to the California border against the possibility that the Japs might follow up their Pearl Harbor strike with an assault against the American coast. Quartermaster units faced the problem of long supply lines and daily convoys moved through Seattle and Everett north to Burlington. On the western side of Puget Sound the supply line led through Shelton to Sequim and Port Townsend. The Grays Harbor defense area was supplied by convoys which delivered to depots at Aberdeen. Truck platoons from the 116th Quartermaster Regiment moved to Vancouver to assist in hauling supplies to Fort Stevens and other coastal defenses and also down into central Oregon to Salem.

Approaching Christmas seemed only a thing of memory to cold, wet soldiers, who, not being very well

oriented on the enemy's positions, imagined the winter forests to be full of Japanese, and who saw in late brush fires and unguarded night lights threats of sabotage. The task of guarding still peaceful country roads, woods of blue spruce, cedar and fir, and isolated fishing and resort towns palled and the possibility of imminent attack by the enemy seemed less real as the days passed. Shortly before Christmas a number of the units were returned to the cantonment area. Half the outfits were manning posts on the Washington coast while the other half lived in restricted but comfortable freedom behind the "lines." Some outfits gave parties and dances in the recreation halls at Christmas. Visiting restrictions were relaxed over the holidays, but few, and lucky indeed, were the men who were able to obtain passes.



The folks back home supplied the troops with plenty of reading matter while they were "fighting" in the hills of California.



(1) Football teams of the 162d Infantry line up for action at Fort Lewis during a scrimmage. (2) and (3) Scenes of the 186th Infantry area during the Hunter Liggett maneuvers.

The 218th Field Artillery Regiment was in convoy from 800 to 1,000 miles out at sea when the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor. It was ordered back to San Francisco at once. Upon arrival at the port it was staged at Golden Gate Park for a week, then moved to the Presidio of San Francisco where it set up a defense for the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. In January this unit returned to Fort Lewis, a deliriously happy bunch of men, coming home after two months of uncertainty, which included five days of official "overseas" service. The same men were to return once again three years later, just as happy, but wiser, tested and not found wanting in battles that had spread them over a thousand miles of coral islands and jungle wastes.

January and February of 1942 brought further radical administrative and tactical changes as the 41st passed from a square to a triangular division. In the streamlining process the 161st Infantry Regiment was removed and later became part of the 25th Division of Guadalcanal fame. The 162d, 163d, and 186th Infantry Regiments remained with the Division. Out of the headquarters companies of the 81st and 82d Infantry Brigades, the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was formed.

Reorganization of the field artillery was a little more complicated since the new table of organization called for four battalions instead of the original three regiments. The 66th Field Artillery Brigade was disbanded and out of it was formed the 41st Division Artillery



The old-type pie plate helmets are passed out to troops during summer maneuvers in California.

Headquarters. Brigadier General Marshall G. Randol, who had commanded the 66th Brigade, became artillery commander but was soon retired and Brigadier General Ralph Coane assumed command. The new artillery setup included three light battalions and one medium battalion armed with thirty-six 105mm howitzers and twelve 155mm howitzers. The 218th Regiment was split into two battalions, one retaining the 218th designation while the other became the 902d Battalion, which later became part of another Army unit. The 146th Regiment also became two battalions, one keeping the original number while the second became the 167th Battalion. The 148th Regiment became the 205th Battalion, which remained with the 41st Division, and the 148th Battalion, which eventually became a part of I Corps artillery in the Southwest Pacific Theater.

From excess personnel of the field artillery and one company of the 116th Engineers, the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion was formed. Other personnel became the 41st Military Police Platoon, designated a part of Division Headquarters Company. What had been known as the 116th Engineer Regiment now became the 116th Engineer Battalion and the 116th Medical Regiment and 116th Quartermaster Regiment also became battalions, the latter being made a company after the Division arrived overseas. The Signal and Ordnance Companies remained unchanged.


Following the streamlining process the principal elements of the 41st Infantry Division were:



Artillerymen of the 41st Division stand guard against an "invading enemy force" along Washington's scenic Olympia Peninsula during 1941 maneuvers.



(1) Color guard of the 218th Field Artillery. (2) Color guard of the 162d Infantry. (3) One of the last photos of the Division Commander, Maj. Gen. George A. White.



Bivouac area of the 41st Division at Hunter Liggett in 1941.

41st Infantry Division Headquarters
 162d Infantry Regiment
 163d Infantry Regiment
 186th Infantry Regiment
 41st Division Artillery Headquarters
 146th Field Artillery Battalion
 167th Field Artillery Battalion
 205th Field Artillery Battalion
 218th Field Artillery Battalion
 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion
 41st Reconnaissance Troop
 116th Engineer Battalion
 116th Medical Battalion
 116th Quartermaster Battalion
 41st Signal Company
 741st Ordnance Company

ington which were to send the 41st Division three thousand miles across the Pacific within a month and a half. Rumor had it that Australia was to be the new base. During these busy days Fort Lewis saw many strange sights. Each week-end brought hundreds of cars, filled with parents, relatives, wives and sweethearts, into the area to repeat the good-byes which had been said the previous week-end. Living was now on a day-to-day basis. Training was secondary to the re-equipment program. Because there were strictly enforced pass regulations—six hours at first and later a few 24-hour passes—the post theaters, post exchanges and service clubs were jammed with overflowing crowds each night of the week. Morale ran high and expectations were far ahead of the brasshats' schedules. Nobody, despite the discouraging and often tragic news from both the Pacific and European fronts, believed the war ahead would stretch through three and a half years.

Secret orders already were on their way from Wash-

Chapter 3: Overseas to Australia

SPECULATION ran high as to where the Division was going. In early February 1942, the 41st was relieved of defense duty by the 3d Division, pulled back to Fort Lewis and prepared for movement overseas. When the alert came there was a hurried and sorrowful exodus of wives who had been living in the area, some of them for almost as long as their husbands had been in federal service. Now in these last days they thronged into the Fort Lewis cantonment at every opportunity to be with their men for as many as possible of the remaining few precious hours.

Late that month the 162d Infantry, the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 41st Reconnaissance Troop moved across country by train to Fort Dix, New Jersey. On 1 March the men began boarding the SS *Santa Paula* and *Uruguay*. The convoy left Brooklyn Navy Yard on 3 March. This group was a part of the legendary "forty days and forty nights" convoy, this being the amount of time required for the trip. This was the beginning of troopship routine for the 41st. Here was the medium-size ship, crammed with many more men than it was built for and taking the longest route to its destination. Here, too, was the endless standing in line for more than eight hours a day in order to get through the chow line. There were drills and schools and the fascination of watching the ink-blue water rush by.

The first few days were fine. There was plenty of company and it was a new experience for most of the men. The climate was ideal. Finally, however, the red roofs of Panama loomed in sight and marked the beginning of the intense heat which was to become a part of the men's lives for many months to come. The unwary became seared and blistered and many experienced the feeling of having their energy drained to

such an extent that climbing a few stairs to chow was almost more than the food was worth. The ten days' sailing along the Equator was the worst.


Some of the troops drew assignments as antiaircraft gun crews and lookouts. Two dogs, which were not on any passenger list, became a part of ship life and were readily adopted as mascots.

After the ships left the Canal there was no land for several weeks, nothing but the incredibly blue water and heat. One canteen of water a day was allowed and this proved to be a small quantity for the Equator's climate. Other ships in the convoy were even worse off for water, although some of the precious fluid had been taken on at Panama. Salt water was used for bathing and there was fresh water a half hour a day, or perhaps every other day, for shaving.

On 25 March the convoy stopped at Bora Bora in the Society Islands. The men encountered their first piratical natives, who immediately surrounded the ships to sell coconuts and other native merchandise. Grass skirts were sold for the fabulous price of six dollars and it was later said these were manufactured in the United States. The natives seemed to know only two prices—"one dollah" and "six dollah." It was here that the men learned that American cigarettes were good bargaining agents and attractive as legal tender.

During the negotiations the natives suddenly streaked madly for shore—a conning tower was moving through the channel. Soon six moss-covered American submarines hauled into sight. These were "hot" waters. The Jap fleet was around and many times troops on the island held their breath as a part of the enemy navy steamed by the hidden entrance to this secret base which was isolated from help.

Swimming was permitted but the men found the



Trucks of the 81st Brigade roll across a ford on the San Antonio River during the maneuvers of 1941.



An Army travels on its stomach, and judging from the four scenes above, the troops of the 41st Division travelled far. Top left shows the much-hated but always necessary "spud" detail while lower left shows the men passing through the chow line. Top and bottom right are scenes of chow being prepared while en route to the maneuvers in California.

water too hot to be enjoyable. No troops were allowed ashore but some swam in to bring back coral and other trinkets. They discovered what ugly, slow-healing cuts coral can give.

The convoy crossed the International Dateline, led by a New Zealand gunboat, on 31 March and shortly thereafter split, one portion heading for Brisbane, Australia, while the *Santa Paula* and *Uruguay*, which had developed engine trouble, started for Auckland, New Zealand, arriving there on Good Friday. Again the men were not permitted to go ashore and had to be content with watching natives waving bottles of beer, the first they had seen since leaving Fort Dix.

The ships left late the following day, going to Melbourne, Victoria, via a very rough and stormy Tasman Sea. Those few who had begun to get the feeling that they were really meant for the Navy soon began changing their minds as more and more men went through the awful agony of seasickness.

Australia was sighted 9 April and the following day the second contingent of the 41st Division set foot on

the soil "Down Under." It was a dirty group of men, starved for the sight of new faces and excited at the sights of a new land, that stepped ashore that day. The "forty-forty" trip was ended and one man summed up the opinion of the group when he quipped: "I used to think this guy Magellan was a great man. Now I think he was a damned fool."

As they came down the gangplank the men whistled like a covey of canaries; they were greeted with "Hi, Yank." Attempting to mimic the strange accent, one soldier shouted, "I sye, I see a lyedy."

While the convoy carrying the 162d Infantry was sweeping down the Canal Zone the 163d Infantry, 167th Field Artillery Battalion, Division Headquarters with General Fuller and General Rilea, Division Headquarters Company, 41st Signal Company, 116th Engineers, 116th Medical and 116th Quartermaster Battalions gathered at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation during the early morning hours of 19 March. By 1500 hours they were losing sight of the Golden Gate Bridge. Some ten thousand troops were aboard the British



At top soldiers of the 163d Infantry assemble under a spreading oak tree while awaiting orders to move up during the Fourth Army maneuvers. Center photo shows 162d Infantry troops moving forward over dusty roads and through streams. At bottom the 161st Infantry crosses a bridge over the San Antonio River on their way into the wild back country of Hunter Liggett.

Queen Elizabeth, largest vessel afloat. Also in the convoy were the *Coolidge* and *Mariposa*. Escorting the convoy was the cruiser, *Chester*; later the British cruiser, *Exeter*, which had won fame in the destruction of the German *Graf Spee*, covered the convoy. These ships sailed along the coast of South America, stopping at the Marquesas Islands where they were refueled. This contingent became the first group of Sunsetters to arrive in Australia, landing there 6 April. Because the *Queen Elizabeth* could not be accommodated at Melbourne she was unloaded at Sydney. The troops and cargo were transported to Melbourne by small Dutch ships and by rail.

The Americans were received joyfully in Australia, where, during those uncertain times, desperate plans were being made to defend the continent from Brisbane to the south. The Australians, fearful that the Japs would not be stopped, were burying their silver and many of them had moved out of Queensland. The Japs had air superiority and had been bombing Port Moresby in New Guinea and Darwin in northern Australia just about as they pleased. Some of the people wept as the men poured ashore, for these American fighting men were a welcome sight. What Australian combat troops there were had been marching back and forth on the African desert with the British Army for two long years. Now the Japs were poised, ready to strike. It was not an enviable position for this land, which is about as large as the United States in area but has only a population between seven and eight million.

Australia was a strange continent. It was apparent in the way the houses were built, the look of the people and the very smell of the place. The men soon learned that the Australians tell the size of a place by the number of hotels it has. Each hotel houses a pub and the number of pubs seem proportional to the number of people.

The troops entrained and moved to Seymour, sixty-five miles inland from Melbourne. This camp had been used by the Australians during World War I and there were a few Aussie units in the area when the Division arrived.

The first meal was a shock. The Aussies had prepared it. They had two oil drums made into cookers. One held mutton stew while the other had the Australian version of coffee. Shortly thereafter American mess sergeants, using American methods, went to work. Men gulped the second day as they watched two dirty militiamen haul in a load of bread in a flat-bed truck, much like we haul cordwood. As soon as the bread was unloaded, garbage was put on the trucks. After two days of this procedure some changes were made and the Aussies contended that the Yanks were too fussy.



A chaplain of the 162d Infantry helps music-makers prepare an entertainment program.

In April the remainder of the Division, including the 186th Infantry, 146th, 218th and 205th Field Artillery Battalions and Division Artillery Headquarters with General Coane entrained at Fort Lewis for San Francisco. The trip to Frisco was pretty wonderful since the trains were composed of the best Pullmans available, the food was plentiful and good, and the stations of the small railroad towns usually were crowded with people whose sons, fathers, brothers and friends were on those trains. To many on the trains the country was new, but to many more the trip was old and familiar, the names of the peaceful little towns reading like a summer vacation guide book.

In the early morning hours of 22 April the men arrived in San Francisco. Weighted down by the old blue barracks bags, they detrained, marched into a buzzing troop-filled pier, exchanged the old-time porkpie helmets for the newer models, filed up the gangplanks and into the cavernous depths of such floating hotels as the *Argentina* and *Matsonia*. The convoy, which had in its group the first of the slow, ugly Liberty ships, gathered in the bay beneath the Golden Gate. A large part of the 32d Infantry Division was also in this group. Three days after loading, the last elements of the 41st sailed under an incomparable California sunset which made the bay city look white as carved marble. The ships passed beneath the majestic and graceful bridge, through the channel that led to the strange dark sea and thousands of enemy-dominated miles.

Men of the Sunset Division clung to that last glimpse of the Golden Gate Bridge. No other bridge in the world ever spanned so many lonely, eager, baffled, brave departing men. No other bridge on earth was to become such a symbol of return. No other bridge would arch above so many home-coming, tearfully happy men. No other bridge would ever mean so much



Men of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, prepare to leave the staging area at Fort Dix for overseas on 1 March 1942 (Erickson photo).

to men of Oregon, Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. In the rain forests of Buna, Salamaua, Hollandia, Zamboanga and Palawan, the memory of this bridge shone before eyes that were dead with great weariness, upon hearts that remembered it as brighter than the rays of the tropical sun, and braver, infinitely braver, than the glories of Rome. There probably were men of the 41st who died with that hazy image mixed up in their last mortal dreams.

The last of the 41st arrived at Melbourne on 13 May, debarked the following day and went to Seymour to join the remainder of the unit. To the men of the 41st had fallen the honor of putting the first complete fighting unit of United States troops into Australia. This was to be the beginning of a whole new chapter in the life of the Division, a life to be told through the medium of a new language, new names, new expressions, new interpretations. Australia was the gateway to the islands that irrevocably must lead to Tokyo and complete victory.

The entire Division now was in the vicinity of Seymour. The surrounding country became the site of hard, extremely thorough training. The countryside was bare. Although the hills looked green, when one set foot on them he found patches of grass as big as a hand with coarse gravel dirt between them. Thousands of grazing sheep kept the hills that way. Few trees were evident and these were eucalyptus, or gum

trees, as the Aussies called them. It rained almost constantly and keeping dry became a major problem to all.

By the end of May the Division was busily engaged in training and continuing to build the cold, muddy camp. Training was hard. Thirty-mile-a-day marches were made and these were carried out for three consecutive days. Everything in the book was practiced as the men slogged through muddy days and nights. The artillery began firing at Pucapunial, but in the latter part of May began moving to Rockhampton, Queensland, where it trained through the next four months.

Newspapers of Melbourne and Sydney daily followed the unrelenting enemy advance down the coast of New Guinea, and the battle of the Coral Sea was to the men of the 41st the only bright spot in the darkening lining of the military cloud.

Melbourne became a week-end haven and shopping day stomping ground for the Yanks. It was a blue-law town. Trains jammed with American soldiers arrived late Saturday night and everything was closed on Sunday. There were no movies, and even a suitable eating establishment was hard to find. However, the people were friendly and any man wishing to do so could week-end with an Australian family.

Scotch whiskey sold for eighteen shillings, which was about three dollars in American money. The beer was deceptive. Although some brands were as good as



Camp area of Company L, 162d Infantry, at Seymour, Australia.

anything produced in the States, the stuff was quite potent as many men learned in a short time. The Yank soldiers were popular with the Australian girls and the high regard shown women astonished the Australian women. In this land the women let the men have the spotlight. The man is the important person in any couple. One Australian girl explained the comparison when she said:

"An American, if he is taking a girl out, will probably send flowers first. He will take the girl to a good dinner. He will ask her where she wants to go and what she wants to drink, if anything. An Aussie will come up to your house for the evening and bring a bottle of beer, which he probably will drink himself."

It was generally conceded that Master Sergeant Chester E. Wallace of Division Artillery Headquarters was the first man to carry a swagger stick, which was the latest vogue. Saturday nights found the men relaxing; on Sundays the high and low churches were filled to capacity. Collins Street was famous for its hundreds of milk bars. On Little Collins one found burlesque and itinerant offerings of stock "Mikados" and "Pinafores." The men smoked Craven-A's and drank hock, went boating on the St. Kilda, night-clubbed at a dozen lavish places, and took communion in St. James. "One Dozen Roses" was topping the Hit Parade back home and this catchy tune was fast becoming the favorite with the men overseas. To the men of the 41st, in those first two months, Australia was Melbourne, Melbourne was heaven, and heaven was theirs, for the taking.


But all of this came to an end on 19 July 1942, and the Division closed in on Rockhampton, where it found a semi-tropical climate and better training country. The arduous rail trip from Seymour to Rockhampton meant unloading and reloading at every State line as track gauges changed. For several days the Division monopolized Australian trains over two thousand miles. The Aussies themselves tell jokes about their trains, but like the weather, nobody seems to do anything about it. One time the Queensland Railways lost an entire string of cars somewhere on the 400-mile

single track between Rockhampton and Brisbane. The trip was not invigorating but it certainly was enlightening. From New South Wales to Queensland was a jump of a thousand miles and the change from the wet chill of Melbourne to the dry heat of Rockhampton was an acclimatical problem. Olive drabs were shed for the first time and the men blossomed forth in the khaki that was to be the official uniform from Queensland to the Golden Gate, via the Southwest Pacific.

At Rockhampton the battle training became realistic



The 116th Engineers construct a bridge



Troops of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, use an Australian train to move from Melbourne to Rockhampton

as the men readied themselves for jungle and amphibious warfare. Queensland was hot and the troops spent week-ends rushing for buses to the beach at Yeppoon and Rockhampton. The 163d, 186th, and 162d Infantry Regiments, respectively, went down to Toorbul (Terrible) Point on the coast north of Brisbane, a battalion at a time, for amphibious training under the Australian Army. Each battalion trained on the Fitzroy River prior to training at Toorbul Point. All except the 3d Battalion of the 162d Infantry spent a week in rest camp near Yeppoon following the amphibious training. Meanwhile some of the junior officers were sent to Australian-conducted tactical schools. Everything pointed to battle in New Guinea and the men were ready.

The artillery conducted its training on the Coberra range, which echoed daily to the thunder of 105s as cursing gunners manned their weapons and sweating

second lieutenants learned the hard way of conducting fire. The tables of equipment and organization within the artillery now called for a complete air liaison section, which allocated two L-4 Piper Cubs to Division Artillery Headquarters and two each to the four battalions, a total of ten. Pilots were to be staff sergeants while officers were to supervise and handle administration. Later the enlisted pilots were authorized commissions.

Other innovations were introduced into the artillery during these months of training. The 167th Artillery Battalion left Rockhampton for Townsville, Australia, in January 1943, where it became a horse-drawn, pack outfit. The 218th Battalion put aside its 155s for a time and experimented with 75s which were carried in jeeps and could be broken down into the integral parts for easy transport. Captain (then First Lieutenant) Donald E. MacArthur of the 146th Battalion, already was beginning to think about a method of firing on targets using a system which was to become known as Radial Line Plotting.

Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger and his I Corps command had arrived in Rockhampton in August 1942, and from this command the 41st inherited two necessary but galling rituals: first, motor stables; second, field tests conducted by Corps officers every twelve weeks, covering everything from administration to tactical problems. Seven months of strenuous and continuous tactical training was being rounded out. Training got tougher and tougher and the tourist hey-day in Australia definitely was over.

Commanders throughout the Division had made a religion of motor stables and first sergeants were tearing out their hair over the commandments and golden rules of checking horns and lights. Check this, check that, check, check, check!

Supply sergeants began issuing the ill-fated zoot



Taking it easy on the Yeppoon beach, in one of the few moments of relaxation granted those who were preparing to launch the first offensive against the Japs.



Here men of the 162d Infantry storm a beachhead during a practice assault at a combined training school at Toorbul Point.

suit, the camouflaged jungle pack, machetes, hunting knives, ponchos which absorbed the rain instead of shedding it, fishing tackle, dubbin, hammocks and herringbone twills. Atabrine was to come a little later.

The best noncoms were being trained to replace officers in the event of battle casualties. Some were bundled off to officer candidate schools and seen no more. A few rejoined the Division but many joined the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32d Division, or one of the many independent units which were pouring into Australia at that time. Some of the men were receiving commissions by direct appointment.

When the men were not working they were turned

loose to blow off pent-up steam. Rockhampton and Yeppoon were the two towns which bore the brunt of the "attack" on week-ends and occasional three-day passes, and they always were filled to capacity. Long remembered will be such names as the Bluebird Club, the Golden Gate Café, Earl's Court Theatre, the Red Cross Club, the Catholic Club, the Botanical Gardens and the ancient bridge that was like some carousel ride in an amusement park except that the speed limit across its arched crumbling bed was eight miles an hour. And who will ever forget Yeppoon, the blue-surfed vacation spot with its golden sandy beaches and milk bars that ran out of everything except sarsaparilla by 1500 hours each Saturday afternoon.

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Chapter 4: Baptism of Fire

IN THEIR 1942 offensive the Japs shifted their assault to the southeast and planned a two-pronged attack, one for the control of southeastern New Guinea and a second to thrust through the Solomon Islands and cut the American supply line to Australia. Neither attack reached its objective. The Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942) dealt the Japs a decisive licking and five months later the Jap advance toward our supply lines was halted in the Solomons.


Their failure by sea did not discourage the Japs' effort to capture Port Moresby, which would afford them an invasion base only 340 miles from the Cape York Peninsula in Australia. In July they landed at Buna, Gona and Sanananda on the northeast coast of Papua and pushed southward across the Papuan Peninsula. By early August the Japs had eleven thousand men fighting their way across the deep gorges and razor-back ridges of the Owen Stanley Mountains and descending to within thirty-two miles of the port. Here the Australians stemmed the Jap onslaught and by 14 September the advance was held at the Imita Range, south of Ioribaiwa.

Bombing of the Jap supply line and a flank attack by the Aussies forced the enemy to make a hasty withdrawal up the trail. A Jap attempt to land troops at Milne Bay had been repulsed.

Just as the tide of invasion began to ebb, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, committed his first American troops. Both the 41st Division and 32d Division were

ready but due to the fact that the 32d was in a position where it could be moved more easily, it got the initial call, and the first elements proceeded to Port Moresby. Allied strategy now was shifting from defense to counterattack. The Japs were being pursued by the Aussies toward Kokoda. While the Australians were doing this the 32d Division made a wide envelopment to the east and hit the enemy's left flank in the vicinity of Buna. This move would cut off the retreat of the main Jap force facing the Australians. Plans called for flying this force to the seacoast southeast of Buna.

The enemy had constructed two almost impregnable defensive lines in the swampy jungle. One lay across the Soputa-Sanananda road while the other was in front of Buna itself. The fighting took place in a narrow strip on the northeastern coast of Papua extending on both sides of Buna Mission, the prewar seat of government for the area. It was bounded on the west by one of many outlets of the Girua River and on the east by the coast a half mile south of Cape Endaiadere. The battleground was about three and a half miles long and three quarters of a mile deep. The whole area was a flat, low-lying plain patterned with steaming jungle, impassable swamp, coconut plantations, open fields and, of course, shoulder-high *Kunai* grass. Typical of the rivers is the Girua which is forty to sixty feet wide until it disappears in the swamps southwest of Buna Village, and eventually finds the ocean through several mouths. The principal swamp



A member of the 116th Engineers surveys with pride the all-weather Army road constructed by his unit on the Oro Bay-Dobodura road at Oro Bay.



A jeep convoy makes one of its daily trips with mail and supplies to American troops in New Guinea.

in the Buna area lies between Entrance Creek and Simemi Creek and reaches inland to the vicinity of Simemi and Ango. It was absolutely impenetrable, a fact of vital importance in the fighting.

Most of the drier land is covered with a thick growth of *Kunai* grass or plantations of coconut palms. This coarse grass usually grows to a height of more than six feet, but its height varies greatly.

In the open ground southeast of Buna Mission was the landing field, most important Allied objective. It was 105 air miles from Port Moresby and would be a source of support for further advance along the north coast of New Guinea.

The approach to Buna was difficult by land or sea. It had no harbor. Coral reefs abound near the shore and are scattered over the sea as much as twenty-five miles from land. Native canoes had to be used for carrying cargo. On the land, Buna is cut off by swamps and creeks and can be approached only along four narrow corridors, each with its trail.

The coastal trail runs from Cape Sudest past Hariko then north to Simemi Creek, southeast to the airstrip. Here it meets a second trail which comes from Dobodura and Simemi Village and skirts the east side of the main swamp south of Buna. After the junction, the trail crosses the creek on a permanent bridge and continues along the northern edge of the airfield to the Mission. Between the bridge and the Mission it is a passable motor road. The third trail comes from Dobodura on the west side of the main swamp, joins a trail from Soputa at Ango Corner, and then runs to a fork about twelve hundred yards from the coast.

The right fork leads southeast to the Mission while the left fork crosses Entrance Creek and proceeds to Buna Village. The other joins the left fork at the Ango Trail.

These trails averaged twelve feet in width but were so low-lying that a heavy rain put many sections under water. Engineers worked constantly to put down corduroy in order to make routes passable, for all supply and evacuation was based on these trails.

Along with terrain difficulties went problems inherent in the uniformly hot and muggy climate. A rise in temperature of only one or two degrees increased physical discomfort tremendously. And to add further complication, the campaign was conducted in the months when precipitation, temperature and humidity were the highest.

Malaria and dengue fever were constant threats to the men, who also suffered from depression and weariness caused by the climate and inadequate food. A large percentage of all units became hospitalized from fevers. For every two men who were battle casualties, five were out of action because of fever.

The Jap force at Buna numbered about twenty-two hundred troops; of these eighteen hundred were combat troops. Air support for this campaign was furnished by the Fifth Air Force. The air transport of troops, as conducted by the 374th Troop-Carrier Group, was a major feat at this stage of the war.

After many weeks of rough fighting during which attack after attack had been repulsed, men of the 32d Division were tired and dispirited. The Jap line had not even been dented. Finally, around 4 December, the enemy lines were broken enough so that a wedge could be driven to the sea near Buna Village, but here the attack again bogged down.



Natives construct a culvert on a new all-weather road somewhere in New Guinea.



Men of the 163d Infantry aboard a transport plane in New Guinea.

With this stalemate existing it was decided to commit more American troops to the fight in New Guinea. The 163d Infantry Regiment, with detachments from the 41st Signal Company, 41st Quartermaster Company, 116th Engineer Battalion, and 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, acting as Combat Team 163 under the command of Jens A. Doe, then a colonel, was alerted in Australia on 14 December. The convoy carrying this combat team was at Townsville on Christmas Day 1942. Following a day marked by special religious services, distribution of Red Cross gift boxes and the serving of fresh-baked bread for the first time, it proceeded to Port Moresby, arriving there on 27 December.

While the right wing of the Allied force in Papua was carrying out the Buna operation, the left wing was attacking Jap positions defending Sanananda, a few miles west of Girua River. After the fall of Buna, elements of the 32d Division moved up the coast to the Sanananda front while the Australian 18th Brigade and the 163d Infantry came by way of Ango Corner. Jap defenses west of the Girua River were in many


ways stronger than those at Buna. They constituted a deep beachhead, roughly triangular in shape, protecting Sanananda harbor. The apex of this triangle was three and a half miles inland on the Soputa-Sanananda road, the one good line of advance, while its base was anchored on strongpoints covering the coastal trail between Cape Killerton to the west and Tarakena to the east. Gona was a flank position to the northwest of the main stronghold and could be reached from Soputa by a trail west of the road.

Three groups of mutually supporting positions covered points where trails toward Cape Killerton branched off the main Soputa-Sanananda road. Each defensive position consisted of a single ring of bunkers connected by fire and communication trenches, constituting a perimeter. Many of these perimeters were flanked by swamps and all were well concealed in dense jungle. Within this fortified area were some three thousand survivors of the unsuccessful Japanese attack on Port Moresby, together with reinforcements which had arrived by sea. Among these troops were three battalions of the Japanese 41st Infantry. One


SANANANDA FRONT

22 NOVEMBER 1942 - 9 JANUARY 1943.

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Map 2



Map 3



Army engineers construct an airstrip at Dobodura.

battalion was at Gona, and the second and third battalions were near the junction of the Killerton Trail and Soputa-Sanananda road. Total enemy strength at Sanananda was between four and five thousand.

Australian units had conducted this operation but were too exhausted and too few to crack the enemy's strong defensive position. The Aussies had pushed the Japs back across the Owen Stanley Mountains, but then the attack slowed down until after the fall of Buna. By this time enough American troops had been moved in to press the attack with unremitting intensity until the final Jap units were subdued on 22 January 1943.

Gona fell on 9 December and the fight was being pressed for Sanananda and Buna. The 163d Infantry of the 41st Division began arriving at Popandetta and Dobodura by air from Port Moresby on 30 December, just three days after its arrival in New Guinea. This outfit became the first full American regiment to be flown into battle in the Pacific Theater. The 163d relieved the Australian 39th Infantry Battalion in its positions, this mission being completed between 2 and 4 January. In this one-day march to the forward bivouac area the troops experienced for the first time the discomfort of marching through the jungle while laden down with full equipment.

Operations at Buna were drawing to a close, permitting a shift of more Allied strength. The 127th Infantry, operating on the western flank of the Buna front, had established an outpost in Tarakena Village and was firmly entrenched in this spot by 8 January. Meanwhile, Australian elements were moving from Buna to the Sanananda front via Ango Corner.

The Japanese position "P" (see Map 3) at the junction of the trail to Cape Killerton with the Soputa-Sanananda road had been holding up the Allied advance, but a roadblock maintained by Allied troops to the north forced the enemy to rely on the roundabout and difficult Killerton Trail for supplying his front. The situation along this road was extraordinary with Jap positions and Allied positions lined up in leapfrog fashion. The original Allied roadblock, about a half mile north of the Jap advance position, was

organized for all-around defense and was called Perimeter Musket. Immediately north of this was a second Jap defensive position and just beyond this a second Allied roadblock, called Fisk in memory of Lieutenant Harold R. Fisk, the first officer of the 163d Infantry to fall in battle. Less than a quarter of a mile north was a third group of enemy defenses. Allied supply lines to the roadblocks ran through dense jungle east of the road and these routes had to be under constant patrol. At several points small defensive positions were maintained.

The Musket perimeter was on relatively dry, jungle-covered ground, some four feet above swamps on either side. Foxholes were dug for an entire squad and were arranged in square or circular patterns. Positions were about fifteen yards apart. There were two sections to each perimeter, the outer ring consisting of rifles and automatic weapons while the inner ring contained higher headquarters, the switchboard, 81mm mortars, ammunition dumps and aid station. Between these rings were small supply dumps, kitchens and lower headquarters. Slit trenches were everywhere and the area was often densely crowded, especially when troops were in transit to other points. Fortunately, during this time the Japs used no heavy mortars or artillery and the Allies had air superiority.

When the 163d took over the Musket perimeter from the Australians they found Jap tree snipers troublesome. The Aussies, strangely enough, had not used tree snipers but the American troops took measures to counteract enemy snipers and before long the Jap snipers were thinned out.

Movement at night was strictly forbidden and after one fatal accident this rule was obeyed religiously. To avoid disclosing the position of weapons, front-line men used only hand grenades against suspicious noises. Musket was the main Allied position while the Fisk perimeter consisted of two smaller perimeters, one on each side of the trail. The enemy employed neither artillery nor planes and the fear of casualties from tree bursts prevented effective use of his mortars. Consequently, it was a battle of small arms and grenades.



A soldier of 41st Division Headquarters Company gets dental treatment at a dispensary at Dobudura.

Jap defenses consisted of groups of bunkers arranged about five yards apart in circular or oval patterns on both sides of the road. Automatic weapons were arranged to fire from six to eight inches above the ground and along fire lanes so carefully cleared that little disturbance of the jungle was apparent. Around these perimeters were trip wires and vines attached to warning rattles. Enemy patrols and snipers were active on all sides.

During the seven-week stalemate which existed prior to the arrival of the 163d Infantry, American and Australian patrols discovered several Jap defensive positions along the Soputa-Sanananda road, but there was no clear understanding as to their nature or extent.

Patrols of the 163d between 4 and 7 January found that just north of Musket there were two enemy perimeters: Q on the west and R on the east of the road. At noon on 8 January, following a fifteen-minute artillery, machine-gun and mortar preparation, Companies B and C of the 163d's 1st Battalion attacked perimeters R and Q. Company C attacked south from the supply trail leading to Fisk via the Moore perimeter but was stopped in front of its objective by a swamp which was more than waist-deep as a result of heavy rain during the preceding night. Company B advanced

north but had moved only twenty yards when it came under a heavy crossfire. About halfway between Musket and Q it dug in, at one point only twenty feet from Q. Failure to accomplish its mission was due to inadequate fire support, the unexpected depth of the swamp in front of Company C and the use of a frontal attack instead of a flank attack by Company B. Company B's frontal attack was made necessary by the location of the Australian artillery.

By 7 January the 2d Battalion of the 163d Infantry, less some of its heavy weapons, had been flown in and had moved to bivouac along the supply trail east of the road. Company E moved into Musket to relieve Company B, the latter's slit trenches being waist-deep with water and the men in much need of sleep and hot food. Company B resumed its position in the lines on the morning of 9 January in time to enable Company E to participate in the fight for the enemy roadblock a half mile due west of Musket on the Killerton Trail. This roadblock, later called Perimeter Rankin after Captain (later Colonel) Walter R. Rankin of the 163d, had been used by the enemy to supply his advanced positions.

This move by the 2d Battalion was the first phase of a divisional plan of attack which was to employ



Troops of the 162d Infantry gather in a tent set up in the jungle at Morobe for Easter services on 29 April 1943.

both the 163d Infantry and the Australian 18th Brigade, now ready to advance. The plan called for the 163d to hold both possible lines of enemy retreat at Musket and Rankin while the 18th Brigade was breaking through the southernmost Jap defenses at P. The Aussies were then to drive up the Killerton Trail to the sea and swing eastward along the coast, thus enveloping the entire enemy defenses along the Soputa-Sanananda road. In the coastal area, troops of the 32d Division were readying themselves for a drive northward to make contact with the Australians. Thus the trap was set for a three-pronged attack against the Nips.

Patrols were active in the Musket area for the next few days and on 10 January discovered that Perimeter Q had been evacuated. It was occupied at once by Company A, 163d. This gave the 163d a solid front from Musket to Fisk on the west side of the road and left the Jap Perimeter R open to attack from all sides. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion of the 163d was arriving at Musket along the supply trail.

On 12 January the Australians attacked northward on both sides of the road against P while mortars of the 163d Regiment provided diversions in the form of fire directed against R and enemy defenses on the Killerton Trail south of Rankin. The Aussie attack was aided by four light tanks while Company K of the 163d operated south from Musket to cover the Australian right flank. By noon three of the four

tanks were out of action and the Aussie attack was an obvious failure. Patrols were sent out from Musket during the afternoon to determine how far north the Jap position extended.

Shortly after daybreak on 14 January, a 163d patrol picked up a very sick Japanese soldier in the bushes along the road just south of Musket. This man was taken to the Australian 7th Division headquarters for interrogation and he revealed that orders had been received on the night of the 12th-13th for all able-bodied troops to evacuate Perimeter P, the southernmost Japanese position and the objective of the Australian attack two days before. The sick and wounded were left behind; this soldier had tried to follow but was so weakened by malaria and dysentery he could not continue the pace.

On the basis of this information, the 163d was to send all available units southward to block escape routes but not to attack P. Company K had remained just east of the road since the 12th and Company B was sent down from Musket on the west side. The two companies moved south astride the road, while on the Killerton Trail, Companies E and G also moved southward from Rankin, following a 100-round artillery and 200-round 81mm mortar barrage. Nearly a hundred Japs were killed during this phase of the operation. Meanwhile, the Australian 18th Brigade renewed its attack and completely broke enemy resistance south of Musket. For more than a mile north of its

junction with the Soputa-Sanananda road, the Killerton Trail now was open and the first phase of the divisional attack plan was completed.

At 0730 on 15 January, the platoon from Company A attacked from Q and managed to get inside Perimeter R from the north without being detected. The rest of the company pushed in to strengthen this toehold and Company C moved out from Fisk to press the attack from the east. Companies B, E, G and K were released from their southward movement by the 7th Division, and Company B was sent to the west side of R to complete the 163d's stranglehold on the enemy. Bunker after bunker fell to small groups of men using grenades, rifles and submachine guns, but the Japs clung tenaciously to the position until the following day when the last ones were wiped out. The second phase of the attack was to begin the following day.

Reserve elements of the Aussies mopped up south of Musket while the 18th Brigade moved up the Killerton Trail through the 163d's 2d Battalion at Rankin to carry out the envelopment of Sanananda. After the Australians had passed through its lines the 2d Battalion moved north from Rankin about one and a half miles along the Killerton Trail to the Coconut Garden, where a branch trail was believed to connect with the Soputa-Sanananda road. On the heels of the Australian advance, the 2d Battalion was to follow the branch trail east to the road, taking the rear of the enemy positions north of Musket. The 3d Battalion was to operate from Musket and Fisk and was scheduled to complete the reduction of Perimeter U. The 1st Battalion was to attack west of the road enveloping Jap positions known to be located north of Fisk. Two batteries of Australian 25-pounders and two tanks were assigned to support the regiment and fifteen 81mm mortars were massed at Musket.

Meanwhile, elements of the 32d Division had expanded their bridgehead north of Konombi Creek in the push up the coast from Tarakena.

In preparation for the attack on the Soputa-Sanananda road, Companies A, B and C of the 163d, which had been reducing Perimeter R, were relieved late in the afternoon of the 15th by elements of Companies K and L. Harassing artillery fire was thrown at the enemy during the night of the 15th-16th in the area north of Musket and a fifteen-minute barrage preceded the jumpoff at 0900. Machine guns raked the trees and brush northwest of Fisk where Companies A, B and C were to advance around the right flank of the enemy positions and effect a junction with the 2d Battalion on the road. Soon after the jumpoff, Company A on the right drew heavy machine-gun fire from the Japanese Perimeter S and was pinned down. Company C on the left, followed by Company B, met almost no

opposition as it swung around to the road where a bivouac was established at Perimeter AD. Meanwhile, Company A had about twenty heat-exhaustion casualties and was ordered to withdraw and join Companies B and C in the new perimeter. This withdrawal was made under Japanese fire, in daylight, and made possible by fire from Company B.

The Aussies had passed through the 2d Battalion and had advanced up the Killerton Trail. The 2d Battalion had begun to move eastward from the Coconut Garden toward the road but after it had progressed some eight hundred yards the trail ended and the troops were forced to chop their way through the jungle on a compass course aimed at the 1st Battalion objective. Companies F and G came out on the road just south of AD and encountered a Company B patrol which guided them into the bivouac area. Part of Company H had been left behind near the Coconut Garden to guard a trail junction, but the rest of the company chopped its way eastward to the road at a point a mile north of AD where it made contact with patrols of the Australian 18th Brigade which had moved eastward from Cape Killerton along trails roughly parallel to the coast. The 2d Battalion encountered numerous small parties of Japs during this movement and killed more than a hundred.

To the north the attack was making progress. By evening on 16 January the Australians, carrying out a wide envelopment, had reached the sea. One battalion of Aussies faced a stubborn enemy group on the west coast of the bay while another battalion, advancing on the right flank, was on the road about a mile from the coast and in contact with the 163d Infantry's 2d Battalion. The 32d Division's phase of the attack still was bogged down.

An enemy plan for an orderly withdrawal along the road to the beach at Sanananda had been thwarted and his remaining forces were split and under heavy pressure, short of ammunition and starving. The first evidences of cannibalism had been discovered to support this latter point. During the night of 16-17 January, high-ranking Jap officers removed their wounded from barges in which they set off to seek safety for themselves.

Following reduction of the Jap strongpoint on 16 January, Colonel Doe sent the following message to his command:

Your Regimental Commander wishes to commend the officers and men of the 163d Infantry Combat Team for the fine planning, organization and individual excellence in execution of the successful operations of 16 January 1943 against the strongest point on the Japanese main defenses between Soputa and Sanananda Point, New Guinea.

This enemy strongpoint had held up the operations of the



There were moments for relaxation, and here is one of them. Men of the 41st Division enjoy a USO Camp Show at their new playhouse at Buna.

Allied Forces for eight weeks. The determination and aggressive spirit of the members of this command has resulted in a splendid victory and has brought credit to both ourselves and our organization.

As one of the 163d Infantry Combat Team, I am indeed proud to be one of you.

The exact nature of the remaining defenses on the Soputa-Sanananda road was unknown but it was believed that a considerable force was entrenched between Fisk and Perimeter AD. On 17 January Company B probed southward from AD until it was halted by fire from bunkers at Perimeter S. The next day Company C pushed forward east of Company B to envelop S but was stopped by fire from both flanks. Then Companies A and K (attached to the 1st Battalion) extended the envelopment movement still further eastward but encountered another enemy perimeter at T. About noon the enemy, who was by now caught between the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 163d, showed signs of his nervousness by opening fire on Fisk without first being attacked, this being one of very few instances in which this happened. The feeling out of these enemy defenses continued for several days

and finally on the 19th a platoon from Company I circled east and north from Fisk and accurately located the Jap perimeter at U. Company F had by now fought its way southward along the road to the north side of T. Reconnaissance in force had explored the ground between the two main positions of the 163d and the general enemy perimeters were known. Preparations were made for an attack on the 20th at which time the three positions would be overrun from south to north beginning with U. Just after noon on the day set for the attack the Australian 25-pounders fired 250 rounds on the target area while the mortars massed at Musket let go a barrage of 750 rounds, and machine guns of Company M at Fisk combed the trees and brush. As this preparation ended, Company I, which was poised for the assault, suffered the loss of Captain Duncan V. Dupree and First Sergeant James W. Boland through a short mortar round, while a sniper got one of the platoon leaders. This caused a delay in the attack and by the time it was launched the effect of the bombardment was lost; the enemy had slipped from his bunkers back into firing position and halted the attack.



After the battle troops of the 41st pause to pay tribute to fallen comrades. Men of the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, seek graves of buddies after memorial services at Soputa on Memorial Day, 1943.

Late the next morning, Companies A and K, following a closely timed concentration of mortar, artillery and machine-gun fire into Perimeter T, breached its defenses and fanned out once they were inside. This softened resistance in front of Companies B and C, which were facing S, and all four companies were able to sweep south on the road in less than an hour, mopping up both S and T. The shell-fire killed many Japs and confined others to their bunkers until the infantrymen could get close enough to throw grenades into the firing slits and entrances or shoot down the survivors as they scampered from their holes. After this attack 525 enemy dead were counted, many showing evidence of starvation and disease. Outposts were placed along the road but most of the men were withdrawn to Perimeter AD for food and rest.

Just before daybreak on 22 January, 31 Japs were killed in front of Company K's bivouac on the road. They were remnants of five hundred reinforcements which had landed ten days earlier near Girua but they had arrived too late and were trying to escape westward when they stumbled onto Company K.

At 1047 that day Companies I and L attacked U from the south, moving out just as the last rounds of a mortar salvo left the guns. Resistance was weak and shortly after noon the attackers made contact with Company E, which had replaced Company F on the east side of the perimeter. The attackers had one man killed and one wounded and killed 69 Japs. Those who fled northward were picked off by patrols which mopped up through 23 January.

The enemy fought desperately even though it was

apparent his end was near. Often he destroyed himself with pistol or grenade rather than face the humiliation of capture. Some of the few who were taken prisoner demanded to be shot in order that they might not be dishonored.

By evening of 22 January the Buna-Sanananda operations were finished. Judged by operations in other theaters this was a small show, but it removed the threat of an enemy land attack on Port Moresby. More than five thousand Japanese soldiers and marines had been killed, some 1,400 of them being accounted for by the 163d Infantry. The 163d captured more Jap equipment than had been taken by any other Allied force of similar size since the Pacific War began. The men who fought in the stinking swamps of Papua, constantly harassed by diseases and heat which accounted for far more casualties than did the enemy, had special grounds for pride in their victory. Many times the men of the 41st Division faced the ravages of starvation as food reserves sank dangerously low. They had fought the enemy, they had fought the jungle and they had learned their bitter lessons well.

In speaking of the comparison in casualties throughout this dreadful campaign, General MacArthur said:

These figures reverse the usual result of a ground offensive campaign, especially against prepared positions defended to the last. There was no reason to hurry the attack because the time element was of little importance. For that reason no attempt was made to rush the positions. The utmost care was taken for the conservation of our forces with the result that probably no campaign in history against a thoroughly prepared and trained Army produced such complete and decisive results with so low an expenditure of life and resources.

In his message to the 163d Infantry, General Eichleberger wrote:

As Commanding General of the Advance New Guinea Forces may I extend my heartiest congratulations and deep gratitude for the part each of you has played in inflicting upon the Japanese the first major land defeat they have suffered. Realizing the difficulties and almost insurmountable obstacles which faced you in the accomplishment of your mission it was with a great deal of pride that I reported to the Commander-in-Chief the important contribution of your Regiment to our momentous victory.

I deeply regret the loss of those who fell in combat and have the utmost sympathy for the families and friends in their bereavement. To those of you who remain I offer my best wishes for the continued success of your Regiment in battle. You and your unit have helped to make history in the jungles of New Guinea.

People on the home front followed the activities of the Montana Regiment of the 41st Division with a great deal of pride. The story which broke on the front pages of the papers on the morning of 9 January 1943 was the first news that people back home had of the Division's activities for more than a year.

The State Legislature in session at Helena, Montana, cabled the 163d Regiment, composed in part of rugged Indians from that Rocky Mountain state, the following message:

With vibrant admiration for your magnificent victory over the Japanese on the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea and elsewhere, with prayers for the wounded and with undying resolve to carry on the high purpose of our noble dead, the hearts of the people of Montana are with you, beating as one every hour of the day.

Chapter 5: The Mopping-up Phase

IN THE LAST WEEK of January the 186th Infantry Regiment, under command of Colonel John T. Murray, was flown over the Owen Stanley Mountains to relieve elements of the 32d Division at Buna and Gona and to mop up the remnants of the enemy. The 1st Battalion relieved the 128th Infantry of the 32d, taking over from Cape Sudest north to include Cape Endaiadere. The 2d Battalion relieved the 127th Regiment, taking over the defense of Cape Giropa, Buna and Buna Mission, and patrolled to Tarakena Point. The 3d Battalion was regimental reserve and went into bivouac at Sememi.

The defeat of the Japs at Buna, Gona and Sanananda wound up the Papuan phase of the fight but was only the beginning of a long and more tedious campaign.

On 1 February, Company G of the 163d Regiment, under Captain Benson, moved approximately twenty-two miles northwest of Gona to the mouth of the Kumusi River. A reinforced platoon from the 186th Regiment was attached to Company G at Sebari. The leader of this platoon reported a Jap position about six hundred yards north. While the remainder of the unit ate, a patrol set out for more definite information about this position.

Shortly after noon the patrol returned with a report that no enemy had been sighted and the company then moved to the south bank of the Kurerda River. A small raft was constructed on which three men, Sergeant Ronald M. Bretzke, Private Ramsey and Warrant Officer Dixon, crossed the river. Shortly after these men left a small Jap assault boat was brought up from the rear and loaded in preparation for the remainder of the patrol to cross.

Preparations for crossing had just been completed when Sergeant Bretzke discovered a group of sleeping Japs. He ran to the river's edge to give warning, but the Japs, who had been aroused by this time, opened fire, killing Bretzke and wounding two men on the opposite side of the river. Enemy mortars went into action and a third man on the south side of the river was wounded.

One platoon of Company G was in defilade along the south bank of the river. It returned fire and finally the enemy fire ceased. Meanwhile, Ramsey and Dixon had taken cover behind a log on the sand spit between the ocean and the river. The tide was coming in and they were being fired upon. They were forced to swim out to sea and after going several hundred yards south they made the shore safely.

The company dug in along the south bank of the Kurerda River while the natives were returned to Sebari. The company commander also returned to Sebari to radio a report to regimental headquarters. The

radio failed so the message was sent to Gona by a surf boat equipped with an outboard motor. Mortars and additional ammunition were requested. Colonel Doe and Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Dawley, Executive Officer of the 163d Infantry, arrived to appraise the situation and correct supply and communication problems.

On the morning of 3 February, 47 men from Company M arrived with four mortars and immediately placed fire on the opposite bank of the river. Under cover of this barrage the 1st Platoon of Company G under a Sergeant Jones crossed the river and advanced about four hundred yards before it was pinned down. The river was parallel to the beach for about a hundred yards. The strip of land between the river and the beach was about one hundred and fifty yards wide and about seventy-five yards of it was heavily wooded. The Japs were dug in throughout this jungle area.

The 3d Platoon of Company G crossed the river but was unable to advance; it was followed by the 2d Platoon which also came under enemy mortar fire. The 1st Platoon fell back and called for another mortar barrage on the enemy, but when it renewed the attack it again was pinned down. The 1st Platoon withdrew and established a perimeter north of the river and about fifty yards from the enemy position.

During the morning of 4 February another hammering by mortars was meted out to the Japs but the attempt to take the position again failed. A platoon from Company L came in as replacements and the next morning this unit and the platoon from the 186th Infantry moved over an inland route to Fuffarda and Kumbado where they left two squads as rear guard. The remainder of the two units pushed on to the sea-coast to attack the Japs from the rear and drive them into Company G.

The patrol worked its way south along the coast but was late in reaching its objective. After making contact with the Japs it withdrew to a perimeter off the coastline and the Japs withdrew along the coast.

On the morning of 6 February Company G advanced north to make contact with the platoon from the 186th, these two units meeting in mid-morning. The 186th platoon turned around and went back up the coast, spending that night in Bakumbari Village, while Company G bivouacked north of the Kambela River mouth.

The company started north the next morning with the 186th platoon as advance party. About 1600 they reached another river and used Higgins boats in an attempt to land on the beach above the river, but heavy Jap machine-gun fire made this impossible.

The next morning mortars and Australian 25-pounders placed fire on the enemy positions, enabling



A doughboy of the 162d Infantry reads the Australian edition of *Yank* in the jungles of New Guinea during a lull in the action.

the platoon from the 186th Regiment to land without opposition. When it had cleared the area of enemy resistance it moved up the coast to the next river. When the rest of the force arrived at the river another barrage was laid down but the Higgins boats were not available. By the time two Jap assault boats were salvaged, darkness was falling and no crossing was attempted.

The Higgins boats arrived on the 9th but they got stuck on the beach and the two Jap boats had to be used. After making the crossing Company G pushed to the next river or inlet. No boats were available and the water here was too deep to allow the men to ford the inlet. The men rebuilt a native dugout canoe and used it to transport equipment and clothing while they resorted to swimming. The crossing was completed shortly before midnight and the company spent the night on the north shore.

On the 10th, Company G pushed on to the Kumusi River and established a perimeter there. Patrolling activity continued until the 14th when Company L came in to relieve Company G and carried on the mopping-up activities.

On 8 February the 162d Infantry, which had been rounding out its training in Australia, left for New Guinea, sailing across the Coral Sea as if it were on an excursion lake cruise. This unit travelled mostly on Dutch vessels.

The convoy arrived at the Division staging area at Port Moresby, which by now was extremely active. Both American and Australian forces had installations there,

scattered as much as seventeen miles from town. Moresby had finally undergone its one hundredth bombing and the raids had long ceased to be more than a nuisance. The town bore battle scars but it was much better off than the men had been led to believe. The second night the 162d was in Moresby, enemy planes roared overhead and the men experienced an earnest blackout but no bombs fell. Water was scarce and a downpour of rain always was welcome because it brought an impromptu shower bath and the men readily took advantage of each rain.

The 162d remained at Moresby only three days and then sailed around the lower end of the island and on to the area which was to be home for the next several months. On 27 February the unit reached Milne Bay and experienced a small air raid, its first enemy fire. Here the men got an idea of life in the combat area as compared with their garrison life. During a blackout in Australia they were accustomed to driving blacked-out vehicles with road spacing of one hundred and fifty yards. When they entered the combat zone they learned that vehicles were driven bumper to bumper with lights blazing until the last minute before the raid and that the lights went on immediately after the raiders left.

Oro Bay, the point of debarkation, was reached early in March. As these greenhorns stepped on land they were assailed with rumors and outlandish tales circulated by the members of the Division who had preceded them into the area. An example of these tall tales was the story that there were Japs all around in small groups and that resistance was so scarce that platoon leaders would flip a coin to decide who was to go and clean out a pocket of a mere two hundred or so Japs.

The 2d Battalion of the 162d marched from Oro Bay to Gona where it took up positions in beach defense



Mail was a welcome item in every man's life overseas. Here a mortar crew pauses to read letters a hundred yards from Jap positions.



Australians and Yanks gather in front of an American Red Cross hut in New Guinea to listen to phonograph music.

and built fortifications along a three-mile stretch from Basabua on the south to a point several hundred yards north of Gona Inlet. Gradually units of the 162d Infantry relieved the 163d Regiment which then went into Division reserve.

As this newly arrived regiment took over the various areas it gained an idea as to the intensity of the fight which had taken place. Buna, Gona and Sanananda were brown against a green background. Trees were whacked off and splintered by artillery shells and bombs. Jap bodies and equipment littered the area. As time passed all the battlefields took on this same haunting, beaten, flattened appearance.

By this time the entire Division, less the artillery and small detachments of the component units, was concentrated in New Guinea. Rations were a problem. Troops were living on Australian canned "bully beef" and "dog biscuits," two-inch squares of indestructible army biscuit. The story was circulated that a batch of these delectable appetizers was left in the rain experimentally for three days and at the end of that time they were just as hard as ever.

Around 15 January C rations began arriving. Although this type ration is not considered ideal as a constant diet, it was considered a delicacy by this time.

During the campaign phase of this period the average loss of weight per man (supposedly trained, hardened fighters) in this area was estimated by medical officers to be twenty-six pounds. Not all of this loss could be attributed to an inadequate diet, but a large part of it was.

Several times bad flying weather halted the air transport of food and stockpiles went dangerously low. At one time service was interrupted for eight days. It was nearly three months before the men got any fresh meat, and then the only meat that did arrive was bully beef, which was only slightly better than the canned variety. One day some bread was flown in and even though it was two days old it was gobbled up as readily as if it had just come out of the oven.

General Rilea, who had been Assistant Division Commander, was relieved of his duties on 22 February upon urgent call from General MacArthur's headquarters. He was put in command of the United States Army's newly established base port at Sydney. His departure broke a long association with the Division.

On 14 March Jens A. Doe received word of his promotion to brigadier general. When he left command of his 163d Infantry Regiment to accept the post of Assistant Division Commander he wrote: "It is not

World War Two



Relieved of combat duty, troops of the 41st Division board the SS Canberra at Port Moresby for the journey back to Australia.

easy to leave. In the past eight months our training was brought to a peak which was culminated in the Battle of Sanananda. The Regiment met and overcame a treacherous and ruthless foe in carefully organized positions of his own choosing. The units of the Regiment displayed those qualities of initiative, daring, courage and intelligent teamwork which have characterized our best American troops in past wars.

"The immediate cause of my promotion was the striking success of the Regiment. The plans played a part; it was the execution of the plans that was important and brought victory. It is not easy to leave an organization and comrades in arms after such associations. In farewell, I wish the 163d continued success in winning the war, and each one of you good fortune. May everything come your way until the end."

Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) Francis Mason assumed command of the 163d Infantry upon General Doe's promotion.

The job now was not one of training but one of preparing and re-equipping the unit for further encounters with the Sons of Heaven. This was another one of those periods of waiting, the waiting which comes when a unit is building stockpiles of supplies for future moves.

Roads at first were all but impassable. It took an hour and a half by jeep to get from Soputa to Division Headquarters at Dobodura. From Division Headquarters it was a four-hour struggle to the base port at Oro Bay, if anything on wheels could get through. There was no bottom to the mud and a lot of bulldozers were required to get a convoy over that road. Everything received for the first three months had to be brought in from the bay port by jeep over an almost impassable road, or in small ships to one or two beach landing points.

The road-building program was the top project and the stretch between Dobodura and Oro Bay came first. The 116th Engineers, aided by several hundred chanting natives and one company of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, toiled on this operation. When it was completed the unit had a fine road.

Natives were put to work constructing a camp site. Huts, consisting of a pole-frame and palm-leaf roof, were built and as time passed these acquired some kind of wooden floors and a waist-high railing.

One night a group of men living only a few hundred feet from the Sambogo River were awakened by a commotion and a gentle lapping against the bottom of their cots. Upon further investigation they found that the river had risen six to eight feet very rapidly due to rain in the hills and had flooded the area.

Until the early part of May life was fairly calm and serene for the Sunsetters. There were frequent air raids,


which usually did little damage, and as each day passed Jap planes became more and more scarce. One day in March, twenty-eight bombers came over in perfect formation. Many thought they were American but little black puffs began springing up throughout the area indicating that the Japs had completed one of their few successful sneak raids. Jap bombers sometimes were very inaccurate, dropping their loads of death and destruction six miles from what should have been their target. Most of the Division units had excellent jungle cover but a raid still called for a blackout, which usually interrupted a good poker game. Many times men would desert their shelters and watch the raid much as one watches an aerial circus performance. Jap dive bombers were much more effective and accounted for some Allied shipping. However, the ever improving ground gunners soon made dive bombing a poor paying adventure.

Radio Tokyo spent many hours throwing propaganda at the Sunset troops, but few soldiers ever listened. During campaigns no one listened to the radio and during rest-up periods Armed Forces Radio service stations came in clearer. One of the better known Japanese radio shows was Tokyo Rose. She attempted to be satiric in her patter but lacked the cleverness. She did have quite a collection of recordings by the bands of Glenn Miller, Benny Goodman and Artie Shaw, but this music could be heard on any station which it was possible to pick up. Another Japanese radio show which became widely known was the Zero Hour, another program featuring recorded music. Usually the music was on the sentimental side so that fear and homesickness could be spread among the Allied troops. Typical of the sign-off comments was: "Well, if the little man with the long bayonet hasn't finished you off by this time tomorrow, tune in again."

Tokyo Rose at times had information that was amazingly accurate but many times, to the amusement of her listeners, she predicted and confirmed extermination of the 41st Division at Oro Bay.

The Division supply situation was nearly solved by mid-April and roads had been greatly improved. Oro Bay now was within easy reach, being only a twenty-minute trip.

Sunday was a day of dancing for the native villagers and a large crowd of soldiers always was on hand to watch the village virgins do their endless version of a Paul Jones. The dance was done to a chant and the girls had their hair streaked with ochre while their faces were sometimes striped with yellow. The men would join in the chanting and noise-making and at the height of the ceremony one native, well smeared with paint, wearing a false face and leaves, leaped into the ring, brandishing a symbolic spear.



General MacArthur chats with Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller after making an inspection of the 41st Division on New Guinea.

The natives smoked a violent brand of black twist tobacco. They rolled it in newspaper about six inches long, with tobacco only in the outside end. Most of the native men chewed betel nut, which gave them a cheap drunk and stained their teeth brown.

In April, almost one year after its arrival in Australia, the 41st Division Artillery, less the 167th FA Battalion, started the trek from Australia to New Guinea. The group sailed from Gladstone to Oro Bay via Milne Bay. At Milne the convoy was subjected to an attack by one hundred Jap bombers and the troops were put ashore post haste. Two of the ships were sunk by Jap dive bombers and the supplies of the 205th FA Battalion went down on one of the ships. Loss of its supplies kept the 205th at Milne longer and it was not until 24 April that this battalion reached Oro Bay. The 218th FA Battalion, Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery had moved into the defensive installations at the Gona sector, following a brief stay at Port Moresby.

This group found Moresby a welcome surprise. The men had heard about New Guinea with its jungles, rain forests, mud and malarial swamps but here they found a bustling, busy little town, not too badly damaged. The bivouac area was only a few miles from town and had been hewed out of the hillside. For entertainment the town offered a couple of theaters and a Red Cross Club. But there was the rain — rain that only New

Guinea could offer — sweeping downpours that kept the men almost constantly soaked.

One incident of the short Moresby stay which will long live in the memories of these artillerymen is the long pavement of laundry soap that was laid that first morning as the trucks drove from the dock to the camp site. Division Headquarters had some PX supplies coming up with this echelon, and among these items were crates of soap. The crates were loaded on trucks and in the transition from the ship's hold to the trucks the crates were broken open and the soap was strewn all along the route to the camp. The next day each unit had jeeps out scavenging bars of soap which had fallen from the trucks. Soap of any kind was as precious as ingots of gold.

At about this time the 146th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to the prosaic job of a labor battalion at Milne Bay. The 167th Field Artillery Battalion had been left in Townsville where it had been training as a pack-artillery outfit.

From Moresby the remainder of the artillery proceeded to teeming, battle-scarred Oro Bay. Here they witnessed the mute testimony of the Japanese bombings. Three sunken Allied ships nearly filled the tiny harbor, their sides and decks awash, their spars and masts sticking upward in a kind of silent communion.

The units were assigned overnight camp areas near the beach and the orgy of unloading began. The day

of landing was hot and officers and men sweated and strained at the task of unloading and separating supplies. Shifts were scheduled to work throughout the night and Oro-based portable kitchens kept C rations and hot coffee on hand for the laborers.

At 2000 there was a red alert. All vehicles travelling between the docks and supply points were halted. Sentries posted by the base command on the jutting bare hills that rimmed the bay, called down to the toiling men below, ordering all fires and lights to be extinguished. (These were the days before the conventional three red flares were used to herald an attack.) Men huddled together in groups, speculating and nurturing the first of those fears that only bombed peoples of the earth can ever truly know. Nerves became taut as the hours rolled slowly by but the men peered into the darkness and listened. At about 2315 the "all clear" sounded. Lights came on and the quiet which had prevailed throughout the alert now was shattered by reborn voices. Work was resumed and the ships in the harbor, which had sought the open sea, opened their holds to allow men to finish the unloading. When morning came the men trekked into the mess, dirty, unshaven and tired.

About mid-morning the air raid alert sounded again. Almost before the echo had died away, bombs from an enemy force of fifty-nine planes were falling on Oro Bay. The docks and tightly packed ships were the immediate targets. On the docks, caught in the initial terror of the attack, were men who only a moment before had been busy at the task of moving equipment from docks to the shore. The first bombs hit behind the beach road, igniting gasoline dumps and outer in-

stallations. Even in the initial panic men, acting automatically, reached the slit trenches that rimmed the bay. But once they were safely in their holes they could not stay too far under the earth, because the sight of American planes rising to give chase, the dogfights in the sky overhead, the excitement of the whole tragic business was too great. The fiercely burning gas dumps filled the blue heavens with fat, rolling clouds of black smoke. There had been casualties, but no dead.

Signs began appearing everywhere. These added a light touch to things, bringing an occasional much-needed laugh or smile and easing the strain for some man for the moment. Typical of the signs was that erected by a makeshift, haywire lumber concern, GI operated. On an old mounted, circular saw was painted "Thick and Thin Lumber Co. Our Best Is None Too Good." Over the Division Quartermaster Office, commanded by Colonel Frederick C. Roecker, was "Dobodura Trading Co., F. C. Roecker, Prop. Hay—Grain—Oats—Boats." Then there was the inevitable signpost which gave the direction and mileage to such points as San Francisco; Tokyo; St. Louis; Sing Sing; Rigby, Idaho; Croneyville; and Sally, Irene and Mary.

While there was a lull in the fight the men worked hard to add a bit of comfort to their quarters. They took machetes and built everything with practically nothing. They dug wells and made furniture without nails or lumber. A well placed grenade off the beach usually was good for a mess of fresh fish.

The supply situation was well in hand and the Japs at Salamaua had been sounded out. Bigger things were hatching and the question of who was going to strike where, was the important topic of the day.



Map 4

Chapter 6: Seventy-Six Days of Combat

THE 162d Infantry, commanded by Colonel A. R. MacKechnie, ended its long period of waiting and got its baptism of fire in the fight which resulted in the fall of Salamaua and Lae, seventy-six days after the initial landing. In brief the story of the campaign was a landing at Nassau Bay, a junction with the Australians on Bitoi Ridge in the Mubo sector, then a slow process of driving the Japs off the ridges around Tambu Bay, with Roosevelt Ridge and Scout Ridge offering the greatest resistance.

An extensive and extremely hazardous air and ground reconnaissance into Salamaua had been made by Lieutenant Rod Orange with the aid of a couple of native trackers. The place was seething with Japs and even though he was far beyond his own forces, Lieutenant Orange stayed out nearly a month and brought back such detailed and accurate information that he gained a personal commendation from General Fuller. A short time later he was reported missing in action during another reconnaissance mission farther north.

Following the landings at Lae and Salamaua in 1942 the enemy had moved via the Francisco River and Bitoi River to Wau. The small Australian force opposing these landings was able to delay the Jap progress only slightly. By the time the Japs had reached the outskirts of Wau, reinforcements had again been flown in, and by January the Jap advance had been halted and the drive back along the route of their advance had begun. The Nips then set up strong defensive positions in the vicinity of Mubo and the Aussies, who had spent months pecking their way up the Markham Valley, were unable to dislodge them from these positions.

The 1st Battalion of the 162d Infantry had entered New Guinea early in 1943, and upon arrival had relieved elements of the 163d Infantry in the defense of the beach in the Sanananda-Killerton-Gona area and at the outpost on the mouth of the Kumusi River. By 28 February this battalion had departed from Killerton by water and leap-frogged, company by company, up the coast. It occupied the various objectives and patrolled before each successive move. The first stop was at the mouth of the Kumusi River where a supply base was established. Then, in turn, the objectives at Katuna, Opi, Douglas Harbor, and finally the evacuated Jap area at the mouth of the Mambare River were occupied on 15 March.

During the latter days of March, MacKechnie Force was activated and initiated a movement to secure the mouth of the Waria River and Morobe Harbor. This movement was made largely with trawlers and surf boats. By 4 April the 1st Battalion had set up defenses in the Morobe area.

All of this movement north was for the purpose of

flushing out and killing stray Japs from the Buna fight. These marauders were roaming the countryside stealing what food they could get. Very few ever were captured alive. The move to Morobe put the American forces more than halfway between Salamaua and Buna. The forthcoming operations were to include the movement of troops by landing craft at night. Movement inland was to be on foot, and provisions were to be hand-carried by troops and natives. Movement was limited to single files along narrow trails while the combat, in general, was to occur along the tops of steep ridges heavily wooded and covered with dense jungle. As the situation finally developed, 1st Battalion was supplied from the air for more than five weeks.

Throughout this operation the regiment was attached to and under the operational control of the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions, which operated under the command of GOC New Guinea Forces. Differences in operational methods, expressions and customs sometimes caused misunderstanding between the Yanks and Aussies. Several changes in command occurred and questions of command authority arose during the operations, which, added to the natural difficulties of communication, terrain, climate and tactical situation, caused no little confusion at times.

The 162d Infantry had been in New Guinea for four months. Malaria, typhus and other diseases, and the enervating climate had reduced the troops to poor physical shape. Units started the campaign with about two-thirds of their normal strength and in its latter days several companies were reduced to thirty-five and fifty-five men because of the hardships of the campaign, disease and battle casualties.

Artillery and mortars played a major role in this campaign. Frontal attacks were avoided and the nature of the terrain precluded attacks by units larger than a platoon. Throughout the operation several principles of attack were maintained. They were: Maintain constant pressure in front of the enemy position; pound the enemy with mortars and artillery; patrol constantly where the enemy lines are weak; seize a position in the enemy's weak spot with a sufficient force to repel the inevitable counterattacks; follow up vigorously the resultant weakening or withdrawal.

The success of these principles is clearly shown by the figure of 1,272 Japs killed against a loss of 89 men by the 162d Infantry. The Japs paid at a rate of better than 14 to 1 in this fight.

In June plans were laid for the capture of Nassau Bay. Troops assembled at Morobe and patrolled the area as far north as Cape Dinga. The 1st Battalion, which had established defenses at the mouth of the Waria River, was relieved by the 3d Battalion and



Supplies sometimes ran low and, as in the case here, men of the 41st Division had to utilize Japanese equipment until arrival of the American brand.

moved south toward the Waria River where it embarked on an intense offensive training program.

The Allies enjoyed air superiority and were continually hammering Salamaua, Lae, Madang and Wewak. The situation at Mubo had reached a stalemate with the Japs clinging to the Mubo Airstrip, Green Hill, the Pimple and Observation Hill. Lae and Salamaua were well established as Jap supply bases.

The mission of the MacKechnie Force was to land at Nassau Bay on the night of 29-30 June, establish a beachhead and supply base and move inland to positions on Bitoi Ridge where it would participate in a coordinated attack with troops of the Australian 17th Brigade against the Japs in the Mubo area.

By 26 June MacKechnie Force had assembled at Morobe and established supply dumps. Two days later all troops had been moved to Mageri Point, the staging area, except those which were to embark on PT boats at Morobe. All movement was made under cover of darkness and all troops and boats remained concealed during daylight hours.

Allied patrols reported about seventy-five enemy troops near the mouth of the south arm of the Bitoi River, an outpost or two along the beach and about three hundred Japs in bivouac on Cape Dinga, south

of Nassau Beach, with an outpost and OP on the ridge near the east end of the peninsula. One of the PIB (Papuan Infantry Battalion) scouts had spent the night in a Jap camp during these patrolling missions.

One company of Australian troops was to be sent east from Lababia Ridge down to the Bitoi River to attract the attention of the Japs at the mouth of the river and draw them inland. On the morning after the landing this company was to continue down to the Duali area. D-day was set for 30 June with landings scheduled during the night of 29-30 June. During the night of 28 June detachments from the 162d I&R platoon were posted on Batteru, Lasanga and Fleigan, three islands off shore between Mageri and Nassau. One platoon of Australians went to the landing beach, cleared it and installed two lead lights shortly before midnight, 29 June, to guide the landing craft to the beach.

At the same time the PIB moved north from Buso and took up positions along the southern slopes of Cape Dinga. Early the following morning they captured the outposts on Dinga, attacked the Japs on the north coast of the peninsula and blocked the escape route inland.

Strafing attacks were carried out during the after-

noon of the day before the landing and at dusk three PT boats loaded seventy men each at Morobe and moved north to the rendezvous point off Mageri. The loading at the staging area had begun at dusk and waves were leaving Mageri at twenty-minute intervals. The night was extremely dark, rain was coming down in torrents and a heavy sea was running outside the harbor. The first two waves made contact with the PT boats but the third wave failed and continued without guides. The night was so dark and stormy it was difficult to see the wake of the preceding boat.

Everything went wrong during the landing at Nassau Bay, approximately ten miles south of Salamaua. The leading PT boat overshot the beach; in turning back, several of the boats carrying the first wave were lost and much time passed before they could be located. By this time the second wave was moving ashore and crossed in front of the first wave, almost causing a collision. As the boats approached shore they found a ten- to twelve-foot surf pounding the beach. Utter confusion reigned throughout the landing. Boats of the first and second waves attempted to land at the same time in an interval between two lead lights which covered only half of the landing beach. There was a great deal of congestion and, due to the high surf, many of the craft were rammed onto the beach and were unable to get back to sea. Later boats ran into these beached craft or over the open ramps. Of eighteen boats which landed only one made it off the beach and back to sea. All others broached and filled with water as the high surf pounded against them. Despite the rough sea, beaching of the landing craft, confusion and congestion, no men were lost or injured and the only equipment lost were some Aussie radios, which made communications somewhat limited thereafter.

Some of the boats which had been lost took shelter at Buso and attempted to land at Nassau the next night. However, the troops ashore were undergoing heavy attack by the Japs and the boats could get no answer to their recognition signals. They returned to Mageri and did not land at Nassau until the afternoon of 1 July.

The leading elements discovered, after they landed, that the Australian platoon had been lost and had arrived at the beach only in time to establish two lead lights, instead of the three that had been planned. This platoon knew nothing of the enemy situation and was unable to furnish guides who knew anything about the beach area. Company A of the 162d moved inland immediately to a point three hundred yards north of the landing beach and established a perimeter, while Company C did likewise three hundred yards to the south. Company B was being transported in PT boats and could not land because the landing craft had been

broached. This unit returned to Morobe. No contact was made with the enemy that night, although several emplacements and a bivouac area were found abandoned. A prisoner, captured later, said that the landing was a complete surprise and that they knew nothing of it until the boats beached, troops were ashore and the tractors and bulldozers were at work. Due to the noise and confusion the Japs thought they were being attacked by an overwhelming force, including tanks, and they moved inland and hid in the swamps.

By daylight of 30 June, 740 men of the 1st Battalion and 218th Field Artillery Battalion had been put ashore and the beach had been cleared of equipment and supplies. The artillerymen were equipped with 75mm mountain howitzers. Radio communication was practically gone and a heavy burden was thrown on the communications personnel. There was no communication with the PIB on Dinga for three days.

Company C proceeded south to the mouth of the Tabali River without opposition. Company A moved out from the north flank to clear the area to the south arm of the Bitoi River. After a short distance, it encountered enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. The Japs allowed forward elements to advance into their positions and then opened fire on the rear. After attention had been attracted to the rear, they opened fire on the company headquarters group from carefully camouflaged positions. They seemed particularly anxious to eliminate communications personnel. Resistance here was greater than had been anticipated. Company A was reinforced by an Australian platoon and attempted an enveloping attack, but was forced to withdraw so that mortar fire could be placed on the Japs. During this withdrawal the Japs attacked but were held at bay. The Aussies depleted their ammunition supply and a detachment of combat and amphibian engineers had to replace them in the lines. Enemy mortars and machine guns were silenced but the sniping continued.

Company C, less one platoon, was sent to reinforce Company A. The remaining platoon set up a defense north of Tabali Creek and patrolled the area. The reinforced Company A continued northward against light opposition and reached the south arm of the Bitoi by late afternoon. Here it was to establish strong defensive positions for the night.

As Company A approached its objective the platoon of Company C, defending the left flank, reported enemy troops crossing the Tabali near its mouth and approaching the rear of the platoon. A withdrawal was ordered and a defensive line from the beach to the swamp on the south flank of the beach area was to be established. Before this could be accomplished the Japs struck from the rear and flanks and the platoon had to fight its way out to the defensive line. Five men were



A Fifth Air Force photo of the terrain in the Salamaua area. Troops of the 41st Division landed at Nassau Bay, made a junction with the Australians at Bitoi Ridge in the Mubo sector, and moved toward Komiatum along the Francisco River.

killed. Engineer troops, mortarmen from Company D and headquarters personnel were organized into a defensive position and aided in delaying the enemy during this withdrawal.

The attack continued all night. Japs, calling out names and using their usual pet English phrases, infiltrated Allied positions but could not locate any of our men due to the extreme darkness. The darkness was advantageous to the enemy too, since it was almost

necessary to gain physical contact before the outline of a body could be detected.

At dawn on 1 July the Japs opened fire from all positions and continued firing for fifteen minutes. They then withdrew, leaving snipers to cover the withdrawal. The Allies had 4 officers and 17 men killed and 27 men wounded; 50 Japs were killed.

The remainder of Company C joined the platoon and the advance continued south for about a thousand yards

north of the Tabali River. Here the men dug in and patrolled in an endeavor to contact the PIB on Cape Dinga. During the afternoon the enemy made his first bombing attack and these continued almost daily thereafter.

Company B, which had to return to Morobe because of the number of landing craft which had been wrecked during the initial landing, came ashore early on 2 July. The PT boats carrying these troops moved into Nassau Bay and poured cannon and machine-gun fire into Jap-held villages on Dinga Point. Company C continued along the Tabali River but still had not made contact with the PIB on Dinga Point. Company A moved to the south bank of the south fork of the Bitoi River and dug in.

After the Nassau Bay area had been secured, Companies A, B, D and Headquarters troops moved up the south arm of the Bitoi River until they reached Napier, seven and a half miles inland. They were to join the Australians in the Mubo-Wau area. However, considerable resistance was encountered along Bitoi Ridge. Company D hand-carried its mortars and lugged rations and ammunition over this trail which led through the swamps and crossed the swift Bitoi three times. Meanwhile, Company C had pulled back to the Bitoi River and patrolled the Duali area, clearing all resistance north to Duali.

Problems of supply became very difficult and air supply was used. There was a shortage of native carriers and it was becoming increasingly difficult to keep the forward units furnished with rations. Food ran short and water was hard to get, men averaging a canteenful a day for all purposes. Jungle rations had to be mixed with water, but many times there was no water. Faithful native Boongs packed the precious water up the precipitous trails, but even when they got to the troops it was a difficult task to dole out water to thirsty doughboys who were under fire. To make matters worse, the rations given to these men contained salted peanuts. Reserves of ammunition and rations always were dangerously low during this phase of the campaign.

The artillery had similar problems. It could not get into position since the road ran only a half mile inland from the beach. The bulldozer was disabled and the tractor was buried in mud. Engineers and artillerymen worked side by side on the road and after four days Battery C, 218th FA Battalion, had moved inland five miles and was prepared to support the attack on Bitoi Ridge.

The ammunition and food brought in on C-47 transport planes had to be dropped some distance from the troops and the natives carried this equipment, sometimes taking two and a half days to get from the dropping points to the troops.

Evacuation of wounded men was difficult and dangerous. A landing strip for the tiny Cub planes was cleared at Mubo but due to the treacherous winds they could use it only an average of two hours a day. Native litter bearers won admiration and the undying gratitude of the men of the 41st. Over trails hardly wide enough for a man to walk, skirting cliffs often five hundred feet high, they carried the wounded safely and gently. Always there was the soothing comment, "Sorry, Boss" at the slightest jolt of the litter.


The attack on Bitoi Ridge and the ridges west of Bitoi between Buikumbul Creek and Bitoi Ridge got under way at 0800 on 7 July when the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, moved out of Napier. This route was two narrow, rough and winding trails up the Bitoi River to the base of the ridge. The men forded the swift, swollen river twice. Even with hand ropes strung from bank to bank some men were washed under and downstream. However, all were rescued without any fatalities. The trails went over precipitous rises that taxed the strength and endurance of the men under the heavy loads they carried. Mud was heavy and when a man slipped on the trail, down he would go until he was stopped by a tree or until he could grab onto some shrubs or roots. The battalion established a bivouac at the base of the ridge that night while one platoon pushed forward and established an outpost.

By 6 July the entire force had been landed at Nassau. Supplies were coming in regularly, dumps were established and work was progressing on the jeep road along the Bitoi River despite the extreme difficulties of swamps, heavy jungle and incessant rains. The PIB Company had moved from Cape Dinga to the entrance of Lake Salus and by 7 July all of MacKechnie Force had reached Napier.

Two days later Company A captured the ridges adjacent to Bitoi Ridge and made contact with the Australians while Company B moved out to the western tip of Bitoi Ridge to secure the left flank. From this position mortars could be used to support any unit of the battalion. One platoon from Company A moved north and west to Buikumbul Creek while one platoon from Company B patrolled toward Green Hill, finding the terrain rough and treacherous.

In order to find routes of approach to the junction of Bitoi River and Buigap Creek, patrols were active throughout 10 July in the area which was covered with dense undergrowth.

Early on 11 July some casualties returned with the account of the reinforced platoon of Company A, which had moved to the northwest between the Buikumbul and Bui Alang Creeks. On the morning of the 10th a fighting patrol moved down to Komiatum Track and then moved southwest along the track. At dawn the



Map 5

patrol came upon a Jap outpost with ten sleeping Japs in a hutment, killed these and continued the advance. However, after a short while the patrol ran into an enemy ambush which was covering the track. In a stiff battle over half of the platoon became casualties. The remainder returned to the main body of troops.

The remainder of the platoon, in the meantime, had cleared the junction of Bui Savella and Buikumbul Creeks and continued the trek north of Bui Savella Creek. At 1800 the main Jap defenses were contacted and a full-scale attack, supported by mortars and machine guns, was launched, but this was repelled with severe casualties. The platoon was heavily outnumbered and had no support so it withdrew back along the Komiatum Track to its bivouac area of the previous night. The following morning the Company A platoon moved to a position on the high ground occupied by a Company C platoon near the head of Buikumbul Creek where there was a reorganization and the men drew rations and ammunition, and were given five hours for sleep and rest.

At 0930 a mortar barrage was laid down on the enemy in the Buigap Creek area. A patrol from Company A crossed the footbridges over the creek to make contact with the Aussies on the west side, but before contact was made it encountered a large force of Japs moving northeast. The patrol called for mortar fire and additional men but was forced to withdraw about mid-afternoon. One platoon from Company C moved north, cut the Komiatum Track north of Bui Alang Creek, set up ambushes and reconnoitered for a trail leading to Mount Tambu.

On 12 July a Company B platoon contacted the Aussies in the vicinity of the junction of Bitoi River and Buigap Creek. Company A attacked the strong Jap position in the Bui Savella Creek area, following an artillery barrage, and cleared the position without the loss of a man. By noon of 14 July the 1st Battalion had cleared the enemy from Bitoi River to the Bui Alang Creek. This ended the first phase of the fight and for the next two weeks positions were consolidated and defenses strengthened.

By 27 July Company B had moved to Mount Tambu and plans were formulated for the attack on that Jap stronghold. In the early morning hours of 30 July the 1st Battalion started the attack with Company C moving out just as the last mortar rounds were fired. The attack moved slowly and within a half hour the enemy had halted it with machine-gun fire. The assault platoon was pinned down, but the second platoon moved to a position just below the crest of the hill. Some of the men had worked in close enough to clear the first pillboxes, but the Japs regained these positions. Late in the morning one platoon from Company A



A bomber drops rations to troops of the 41st Division somewhere in New Guinea, when the supply problem became desperate.

moved into the fight, but by noon both Company C platoons were pinned down. Then a platoon of Company A swung around to the extreme left to outflank the enemy. The Nips continued to pour in troops and weapons and shortly after noon all units were pinned down by automatic and small-arms fire and were being severely pounded by mortars and grenades. Several minutes later a withdrawal was ordered, this being covered by machine-gun fire and smoke grenades, and completed by late afternoon. Our casualties were heavy, one-third of the attacking force having been either killed or wounded. By 1800 silence reigned over bloody, enemy-held Mount Tambu.

Harassing fire was delivered on Mount Tambu throughout the next week as the troops organized an active defense. Reconnaissance patrols were constantly searching for enemy fortifications, weak points, trails, water points and troop movements. Contact was made with the 3d Battalion of the 162d Infantry which had landed and was moving north. Patrols also found that the enemy held the ridgeline running northeast toward Scout Track. One patrol moved around the Jap positions and located an unoccupied ridge paralleling the Komiatum Track, which served as the main Jap supply trail. The Aussies moved into positions on this ridge and these later became the key to a movement which forced the enemy to evacuate from Tambu to Goodview Junction.



This Air Forces photo shows the rugged terrain over which 41st Division troops fought their way to Salamaua. After the capture of Mubo and the Japanese positions on Lababia Ridge and Green Hill, the attack moved along Buigap Creek to Komiatum, gateway to Salamaua.

Starting 6 August, combat patrols harassed Jap supply and working parties and established ambushes at all known forward watering points. Mortars pounded the Japs from Mount Tambu to Goodview Junction and this type of action continued for a week.

An Australian sergeant in charge of native workers reported on the morning of 12 August, that one of


his workers had noticed a freshly made track crossing the Mount Tambu-Boisi Track on the lower eastern slope of the ridge. A patrol was dispatched south and southeast and made contact with the Japs, estimated to be about forty in number. A platoon of Company B set out to overtake the enemy. The Japs, either by intent or through unfamiliarity with the terrain, had

swung to the southwest, then to the top of Bitoi Ridge and on toward Lake Salus. Another group joined the Company B platoon and the two forces moved to the west shore of the lake. For five days nothing more was heard from this group but on 18 August fifteen men reported back to Boisi and told about the fight against an estimated two hundred Japs on the northwest shore of the lake. The Company B party ambushed the track, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. On the night of 16-17 August the positions were organized by Company B under Lieutenant Messec. These positions came under heavy counterattacks and were completely encircled by the Japs, but the Company B party fought its way out in two directions with only one man being wounded. The party reported into Nassau Beach, completely exhausted, having been without food for two days and being very footsore from the long arduous march. Its action, however, had broken up a suicide attempt to knock out artillery positions from Lake Salus to the north.

Harassing fire continued on Mount Tambu. Late in the afternoon of 18 August a patrol on the east slope worked its way to the crest and found that a partial evacuation had been made. The next morning Companies A and B moved into position to exploit this

avenue of approach, and one platoon reached the crest by midmorning without opposition. A few remaining enemy stragglers were wiped out. After four long weeks of artillery and mortar pounding and three direct assaults Mount Tambu was at last in Allied hands.

Jap positions were found, in many instances, to be ten feet underground with a complete system of tunnels and connecting trenches. At least a full battalion, with virtually perfect organization underground, had occupied the position. Artillery and mortar fire had done little damage to the position but apparently had broken the morale of the garrison. With the capture of Mount Tambu, the 1st Battalion was ordered to rejoin the 162d Regiment. Despite the fact this meant movement over extremely rough terrain it was welcomed by all because it meant a return to normal command and supply and the possibility of a change in diet. After seven weeks of fighting side by side with the Australians the two parted company with equal admiration for one another's ability as fighting men. On the evening of 20 August some men of Company D tripped a Jap booby trap near their bivouac area and eight men were wounded. This was the first booby trap encountered and was to be the only one found during the campaign.



Chapter 7: A Nickname Well Earned

AFTER THE 1st Battalion of the 162d Infantry had secured the Nassau Bay area and had moved inland for the fight on Bitoi Ridge and Mount Tambu, the 3d Battalion, under the command of colorful, intrepid Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Archie Roosevelt, son of the late President Theodore Roosevelt, came ashore on 6 July. This unit set up defenses on the Nassau beachhead and patrolled north of Salus Inlet. Patrolling activities continued for about two weeks but only light contacts were made with the enemy. Part of Company I hand-carried supplies to the 1st Battalion on Bitoi Ridge when the supply problem was critical there.

Around 14 June the 3d Battalion was designated as part of the Coane Force, along with the 2d Battalion and elements of the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, under the command of the 41st Division Artillery commander, General Coane. Plans were made for the move north towards Salamaua. These called for Company I, with one section of heavy machine guns, to move to the high ground overlooking Tambu Bay from the west. Company L, with a section of machine guns and 81mm mortars, was to occupy an open spot on the high ground southwest of Tambu Bay. It was to be joined later by Company K.

Companies I and L moved out on the morning of 18 July. Information regarding a secret trail which was supposed to allow Company I to reach its objective by late afternoon was erroneous, and due to the rugged terrain encountered two days were required for the march. At the end of the first day, rations were almost gone, many men's shoes were unserviceable and the company was a day's march from its objective.

Company K set out via a back trail on 20 July and knocked out some light opposition, reaching Boisi Village late in the afternoon. The advance elements had passed through the village when the Japs opened fire with heavy mortars and artillery from Roosevelt Ridge, a peak named for the commander of the 3d Battalion. Despite the heavy fire, quick action on the part of the company commander, who was himself wounded, prevented excessive casualties. American artillery was brought into play and silenced the enemy guns. Company K then reorganized and dug in south of the village. At 1500, Companies I and L moved into Tambu Bay. Although they were worn out from two days of forced marching, they reached the swamp south of Boisi by 2100.

The battalion caught hell getting into Tambu Bay. The Japs, strongly entrenched on Roosevelt Ridge, threw everything at the advancing Sunsetters while other Jap forces on towering Scout Track Ridge, to the left of the battalion, raked them with withering en-

filade fire. Despite this heavy enemy resistance, and with the aid of their own artillery, the men of the 3d Battalion edged slowly ahead and established a command post at the base of Roosevelt Ridge, while a part of the force tried to drive the Nips off Scout Track Ridge, thus ending the menacing enfilade fire.

The initial attack on Roosevelt Ridge got under way early on 22 July when Companies K and L assaulted, with Company I in reserve. The sides of the ridge proved to be too steep for climbing, forcing the men to ascend hand over hand. As they neared the top the Japs rolled down grenades and, in some cases, mortar shells on them, supplementing these with heavy rifle and automatic-weapons fire from well dug, cleverly concealed positions.

The following day Company I moved atop Scout Track Ridge and reconnoitered the area. For purposes of clarification it can be stated here that later developments proved that there was no junction between Scout Track Ridge and Roosevelt Ridge, although this was not established until after the capture of the latter. It also was discovered that Scout Hill and Mount Tambu had no connecting ridge but were separated south of Roosevelt Ridge by deep canyons, despite photo and map interpretations which indicated connections.

During the next few days Company L established a perimeter due east of Boisi on Scout Track Ridge while one platoon moved south toward Mount Tambu. This platoon routed a Jap combat patrol but soon was halted by a superior force, well deployed across the trail. Forward elements of Company I, in the meantime, moved north along Scout Track Ridge and after a 200-yard advance drew strong resistance from a well dug-in Jap position, which contained, among other weapons, a 70mm howitzer that proved to be quite effective against Allied artillery.

While the 1st Battalion was reducing Bitoi Ridge and moving into Mount Tambu for the showdown fight, the 3d Battalion was butting against the stubborn Roosevelt Ridge emplacement. From 30 July to 13 August several assaults had been made against this stronghold but each was repelled. Help was needed and the 2d Battalion of the 162d Infantry, which was at Morobe, far down the coast, was committed to the fight. When the 3d Battalion left Morobe for Nassau Bay, it was the 2d Battalion which had taken over the former's installations.

At dawn on 16 July, Company G had landed on Lababia Island, a half mile off shore from the mouth of the Bitoi River. While this landing was taking place the remainder of the battalion moved into Nassau Bay, and Company F moved north along the beach as



A doughboy struggles across a swift-running jungle river into Japanese territory in the Salamaua area as Americans and Australians advance on the north shore of New Guinea.

Coane Force reserve. It arrived at Tambu Bay on 21 July.

When it moved into the Tambu Bay area, the 3d Battalion met such stiff resistance, and rugged terrain over so extensive an area that General Fuller gave orders to commit the remainder of the 2d Battalion, commanded by Major Arthur Lowe, later by Major Armin Berger. The 2d Battalion moved into the Tambu Bay sector aboard landing craft at night and completed the move by 29 July. An Australian unit took over the defenses of the Nassau Bay area.

Now the infantry had two battalions—at least in name if not in number—ready to assault Roosevelt Ridge, the extremely rugged feature with very steep, heavily wooded slopes. This ridge protected the northern section of Tambu Bay, where it rose from the sea and extended westward some eighteen hundred yards. Here it appeared to make a junction with Scout Track Ridge, although this was later disproved.

Two artillery battalions were in position, and frequent heavy artillery and mortar shellings were placed

on the ridge but the Japs merely pulled back into their holes. When the fire lifted and our troops began to move up the steep slopes, a signal, usually a bugle call, sounded, and the enemy poured out to man his guns and emplacements. Attack after attack by the 3d Battalion had been staved off in this manner. So heavy was this fire that some spots on the ridge were blasted virtually bare of vegetation.

On 28 July Company E gained a firm hold on a small side ridge slightly below the crest of Roosevelt Ridge, this being gained only after severe fighting highlighted by excellent artillery support and aggressive leadership. This unit beat off several counterattacks and was subjected to sniping and mortar fire but clung desperately to the ground which it had gained. Several attacks were pressed against the crest but again the outcome was utter failure.

After some hard fighting, Company G, which had rejoined the 2d Battalion, established a combat outpost on Roosevelt Ridge on 12 August and now was in position to support the 2d Battalion attack the follow-

ing day. Company F made the main assault on the left, attacking the known enemy positions, while Company E pulled a diversionary movement toward the next high ground to the east. Artillery fire protected the flanks. Shortly after the battle started the men manning the Company G outpost attacked the enemy in front of Company F and assisted the latter in gaining its objective.

The fight continued throughout the afternoon and night of the 13th, and as darkness fell over the shattered battlefield on the night of the 14th the enemy lines had been breached in two places. The 162d Infantry had gained the top of the ridge and cleaned it off to the shoulder of its junction with Lokanu Ridge. This firmly entrenched the Sunsetters on the seaward end of the ridge.

The day for the attack on Roosevelt Ridge was a brilliantly clear one. Task Force Headquarters was crowded with officers, men and war correspondents. Though the imminent show was classified top secret, word was passing down through the ranks that something out of the ordinary was stewing. Any observant person walking along the beach that morning could see that the anti-aircraft guns were being turned inland towards the ridge, leveled for ground firing, checked and oiled. Ammunition was being piled and covered in preparation for H-hour. Men were lining up the sights of the Bofors guns on that dark, mysterious ridge, where for weeks the infantry had gallantly tried to rout the deeply entrenched enemy along the commanding crests. All of the guns at the disposal of the commander of Royal Artillery were ordered to turn their far distant barrels toward Roosevelt Ridge. There was a thrilling, ominous feeling in that order. Gunners were quickly laying their pieces on a target which was miles away, in some cases beyond their sight and immediate knowledge. All morning long the preparations continued. Fire-direction centers checked and rechecked figures and computations. All morning switchboards buzzed with traffic, radios monitored and sent and relayed and received. By noon the newsmen were downing hasty lunches and leaving for the beach, Tambu Bay, Boisi Village, all of which served as grandstand seats for the whole tragic business. At about 1315 the jungles north, south and west of Roosevelt Ridge shook and shivered to the sustained blast. The mountains and ridges threw the echo back and forth, down and out, and the quiet whitecapped sea to the east, ringing the outer third of Roosevelt Ridge, grew dark as it received the eruption of earth and steel on that stricken shoulder of land. Scores of guns—75mm howitzers, Aussie 25-pounders, 20mms, Bofors, light and heavy machine guns, even small arms—had opened up simultaneously on the enemy-held ridge. A score of more

Allied fighters and bombers had swooped low to strafe its dome and tons of bombs released from the B-24s and B-25s fell straight and true, to detonate, shatter, rip and tear and to deliver certain death at that moment on an August afternoon. Those who watched from the beach saw the top fourth of the ridge lift perceptibly into the air and then fall into the waiting sea. In a scant twenty minutes all that remained of the objective was a denuded, redly scarred hill over which infantrymen already were clambering, destroying what remained of a battered and stunned enemy. Following the fall of Roosevelt Ridge the 162d Infantry was faced with a series of ridges on Dot Inlet, just north of Tambu Bay. This bay was surrounded on three sides by ridges—Roosevelt to the south and southwest, Scout Track Ridge on the west, and Lokanu on the north. Extending toward the sea from Scout Track Ridge, and running generally parallel to Roosevelt Ridge, were five ridges designated as A, B, C, D and Lokanu or E Ridge.

By this time the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harold Taylor, had been released from Australian operational control and reverted to regimental control. This marked the first time that the 162d Infantry had fought as a unit. The 1st and 3d Battalions began the job of cleaning up Scout Track Ridge. Companies A and B swung to the west in an envelopment. Almost immediately Company B ran into well organized positions on the northwest ridge of Bald Hill, so named because of its complete devastation from artillery and mortar fire. Reconnaissance showed that this position, which extended in front of Companies I and L, was a deep coverage of supply lines to the main ridge position. Company A made a wide envelopment to the north, cut further supply lines and succeeded in gaining a position astride the main Jap supply trail for the entire south Scout Track Ridge sector. This pinch put the Japs in dire distress, a fact which became even more evident on the night of 30 August. Company A patrols had maintained ambushes for three days but on this date a large force of Japs completely surrounded the Company A position, cut telephone wires and assaulted in nine waves. The fire was terrific but the 84-man garrison stalled off one wave after another; the Nips lost 159 men and suffered heavy casualties while Company A had four men killed and a similar number wounded. The supply of hand grenades and tommy-gun ammunition had been depleted and efforts to supply this position failed for two days because the steep ascent was raked with deadly machine-gun fire. To make the supply of hand grenades stretch as far as possible the men heaved mud balls when they heard a noise in the jungle. If the noise continued, the conclusion was that it was



The 205th Field Artillery Battalion uses tractors to pull a Bofors AA gun up a new road to the top of Roosevelt Ridge.

being made by an animal. However, if the noise stopped when the mud ball fell then it was pretty certain to be a Jap and then a real grenade was used. A runner from the encircled company wormed his way back to the other units with the story of his unit's plight. A withdrawal through organized enemy positions was made without a casualty and was so successful that even the wounded got out. Mortars, machine guns and 37mm guns fired on the position just evacuated by Company A.

Meanwhile, Company B had hacked away at enemy positions on the west of Bald Hill and finally occupied the area, making contact with Company L on top of the ridge on the morning of 29 August. Company B then covered the supply trail to Company A and Company C fell in the rear of Company B, deploying the battalion in a column. A ridge-by-ridge campaign was waged until Scout Track Hill was taken on 9 September. In patrolling Dot Inlet the 2d Battalion found that all ridges except C were thickly infested with Japs and that these enemy troops kept coming up from Lokanu (or E) Ridge.

Manpower, always a major problem, by now had reached the critical stage. No replacements had been

received by the regiment since its arrival in New Guinea. Normal attrition, casualties, disease, and neurosis brought on by the very nature of the terrain over which the men fought accounted for tremendous losses and greatly reduced the force. With this situation existing a provisional battalion composed of the Antitank Company, Cannon Company and the Regimental Band was formed and took up positions on Roosevelt Ridge to furnish flank and beach security. Antitank Company had found no Jap tanks to stop and the Cannon Company, whose normal weapon was the self-propelled 105mm gun, lacked these weapons and during this campaign fired 81mm mortars.

When Company G was relieved on Lababia Island it moved to Dot Inlet and set up a perimeter at the base of Ridges C and D, near Bulambun. Five days later the remainder of the 2d Battalion moved into the sector. The battalion plan was to cut the enemy's line of communication on Scout Ridge at the point where Scout Track Ridge and Ridge C formed a junction. Patrolling activities uncovered the fact that there was no junction. Ridge C came to a dead end, and where there was supposed to be a junction there was nothing but heavy woods and jungle. Company F and

Company E, which had followed to give support and cover the supply trail, set up a perimeter which extended down Ridge C.

About two hundred yards across a deep draw to the right front was Berger Hill, while on the left was high ground which first appeared to be the northwest end of Ridge B, but was later found to be a separate hill. Directly in front of these two companies was a deep gorge which contained a Jap watering point.

An investigation of Berger Hill got underway early on 26 August by a Company F patrol. This patrol moved to the enemy water hole and had just left this spot when it heard noises to the left rear in the direction of Scout Track Ridge and Ridge B. The patrol took cover and waited. In a little while three Japs, en route to the watering point, appeared. The patrol killed two and wounded the third. However, it was believed that the wounded man still was capable of spreading the alarm, thereby tipping off the main body of Japs that the patrol was approaching. The patrol made a hasty reconnaissance and returned to the main body before its presence was detected and the return route cut off. Enemy emplacements had been spotted on top of Berger Hill.

Later that day another patrol from Company F encountered a party of Japs in the vicinity of the water hole and got into a skirmish. Many casualties were inflicted on the enemy but he retaliated with extensive grenade fire and the patrol had to withdraw. Patrolling activities continued through 29 August with much effective sniping being done by the Americans.

By 29 August, Company L was able to move north from a position which had been static since 24 July. This was made possible by the envelopment of Ridge C on the north and east by the 2d Battalion. Company L moved northeast and made contact with Company I the following day. This move forced another enemy withdrawal, again somewhat influenced by 2d Battalion pressure on Ridge C and an attack on Ridge D by a company of the Australian 15th Infantry Battalion. The enemy now occupied positions immediately in front of the 2d Battalion and still held Berger Hill.

The 2d and 3d Battalions now began the reduction of the enemy concentrated in a pocket between them on Scout Track Ridge. Company A tried to circle in order to contact the 2d Battalion but failed when it was attacked. Plans now called for the 3d Battalion to secure the ground to its front, this being to the left front of the 2d Battalion. When this was accomplished the 2d Battalion was to pivot to the right, take Berger Hill then advance on Scout Track Ridge and secure Scout Hill.

Company E, after being in contact with the enemy for forty-four days, was driven from Berger Hill late


in the afternoon of 8 September. This marked the last contact with the enemy until the conclusion of the campaign in mid-September. The following day Company F occupied Berger Hill without opposition and made contact with the Aussies on Scout Track Ridge. The enemy withdrew from Lokanu (Ridge E), and it was occupied by the Allies on 8-9 September. The following day the 3d Battalion drove up the coast toward the Francisco River, which bordered the Salamaua airport. The 2d Battalion went down Scout Track Ridge while the 1st Battalion fell back into regimental reserve.

The Japs were falling back but they were getting no respite. The artillery and air force were giving Salamaua itself a terrific pasting. During the progress of the campaign on 4 September, the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions had moved in, landed north of Lae and pressed the fight into that important port. From the ridges to the south the 162d Infantry troops could observe the great sea movements. At about this time the first United States paratroopers committed to action in the Southwest Pacific area, landed in the Markham Valley and began to push toward the seacoast. The enemy was hemmed in from three sides and had his back to the open sea. Troops of the 162d Regiment plus some Aussies were pushing up from the south, the Aussies were moving in at Lae on the north and the paratroopers were striking from the west.

To the battle-hardened veterans of the 3d Battalion was to fall the task of winding up the Salamaua campaign. This unit, now under the command of Major Jack E. Morris, moved all day of the 10th and got to Logui Point on Bayern Bay the following day. The movement was made so fast that the men carried everything on their backs, across swamps, and through the ocean when they were forced to wade around the jutting points. They drove through one perimeter after another, finding some unoccupied. Resistance was negligible but much Jap equipment, including artillery, was captured. Later it was learned the Japs had left between eight hundred and one thousand Imperial Marines to make a rear-guard action to cover the escape of the main force.

The 3d Battalion pushed unrelentingly toward Salamaua. Vehicles could not follow the tortuous route and it was decided to get to Salamaua first and depend upon picking up supplies later. Guns, food and necessary ammunition went forward on the backs of the men. The command post at this time consisted of a map in the battalion commander's hip pocket.

On 11 September, orders were given to cross the Francisco River and storm Salamaua. No one knew what lay ahead but all expected to catch hell and a fight to the finish since the fall of Salamaua would



Private Charles Ruocco gives a trim to General Fuller outside the Division Commander's tent during a lull in the fighting.

signify the end of the eastern New Guinea campaign. However, the vaunted Japanese determination to make a death stand apparently weakened under the threat of the three-pronged attack.

A small group of officers and men, deciding to test what the Japs would offer at Salamaua, walked into the Francisco River on 12 September and deliberately, although apprehensively, forded the stream. Not a shot greeted this group as it waded through the water and climbed out on the opposite bank. Just the previous day the Japs had been throwing out some heavy artillery fire but now the guns were silent. The Japs had fled. The 3d Battalion immediately crossed the river and Salamaua was in American hands. This had been a dream of conquest on the 28th day of June 1943 and was an objective gained on Sunday, 12 September—exactly seventy-six days after the initial landing. This became the longest siege of sustained combat in the Pacific area. Only one Jap was taken prisoner in this final push and only six throughout the campaign.

The Aussies from the north poured into Salamaua on the heels of the Yanks and the 2d Battalion followed the 3d across the river.

When the Japs had overrun Salamaua in their southward march in 1942 it had been a lovely place on a beautiful, land-locked harbor. When they gave it up, it was a filthy, rat-ridden, pestilential hole. Rotting corpses sent up a vile stench and rats as big as small dogs roamed all over the place.

The Salamaua campaign from Nassau Bay through Tambu Bay, Roosevelt Ridge and Scout Track Ridge had taken seventy-six days of fighting over as difficult military terrain as the United States Army has ever encountered. From start to finish there had been no let-up, day or night, in the heavy fighting, small skirmishes and patrolling. The 162d Infantry had received its baptism of battle and moved nearly two hundred miles from Sanananda Point to Salamaua. It had recaptured more ground for the Allies than had any other force since Pearl Harbor. The campaign from beginning to end was a paradox of contradiction, countermanding command responsibility, inadequate supplies and insufficient personnel. When Company G arrived at Tambu with its 135 men (normal company strength was 196 officers and men) it was the strongest company in the 2d and 3d Battalions. About a week before the final assault on Roosevelt Ridge the 3d Battalion was down to 426 officers and men, just about half of its normal strength. Companies I and K at this time had only 65 officers and men and Company K's strength dropped to 39 men by 30 August. The only replacements the regiment received were its own wounded and sick who were restored to duty. One time 52 newly commissioned second lieutenants, enlisted men from the 41st and 32d Divisions, who had won bars at the officer candidate school in Australia, were brought in as replacements.

Officers were choice targets for the Japs and the casualties among commissioned personnel were high. The Japs would let a hundred enlisted men pass in order to get a shot at an officer. To get the utmost protection, officers wore no insignia of rank and they tried not to reveal their identity by pointing, or using other sure fire means of distinguishing themselves as leaders or key personnel. However, just the opposite was done by the enemy. The Jap officer bore himself importantly, strutted and usually carried a saber.

The versatility of the artillery had been a big factor throughout the entire New Guinea campaign. It trained and fought well with all types of artillery pieces. The men became so proficient in laying down fire that sometimes the bursting shells were falling only seventy-five yards in front of the advancing infantrymen. Throughout the fight the artillery played havoc

with the Japs. The enemy even went so far as to attempt a suicide raid on the Allied artillery positions. Just after the fall of Roosevelt Ridge a group of approximately 150 Japs made a futile attempt to knock out the artillery with demolition bombs. They worked themselves behind the Allied lines and caused some casualties among the artillerymen, but the latter deployed as infantrymen and drove off the raiders. Damage to the guns was slight.

The 218th and 205th Field Artillery Battalions were concentrated at Tambu Bay, some six miles from the Salamaua Peninsula. One day an artillery observer saw a Japanese transport plane coming in for a landing on the Salamaua airstrip. He called for fire on the airfield and a lucky shot hit the plane squarely, blasting it and the occupants into eternity.

Colonel William D. Jackson, 41st Division Artillery executive officer, had gone into the Salamaua campaign as artillery commander for the MacKechie Force and was later made commander of the Royal Artillery, putting him in charge of all Australian and American artillery in the area. For his fine job the Prime Minister of Australia awarded him the British Distinguished Service Order.

Mortars played an outstanding role all during the campaign. As the long battle wore on the mortar men could lay 60mm mortar fire within twenty-five yards of their own forces and 81mm fire within thirty-five yards. The Japs were proficient with mortars too and caused many Allied casualties with this weapon.

The Australians and Americans fought entirely different campaigns. When the Aussie infantrymen lacked immediate artillery support they would storm the enemy and take the objective by sheer perseverance and bravery. In one instance, twenty Japs in a pillbox took the lives of two hundred and fifty Australians before the Aussies reduced the emplacement. The Yank style of fighting was to wait for the artillery to come up and let the big guns blast the enemy positions as barren of all life as possible. It saved many American lives and got better results, although it took longer.

In speaking of this American style of fighting, Colonel Jackson said, "Power kills more Japs faster."

When men reminisce over the days of this campaign three places will stand out in their memories. Artillerymen will remember Hines Beach, the starting point for the cannoners, which was nothing more than a stretch of grassy, malarial swamp edging the white beach over which supplies were dragged at night from LCTs. Hines Beach served as Force Headquarters and was the focal point of artillery support. It was a strip of mud which seemed to sink farther into the slime of the lowlands with each pounding rain.



A member of the 41st Division pauses long enough for the luxury of a shave.

The second place of battle which will be indelibly imprinted in the minds of the men is Tambu Bay, the inland jungle home at the base of the tortuous ridges that lay between the Allied troops and their objective—Salamaua. Tambu was another malarial stretch of land, but it was land at least, and not swamp. It was the second and most permanent bivouac and it nestled, ripe for the picking of enemy guns and planes, in a valley around which the mountains shouldered.

And, lastly, the place which will stand out foremost in the minds of these men who made history in the bowels of New Guinea is Roosevelt Ridge, an objective which once had been forested and nearly impassable but now was denuded and made impotent by a powerful combined attack of infantrymen, anti-aircraft fire, artillery fire and air bombardment. It was here that the 41st Division troops had pounded against the Jap defenses for more than a month, and finally drove the enemy up and over and down the other side, a broken and bewildered foe.

Hines Beach, Tambu Bay and Roosevelt Ridge, three ponderables, three steps along the road to Salamaua and the end of a bloody, tiresome fight, three places which the men who fought there hope never to see again but whose names always will have a place in their minds and hearts. They will be talked about whenever and wherever veterans of the fight meet. The

conversation, like all such retrospective conversations, will start with one word—remember?

Remember the small-boats section that ran the tiny outboards between Hines Beach and Nassau Bay, carrying messages, supplies, mail and men—men with stars on their collars and men with one stripe or no stripes at all on their sleeves, but equally important men; men who were equally anxious to see the battle ground and equally willing to return to the relative complacency of Nassau and other points farther south?

Remember the day when the men crowded beneath the trees along the shore all the way from Tambu to Hines to Nassau to watch the B-24s and B-25s and the P-38s bomb and strafe the already legendary Roosevelt Ridge and beyond the ridge the eventual prize, Salamaua?

Remember that early morning when Battery B of the 205th FA Battalion exhausted its ammunition and how a human train was formed from the dumps at Salus Lake, two miles south, up to the mouths of the hungry guns?

Remember the C rations, bully beef, the Fleetwood cigarettes, pup-tent living conditions, the rain, the brave, tireless, worthy, black native boys who carried supplies and wounded? Remember Mount Tambu, Mubo, Boisi Village, the Komiatum Track, Dot Inlet, the Francisco River and Salamaua, that long, slim, cigar-shaped peninsula that stretched out into the blue ocean, the peninsula for whose domination men fought, sweat, bled, cursed and died?

Yes, these and many others will be remembered now that the veterans are back in the quiet and security of their own homes, which are secure only because of fights such as those at Salamaua.

Until this time men of the 41st always had been tagged with the nickname of the Sunset Division. But in the press releases coming from the very heart of New Guinea came more and more frequent dispatches referring to this Northwest aggregation as the "Jungleers" or "MacArthur's Jungleers." This nickname stuck and always is a reminder of those early days when each bit of offensive action in those heretofore little-known, stinking hell holes brought much encouragement to a victory-hungry American people.

General MacArthur was generous in his praise of the gallant 162d Infantry, and in special orders of the day, directed to both American and Australian troops, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring, in command of the New Guinea Force which directed the campaign, said:

"The capture of Salamaua marks the end of a campaign of seven months duration. It has been a campaign of very great importance to the Allied cause in

the Southwest Pacific. You have all done a magnificent job, have out-fought the Japs and have triumphed in spite of the difficult terrain and trying conditions."

During this period the men of the 41st Division had learned many things about themselves and the enemy. And people throughout the world began realizing too that American soldiers could outshoot and outfight the Jap and beat him at his own game. A Jap, coming face to face with an American, hesitated for a brief fatal second, standing with his mouth open. But instinctively the Yank pressed his trigger. It was difficult to catch the Jap off guard, however. He was a master of camouflage and sometimes the American would be within ten feet of his wary enemy before he saw him. The Japs either were completely offensive-minded, or completely defensive-minded, seldom both. Kicked out of a place, he sometimes would attack the American perimeter as many as five times in a night. Jap machine gunners rarely traversed or searched a target with their guns but froze to them, shooting straight ahead, oblivious to everything else. American soldiers sometimes stole up on a Jap machine gunner who had his eyes closed and finger clenched on the trigger of his chattering weapon.

American troops displayed a sense of humor which the Japs lacked. Jumping off on an attack the Jungleers called the no-man's land between their own perimeter and that of the enemy, "the last mile." At Salamaua the Nips constantly harassed the 162d with a 6-inch naval gun whose projectile sounded like a wagon when it went over. The men promptly tagged this gun, "Gurgling Gertie." Another one was "Whizbang Joe."

A sergeant, supervising the loading of ammunition while the dump was being bombed by the enemy, somewhat relieved the tension at the moment when he yelled to the men: "Come on, you lugs, get that ammunition moved and in fifteen days we'll be in the calaboose for being drunk on Broadway."

When Company L came down out of the hills the men found a small creek, the first water for bathing they had seen in forty-five days of combat. They literally plunked down in it and reveled in their luxury for several hours.

Wounded men seldom, if ever, complained or felt sorry for themselves during the campaign. Sometimes as many as twenty men were required to get a litter down from the hills. For that reason a man had to be pretty badly hurt to be classed as a casualty. Officers told of seeing men walk for a mile, with wounds in both legs, in order to get to an aid station.

After Salamaua had fallen into Allied hands the 162d Infantry went into reserve with the Australian 5th Division and took up patrolling and mopping-up

activities. Meanwhile the enemy was doing his utmost to break up the Aussie assault on Lae, and Nip planes were over the Salamaua area daily, making the troops seek the shelter of their foxholes.

On 19 September each battalion held memorial services for its dead. The bodies had been brought out of the hills and laid to rest in an American cemetery established under the palm trees close by the beach at Salamaua. On this occasion Major Morris made an address to his 3d Battalion which was typical of the thoughts and attitudes of the American soldier. He said:

There is no place for sentimentality in the Army—especially an army at war. World-shaking events are daily occurring and on this stage we are playing our small part. The role we have recently completed has been filled with many unpleasantnesses and privations that are better left undiscussed. A soldier's life, especially in time of war, is a hard one. Ours is a dangerous profession. Those dangers are accepted without

question by the soldier and he follows through on his job with little thought for his personal sacrifices, which must necessarily be taken for granted. Men fall on the field of battle never to rise again—and upon their passing we dare not pause to dwell—there is still a war to be won and a job to be done.

A soldier can neither afford nor has the time to dwell in retrospect upon the saddening events that, unfortunate as they may be, necessarily are incident to combat. We are not gathered here to mourn our dead. Crepe-hanging amongst fighting men is as dangerous as enemy bullets. Rather, let us think of being assembled here for the purpose of paying tribute to a group of gallant comrades, who, when the blue chips were down, gave their last full measure of devotion.

In life, as well as in death, these men were truly great. In memory their stature will continue to grow. Such deeds and such men are never forgotten. No one can foretell what lies ahead of us. But some day this will all be over and we will be able to relax. Even then I know that the memory of these men to whom we pay homage today will not have dimmed—and somewhere in a corner of our hearts and minds they will be beside us and take their places in line when the topkick steps out in the company street and yells "Fall in!"

Chapter 8: Back to Australia

WHILE THE 162d Infantry was carrying on the fight at Salamaua other units of the 41st Division returned to Australia. In the second week of July, the 163d Infantry, first of the 41st Division units to go to New Guinea, began the move back to the Land Down Under. Returning as it came, it was flown to Port Moresby and shipped from there by boat.

Next went the 186th Regiment, under the command of Colonel Oliver P. Newman. This outfit moved from Cape Endaiadere on LCTs and LSTs to Milne Bay, where the regiment's 2d Battalion remained as a defense force for Sixth Army Headquarters. The remainder of the regiment was loaded on two Dutch merchantmen and went "home" to Rockhampton. There the units plunged once again into intensive training, advancing under actual fire of artillery and mortars.

Salamaua fell to the Allied troops on 12 September 1943, and the usual activities of souvenir-hunting, reading and answering mail occupied the troops of the 162d Infantry until 25 September when they loaded on LCTs for the return trip to Australia. Loading was carried out shortly after midnight because of the danger of Jap air attack. By afternoon the boats had reached Oro Bay. Some of the men were down to their shorts, while many of them wore an ill-fitting assortment of Jap sailor and marine uniforms which had been taken from the captured dumps at Salamaua. Long-legged Yanks were ludicrous in the Jap pants that hung midway between the ankle and knee.

A military band serenaded the victorious jungle veterans at Oro Bay and they thoroughly enjoyed it. They received new clothing and spent several days doing nothing but bathing, eating and general cleaning up. More stacks of mail were waiting at Oro Bay. Some men picked up half a year's supply of magazines and newspapers, because only the first-class mail had followed them to the combat areas. Generally speaking, the mail service had been pretty good. First-class mail was fairly prompt while the second, third and fourth classes were slower; however, no one expected the postman to visit him every day in the combat zone. Combat troops had first priority on delivery of mail. Letter-writing had been almost as difficult as receiving letters. Most of the supply of writing paper had long since been depleted and the men resorted to using some captured Jap paper and even went so far as to use toilet tissue.

On 28 September the 162d Infantry boarded the *Sea Snipe*, a former German ship which was converted to a transport, and began the last leg of the journey to Australia to rejoin the remainder of the Division.

On the way back there was one enemy submarine scare. Most of the return trip was spent in letter writing and "jawbone" poker. There had been no pay for six months.

In the afternoon of 3 October the task force reached Gladstone, disembarked the following morning, and proceeded to Rockhampton by troop train. Artillery and other units were on the way back and by 30 October the entire Division had reassembled at Rockhampton. Once again it meant good, bounteous food, dry clothes, showers, recreation, ranges, training and all those things of which the men had been deprived. Best news of all was the announcement that seven-day furloughs, plus travel time, would be granted, these being the first since that fifteen-day furlough way back in the autumn of 1941, just before the war had become a real and living part of each man's life. These furloughs enabled some to return to Melbourne and Sydney while others tried new jaunts out to the west. A few men even made it to Tasmania, the isle of chocolates and apples. Bundaberg, a little town in southern Queensland, with its tree-lined main streets, became a favorite rendezvous for the men because it resembled so many country towns back home.

But Rockhampton and Australia were not to be just rest camps and recreation centers. They were again busy training centers. The 41st had learned many valuable lessons. Its soldiers were the veterans, the jungleers, the heroes of Sanananda and Salamaua, and these men were to serve as models for new combat units arriving in the Southwest Pacific. But the Division had to start training all over again for the campaigns which were to come. As Sanananda had ended the Papuan campaign, so had Salamaua ended the Eastern New Guinea campaign. But the Japs still were at Wewak, Aitape, Hollandia, Wakde and Biak and they had to be cleaned out before New Guinea could be cleared.

During this stay in Australia the 41st Division Band organized a male chorus known as the "Men of the 41st." This group made several recordings in Brisbane with the Australian Broadcast Commission and on Christmas Eve, 1943, was featured on a national hookup program. To further facilitate recreation, a platoon from the Sixth Special Service was attached to the Division during its second sojourn in Rockhampton.

When the war started and the Jungleers were at Fort Lewis, all identification had been removed from uniforms. Now this ban was lifted by the War Department and the familiar red-gold-and-blue shoulder patch again appeared on the uniforms of the Sunset men. The old patches had been left at home but new ones were supplied by the Australians. These were not

quite like the originals, but looked enough like the old patches to identify their wearers as members of the proudest infantry division in the Southwest Pacific.

In November the artillery again was complete as the 167th FA Battalion returned from Townsville where it had turned in its horses and pack 75s in favor of new howitzers. This unit had been training as a pack outfit all of this time.

In those fall and early winter days the minds of most of the men were on only one thing—home. The Division had been overseas for eighteen months, in combat for six months, and the men were homesick. The months in New Guinea had filled many with malaria germs and many more carried the pockmarks of jungle rot and infection.

The Division was destined to spend its second Christmas in Rockhampton, its third away from home and loved ones. There were no green fir trees like those back home and no colored lights. But the men unwrapped their Christmas packages (in fact, most of them opened the gift parcels as fast as they arrived, because the Division was on alert and in the event of a sudden departure it would be impossible to carry packages) and they hung the colored bits of wrapping twine on trees about their camps. Christmas religious services had a good attendance.

Uncle Sam's forces in the Pacific were beginning to roll forward. Yet from where the men of the Sunset Division stood, the war in late 1943 took on the appearance of being an endless proposition.

Sixth Army Headquarters devised a malaria rest center which in a short time became known, not nostalgically but virulently, as the "fox farm." I Corps took up the old whiplash of inspections while Division Headquarters pumped and pummelled training down on the shoulders of the men and Division Artillery



Officers and men of the 162d Infantry hear an Easter Sunday program at the 24th Portable Hospital at Morobe.

Headquarters devised new and more improvident measures to nurse along the ailing howitzers and vehicles at motor stables. Camps were built and spit-and-polish became the order of the day.

Talk of further amphibious training at Toorbul Point materialized into the actual thing and one by one the regiments trekked to that unlovely spot to undergo training supervised by the U.S. Navy which employed the latest type of landing craft.

A bit of good news was just in the offing. Early in February of 1944 the War Department announced its long-discussed, anxiously-awaited, much-dreamed-about rotation program which provided for the return of veterans from the combat area. Men who had been overseas eighteen months were to be eligible for return and those who had six months or more in forward areas were to have the highest priority. It was April before the men of the first month's slim quota reached Fort Lewis, from where they were sent home on furlough and then reassigned to other duties. Numerous men and officers of the Division had, by this time, been evacuated from the Southwest Pacific because of wounds and disease and had been returned to the United States, a large proportion going to Army hospitals in the Northwestern States. Others had been transferred out of the Division to new assignments in the Southwest Pacific, principally in Australia, and there had been a considerable shuffling because of casualties, promotions and other reasons, within the various commands.

That last stay of six months in Australia was memorable for many reasons, but the most cogent of these



Out of combat and on their way to Australia, these 41st Division troops attend Sunday morning religious service on their ship.



Helmets were issued primarily for protective purposes, but here a soldier of the 41st Division shows another use for them.

was the fact that beginning in the early spring of 1944, the real battles of the Pacific were shaping up and from the nebulous cloud of talk and wager the hand-writing on the wall could be seen more clearly. Such places as Aitape, Wakde, Hollandia and Biak were little known to the men of the 41st in those days but the new outbreak of fighting in the Admiralties pointed to such places as Guam, Saipan, Morotai and the Philippines, which had to be retaken on the march to Tokyo. In the early months of 1944 the training at Toorbul Point, and later Rockhampton, assumed a new vigor and intensity. Speculation ran high, rumors spread furiously and, with the exception of those men earmarked for stateside duty via the rotation plan, all tried to cram a lifetime of living into the week-ends in town and at the beach.

Neither the 41st Division nor the Japs knew where the Jungleers would strike next, but both knew it would not be long before the unit would be back in action. The Australians had taken Lae on 17 September and had seized Finschhafen, after some heavy fighting, on 2 October. The Allied Air Forces had been constantly pounding the great Japanese base at Wewak, farther northwestward along the New Guinea coast. In the pattern of past events this indicated an assault by ground and naval forces at a later date.

Early March saw forward elements of the Division again leaving for New Guinea, the destination being newly taken Finschhafen, across the Huon Gulf from Lae and Salamaua. Above Finschhafen, the Aussies held Saidor, the northernmost Allied outpost on the Guinea shore. The 1st Cavalry Division was mopping up in the Admiralties, and New Britain was the most active operational area at the time. It was known that all preparations for the 41st's next landing would be actuated in the Finschhafen staging area but the target

remained a dark secret. The 24th Infantry Division had preceded the advance echelons of the 41st out of Gladstone and many were speculating that the next operation would utilize two full divisions, possibly functioning under Corps direction. However, no one really knew.

It was a gray, drizzling late afternoon when the men boarded the ship in Gladstone harbor. No bands or crowds were on hand to wish them godspeed as they trudged in endless lines up the gangplanks. The Division, as an organization, never would return to hospitable Australia, but the men did not know that. Many dimly imagined that for time immemorial they would go trudging off to war in the hellish jungles of the South Pacific and, when the fighting was finished, would return to friendly Rockhampton for respite and training, to renew old acquaintances, to drink ale and bitters, to swim in the incomparable surfs and to dance and make love. Night fell on Gladstone Harbor, anchors were weighed, chow lines began to form in intricate patterns on the decks and amidst the myriad blinking lights exchanging messages from ship to shore, the ships slipped out to sea and Australia began to slip irrevocably behind to become one of the few pleasant memories associated with the war. Each man in his heart, each in his fear and depression, began to imagine and see once more the awful miasmal image of New Guinea rising from the dark sea.

On a bright, cloudless morning two weeks after the departure from Gladstone, the troops sighted Finschhafen. The place was a typical staging area. The



Swapped yarns reveal the manner in which these men came into possession of the Jap flag and saber, prize souvenirs.

harbor was filled with Liberty ships and landing craft, the shores were lined with semipermanent tent camps, shore-control installations, and supply depots; and the hills beyond the beach were alive with bulldozers putting through the vital chainwork of roads so necessary to the operation of all such bases. Sixth Army Headquarters was established there and the place was swarming with thousands of troops. The men were ashore by noon and were loaded in trucks and Buffaloes which started almost at once up the steep, raw roads that led to the Division bivouac area at Cape Cretin. A tremendous, sprawling tent camp was waiting and bags of mail, virtually mountains of it, were distributed that first night. Men were tired after the hectic day of activity. Moving from ship to shore was always one of those periods when a man acted automatically, accomplished the job without recourse to thinking or rationalizing. With a supper of C rations under their belts, cots and mosquito nets up and waiting, and with letters from home waiting to be read and re-read, the men settled down to unaccustomed quiet early that night.

The entire Division had closed in at Finschhafen by 23 March. After being there a week General Fuller gave his officers an idea of how the forthcoming operation had been planned. But it was not until the first part of April that they were to learn the details of what was going to prove to be a very unusual piece of strategy.

The Allied forces had been making short jumps along the New Guinea coast in pursuit of the retreating Japs and, since this policy had been successful, although somewhat slow, it was reasonably certain that this method again would be employed when the next move was made from Finschhafen. With this in mind, Wewak loomed as the next logical target because it was the next important step along the New Guinea coast after Finschhafen. The Japs had developed Wewak into a base of tremendous importance. To lend support to the theory that Wewak would next feel the



Men of the 41st Division filing into St. Paul's Cathedral in Rockhampton to attend services for members of the Division killed in the New Guinea campaign. (Henry Manger photo).

brunt of an Allied assault, there were repeated poundings of this base by Allied planes.


But this was only a smoke screen because General MacArthur had a surprise for the Japs. Wewak was to be bypassed and Hollandia was to be the next objective. When that was taken the Japs on Wewak would be left to starve, a method a little slower, perhaps, than shooting, but much less costly in terms of American lives.

Hollandia lies about 400 miles from Finschhafen, but the route to be taken by the 41st Division was to be about eight hundred fifty miles, taking it far north and east of Finschhafen, toward the Admiralty Islands, and then south toward Hollandia. This was done to prevent reconnaissance by Jap land-based planes. It was the longest amphibious movement of combat troops in the war up to that time. Those in the know speculated that if the Hollandia invasion were a success it would shorten the war against Japan by as much as six months.

The preparatory wheels of attack and advance began to turn late in March. The 163d Infantry, supported by the 167th Field Artillery and elements of the 32d Division, was designated Persecution Task Force under the command of General Doe. The remainder of the 41st Division including the 186th and 162d Infantry Regiments and the 146th, 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, under the command of General Coane, was designated Letterpress Task Force, one of two task forces comprising the Reckless Task Force. Adding to the fire power of the artillery's howitzers were the 4.2-inch chemical mortars of the 641st Tank De-



With time on their hands, men of the 41st Division play cards aboard ship.



A battery of 105mm howitzers, mounted on the deck of an LST, try their accuracy during a training period. (Gilbert Isaacs photo).

stroyer Battalion (later designated the 98th Chemical Weapons Battalion). I Corps Headquarters coordinated the preparations.

It became evident almost at once that the pending operation was to be a relatively prodigious one and secrecy of the plans was of major concern to those in charge. Officers who flew from Australia to Finschhafen ahead of the main body of troops were busy at work on preliminary tactical and logistical phases of the program. By 7 April the plans were advanced far enough to permit a practice landing, this being staged on a beach twelve miles north of Lae where the terrain approximated that of the target area. Even at the time of the dress rehearsal a great portion of the troops were unaware of what the next objective would

be. Rumors had grown so fantastic that orders were issued making further speculation punishable by court-martial, but this served only to increase the talk of the would-be strategists. Results of the practice landing proved the ineptness and confusion bound to exist among uninformed troops and shortly thereafter key personnel were briefed on the plans for the attack, which found the 41st Division assaulting Aitape and Hollandia.

Even the Japs were to help make the Hollandia mission successful. Apparently they were convinced that the Allies would continue a step-by-step campaign along the coast of New Guinea, which would put Wewak next on the list. In line with this reasoning, the Japs began concentrating their forces on Wewak in preparation for the assault. Some of these reinforcing troops were withdrawn from Hollandia, thereby reducing the effective resistance facing Allied troops storming ashore. Military Intelligence officers later estimated that the Japs had at least forty-five thousand troops concentrated on Wewak.

D-day elements began loading on LCIs on 16 April. On the morning of the fourth day loading was completed and the huge convoy, made up of every type of assault, support and supply vessel, proceeded to the rendezvous point north of the Admiralty Islands. All of the Division was afloat, plus elements of engineers, antiaircraft and other units that go into making up a powerful landing force. Navy battlewagons and flat-tops provided escort and protection. Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey was in command of the convoy.

As far as the eye could see the force stretched out. It was particularly impressive to the men of the 41st, since back in the days of Buna and Salamaua a force



The tedious task of administration must go on. Here the G-3 Section carries on in New Guinea.



Members of the 41st Division are briefed for the invasion of Hollandia.


of twenty or thirty LCIs had been enough to constitute a huge convoy. These men were to participate in their first large-scale assault, the first in which they teamed up with other large American forces. For the first time these veterans of the Pacific fight were to land under a naval and air bombardment. For the first time there was a feeling that the eyes of a world at war might be upon them and this gave rise to the feeling that their responsibility was not only to themselves but to the men who would land at Tanahmerah and Aitape, to the men who fired the batteries on the battleships, cruisers and destroyers, to the men who bombed and strafed the enemy from the skies overhead.

Planes from the carriers that trailed in the wake afforded a protective umbrella over the massive convoy; destroyers and cruisers rode in very close while the

huge battlewagons skirted the very edge of the force. Troop carriers wallowed serenely in the quiet swells and the LCIs and LSTs plodded proudly ahead of them.

The night before the convoy was to arrive off Hollandia the ships carrying and supporting the Persecution Force turned south and disappeared like a ghost flotilla over the hazy, blue horizon. The Reckless Force, comprised of the 24th Division and 41st Division (less the Persecution Force) sailed on. Sometime during the dark, moonless night the forces split, the 24th Division proceeding to its objective at Tanahmerah Bay while the Jungleers cut back into the approach to Humboldt Bay.

H-hour was 0700 on 22 April and Hollandia was expected to be a tough nut to crack.



Chapter 9: The Bloody Butchers Strike

66 **T**HE 41st Division butchers are at work again," screamed Radio Tokyo as the unhappy news of the latest Allied advances in the Southwest Pacific was announced to the residents of Nippon.

General Fuller was amused by the new nickname, first applied to the 163d Infantry, and quipped, "Nothing could make me happier."

What great satisfaction this would have been to the late General White who had chided the newsmen because they could not find a nickname for his Division!

By 0600 on D-day the men had been fed and were lined in ranks along the railings and in every conceivable open spot above the deck. The stage was set and twenty-five thousand men on a hundred ships awaited the bloody dawn. Silently and gracefully the convoy slipped between the strange wall of islands that formed the channel into the clear water of Humboldt Bay. Night was lifting, perceptibly, like a backdrop of a shifting scene in a play. Everyone stood quietly and only the grunts and gasps of men shifting their personal equipment, and the nervous whispering seemed to interrupt the noiseless coming of dawn. At this same moment men lined the rails of similar craft to the south, waiting to land on the sands of Aitape, while to the north another division stood silently as it watched Tanahmerah Bay evolve out of the lifting shadows of the night.

In the murky dawn of that 22 April the convoy lay within the bay. Admiral Barbey sent the Navy destroyers and the rocket-firing LCIs forward, as the cruisers took up their commanding positions on the convoy's flanks and the large transports and LSTs began to lower their assault craft into the grey, still water.

By 0625, a thousand antiaircraft guns were pointed to the heavens which were fast turning from darkness into the blue light of a new day. A thousand other guns were trained on the semicircular beaches, their palm fringes and the jungles that lay beyond. Five minutes later the silent, cool morning was ripped to shreds as the bombardment got under way. Shivering men moved their heads like spectators at a tennis match as they tried to comprehend every roaring phase of the attack. The blue-grey morning was alive with scarlet tracers and rafts of cloud-trailing rockets streaking into the already-burning shore. Yellow, searing flashes from the cruisers lit the skies like giant lightning flashes. The destroyers and LCIs were swiftly approaching the shore line and were pouring a terrific concentration of fire into the Jap positions along Humboldt Bay.

Before the naval bombardment was complete, wave upon wave of land-based Army Air Forces planes from Finschhafen and carrier-based Navy planes joined in the fight. They dove seemingly into the very jungle itself, only to rise again over the tree tops like startled



The deck cargo and men of the 41st Division en route to Hollandia, aboard an LST.



Over the side and into waiting landing craft, as another H-hour approaches.

geese, as they bombed and strafed everything in sight. The beaches shook and waves of concussion rose visibly above the black smoke of destruction. The noise increased to Wagnerian proportions, and the soprano wail of the diving planes sang the weird score.

By 0645 the initial waves of infantrymen were forming in their boats which were inscribing what seemed like hysterical circles in the bay. Precisely the same procedure was being followed at Aitape where the 163d Infantry Combat Team was landing, and at Tanahmerah Bay where the 24th Division was landing.

Most of the Japs who were left on Hollandia, and they were largely service troops, fled to the hills. As the air strike subsided the infantry, in its tiny LCIs, moved toward the shore while the destroyers continued the bombardment. The landing craft soon were obscured from those remaining behind by the low-hanging blanket of smoke. Landings were made at four points, designated as White Beaches 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The 162d Infantry's 3d Battalion, which made up the assault waves, landed at White Beach 1 without opposition. The initial waves were followed by six tanks from the 603d Tank Company, elements of the 116th Engineers, the 146th Field Artillery, and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 162d Regiment. Company E of the 162d Infantry had been attached to the 3d Battalion for the landing and after it was ashore it moved out along the edge of the mangrove swamp with the mission of cutting the Pim-Hollandia Track to the northwest of Pancake Hill.

There was a great deal of congestion on the beach since the only exit was extremely narrow. The tanks bogged down and it was impossible for the attack to proceed with the speed which had been anticipated. Once the regiment was ashore it immediately formed for the attack and pushed inland. The 3d Battalion, after securing the beachhead, moved onto Pancake Hill to the north of the beach. The 2d Battalion began the move to the Pim-Hollandia Track, this move being used to serve as a screen for the main action, which was being made by the 186th Infantry against Leimok Hill. The 3d Battalion continued its push north and sent Companies I and K along the beach route to take the heights overlooking Cape Tjoberi and Cape Jogoer. The remainder of this battalion continued north toward Jarremoh Hill. By this time the 1st Battalion, which constituted the Division reserve, went into position on Pancake Hill.

By noon on D-day the 146th Field Artillery was successful in getting its howitzers dug in on Pancake Hill, the naked, shrubless knoll overlooking Humboldt Bay. Pancake had a road which circled it and a branch road which cut up its side to the top. In order to get protec-



Troops check their weapons before the Hollandia landing. Perfect-functioning arms sometimes meant the difference between life and death.



Men of the 41st Signal Company remove a message from the leg of an incoming pigeon and check the time of its arrival at White Beach 3 at Hollandia.

tion, the artillery pieces were nestled into one of the shoulders of the hill; however, from the air they were very vulnerable.

One reinforced platoon from Company A, 162d Infantry, landed at H-hour on White Beach 2, captured and secured Dulcimer Hill, which overlooked the entrance to Jautefa Bay from the south end of the landing beach. After overcoming some slight resistance this company occupied the Cape Pie area.

Within a half hour after the initial assault waves had poured ashore, the first wounded were being returned to the troopships in the harbor by the small craft in which they had landed. The landing had been made, the enemy had been engaged and once again history was recording the activities of the Jungleers as they fought and killed and were killed.

To the 162d Infantry was to fall the task of taking Hollandia Town, this being accomplished on the second day. Supporting this drive directly was the 146th Field Artillery; the 218th Field Artillery Battalion was furnishing general support to all forces.

The engineers had cleared the exit roads from the beaches but due to the rugged terrain and the swamp, rapid road construction was impossible and this program was abandoned temporarily.

In the early afternoon of D-day a reinforced platoon

of the 1st Battalion seized Hamadi Island following a twenty-minute rocket barrage. At the same time the 3d Battalion was regrouping on the eastern slopes of Jarremoh Hill.

The 2d Battalion, which was moving westward toward the Pim-Hollandia Track, found the going very tough since the terrain was dense swamp, and by noon it had progressed only eight hundred yards, being forced to cut a trail most of this distance. Company G had taken a route more to the north and after several hours of hacking out a trail, the remainder of the 2d Battalion retraced its steps and followed the Company G route. Meanwhile, Company E already had cut the Pim-Hollandia Track and was awaiting arrival of the 2d Battalion before proceeding north along the track. When the 2d Battalion reached the trail it moved to the west slopes of Jarremoh Hill where it effected a junction with the 3d Battalion, this bringing to a close the first phase of the operation.

The 162d Infantry requested authority to move in and take Hollandia Town but was instructed to dig in at its present position for the night.

As the mellow dusk closed in on D-day, a single enemy bomber, too low for radar detection, flew in over Hollandia Town and White Beach 1 and dropped a




Doughboys, carrying a mortar and ammunition, push inland from the beachhead to penetrate the jungle during the action at Hollandia.

string of four bombs on the beach. Three of the bombs resulted in great geysers of sand and water, but the fourth bomb made a direct hit on a Jap ammunition dump. The subsequent explosions ignited one of the landing force's gasoline dumps, setting off in an instant a four-million-dollar fire which spread a thousand yards up and down the beach in a matter of minutes. Some elements of the Division Artillery were caught on the beach that memorable night and at one time the guns of two battalions were seriously endangered. For two full days the fire burned furiously, destroying all ammunition, rations and a large quantity of engineering supplies. Throughout the night and following morning relief parties were formed but the intense heat drove back all efforts to salvage supplies. Additional medical men were called to the area to administer first aid and much effort was made to quarter and feed the many transients who were cut off from their units during the fiery night. This was the first hostile air action of the campaign and it resulted in death to twenty-four soldiers and injury to more than a hundred as the fire spread along White Beaches 1 and 2. The only supplies left the task force were five hundred tons of ammunition and rations which had been landed at Beach 3. With this situation confronting them, the troops were ordered to go on half rations and an effort

was made to expend only necessary amounts of ammunition.

On the morning of 23 April, Hollandia was subjected to a bombardment from the air, from naval units standing off shore and from the artillery located on the heights to the south. Following this bombardment the 162d Infantry jumped off, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, and by noon it had passed through the town and was moving onto the high ground west of Imbi Bay. Very little resistance was encountered and most enemy emplacements were found deserted. The objective of the 162d Infantry had been taken and the second phase line had been reached. Consolidation of positions and vigorous patrolling in the area north of Imbi Bay occupied the regiment until 28 April.

On 26 April, after a short artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion made a shore to shore movement across the mouth of Imbi Bay and landed on Cape Soedja with Companies A and C landing abreast. No resistance was encountered and by mid-morning Company C had swept across the cape, killed four Japs on Hill 640, and had occupied the ridges. The battalion swung to the north along the peninsula, eliminating small scattered enemy groups, and occupied an enemy field hospital. Patrolling continued northwest along the coastal track.





Top: Landing craft assemble for the dash into the beach. Center: Men of the 186th Infantry at Sentani Airdrome on New Guinea. Lower: Sherman tanks aid a patrol in mopping up remaining Japs and knocking out stubborn resistance during the Hollandia fight. A Japanese ammunition dump blazes after having been set afire by the preliminary naval and air bombardment.



Equipment of the 41st Division is moved from Humboldt Bay to the top of Pancake Hill on New Guinea.

On 28 April, the 2d Battalion, less Company G, moved to Hollekang by water and relieved elements of the 34th Infantry (24th Division).

The secondary objective of the 162d Infantry was Tami Drome, the airfield lying east of Humboldt Bay. This field was located on a coastal flat, and was cut off from the Hollandia area by the Djar Mountains and the swamps around Hollekang. These terrain features made the activities in this sector more of a separate minor operation than a part of the main effort. Two days after the landing two Alamo Scout Teams had reconnoitered the area and during a two-day period had located several scattered enemy groups. A party of 125 missionaries had been found and evacuated.

On 27 April Company G of the 162d Infantry, reinforced with a platoon of machine guns, made an over-water movement from Hollandia Town to the beach north of the airdrome. The company swept the area toward the field and made no enemy contacts. Company G then provided security for the engineer units working on the drome and on 1 May enemy harassing forces, composed largely of individual snipers, became very active and the troops available were unable to provide adequate protection for the work details. Company G requested reinforcement and was relieved by the 2d Battalion of the 34th Infantry which cleared the area by vigorous patrolling while Company G went back to rejoin the 162d Regiment at Hollekang.

186TH INFANTRY

While the 162d Infantry was moving north to overrun its objective, Hollandia Town, the 186th Infantry was moving westward to capture two of the three airdromes which were the prime objectives of the landing force.

Elements of the 1st Battalion landed on White Beach 1 in the third wave and proceeded north and west around Mangrove Swamp until they reached the Pim-Hollandia Track. They followed this trail south until they reached Leimok Hill. Meanwhile, Company I had landed on White Beach 3 at H-hour, seized Cape Tjeweri and blocked the peninsula from the south.

Cannon Company followed closely on the heels of Company I and blasted the slight resistance of three enemy positions. Company I then advanced south along the beach to a point two miles from Cape Tjeweri.


Shortly after it had landed, Company I was accidentally strafed by American planes, four men being killed and twelve wounded. Lack of communications prevented the company commander from requesting a halt to the strafing.

Two platoons of 4.2-inch mortars which had landed at Cape Pie were laying down a smoke screen across Jautefa Bay. The 3d Battalion, using Buffaloes and LVTs, passed through the narrow channel between Cape Pie and Cape Tjeweri and landed at the foot of Leimok Hill. The hill was too steep for the Buffaloes but the troops unloaded, fanned out and advanced up the slope unopposed.

The 2d Battalion, less some of its component units, landed at White Beach 1 and passed to Division re-



Mopping up remaining Japanese in the Hollandia area calls for the utmost caution.





The 162d Infantry moves along White Beach 1 at Hollandia. A Jap oil dump is ablaze as the result of aerial bombardment.

serve. By late afternoon it had established a roadblock on the Pim-Hollandia Track. That night five Japs came along the trail, moving south, with two soldiers of the 162d Infantry in their custody. A 2d Battalion outpost killed one Jap while the other four took to the woods, leaving the American prisoners hiding in the jungles, where they were recovered the following morning.

The 186th Regiment was receiving direct support from the 205th Field Artillery and two companies of 4.2-inch chemical mortars of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion. Cape Pie offered the only suitable observation point and firing positions so the artillery was concentrated there. Several antiaircraft artillery units came ashore, but with egress from the beaches being blocked, all these batteries went into position along the shore line.

Early on the second morning the 1st Battalion of the 162d Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion at the roadblock position on the Pim-Hollandia Track. The 186th Infantry, spearheaded by the 3d Battalion, made a move down the trail. With support from the air, this column of battalions brushed aside the few enemy disposed to dispute this advance and by evening the 3d Battalion had reached a point a mile beyond Brinkman's Plantation. At that point, Company I rejoined the battalion, its position on Cape Tjeweri having been taken over by the 41st Reconnaissance Troop. The 1st Battalion closely supported this movement and went into position about two miles northwest of Brinkman's Plantation. During the afternoon, Companies A and C

repulsed a series of counterattacks launched against the perimeter by a force estimated to be 150 Japs.

The 3d Battalion was to move by LVTs on 24 April via Sentani Lake to capture Cyclops Drome. However, in moving up to the front area the LVTs bogged down in the swampy road and it became apparent that they would not arrive in time to make the attack. The 3d Battalion resumed its advance on the morning of 24 April, winding its way into the rugged hills east of Sentani Lake. Supporting artillery displaced forward as closely as the terrain would permit. However, lack of transportation prevented the 4.2-inch mortars from displacing forward and they did not rejoin the regiment after the first day of fighting. The terrain was extremely favorable to defense and the somewhat demoralized enemy made some use of it. Such defensive positions as were encountered consisted of locally organized centers of resistance, based on dugouts and pillboxes. These isolated positions fell readily to the combined efforts of the artillery and infantry and as lengthening shadows began to fall the 3d Battalion had reached Koejaboe, on the eastern tip of Lake Sentani. Some of the 24th Division artillery was moved to a position where it could lay fire on the drome areas.

The 186th Infantry started out to take Nefaar, southeast of Cyclops Drome, on 25 April. Rather than pound its way through the swamps and rugged terrain, the regiment resorted to amphibious tactics. At 0800 the 1st Battalion loaded into Buffaloes and moved across the northern part of the lake, making the landing and securing the village by noon. The remaining battalions continued the overland movement along the shore road



A wounded soldier of the 186th Infantry is carried into the 12th Portable Hospital about four miles below Sentani Airdrome.

against steadily diminishing resistance. The regiment now was in position to lash out at the airdromes, but it was ordered to stand fast until the 24th Division Artillery lifted fire from the area. By this date the 34th Infantry Combat Team had landed on White Beach 3 and was taking over the defense of the Pim area.

By the morning of 26 April, everything was in readiness for the assault on the dromes. The 205th and 218th Artillery Battalions were ready to give direct support, breaking up every enemy effort to make a defensive stand. Cyclops Drome was assigned to the 1st Battalion while the 3d Battalion swung down the lake shore to strike at Sentani Drome from the southeast. The 3d Battalion was held in reserve. The assault got under way at 0900 and in less than two hours Cyclops Drome had fallen while Sentani came under Allied control shortly before noon. In both cases only minor resistance was encountered. Defensive organization of the two fields was begun immediately and patrols moved out towards the Hollandia strip. By late afternoon a 1st Battalion patrol made contact with a 24th Division patrol and the junction of the two divisions completed the pincers movement and brought into American hands all the primary objectives, these having been taken just four days after the landing. There was, however, some mopping up to do and the regiment took up the task of clearing the sector of scattered enemy groups and consolidating for defense.

Company K, operating in Buffaloes, made a comprehensive patrol of Sentani Lake, putting parties ashore to investigate Poegi and Ase Islands and the vicinity of Ajapo, on the south shore of the lake. The patrol found no enemy and returned to its starting point at Ifaar.

An estimated four hundred Japs were reported in a strong defensive pocket on Hill 1000, northeast of Cyclops Drome on 27 April. Companies B and C attacked the position the following day but were repulsed after they had killed an estimated fifty Japs. These two companies withdrew under a 350-round artillery barrage. They then took up their original positions until 29 April when the entire 1st Battalion, on the heels of five artillery concentrations, launched a determined assault and overran the enemy, killing some seventy-two by rifle fire while an undetermined number were killed by artillery fire. Revised estimates placed 150 enemy troops on the hill and the attack continued about one thousand yards beyond Hill 1000 where the enemy dispersed. One company set up defenses on the south slope of the hill while the remainder of the battalion returned to the regimental area. Patrolling and consolidating activities continued through 4 May.

The veterans of Sanananda and Salamaua had found little "butchering" to do at Hollandia. The Japs had missed a golden opportunity. Some officers predicted that the enemy, if he had any imagination at all, could



General MacArthur talks with a Navy officer while viewing the task force of 41st Division infantrymen who are going ashore at Hollandia.

have kept the Allies away from the three airdromes for a month. However, captured documents and testimony by prisoners confirmed the contention that just prior to the landing the bulk of the enemy garrison had moved to Wewak where the Jap expected the next Allied thrust.

High-ranking Army and Navy officers who had witnessed the landing described it as the perfect amphibious assault. It went off, some said, just like a maneuver and casualties were extremely light. General MacArthur, who twice before had praised the veteran 41st Division, was on hand to see it perform. He directed and observed the landings from the deck of a Navy cruiser and later in the morning went ashore to inspect the beach and Pancake Hill.


Pancake Hill had been thick with red mud which made it tough for the artillery to move its weapons into position. However, when this mud dried and turned to dust it blew down throats, up noses, and into food and machinery. Long after the Hollandia campaign had ended and the 41st Division had plunged ashore on coral-white Biak, red dust still could be found.

Communications during the early stages of the operation had been very poor. To alleviate this condition

wire had been laid over steep, muddy jungle tracks while another line had been laid under water from Beach 1 to Beach 4. Both of these lines failed, however.

It is worth noting that the Japs were surrendering more readily than they ever had. In one case a soldier interrupted seventeen unarmed Japs who immediately surrendered and were marched off to the stockade at Nefaar. Most of the Japs here were service troops and very much disgusted with things in general. All during the campaign groups of Indian soldiers, who had been captured by the Japs at Singapore and were being used as laborers, were captured or came wandering into American lines.

Ten days after the landings at Hollandia plans for future operations already were getting under way. General Fuller and several members of his staff boarded one of the Navy ships at noon on 2 May for a conference which would take the 41st Division another step along the way on the road to Tokyo and final victory. The 24th Division began to relieve the Jungleers and took over the defense of the Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Tami Airdrome while the 41st Division began moving into a staging area near Hollekang.



Chapter 10: The Aitape Campaign

WHILE THE 162d Infantry and 186th Infantry were making the landings in Humboldt Bay, the 163d Regimental Combat Team, backbone of a task force of 22,500 men under the command of General Doe, was making a simultaneous landing at Aitape. The mission of this force was to land in the Aitape-Tadji area, rapidly seize the Tadji dromes and to prepare these airfields quickly to accommodate one fighter group.

H-hour was set for 0645 and the plan for the landing called for the 2d and 3d Battalions to land abreast and secure the beachhead. One hour later the 1st Battalion was to come ashore, pass through the 3d Battalion, and in conjunction with the 2d Battalion, attack west and secure the airstrips. By 0200 on D-day the troops were fed and at 0530 the small boats were loaded in the water and waiting. A well executed naval preparation fire began at 0600 and continued for a half hour. As the landing craft started for shore, escort-carrier planes took to the air to provide support. Naval rocket boats accompanied the assault waves and laid down a rocket barrage all the way. The landing was to have been made at Korako but was made, instead, in the vicinity of Wapil, approximately one thousand yards east of the selected beach. Only slight resistance from individual Japs was encountered.

When the road from Korako to the airstrip could not be located it was realized that the landing had been made at the wrong place. The Korako-Tadji road was located by the right (west) flank guard (Captain Zimmerman) and units were moved to assembly positions according to plan.

As soon as Company L came ashore it moved west along the beach and occupied the village of Relia. It then sent security detachments to the east as far as the

Nigia River. The 1st Battalion landed, passed through elements of the 3d Battalion and began the move to capture the Tadji dromes. No enemy resistance was encountered and by mid-afternoon the dromes were in American hands. The Japanese garrison started to retreat to the west during the naval preparation.

The 167th Field Artillery had come ashore at 0745 and shortly before noon it announced that its guns were in position in the vicinity of Nor. The guns were registered in but the battalion was not called upon to deliver fire. The engineers were ashore early and had begun construction work on the coastal roads from Wapil to Korako to the airstrip and from Wapil east toward the Nigia River. Because of the swift advance, work on the north strip of Tadji Drome was started at 1300.

Five tanks of the 603d Tank Company supported the infantry in its advance down the airstrip and one battalion of 4.2-inch chemical mortars was in direct support.

Since the enemy had fled, it was decided that work should be continued throughout the night. Floodlights were used both on the beach and on the drome and there was no enemy reaction, not even by air.

The 127th Regimental Combat Team, less its 1st Battalion, arrived in the area in the early morning hours of 23 April. Two companies of this force were to be used in reducing Tumleo and Seleo Islands, which lay about two miles off shore. Naval and air bombardments preceded the landings, which were made by Companies F and G at 0700. There was no resistance on Seleo Island, and forces landing on Tumleo drew only weak fire from a lone enemy bunker on Hill 262. Both islands had been secured by 1400. The remainder of the 127th RCT landed at Korako and relieved the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry in the area east of the



Tanks go into action at Aitape while troops of the veteran 41st Division wait for a Jap pillbox to be knocked out. The coconut palm leaves and branches afford concealment for the waiting infantrymen.



Top: A patrol of the 163d Infantry crosses a river at Aitape. Lower: Another patrol of the 163d Infantry moves north of an airstrip at Aitape.



Doughboys of the 41st Division ride to the front lines aboard a DUKW on a beach in the Aitape area, while in the background other men enjoy a pleasant and peaceful swim.

north-south road from Korako to the dromes. Company E relieved Company L at Relia and became responsible for protection of the east flank.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 163d RCT began the advance westward at the same time the 127th Regiment was making its landings. Shortly after noon they had reached the Raihu River and still there was only slight enemy resistance. Patrols were sent forward to determine the character of enemy installations in the area around Hill 200. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, after being relieved by the 127th Field Artillery, came ashore around Korako and immediately moved into positions at Pro, ready to support the westward advance of the 163d Regiment.

By now the engineers were laying matting on the north strip while other engineer units were constructing bridges over the Waitanan and Pimi Creeks and improving roads. Antiaircraft artillery units were selecting permanent positions, and dump areas were being established and supplies unloaded.

On D plus 2 the 1st and 2d Battalions were continuing the advance west from the Raihu River against disorganized resistance. The movement was so fast that by 1300 Aitape had been taken and was secured. The 2d Battalion organized the Aitape perimeter while the 1st Battalion withdrew east of the Raihu River and took up positions in the vicinity of Tadji Plantation along with the 3d Battalion. Patrols were dispatched west toward Tepier Plantation and south towards Kapoam Village. Meanwhile, the 127th Infantry was consolidating positions in the vicinity of Nigia River and was patrolling the area.

The field artillery still was inactive insofar as being called upon for fire missions but the liaison planes were being used for observation missions. The airstrip was

pronounced ready for use, although improvement work was continued. Company B, 116th Engineers, had constructed a two-way road from Korako to Wapil. Work was being done at night and as yet there had been no enemy reaction.

The period from 25 April through 27 April was spent in patrolling and consolidating positions. Patrols from the 163d Infantry reconnoitered areas around the Tepier Plantation, Kapoam Village and Pultalul while the 127th Infantry patrolled to Chinopelli, Afue and Anamo, but there were no contacts with the enemy. On 25 April, Company G of the 127th Infantry occupied Ali Island against light resistance and thus completed the reduction of the three main islands offshore. Liaison planes, flying patrol missions along the coast twenty-five miles east and west of Aitape, reported disorganized enemy groups evacuating. It was on 25 April that the 78th Fighter Wing (RAAF) moved from Cape Gloucester to its new base at the north strip at Aitape. Ferry service was in operation across the Raihu River and work was begun on a bridge. Radar installations had been installed at Wapil, Seleo Island and Tumleo Island.

The unloading of supplies was progressing and the only delay came on 27 April when there was a four-hour stoppage caused by a submarine alert in the early morning hours. No contact was made with the sub and work was resumed.

The first enemy action of any consequence occurred on the afternoon of 27 April. A platoon of Company L moved into the village of Kamti where it had established contact with an enemy force. An estimated two hundred Japs surrounded the platoon, which had taken up defensive positions, and that night the enemy attacked in three waves, each assault being repelled by

the surrounded infantrymen. Forty-one Japs were killed. A liaison plane dropped rations and ammunition and on the afternoon of 28 April the remainder of Company L went to relieve the surrounded unit.

The first enemy air action occurred on the night of 27-28 April when a lone plane approached the beachhead from the west, flying low over the Torricelli Mountains. The plane made two runs over the harbor, dropped three 500-pound bombs and scored a hit on the USS *Etamin*, which settled at the stern but did not sink. One man was killed, five were missing and thirteen were wounded during this attack. Personnel abandoned the ship by way of small boats and received quarters and rations on shore. Later the crippled ship, which had been carrying gasoline and bombs but was nearly unloaded, was towed to the Admiralties. During the night of 28-29 April another red alert was sounded but no enemy planes appeared.

One battery of the 126th Field Artillery displaced forward on the morning of 29 April to support the action of Company L at Kamti. The remainder of the

company had arrived to aid the surrounded platoon and in the ensuing skirmish killed nine Japs. During the night Company L repelled two enemy counterattacks. At 1300 on 30 April another counterattack forced Company L to withdraw, under cover of air and artillery support, to defensive positions near Margne. Later that afternoon a platoon of Company K reinforced Company L and as darkness fell the situation was well in hand.

Company A (reinforced) departed from Aitape at 0800 on 30 April for Bes, a trail focal point seven miles to the southwest. The mission of this force was to block escape of the enemy to the west and to patrol this sector. During the night the artillery fired 240 rounds of harassing fire on the enemy at Kamti.

From 1-4 May aggressive patrolling was conducted in the vicinities of Serra, Bes and Kamti by Companies A, G and L. On 3 May the 32d Division arrived in the Aitape area and by the following day it had relieved elements of the 163d Regiment, which was moved to a staging area to await the next Allied move.

Chapter 11: Wakde Falls

THE Biak and Wakde Island campaigns were not long in materializing. Hardly had the red dust from Hollandia and Aitape been washed out of the men's hair when General Doe was given command of Tornado Task Force, whose mission was to secure Wakde Island and that portion of the New Guinea shore adjacent to it. Wakde Island on the map is called Insoemoar Island. It is two miles long and a mile wide, and lies offshore about two miles from Toem Village. How much the Japs used the island is not known, but they did develop an airfield which handled many of their planes. Elaborate hangars, control towers, radio stations and quarters were established and an extensive roadnet and system of supply dumps had been built. These came in for a lot of attention from the Allied Air Forces in 1944. The seizure and development of the Wakde area as an advance air and naval operating base would prevent hostile interference with the development of the Hollandia area and also would assist in the support of subsequent operations to the northwest.

The Allied force was composed of the 163d Infantry Combat Team (reinforced), with the 167th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions furnishing support for the operation. Since the latter was at Hollandia the convoy had a layover at Humboldt Bay until loading details were completed. The 128th RCT of the 32d Division, located at Aitape, and the 158th RCT, an independent combat team located at Finschhafen, were designated as reserves for Alamo Force, the code name

applied to the Sixth Army units participating in the Wakde-Biak invasions, and these units were to be prepared to reinforce either task force. Meanwhile, at Hollandia preparations were going forward for the landing at Biak which was to be made on the heels of the Wakde invasion.

Occupation of Wakde was to be a shore-to-shore operation by elements of Persecution Task Force, composed of 22,500 men. Wakde was too small an island to permit the landing of all combat and service troops of the task force. By making a landing on the mainland, the force would eliminate the congestion of troops and supplies, would secure excellent artillery positions to support the subsequent landings on Wakde, and, conversely, would deny the enemy the areas in which he could place artillery to fire on the island. A landing at Toem was not feasible because this village was within close range of any hostile guns that might be on Wakde. Arare, west of Toem, was selected as the landing site because it would eliminate much of this threat.

Following a naval bombardment on the morning of 17 May the force made a landing against light opposition at Arare on the Dutch New Guinea mainland, across the channel from Wakde. The 163d Infantry landed in column of battalions with the 3d Battalion seizing the initial beachhead. After establishing the beachhead this unit deployed toward the Tor River in order to secure the west flank of the beach. The 2d



The 41st Division hits the beach during the invasion of Wakde.



Men of the 163d Infantry check weapons on the beach at Arare before loading into Higgins boats for the Wakde invasion.

Battalion pushed elements along the coastal road to the Tementoe Creek, but the bulk of the unit occupied positions at Toem. The 1st Battalion came ashore and followed the 2d Battalion down the beach to Toem where it immediately began preparations for the movement to Wakde the following morning.

During the landings on the mainland two LCVs reconnoitered Insoemanai Island and found it unoccupied. During the afternoon of D-day, Company D, three heavy-weapons companies of the 163d Infantry, and one company of 4.2-inch mortars landed on the island. The seizure of this objective gave the landing force going ashore on Wakde additional fire support. Wakde and Insoemanai Island also were bombarded by naval and air units during the landings on the mainland. The 191st Field Artillery Group, with Cannon Company of the 163d Infantry and the 167th Field Artillery Battalion attached, supported the eastward advance of the 2d Battalion. When it reached Toem it went into positions and prepared to support the assault on Wakde.

Wakde came under naval, aerial, artillery and mortar

bombardment for more than twenty-four hours. Destroyers stood a thousand yards offshore while rocket launchers drove in closer to shore to release their projectiles. The Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed from tree-top level. No Japs could be seen. No return fire was encountered and the commander of the Insoemanai Island detachment sent word that if his orderly didn't have sore feet, the two of them could wade over and take Wakde. Air units reported that no flak had been encountered for the past ten days. However, the forces landing on Insoemanai Island on D-day had received light machine-gun and rifle fire from Wakde. All of this led to the belief that there would be very little resistance.

The landing force was four companies (A, B, C and F) and four General Sherman medium tanks. Approximately two-thirds of the troops were veterans of the Buna-Gona-Sanananda fights while the rest were well trained replacements who had joined the Division during its latest sojourn in Australia. Three weeks earlier this same outfit had made landings at Aitape, and it was just six weeks since the unit had left Australia.



A patrol moves along a jungle trail at Wakde. Trucks, jammed with supplies, wait at the side of the trail until it is safe to deliver and distribute their cargoes.

Six waves loaded in four LCVs at Arare Village on the mainland on 18 May and each was followed by four LCMs. The landing points chosen were the jetties on the south side of the island. This appeared to be the only reef-free beach and had the added advantage of lending itself to machine-gun and mortar support from Insoemanai Island.

Companies A and F were to go in abreast, with Company A on the right, followed by Companies B and C. Company A was to turn to the right and clean up and hold the southeast tip of the island while Company F was to turn left and mop up the southwestern portion of the island, and then move up to an assembly point at the east end of the airstrip. Companies B and C were to push inland towards the airstrip. Thus, it was figured that merely by establishing a beachhead and capturing the second objective, the airfield, two-thirds of the area would be in Allied hands and the island would be cut in half. Then resistance could be reduced in piecemeal fashion. Because so little resistance was anticipated, LSTs with supplies were scheduled to come in at H plus 1. For shore-to-shore communication an underwater telephone cable was laid from the mainland to Insoemanai and later to Wakde.

In loading on the mainland a heavy surf was encountered. One tank shorted out its ignition system, thus putting it out of action even before the loading was completed.

The leading wave began to receive Jap rifle, mortar and machine-gun fire about three hundred yards from the beach, despite the close mortar and machine-gun support from Insoemanai Island. At first most of the enemy fire was frontal and did little damage, but as


the men closed in the fire increased in intensity and came from the flanks as well, causing heavy casualties. Several coxswains and boat operators were killed and, although no boats had to turn back, several got out of control and disrupted the wave and boat organization.

Later information and evidence indicated that the Japs expected the landing on the opposite side of the island and they were braced against that point. Reefs and jagged rocks, however, denied the beach there and the invading troops would not have had the benefit of effective supporting fire from the mainland and Insoemanai Island.

After the third was ashore, other waves received less



A litter casualty is loaded into an evacuation plane by medics and a flight nurse. Wakde wounded were flown to a base hospital.





With a background of shattered coconut palm trees, a reminder of the fierce fight for possession of Wakde, members of the invasion force stock up supplies on the beach.

fire while approaching the shore because the Japs, by this time, were concentrating on the assault companies. These, in spite of heavy beach fire, had reached some cover along the beach shelf and fringe. The supporting fire from Insoemanai kept the Japs in their installations and prevented them from rushing the pinned-down troops on the beach. It also prevented the enemy reinforcements from moving out of the interior of the island.

During the landing phase of the operation, three company commanders were casualties. Things were pretty hot and as the landing progressed the messages sifting back to those still at Hollandia indicated that the resistance being encountered was the toughest that had thus far been put up by any enemy garrison along the New Guinea shore. The beach strip was open sand. Those who made it ashore were hugging the ground, shoulder to shoulder, under the beach shelf. They were pinned down by heavy machine-gun fire from concrete blockhouses, a trench system and a series of caves. Inland there was a mass of blasted coconut trees and frond, wrecked piers, warehouses and equipment. The noise was deafening. Gradually, individual men worked forward and gained firing positions but this method was slow and extremely costly in proportion to the ground gained.

The three tanks started ashore and they laid down machine-gun and cannon fire as they started down the ramp. One tank immediately disappeared in seven feet

of water and only the top of the turret hatch was visible. Now only two tanks remained. When they hit the beach every Jap on the island fired futilely at them. Japs raised up from the trenches and stuck heads out of pillboxes to gape at them. Fifteen minutes after the tanks landed the Allies had fire superiority in the beachhead area. Later 150 dead Japs were counted here.

The two tanks worked together beautifully and they had a psychological effect upon the enemy. Stories were told of Japs shaking angry fists at the steel monsters and charging them with sabers and bayonets. A few Japs managed to get atop the tanks but were killed before they could do any damage.

The island was covered with bombproof bunkers and pillboxes. Some of these had walls of coconut logs, ten to fourteen inches in diameter, with six to eighteen inches of coral rock and soil between them. In some cases gas drums filled with sand, truck bodies and frames, and steel landing boats were incorporated in the construction. Roofs were usually of three to five feet of coral. The enemy holed up in these installations all during the bombardment phase of the invasion and lived a life of comparative ease and safety. The only disadvantage evident was the poor organization of these bunkers and pillboxes. There was no plan or system as to their location.

The tanks broke the stalemate on the beach but it was impossible to keep the entire line moving with



Troops of the 163d Infantry hug the beach when they are pinned down by sniper and machine-gun fire on Wakde.

only two of them. It was at this time that the two tanks were used together in order to help the infantrymen forward by groups from right to left. Both tanks went into the Company A sector because the ground was firm there. It was the highest elevation on the island and commanded the beachhead. It was assumed that the Japs would fight hard to hold this but the unpredictable Nip didn't have over a dozen men on the ridge and these withdrew rather than face the pressure. Company A reorganized on the ridge and the tanks transferred their support to Company B, which started forward but ran into long-range enfilading fire from its right and right front. Some of this fire, it was later learned, was delivered from the roofs of partially destroyed buildings and from a water-storage tower. The result was that the 163d right flank separated and a gap developed.

Company B reached the airstrip, but Company F reported that it was up against stiff resistance. It was in terrain resembling a bowl and was bucking against strong emplacements. Company F was in the pit of the bowl and the enemy emplacements were on the rim. The unit was suffering some casualties.

Company C reported light opposition and expected to reach the airstrip without help. However, the tanks were sent to support it to insure its reaching the second objective without mishap. Simultaneously, Company A was ordered to leave one squad to hold the high point it had just taken while the remainder of the company took up positions to the right of Company F. The units trying to relieve Company F ran into an extension of the resistance that was holding up that unit.

More trouble and inconveniences were developing. LSTs and barges were landing and sailors and Merchant Marine men were under foot everywhere. Two

of them rolled over a supposedly dead Jap; however, he had life enough to detonate a grenade, killing himself and seriously wounding both seamen. The underwater telephone cable refused to work and radio had to be used exclusively. Before long the network was jammed with messages. The first bulldozer ashore tore out all four company phone lines to the command post. At this time Company D was ordered to rejoin the 1st Battalion on Wakde, this unit having landed on Insoemanai the previous day.

Company C by now had reached the airstrip and the tanks were turned over to Companies A and F. The obstacle delaying their progress was soon overcome and they swept around the west end of the airstrip. The plan was to advance two companies abreast through the area between the north side of the strip and the beach. The tank commander notified the infantry commander that the tanks had exhausted their supply of ammunition and that a trip back to the beach was necessary to reload. This trip would require at least an hour and it was already 1630. The infantry commander still was determined to get the remainder of the Japs into a smaller area so they could be contained and held better during the night.

Companies A and F ran into more resistance on the extreme northwestern tip of the island and their advance was slowed down. It was obvious that the Japs were moving in and building up a line against them. This was one of the rare instances where Jap officers seemed to take command of their troops and direct them. The terrain here favored the enemy. There were some coral crevices and rocks, the brush and debris was dense and thick, and wrecked planes, trucks, and equipment were scattered about in confusion.

Although the southern edge of the airstrip was

secured by 1700, grazing machine-gun fire from the eastern end of the strip made crossing impracticable. However, part of Company C was later sent across the drome under protecting fire from the weapons platoons of both Companies B and C. This movement cost three casualties, but it severed the enemy's route of reinforcement and withdrawal. In the final analysis 94 Japs were cut off and trapped in approximately a ten-acre area surrounded by the two companies plus two platoons. The fight to eliminate the trapped enemy troops continued for about a half hour and many Japs began individual suicidal action.

The Japs left on Wakde now were confined to about an eighth of the total area. During this time Company B was taking a lot of punishment and it was ordered to fight merely a holding action. This company was receiving enemy grenade and knee-mortar fire and, furthermore, the Japs were slipping around the company's right flank. To halt this enemy action and to prevent the enemy from again deploying over the whole island, including the beachhead, Company A pushed forward on the north side of the strip as far as it could. At the same time Companies C and F were pulled out and put on a line with Company B, thus completely closing an encirclement from the mid-point of the airstrip to the seacoast on the east end of the island. By the time Companies C and F got into position, Company A had gained five hundred yards on the north side of the strip. Then more opposition developed. It was getting late and the units began to consolidate their defenses for the night. With the aid of carrying parties and an Alligator, water and a re-supply of ammunition were delivered to all units as they dug in at the end of the first day's fighting.

The night was relatively quiet. Company G took some intermittent knee-mortar fire until about 2000. Harassing artillery fire at the rate of twenty rounds per hour was delivered on that portion of the island still held by the Japs. In order to halt the knee-mortar fire, the artillery was drawn in as close as possible and fired thirty rounds. This silenced the Jap until daybreak. At 0200 a platoon of Japs, consisting of an officer and fifteen men, with a knee mortar and a light machine gun, advanced down a side road toward the battalion CP perimeter. A Sioux Indian sergeant had a light machine gun covering the road and he allowed the enemy to approach within five yards of his position before he opened fire on them, killing fifteen. One prisoner, a Hawaiian-born Jap marine who spoke excellent English, walked into a supply dump on the beach and surrendered. This was the only captive taken throughout the entire fight.


At daybreak a party of six or eight Japs set fire to four trucks belonging to the aviation engineers. These



This officer inspects a hole where a Jap slug tore through his helmet and liner during the Wakde invasion.

trucks had been driven inland and left without adequate guards. Fifty-four Japs, who had been by-passed during the first day's fighting, had assembled during the night and made a futile attack on a group of Air Force engineers on the beach. A sergeant took command of the situation, organized an enveloping counter-attack and wiped out the enemy. Company A was desperately short of water. An adequate supply to carry it through to noon had been delivered the previous night but Jap fire throughout the night had punctured many cans. This company had killed over eighty Japs who were trying to escape through it during the night and early morning.

The tanks were slow in reporting to the front area that morning, the delay being caused by the fight between the Japs and elements of the engineers. This fight resulted in everyone in the beachhead area being



Map 12

pinned down. When they did put in an appearance there were three of them, the third being the one which had dropped into the water at the beachhead during the previous day. It had been towed out and put into operation.

The attack for the second day called for Company A to hold fast since it was planned to push the remaining Japs into the area just in front of this company. On the south side Companies B and C, with the aid of the tanks, were to advance until they pinched out Company F. When the advance reached the narrow area between the east end of the airstrip and the seacoast, Company F then was to join Company A for the final clean up.

The plan worked well. Company A, now on the north of the strip at its eastern end in three platoon perimeters, held fast and sniped Japs, like shooting ducks from a blind, until noon. At noon both flanks

made contact. The whole island had been covered by now but there still were Japs left. These were hiding under debris and in cleverly concealed pillboxes, while the more tenacious ones crawled into coral caves and crevices, several of which were on the east end of the island. From these they fought fanatically to the bitter end. Tanks proved ineffective against these caves as the openings faced seaward and the approaches were too rocky for the tanks to negotiate. Flamethrowers were pressed into action and by evening all the emplacements were cleaned out. The last organized resistance, which had continued stubbornly from the northeastern section of the island, was reduced during this second day of fighting. The day also marked the unopposed landings of Company E on Liki Island and Company I on Niroemoar Island. Radar installations were established on these islands without enemy interference.



Men of Company B, 163d Infantry, take time out on Wakde while awaiting the return of advance parties from the airstrip.

At 1700 all units were pulled back to the mid-point of the island for the night. Kitchens were brought over from the mainland and the men were given a good, hot B-ration supper. Guards were posted and the men settled down for a good night's sleep.

Next morning the consolidation of Wakde and scattered mopping-up activities continued and 803 enemy dead were counted. Intelligence officers revealed that there had been nineteen different Japanese units represented. These varied from port detachments to two companies of Tojo's much ballyhooed "Tiger Marines," who were veterans of several years of fighting in China, had been in on the rape of Nanking and boasted the name of "Conquerors of Java." In the forty-eight hours of fast and continuous action the Americans had 20 men killed and 36 wounded. Over one hundred bunkers of concrete or coconut logs and twelve deep caves, containing food, water and ammunition, had been reduced.

With its task successfully concluded the 1st Battalion returned to the mainland on 20 May. Work progressed on the strip from the time it was secured until 21

May, when the first P-38s, P-40s and medium bombers arrived to use it as a forward base.

While the 1st Battalion had taken Wakde, patrols on the mainland had contacted Japs on both sides of the Tor River, but no strong offensive action had been taken pending the arrival of the 158th Infantry Combat Team. This unit reached Toem on 21 May and began a push west of the Tor River against heavy hostile fire. As the 158th Infantry took over the fight in the Maffin Bay area, the 163d Infantry Regiment prepared for movement to Biak where it would rejoin the 41st Infantry Division.

The 41st Division in its bitter struggle for Wakde Island had secured another airdrome which would be an important factor in the westward advance of the Southwest Pacific Forces. The campaign was unique for its brevity and conclusiveness, and marked the first time that terrain and conditions permitted the full use of tanks. This was not a large-scale operation but it embodied all the ugly factors that go into the making of any war, no matter how remote or unexploited by the press and radio.

Chapter 12: Bloody Biak

WHEN THE Toem-Wakde campaign still was in the planning phase the instructions called for the 41st Division, less Persecution Task Force, to make a landing in the vicinity of Sarmi. As the plans took shape the Sarmi phase of the operation was abandoned in favor of a strike at Biak, one of the Schouten Islands. The initial phase of this operation was the landing at Arare on 17 May by the 163d Infantry while the decisive phase was to get under way on 27 May when the remainder of the Jungleers were to storm ashore on Biak.

The Schouten Islands are located in the north central portion of Geelvink Bay. Only a narrow channel separates Biak and Soepiori Islands, the two principal islands of the Schouten group. Biak is the easterly of the two and is the result of a series of regional uplifts of the earth's crust which brought a shallow sea floor to the surface. A coral reef made an outside border around the island. The eastern third of the island, roughly the area east of an imaginary line between Sorido Village and Korim, is bounded by an almost unbroken ridge of this narrow, terraced, coral reef, which in places rises to 330 feet on the ocean side and 160 feet on the landward side. The reef is covered with tall rain forests and frequently is made up of parallel ridges which serve as additional obstacles in terrain already quite difficult. The island has a generally flat surface, with the exception of limestone mountains in the northwest and in a small area north of Bosnek.

A road suitable for motor transport was constructed by the Japs from Sorido Village to Bosnek. In addition to an excellent track running from Sorido Village to Korim, a network of trails radiates north and northeast from Bosnek. West from the surveyed airstrip site, north of Bosnek, run two trails paralleling the coral ridges. These trails assumed importance during the operation as the routes leading to Mokmer Airdrome.

Much thought was given to the selection of D-day for the Biak phase of the campaign. Those making the plans figured that if an interval of ten days separated the landing at Wakde and the assault on Biak, the amphibious shipping used at Wakde could supplement the shipping needed for the landing at Biak. Furthermore, such a spacing of the landings would enable fighter aircraft from Wakde to cover and support the operations at Biak.

Accurate maps were unavailable and headquarters had to rely solely upon the reports of air observers and the interpretations of aerial photographs for the timely information of the terrain and the enemy installations in the objective areas. Although reconnaissance patrols could have obtained some helpful information these

were not used because the detection of such activities by the Japs would have revealed the Allied intentions and robbed them of the ever important element of surprise.

Mokmer, Bosnek and the area between these two villages provided possible landing sites in the Biak area. The strongest resistance was expected at Mokmer, which was known to be the most heavily defended area. Aerial photographs indicated that between Mokmer and Bosnek either mangrove swamps lay immediately behind the beaches, or cliffs rose sharply from the beach. Bosnek finally was selected as the landing site because the area had a good road, two coral jetties and coral dispersal areas suitable for supply dumps.

The Biak force, known as Hurricane Task Force and commanded by General Fuller, had as its major combat unit the 41st Division, less the Wakde Force, reinforced. Hollandia was selected as the staging area for this force and under the palm trees and perfectly cloudless skies the preparations went on, beginning around 10 May. Work went far into the night in blacked-out tents which served as command posts. Yet, nearly everyone found a few lazy minutes each day to lie on the white sandy beach and swim in the blue surf. There were outdoor movies, and there were red alerts practically every night. One night it was necessary to sit in front of the theater screen for nearly five hours to see a particularly good show from beginning to end. Four red alerts interrupted the cameraman that night. Food was good and plentiful, and just before this force sailed for another invasion, a large group of men left the Division for the long-awaited voyage home via the rotation plan. These men were incredibly happy over having cheated combat—and possible death—by so little as one week. And as it turned out they were more lucky than any realized because Biak proved to be the most expensive combat mission the Jungleers ever were to know—in length, arduousness and in lives lost.

During the planning phase the possible use of the 163d Combat Team as reinforcements for the Biak force was visualized. Accordingly, LCIs were to be available to transport this unit from Toem on 2 June. In the event that the hostile opposition at Biak proved to be stronger than was expected, the 163d Infantry was the logical reinforcing unit since it would be moving from the nearest Allied base to Biak and would be strengthening its parent unit, the 41st Division. To insure the availability of the 163rd Regimental Combat Team for this role, without weakening the Wakde force, the 158th Combat Team moved from Finschhafen to the Toem area about 21 May.

On 25 May Hurricane Task Force assembled on



A destroyer of a naval task force which invaded Biak lies close to shore to render support to the landing of 41st Division troops.

Hollandia's White Beach 3 and that night jumped off for Biak's coral offshore reefs, narrow, sandy beaches and high, narrow coral ridges with their many honey-combed caves in which the Japs took refuge. These were to cause the Jungleers a lot of trouble. Biak had three airdromes. Mokmer, the most important of these, had to be taken before the New Guinea campaign could be concluded.

The force traveled all that night and the next day and night and on the morning of 27 May it stood offshore at Biak. The Japs must have known this was coming. The island had been subjected to heavy aerial bombardment and no shadow of a doubt could have remained when the Navy moved its cruisers and destroyers in close to shore two weeks prior to D-day and began tossing tons of shells into the island at the rate of thirty rounds an hour, continuing this pace night and day. However, the Japs just crawled farther into their holes and were safe from the bursting shells.

The morning of D-day was a brilliant, clear, sunny day. A forty-minute naval barrage and air bombardment left smoke billowing against the sky. It became so dense that troops in the landing craft could not see the shore and the objective areas were hidden from sight beneath the pall of a slowly dissipating grey cloud. The Japs, for the most part, retreated to their underground installations and just waited.

The coral reefs offshore caused some confusion among the landing craft as they came in to make the landing. The narrow sandy beaches offered an insecure foothold. The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, in Buffaloes, amphibian troop and cargo carriers, was the assault battalion, hitting the beaches at 0730. A section where two jetties projected into the water was selected for the landing of this battalion. The first wave of sixteen Buffaloes was divided into three groups. Eight craft were to go in between the jetties, with four on each flank. Because of a six-mile-an-hour westerly current and the limited visibility the entire 2d Battalion, first, second and third waves landed in the swampy area just west of Mandon and about two miles west of the proposed landing site.

The 3d Battalion of the 186th Regiment was assigned to take a position on the west end of the beachhead and the 2d Battalion was to take up a position on the right, but it landed far out on the left. The 2d Battalion proceeded inland without resistance until it reached the Bosnek-Mokmer coastal road where it quickly reorganized. By noon the 2d and 3d Battalions reached their respective objectives and the 2d was receiving scattered resistance from the caves in the face of the ridge.

The 162d Infantry, which had been assigned the mission of seizing Mokmer airdrome, landed behind the 186th Regiment. Once ashore the 3d Battalion, which was in the lead, passed through the 186th Infantry and began the westward advance down the coastal road toward Parai. The 2d Battalion, less Company E, followed the 3d Battalion down the coastal road.

Time was valuable at this stage of the operation and some was lost while the units criss-crossed back and forth to join their proper organizations. Careful orientation of the men as to their mission and the tactical situation added to the ease with which the predicament was adjusted.


Supporting the infantry were the 205th and the 146th Field Artillery Battalions; the 121st Field Artillery of the 32d Division; and the 947th Field Artillery, a Sixth Army battalion of 155mm howitzers, which had been attached to the task force for this operation. Division Headquarters and Division Artillery Headquarters were among the initial units ashore on D-day. By midmorning the artillery was ashore and the guns were in position at Bosnek Village.

The 186th Infantry had extended the beachhead one mile to the east and west of Bosnek and patrols were active to the north, meeting only slight resistance. Meanwhile, at a point about seven thousand yards west of Bosnek the coral ridge approaches to within forty or fifty yards of the coastline and at this point becomes a vertical coral and limestone cliff, forming a narrow defile. Here the advancing 162d Infantry encountered the first organized Jap resistance. The re-

CROSS SECTION OF CORAL RIDGE
CLIFF ON SEAWARD SIDE 200-300 FT HIGH.
NUMEROUS CAVES IN THE HEAVILY FORESTED
CORAL RIDGES. TERRAIN EXTREMELY DIFFI-
CULT TO TRAVERSE.

2.

AFTER LANDING, 162D INF PASSED THROUGH
186TH INF AT BEACHHEAD AND ADVANCED TO
PARAI AGAINST WEAK RESISTANCE. AFTER AD-
VANCE BEYOND MOKMER VILLAGE ON 28 MAY
REGIMENT WAS FORCED TO WITHDRAW BY
HEAVY FIRE FROM FRONT AND FROM CLIFFS
ON FLANKS



BIAK I.

World War Two Veterans.Org

4.
163 INF (LESS THE 2D BN) ARRIVED 31 MAY AND IMMEDIATELY TOOK OVER DEFENSE OF BEACHHEAD PERIMETER. ONE COMPANY OF THE 186TH INF SECURED RIDGES NORTH OF BOSNEK AND RECONNOITERED SURVEYED DROME SITE. ONE BATTALION MOVED EAST TO OPIAREF.

SURVEYED FOR DROME

BEACH HEAD

MANDON

OLD JETTY BOSNEK NEW JETTY

LIMIT OF WITHDRAWAL

3.
162D INF REPULSED THREE COUNTERATTACKS AT MOKMER VILLAGE ON 29 MAY BEFORE WITHDRAWAL TO NEW PERIMETER NEAR MANDON. EIGHT ENEMY TANKS WERE DESTROYED AND 400 JAPANESE WERE KILLED. ENEMY HAD FORMED ROAD BLOCK WHICH THE 162D INF WAS FORCED TO REDUCE AS IT WITHDREW.

1.
41ST INF DIV (-163D RCT) LANDED 27 MAY 1944 AGAINST SLIGHT OPPOSITION. CURRENT AND POOR VISIBILITY CAUSED LEADING WAVES TO LAND NEAR MANDON INSTEAD OF BOSNEK BEACH HEAD RAPIDLY ESTABLISHED.

LANDING AND OPERATIONS AT BIAK

PERIOD 27-31 MAY

0 1 2
MILES



A DUKW carries 41st Division troops toward the fighting front on Biak.

sistance was not being offered by a large force but due to the terrain advantage, the few enemy troops were able to hold up the Jungleers' advance for several hours. American tanks were pressed into action and, supplemented by naval-gun fire, finally dislodged the enemy.

While this battle was in progress Company E of the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, had landed and was moving inland across the ridge in an effort to reach the plateau. It reported that the series of ridges was so rough and vegetation so thick that rapid progress was impossible. This company was to have maintained a position either parallel with or echeloned to the right rear of the 3d Battalion. However, it was lagging far behind and was unable to hold the position. In order to sustain a more rapid rate of advance, Company E was ordered to rejoin the 2d Battalion and reached its parent unit at about the time the defile had been cleared and the advance toward Mokmer drome continued. By the end of D-day the 162d Regiment occupied positions with the 3d Battalion about midway between Parai and Mokmer Village, and the 2d Battalion and advance regimental CP was at Parai Jetty. The 1st Battalion, which had come ashore prepared to follow the 2d and 3d Battalions down the coastal road or to re-embark in amphibian craft and move to Parai Jetty in a flanking movement, was in the vicinity of Ibdi.

As dusk closed in on the Jungleers, enemy planes made a bombing and strafing run over the beachhead area, causing only slight damage. During the night Company I of the 186th Infantry was harassed by enemy reconnaissance patrols while Company B was attacked by an enemy patrol for one hour beginning at midnight. It was believed that this patrol was transported by barge from a point farther east as the

muffled sound of motors was heard from that direction just prior to the attack.

The second day found the 162d Infantry advancing to Mokmer Village where strong hostile forces laid down heavy mortar and machine-gun fire from the dominating cliffs on the north flank. The coral ridge and cliff turned sharply north just east of Mokmer Village and widened into a coastal plateau. A sharp coral cliff approximately twenty feet high ran diagonally across the coastal corridor, forming a terrace. The enemy launched an attack here and drove a wedge to the coast, thus cutting off the leading elements of the regiment while the 2d Battalion was pinned down and was unable to get onto the terrace. The shoreline in this area was a vertical cliff varying from twenty to sixty feet in height. Small secondary growth covered the area and was thick enough to prevent good observation from the ground but open enough to allow excellent observation from above. The enemy occupied a very formidable position in the steep limestone ridge to the north of the 3d Battalion. This ridge afforded the enemy perfect observation of Allied movements, excellent cover and concealment in the vegetation, coral caves and crevices in the ridge so that opposing fires had little effect upon him, while he was able to cover the area with devastating fire.

The cut-off 3d Battalion was suffering heavy casualties and communication was difficult since all wire lines had been cut and all but one radio failed to function. The position of the 3d Battalion forward elements was untenable, and further advance was impossible until the enemy on the ridge and in the face of the cliff could be dislodged either by action from the north or by naval fire from the seaward side. During the afternoon the 3d Battalion began a withdrawal but enemy pressure heightened to such an extent that this



Landing craft carry troops of the 41st Division in for the Biak landing.

move was impossible. Lack of communications prevented laying a concentration of sufficient fire on the enemy to neutralize his fire. The 3d Battalion repulsed several attacks. For the first time in the long New Guinea campaign the Japs were employing tanks against the Americans.

Ammunition and medical supplies were running dangerously low and LVTs were used to bring in these critical items. These remained well out in the channel beyond the range of enemy weapons. When they came abreast of the 3d Battalion area they darted to the beach in a direct line, one coming in at a time, to a position at the base of the coastal cliff which offered cover from enemy fire. When the supplies were unloaded wounded men were loaded and evacuated.

As darkness approached, the artillery, air and naval units were able to neutralize the enemy fire sufficiently to permit the cut-off elements to withdraw by infiltrating along the beach. Four tanks of the 603d Tank Company joined in the fight and covered the withdrawal, which was completed by 1830. All equipment and wounded personnel were evacuated from the forward area. The 3d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion and took up positions directly to its rear. Patrols from the 186th Infantry still were probing north and east from the beachhead and a Company G patrol was dispatched to Opiaref but met no enemy.


In his report to General Krueger, General Fuller announced the situation as "grave" and requested reinforcements to consist of the 163d Regimental Combat Team. The 163d Infantry, less one battalion, made arrangements to leave Wakde and the 503d Parachute Regiment moved from Oro Bay to Hollandia for subsequent employment at Biak should developments require its use.

On the third day the enemy continued his resistance with strong offensive action, launching three separate counterattacks from the west, supported by tanks.

American medium tanks took up the fight and the first tank battle to be waged in the Pacific followed. Failing to reckon with American tanks, the Japs foolishly sent their armor down the road in a column, each tank rushing forward to replace the lead tank as it was knocked out of action. At the close of this historic tank engagement, seven Jap tanks lay completely destroyed on the beach while others had been severely crippled and withdrew. The enemy ground troops, however, continued their aggressive action and the 162d suffered heavily, although by the end of the day it had killed some four hundred Japs and was able to withdraw to more favorable terrain. The Japs made a circling movement similar to the one of the previous day, and again the regiment was cut off temporarily. Company B and Cannon Company, acting as a rifle company during this campaign, broke the enemy line with a successful counterattack.

By now it was apparent that no successful attack could be launched against the airdrome area until Allied forces controlled the high ground overlooking it, and had neutralized the enemy fire from the Mokmer pocket and the coastal corridor approaching it from the east. It was decided to withdraw toward Mandon and regain contact with the 186th Infantry to the east. Led by the tanks some of the unit infiltrated through the defile while the remainder employed amphibian craft to fall back. One platoon of Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, was ordered to maintain supporting fire with its 4.2-inch mortars and at the completion of the mission to destroy the weapons and rejoin the regiment. By nightfall the withdrawal had been completed successfully.

To the east the 186th doughboys had been subjected to two air raids in the early morning hours. During patrol activities that day they found a motor road which connected Opiaref with the surveyed drome north of Bosnek.



MOKMER POCKET
SCHEMATIC CROSS SECTION

Following the withdrawal in the 162d Infantry sector a new plan of attack was formulated. The incoming 163d Infantry was to take over the defense of the beachhead area, thus relieving the 186th Infantry, which then could divert its activities toward the airdrome site north of the coral ridges and Bosnek. When preparations were complete, the 186th, making the main effort, would launch an attack westward along the high plateau north of the ridges, putting the regiment in position for an assault on Mokmer drome from the northeast. At the same time the 186th was making this move it was planned to have the 162d advance west to the drome along a narrow strip of level ground, between the sea and the coral cliffs. In the vicinity of Parai, the base of these cliffs and the seashore almost merged and this terrain feature was referred to throughout the campaign as the Parai Defile.

For the next three days the 162d Infantry conducted intensive patrol activities to determine the enemy positions on the ridges to the north. It also consolidated its positions and reorganized its broken ranks. The artillery, mortars, planes and Navy shelled and strafed the area of Parai, Mokmer Airdrome and the ridges which hemmed the drome on three sides away from the sea. The enemy was making splendid use of the defensive qualities of the terrain and there was little doubt lingering in the minds of the Jungleers that the coming battles would be tougher than anything which the Division had encountered thus far. That the Jap felt that Biak was worth fighting and dying for was evident by the increasing number of low-level bombing attacks carried out during daylight hours. Harassing attacks at night also were becoming more numerous. The 162d patrols found that what was thought to be a single ridge was actually a series of seven sharp coral ridges, which apparently had been caused by an upheaval in the earth's surface. This entire ridge arrangement was honeycombed with small caves, holes and crevices and, though there was practically no soil



A patrol of the 162d Infantry advances toward the airstrip on Biak.

covering the coral, the area was covered with a dense growth of rain forest. Two native tracks crossed the ridges just east of Ibdi but the enemy had strong positions blocking both trails.

Patrolling continued in the 186th Infantry sector until 1 June when the newly planned attack was inaugurated. The 163d Regiment landed at Bosnek on this date and took over the defense of the beach area. Now after more than fifteen months of fighting and dying in the jungles at Papua, New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea, the 41st Division was assembled as a fighting machine and was making a coordinated effort for the very first time. Upon being relieved, the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, moved to Opiaref and reduced the enemy resistance there. Later the 3d Battalion joined the 2d near the surveyed drome north of Bosnek and made last-minute preparations for a coordinated attack to the west. Five tanks and one platoon of the 116th Engineers moved into the area and the 121st Field Artillery was attached to the 186th Infantry for the westward move. The engineers completed repairs on the supply road leading west from Opiaref by late afternoon. At the same time the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, took to one of the trails leading across the ridges on its north flank, and the 163d Infantry was aiding in the movement of supplies in addition to its defensive duties.

In the early morning hours of 2 June the 186th Infantry was attacked by a force of unknown strength. Mortar fire and loud shouting preceded the attack which lasted four hours and featured considerable hand-to-hand combat with each side employing machetes, grenades, bayonets and a limited amount of small-arms fire. At daybreak the attackers began to withdraw while some of the more seriously wounded Nips either committed *hara kiri* or attempted to fight



Shell-scarred fallen trees furnish additional handicaps to men of the 162d Infantry as they move toward Mokmer Airdrome.



Men of the 162d Infantry move up toward Mokmer Airdrome on Biak.

and were killed. No prisoners had been taken but 86 Japs and three men of the 3d Battalion had been killed.

At 0900 the 186th began to move westward along the inland plateau. It was a slow, tedious march, and maintaining a supply line, especially for water, was a major problem. The regiment was flanked by mountains on its right and by the cliffs, dropping away to the sea, on its left. The heat and humidity were intense. Thick scrub growth, about twelve feet high, covered the area and shut off any breeze. Each soldier was allowed only one canteen of water, which was most insufficient. Troops caught rain water in ponchos and, in many cases, this prevented heat exhaustion. Some attempt was made to haul water to the troops as engineers followed the doughboys with bulldozers, opening a road for vehicles. Enemy resistance was light and the 186th plodded steadily westward.

At the same time the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, kept reducing Japs along its route of march. Late in the afternoon this unit established contact and was attached to the 186th Infantry just northwest of Ibd. Antitank Company of the 162d, also acting as a rifle company, was given the mission of covering the line of communication for the 2d Battalion. The remainder of the 162d Infantry was stalemated as a result of the enemy roadblock on the coastal road in the defile area.

Company A, 163d Infantry, made a landing on Owi Island on 2 June but found no enemy. It then moved to Woendi Island and again was unopposed. Zeros

strafed the beach area at Bosnek and inland and many were brought down by ack-ack fire. Air Force troops relieved Company A on Owi and Woendi Islands and the 3d Battalion of the 163d Infantry moved north of Opiaref to guard the 186th supply line.

On 3 June the 186th and 162d Regiments resumed movement westward, the former continuing along the inland plateau route while the latter clung to the coastal road. The 162d had progressed 2,500 yards when intense hostile fire forced the 3d Battalion to withdraw from the Parai Defile. The 186th encountered only occasional sniper fire and advanced some 3,500 yards during the day. Supply remained a difficult problem since a very inadequate trail was the only means available. The 121st Field Artillery had such difficulty moving over the route that it finally retired to the surveyed drome area. Maintaining contact was extremely difficult for the infantrymen since visibility was limited to about ten yards.

The engineers by this time had made a reconnaissance of Owi Island and reported that it was suitable for construction of an airstrip. As the Mokmer drome obviously could not be secured for some time, heavy engineer equipment was moved to Owi Island and work began at once on a new strip.

It was reported on 4 June that a large enemy naval force was headed for Biak and had been sighted by American planes. The force, according to reports, consisted of two battleships, eight cruisers, and a considerable number of destroyers. It was estimated that it would reach Biak by 1630. Location of US Navy units was such that they would be unable to reach Biak before 1930. All artillery units except the 121st Battalion were



A column of 41st Division troops follows a Sherman tank on a ridge north of Mokmer Airdrome.




The Japs used caves like this during the Biak operation. Jungleers prepare to attack this one.

ordered to prepare to fire two batteries seaward. Bulldozers and dump trucks assisted in digging gun pits and preparing revetments. Headquarters prepared to move on a moment's notice and alternate wire systems were laid. At 1710 news came that the enemy task force was about 35 miles west of Manokowan and that a large force of B-24s and B-25s was on its way to attack. American naval units were approaching Biak, and by 1940 four cruisers and eleven destroyers steamed full speed past the island on a westward course. The Jap force was reported to have turned northwest at Manokowan and lost contact with Allied airmen about three hundred miles west of Biak. This is the story as related in a journal entry but it does not record the many little things that contributed to the excitement and trepidation felt by the men that day.

It does not record the fact that the day was very hot, and that even with the threat of an enemy naval bombardment, a man could dig revetments, tunnels and other installations just so fast and no faster in the coral earth of Biak Island. It does not reveal the real throb of excitement that hung over the beaches all day as the cats seemed to dig, scoop and shovel harder and faster to fashion the revetments on the beach from which the

tanks were to fire seaward on any invading enemy units. The journal account also does not tell of the taut nerves that made men work without let-up at the end of a pick or shovel or at a typewriter all day long, making the record in coral and on paper of an enemy fleet coming ever closer to shores so newly won. It only tells of the parade of US naval might going past the island to give chase. Men lined the beaches that evening and broke into spontaneous cheers and finally went off to the mundane task of fighting the caved-up enemy on Biak. There was a feeling of relief, carelessness, and perhaps a little of mightiness.

The westward advance was halted on 4 June while a search for an approach around the Parai Defile took place. For three days elements of the 162d Infantry tried to break through this enemy stronghold. On 5 June an attempt was made with the support being furnished by a destroyer, a rocket LCI and flak boats but despite this strong support the mission failed. The following day the 162d probed the defile to maintain pressure on the enemy but made no gains. Attempts to make an enveloping movement over the ridges also failed. Meanwhile, the 186th pushed patrols to the south and west in an effort to discover routes leading




over the coral ridges to the Mokmer drome. Except for these patrols there was no activity on 6 June.

On 5 June the 186th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion of the 162d Infantry attached, moved to the eastern bases of the ridges dominating Mokmer strip where they reconnoitered throughout the following day. A coordinated attack, which resulted in the capture of Mokmer strip and the establishment of a beachhead south of the strip, was launched on 7 June.

Artillery fire had been laid down on the strip before the jumpoff and by 0850 the leading battalion was on the beach. The troops encountered no opposition get-

ting onto the drome, but after about one and a half hours the Japs opened up on them with artillery, mortars and machine guns from the high ridge along the beach and from the high ground in what was called the Sump Hole Area, on the left flank of the Yanks. These enemy weapons were well camouflaged in dense scrub growth and well protected, as later determined, by defilade or by emplacement in caves. This intense fire continued for about four hours after which it decreased when Allied artillerymen and mortarmen used the muzzle blasts to direct their own fire on the enemy. The artillery also began to fire on the two dromes that



Map 15

lay beyond Mokmer. It was to be many weeks before these were to be captured but the softening up process had already begun.

Word reached the 162d Infantry that the 186th had reached the Mokmer drome. After another unsuccessful attempt to break the enemy blockade at the Parai Defile, amphibian craft carried elements of the 3d Battalion to a landing point at Parai Jetty on 7 June, thus by-passing the defile which had held up the advance. The landing was completed during the afternoon but, due to the limited number of personnel employed in this movement and the strong enemy resistance, it was

impossible for the 3d Battalion to make any headway for an attack on the defile.

Some attempt was made during the afternoon to reinforce both the 3d Battalion of the 162d Infantry and the 186th Regiment. Two tanks and Cannon Company did get ashore at Parai, but accurate heavy fire at Mokmer prevented LCMs and LSTs from landing until after nightfall. Then tanks and supplies were landed and the wounded evacuated. Many of the craft were hit during this period. Throughout the day the 186th Infantry had 14 men killed and 68 wounded.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, by-passed the Parai



Colonel Archie Roosevelt, second from left, 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, plans a new attack against Jap installations on Biak.

Defile and followed the 3d Battalion ashore at Parai on 8 June. The 2d Battalion of the 162d Infantry, which was attached to the 186th Infantry, began to move eastward from Mokmer drome on 9 June and established contact with its parent unit, thereby opening a sorely needed supply route. Following contact between the 1st and 2d Battalions, the latter reverted to 162d control.

Meanwhile, in the 186th sector, organization of the beach continued and defensive fires were coordinated. The regiment was harassed by enemy patrols and mortar fire and it was noted that following the mortar fire the enemy sent trained dogs to locate Allied positions. Several dogs moved to within a hundred yards of the 3d Battalion position on the beach, south of Mokmer drome. Some of the dogs stopped and barked while others approached the outposts and, without making a sound, trotted off to the west. The enemy then advanced and built up a line behind the dogs.

That night the Japs launched a heavy attack accompanied by the usual blood-curdling battle cries. A few of the enemy infiltrated the Allied positions and bayoneted a few men. Hand grenades were used effectively by both sides. The following morning, while still under heavy fire, the Americans buried their dead on

the Mokmer drome near the beach. Eight Americans paid the supreme penalty while 42 of the enemy had fought the last time for the glory of the Emperor.

The beachhead was firmly established by 9 June and early that morning amphibian Buffaloes brought in ammunition and supplies and evacuated the wounded. Patrolling was begun toward the high ground to the north of the drome by Company B, which was using hand grenades and flamethrowers to clean out numerous caves in the vicinity of Mokmer. The beachhead area still was being plastered with heavy artillery and mortar fire.

Companies B and C of the 186th and the 1st Battalion command group took up the destruction of the enemy positions encountered the previous day north of Mokmer drome by Company B. An artillery barrage preceded the attack and continued until 1035. The advance was to the west with two companies abreast, Company B on the ridge and Company C on the right on the tableland. By 1100 both companies were under heavy fire. An hour later Company C detected a large number of the enemy moving around its north flank and killed 22 of them. The balance of the group continued moving east on Company C's rear. Rocket-launcher and tank 75mm fire played on the enemy posi-



Japanese tanks, used unsuccessfully against troops of the 41st Division on Biak, were quickly put out of action by Allied gunfire in the first tank engagement in the Pacific.

tions for two hours with no effect. The probing units withdrew south and the artillery laid down fire. Elements of the 162d Infantry relieved the 186th troops and the latter moved to the Mokmer drome. The 3d Battalion, aided by armor, continued the destruction of caves along the shoreline and the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, moved east with no resistance. Nine more tanks were attached to the 186th. Enemy long-range machine-gun fire proved quite annoying to the engineers working on the drome and soon increased to such an extent that work was halted, not to be resumed for ten days. Enemy artillery still was operating from deep defensive territory but had more of a harassing effect than the deadly fire of previous days.

Elements of the 162d Infantry continued to by-pass the Parai Defile and joined the regiment at Parai. The 2d and 3d Battalions began to move west toward Mokmer drome while the 1st Battalion defended the Parai Jetty area and applied pressure to the defile from the west. The movement to Mokmer drome was slow and required a full day. The coastal corridor still was subjected to Jap fire and the two battalions had to move along the coast under the shelter of cliffs. This necessitated moving in a column of files, and men waded through surf that was waist-deep at high tide. At several points along the route the column was exposed to enemy fire and suffered some casualties.

During this period of fighting the 163d Regiment was consolidating supply lines and making scattered contacts with the enemy. On 11 June the 2d Battalion and Cannon Company, which had remained at Wakde, arrived at Biak and moved to the vicinity of Ibdi where they relieved units of the 162d Infantry with the mission of guarding the coast supply route. The remainder of the regiment patrolled, flushing out isolated enemy groups.


A coordinated attack against the ridges north and northwest of Mokmer drome was launched by the 162d and 186th Regiments on 11 June. For this attack the two regiments were deployed abreast from the coast

to the ridges north of Mokmer. The 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, moving along the ridge just north of the drome, met stiff resistance from Jap pillboxes and could not maintain the advance with the other battalions. By 12 June the 2d Battalion, 162d, and the 186th Regiment reached their objective. The 3d Battalion, 162d, was unable to proceed west along the ridge until Company L made a flanking movement to the north and dislodged the Japs from the crest of the ridge. One small pocket of resistance remained between Company L and its parent unit but this was eliminated during the following day. Meanwhile, shortly after noon on 12 June, word came that the Jap positions in the defile area between Parai Jetty and Ibdi had been reduced and the defile now was open to traffic.

The 2d Battalion, 162d, moved north and took up a position on the ridge on 13 June. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry, tried to reduce the resistance between them, and made short advances despite determined resistance. The 1st Battalion dispatched patrols north from its position on Mokmer drome in an effort to locate possible routes of advance for a proposed wide envelopment by that battalion. The 1st Battalion, 162d, moved north via a trail through the 3d Battalion,



A surgeon and his assistants operate on a soldier for shrapnel wounds at the 26th Portable Hospital on Biak.



162d. The 1st Battalion, 186th, moved north beyond the 1st Battalion, 162d, and these two units turned west and made a coordinated attack in a west and southwest direction.

This attack continued through 14 June but due to rough terrain and enemy resistance it did not progress as rapidly as had been planned. During the night the Japs attacked, using tanks, but these attacks were repelled. However, the 1st Battalion, 162d, suffered many casualties. On this date the 162d Regiment reached the main enemy defense known as West Caves while the 186th Infantry continued patrolling toward Borokoe drome and the area south to the coast line.

The situation on 15 June found the two regiments deployed abreast with the 3d Battalion, 186th, on the left or coastal flank. North of this unit were the 2d Battalion, 186th; 2d Battalion, 162d; 3d Battalion, 162d; 1st Battalion, 162d and the 1st Battalion, 186th, which held the right or inland flank.

Prompted by an Air Corps report of probable attempts by the Japs to send reinforcements to Biak and by the marked signs of fatigue among the troops, General Fuller, commander of the Biak forces, requested another regiment as reinforcements. General Krueger placed little credence in the Jap's ability to strengthen his Biak garrison, but nevertheless he sent the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division to Biak where it arrived on 18 June.

Because of the slow progress being made on Biak and the failure to secure the airdromes at an early date, as directed, General Fuller was relieved as commander of Hurricane Task Force. Continuous heavy fighting,




Dogs of a war-dog platoon aided Jungleers in flushing out Japs on Biak.

coupled with extremely difficult terrain, intense heat and the scarcity of water had tired the task force troops to a critical degree and was largely responsible for the delay. The situation at Biak indicated that the success of future operations was threatened. General Eichelberger replaced General Fuller on 15 June and three days later General Fuller, at his own request, also was relieved from command of the 41st Division and was replaced by General Doe, who subsequently received his second star. In a final statement to the officers and men whom he had led overseas and through many months of bloody combat, General Fuller gave his thanks for their efforts and praised the Sunset Division as one of the finest group of men he had ever commanded. With General Fuller's departure the Jungleers lost an excellent and highly admired soldier but in General Doe the men got a worthy successor.

In a sense, 17 June marked the halfway point in the Biak campaign. Although weeks of combat lay ahead, the primary objective, Mokmer drome, had been seized although it had not been fully secured. Secondly, the initial phase of the campaign was past. That phase where enemy air, naval and ground arms could still be coordinated in carrying out prearranged tactics definitely was over. True, there still were bombing attacks but these were mostly of a harassing nature and about the only naval action was to be the dispatching of a submarine to Biak near the end of the campaign in a futile effort to evacuate some of the defeated elements



Men of a signal company lay a submarine cable from Biak to Owi Island.



Map 17



Surgeons of the 26th Portable Hospital perform a delicate brain operation on a 41st Division soldier somewhere on Biak.

of the enemy force. Last, and by no means the least significant, was the change in command and the introduction of more fresh troops into the fight.


At the time General Eichelberger took over, the ground situation was as follows:

Shortly after the landing the 162d Infantry had approached Mokmer drome by a drive along the coast but had failed to secure the drome so that it could be used. This unit had extended its lines without obtaining control of the dominating ridges along the coast. As a result its flank was attacked at the Narrows, a point in the vicinity of Mokmer Village at which the high coastal ridge extended almost to the sea. While advance units of the 162d Infantry were withdrawn by water and by overland movement the situation was countered when the 186th Infantry moved north of Bosnek, then west where it stormed the airdrome from the north and northeast.

The 186th had moved east along the coast after landing and the move to the drome necessitated a long march over very difficult terrain. Heavy fighting was continuous, the water supply was critical and many men were close to the point of exhaustion.

After the 186th seized Mokmer drome it relaxed, but only momentarily. Although it had pushed through the high ground north of the drome, it failed to secure the drome after capturing it. The Japs again occupied the ridges and brought the drome and its captors under fire. This halted work on the drome and the 186th pivoted to face the Jap positions in a northeasterly direction. Several frontal attacks were unsuccessful.

After reorganization following its Narrows engagement, the 162d moved up to the trail leading northwest of Mokmer drome and reached the Sump Holes. This regiment attempted several frontal attacks but was denied success.





The 41st Signal Company enjoys the first beer ration issued to Jungleers on Biak.


When the 163d landed at Bosnek on 27 May it took up the 186th's mission of eliminating the enemy in the ridges east of Bosnek. This mission was enlarged to include the ridges west of Bosnek as far as Parai Town. The 163d operations consisted of patrolling and mopping up areas bordering the coastal track, and securing the water point north of Bosnek which the 186th had captured prior to its move to Mokmer drome. The 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, had moved overland to the northeast of the enemy's main defenses, and succeeded in establishing a squad on the crest of Hill 320. This hill was the dominating terrain feature within the entire zone of action north of the dromes and afforded excellent observation. This move evidently took the Japs by surprise.

In the 186th sector patrolling toward Borokoe drome continued and the artillery registered on this objective. The 2d Battalion, 186th, relieved the 2d Battalion, 162d, and attacked west in order to close the gap that had existed for several days between 2d Battalion, 162d, and the remainder of that regiment to the northeast. The closing of the gap got under way on 16 June. During the action Private Edward Morales single-handedly cleaned out a hasty emplacement containing several Japs and was proceeding toward another when he was killed by snipers. Private Morales made a one-man frontal attack on the enemy machine-gun emplacement with his Thompson submachine gun and grenades. He killed eight of the enemy while under intense fire before he was cut down. For this action, Private Morales was posthumously awarded the DSC.


About mid-morning contact was made with the 3d Battalion, 162d Regiment. During this attack the Jungleers had 15 men killed and 35 wounded and killed 62 of the enemy. While this gap was being closed, the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was pinned down by fire from the battle raging on its left flank and could not move.

Patrolling toward the Borokoe and Sorido dromes took place during the next few days and plans were laid for a coordinated attack to be launched on 19 June. This required reorganization within all units. The mission of this attack was to envelop the enemy right (south) flank, seize the high ground north of Mokmer drome and occupy the ridgeline one thousand yards east of Borokoe drome. This last move was to pave the way for the attack on Borokoe and Sorido dromes.


The 163d Infantry was directed to increase the tempo of its patrol activities and to locate and engage enemy forces within its area. From the number of caves, holes and precipices it was evident that the Japs were free to choose the location of their positions at will. The enemy's main strength could be shifted to counter any localized attack that the American forces might make. To prevent any shift of enemy strength prior to the 19 June attack, the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, was to hold its position in the vicinity of the Sump Holes. In the coordinated attack the 162d was to continue its frontal assault while the 186th attacked north and east from its positions on the ridge above Mokmer drome. This would envelop the enemy and put the 186th on the high ground to the north and west of the Jap



PROFILE OF ③ & ②



PROFILE OF ①



THE SUMPS - BIAK ISLAND

ASSAULTED 22 JUNE, 44
REDUCED 27 JUNE - SCALE 1" = 100'



A general view of the 92d Evacuation Hospital area on Owi, just off Biak.

positions while the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 162d Infantry would be on the low ground to the south in defensive positions. The 3d Battalion, 163d, would be on the high ground to the north and west of the enemy.

Prior to the attack on 19 June a preparation was laid down by 4.2-inch mortars and artillery. The 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, was the assault unit. There was no resistance encountered until the lead companies, E and F, began advancing up the ridge and were greeted by mortar fire. By 1130 these two companies were on the objective while Company G covered the rear. The 3d Battalion followed the 2d and Companies K and L occupied the northern half of the objective while Company I protected their rear. The attack was a complete success and the enemy was overrun to the north of the Sump Holes. The 1st Battalion, 162d Regiment, engaged the enemy at the eastern end of the Sumps during the 186th Infantry attack while the remainder of the 162d Regiment stood fast. It was becoming more and more apparent that the Sumps were the key position in the Jap defense north of the dromes.

Destruction of the Sump Hole area and seizure of Sorido Village was next on the agenda. The attack got under way at 0630 on 20 June when the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division entered the fight. This unit took the Sorido and Borokoe dromes and occupied Sorido Village against moderate resistance. Meanwhile, the 162d Regiment continued operation in the Sump Hole area. The 1st Battalion moved to the surface of the caves and killed many Japs by dropping drums of gasoline into the caves and igniting it with high explosives. Late in the afternoon the attacking units withdrew after being unsuccessful in attempts to reduce the Sump caves.

The following day the 1st Battalion again sent troops to the Sumps preceded by two patrols on the high ground on each side of the Sump Hole area. Automatic and small-arms fire covered some men who went


forward and sprayed sniper positions with flamethrowers. Freed from sniper trouble and supported by two Sherman tanks, the infantrymen reached points on the western lip of the Sumps from which they could fire and throw grenades into the entrance of the cave. As enemy soldiers ran out they were riddled with bullets. However, the main cave entrances were shielded by stalagmites and stalactites and were firmly held.

Cave 1 at the western end of the Sumps was attacked on 21 June and tank fire and flamethrowers were brought to bear on its mouth. To add further to the enemy's distress, five large drumfuls of gasoline were poured into the cave through the crevices and seepage points on top of the cave and then ignited. Explosions roared throughout the following day and it was believed that the fire had reached the ammunition stores.


An attack against a second cave position failed and the Jungleers pulled back for the night and 4.2-inch mortars took up the fight.

That night the Japs made an effort to reach Korim Bay. The story was told by a Jap prisoner who said that Colonel Kuzume, commander of the Japanese 222d Infantry, held a ceremony in the main Sump Cave at 0300 on 22 June. He urged all able-bodied soldiers to attempt a withdrawal to the north using any possible means. Documents then were destroyed and the gasoline-soaked regimental colors were burned. The Japs tried a suicidal effort to break through the 186th lines. Twice heavy machine guns broke up the attack in the early stages but in the third attempt the enemy penetrated the inner defenses and engaged in hand-to-hand combat, using bayonets and grenades. During the night 115 Japs were killed while the 186th had one man killed, this occurring when a Jap jumped into a soldier's foxhole and fired a grenade which killed both men. Later that morning the lip of the Sump was secured.

Several experiments had been tried in the reduction of the Sump caves, but none was so effective as the




OPERATIONS AT BIAK 20 JUNE - 10 AUGUST.



World War Two Veterans.Org

GENERALLY FLAT TERRAIN



ATTACK OF 163 INF. 26-27 JUNE
BIAK ISLAND
DUTCH NEW GUINEA

850-pound charge of dynamite lowered into the cave by a winch and fired electrically by the engineers. Few Japs survived this explosion, and of those who did many were driven insane.

A systematic reduction of the caves was carried out using tank fire, explosives and flamethrowers. By 27 June the last Jap had been killed within the Sump network and the Allied troops entered the inner recesses of the caves where they found considerable quantities of equipment. Living conditions in those last few days must have been unbearable as the smell of rotting bodies permeated the tunnels and inner chambers. By the end of 23 June nearly all organized enemy resistance had ceased but scattered opposition was encountered.

With the West Caves completely wiped out, attention was turned to the enemy pockets in the ridges north of Mokmer and Ibdi Towns. The 163d Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, had been patrolling the ridges between Parai and Warwe. The enemy situation had developed as follows:

On 21 June, Company F, 163d Regiment, began an attack to the southwest from its location on the high ground northwest of Ibdi. About one and a half miles northwest of Ibdi it ran into strong resistance. The unit had missed the enemy outposts and when it opened fire it received fire from three directions. Other elements of the 163d Infantry were due north of this position on a piece of high ground and observed the fire. Heavy machine-gun fire from this position evidently led the Japs to believe that they were being attacked by a force of considerable size and they opened up all along their positions on the high ground to the north. During this barrage, Company F withdrew to



Motor maintenance was always important, and troops improvised grease racks like this one to make the job a little easier in the jungles of New Guinea.

a point along the ridge which it could hold. One platoon remained in that location to prevent any move to the east and the remainder of the company moved back to Ibdi Town.

Throughout 22 and 23 June the Jap positions along the ridge were subjected to harassing artillery fire and on 24 June the enemy position was bombed by twelve B-25s. From the air it was observed that the main enemy defensive position was apparently in a large cylindrical hole with caves leading off from its side. On this date the 163d participated in a coordinated attack with the remainder of the 41st Division to seize the ridge extending from a point northwest of Ibdi to a point north of Mokmer Village. The 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, had been under control of the 41st Division but was released to the regiment and placed in reserve, occupying a position on the trail north of Mandon.


In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the regimental mission, it was decided to eliminate the enemy strongpoint northwest of Ibdi which had been under artillery and aerial bombardment. The maneuver was to be an enveloping movement. The 1st Battalion, attacking from north and northwest, and Company F, attacking from the southwest, were to be the assault elements, while Company G occupied a position to the east where it could block and hold.



Men of Headquarters Company, 186th Infantry, eat chow at the front lines on Biak.

World War Two Veterans Org







Left: A far cry from the modern post office back home, but it serves the purpose in the jungles of New Guinea where a soldier starts a registered letter homeward. Right: These men help a machine gunner over a steep ridge while advancing into combat on Biak.



After a heavy preparatory fire the attack was launched at 0530 on 26 June. It is significant to note that this attack was launched before daylight, a move too infrequently attempted by American forces in jungle fighting. The result was highly satisfactory and completely surprised the enemy. Many enemy forward positions which normally were occupied during daylight hours were found unmanned, this factor being an aid to the Jungleers during the initial stages of the attack. Later a series of enemy emplacements, well organized in depth and protected by heavy sniper fire, were found. The close of the day's fighting found the regiment in position as indicated on map 21.

By the end of 27 June, Company F had moved to a position adjoining the Company G area and was assisting the latter in blocking and holding. Slight advances were made by the attacking forces during the day and they were prepared to carry on the attack the following day. In the meantime, it was known that the Mokmer Pocket (or East Cave) still was occupied by the enemy. This position was located in the cliffs north of Mokmer Town, and though seldom active, it remained a potential threat to traffic on the road to the airdromes. On one occasion the road had to be closed when the Japs placed mortar fire on the shoulders of the road.



The 186th Infantry's "rabbit squad" smokes Japs out of a pillbox near Mokmer Airdrome.

A company of infantrymen from the 163d Regiment was given the mission of reducing this position but by 27 June had met with little success. Several fire fights took place but their results were unobserved. On 27 June the Japs shelled the highway and again halted traffic on the main road. Twelve P-40s took to the air and for one hour bombed and strafed the position. At the completion of this strike silence reigned over the enemy's stronghold and later the cliff positions were entered. By 4 July they were cleared.

It was on 27 June that General Eichelberger's I Corps Headquarters was ordered back to Hollandia and command of Hurricane Force was handed over to General Doe. By this time the situation on Biak had become stabilized and the complete enemy dispositions were known. All organized pockets of resistance were under constant attack and mopping up activities were being conducted in the West Caves and the area west of Mokmer drome.

The 162d Infantry was ordered to relieve the 34th Infantry in place on 28 June and by 1 July had completed this move. The mission was a defensive one: to secure the western sector of the Division defense area to prevent enemy interference with the development and operations of the drome and dump areas. Patrol activities were carried out by this regiment through 9 July.

The tedious job of cleaning up scattered units of Japs was so successful that by 9 July the only organized enemy resistance was the pocket 1,200 yards north of Ildi. For two days this pocket came under aerial attacks, and then one company of the 163d Infantry entered it from the east. This unit was halted by heavy fire and resistance remained firm until 22 July when a terrific bombardment was laid down by B-24s, mortars and artillery. Two companies from the 3d Battalion,

163d Infantry, launched a coordinated attack and by nightfall had broken all organized resistance. Until this final attack took place one company of the 3d Battalion remained in constant contact with the enemy, slowly reducing pillboxes with the aid of bazookas, artillery and mortars. During this fight 132 Japs were killed while only two surrendered. Mopping up continued in the Ibdi pocket until 26 July.

Patrol activity was conducted in all sectors and on 15 July the 34th Infantry left Biak to rejoin its parent unit, the 24th Division, at Hollandia.

The 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, moved by LCMs to Korim Bay on 3 August and patrols began to operate south, east and west from Korim Village. The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, later joined in these mopping up activities.


The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, aided by naval-gun fire and air support, landed at Wardo on the southwestern coast of Biak. The landing was unopposed and patrolling continued until the campaign was officially terminated on 20 August.



Colonel Oliver P. Newman (center), CO, 186th Infantry, and Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, CG of I Corps, get the latest details on the fight for Mokmer Airdrome from front-line troops.

ORIENTATION MAP 41ST DIVISION IN RECONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

← 41ST DIV OPERATIONS
← OPERATIONS BY
OTHER UNITS



Chapter 13: Return to the Philippines

AFTER THE END of the Biak campaign the 41st Division enjoyed a period of relief from the housecleaning duties of sweeping Japs out of the far Pacific areas. Fleet Admiral Chester N. Nimitz's Navy forces pressed nearer and nearer the Japanese homeland. United States submarines waged unrelenting warfare against Nip supply and war craft, and the Marines carried the Star-Spangled Banner proudly to the crest of smoking, blood-drenched islands. The great American battle fleet scoured the seas for the Jap Fleet.

Midway's glorious victory was re-enacted twice in the two battles of the Philippines, in which proud old battleships returned from inglorious "destruction" at Pearl Harbor to strike the dwindling Jap Navy. These ships, restored to duty, fought side by side with more recently constructed craft and dealt blows which greatly reduced the Tojo fleet to the stage of impotence.

Navy flyers had a "shooting" time at Saipan, Tinian and Guam, shooting Japs out of the skies by the score. This memorable series of aerial battles has been dubbed the "Marianas turkey shoot." From China and India, and later from Guam and Saipan, as island airstrips were conditioned for American use, great fleets of B-29 Superfortresses began all-out warfare against the cities and war plants of Japan itself. Formosa and the Philippines began to feel the sting of Navy gunfire and the fury of Army, Navy and Marine planes.

Back in the United States people waited anxiously and amid great speculation to see what role the Jungleers would play in this new phase of the war against Japan. The usual rumors that the Division would be returned to the States as a unit were bantered back and forth. Many of the Division's veterans were coming home via the rotation plan. Many others came back on leaves and furlough, and at their termination, rejoined the Division.

General MacArthur would make good his pledge—

"I shall return"—to the peoples of the Philippines. Everyone, including the Japs, knew this. But the secrecy, and the suddenness with which he made this long-promised return came as a tremendous surprise.


Many Pacific war observers thought the 41st Division would be chosen to spearhead the thrust into the Philippines. However, General MacArthur deceived the Japs, and amazed the world, when he launched the liberation of the Philippines by throwing a powerful force ashore on Leyte on 20 October 1944. The business of recapturing the Philippines moved forward under the cloaks of mystery and surprise, which had been so typical of the strategy in the Pacific. The Leyte invasion was followed by a strike at Mindoro on 15 December, and Sixth Army troops stormed ashore on the beaches of Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945 to begin the fight for Luzon. On 21 January, another powerful force hit the beaches at Subic Bay, north of Manila, and with this landing came the announcement that the participating divisions were a part of the newly formed Eighth Army, commanded by General Eichelberger. When the 41st Division later struck at Palawan it was announced that the Jungleers also were a part of this Army.


While these Philippine battles were raging, Oregon was paying honor to the 41st Division, its location and plans now undisclosed and a topic of increasing conjecture. On 20 January, at the Henry Kaiser Swan Island shipyards, a giant tanker, the SS *Sunset*, was launched to bear the name of the Northwest's own fighting division.

There still was no word from the Jungleers and there were many on the home front who predicted and reasserted that the Sunset Division was being saved for an invasion of the Chinese mainland. This speculation continued until 2 March when newspaper headlines broke the spectacular story that the Jungleers had invaded Palawan on 28 February.



Naval units gather in a harbor to carry 41st Division troops off on a new invasion effort against the Japs.







Jungleers headed for an invasion have breakfast aboard an LST.

In announcing the news which electrified the Pacific Northwest, General MacArthur said, "The enemy, engrossed in operations elsewhere, again failed to diagnose our plans and properly prepare his defense." Jungleer losses were announced as "very light."

Much had transpired between the departure from Biak and the day when the 186th Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Colonel O. P. Newman, stormed ashore on Palawan. Late in January 1945, troops began to leave Biak, headed ostensibly for Luzon. By 9 February the outfit had arrived at Mindoro where it staged in the San José area. The planning phase for the Victor III operation was completed by 24 February, seven days after the activation of the force. Brigadier General Harold Haney, Assistant Division Commander of the 41st Division, was placed in command of the force whose mission was to take Palawan. Personnel and equipment were loaded by 25 February, and at 1700 the following day the eighty-ship convoy departed from Mindoro, arriving in Puerto Princesa Bay in the early morning hours of 28 February.


The Thirteenth Air Force and naval units laid down a bombardment, and at 0845, following a ten-minute rocket barrage, the assault waves stepped ashore on White Beach 1, just west of Bancaobanco Point on the north side of the entrance to Puerto Princesa harbor.


There was some confusion during the landing because of poor beaches. However, since no opposition was encountered the landing forces were quickly consolidated. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, furnished the assault waves.

The assault battalion pushed inland at a rapid pace and moved onto the airstrips. By 1100 it had passed and secured the first phase line, and the reserve battalion had come ashore. The 2d Battalion was moving very slowly but was closing in on Puerto Princesa. Shortly after noon it crossed the second phase line, poured over the runways of the airdrome and was patrolling north of the third phase line. Late that afternoon all areas within the third phase line had been secured and patrols were continuing their activities. The town of Puerto Princesa fell to the 2d Battalion at 1259.

The airfields were found to be unserviceable due to the pre-landing bombardments and the town was found to be seventy-five per cent destroyed, although the docks suffered little damage. The enemy apparently had taken to the hills, and it was evident that he never intended to defend Puerto Princesa since no military installations, other than air-raid shelters, were found.

The 2d Battalion, less Company G, made a shore-to-shore landing at the mouth of the Iwahig River, across





Order of Battle for Victor III and IV.



Elements of the 41st Division land at Puerto Princesa, on Palawan, and advance along a road eight miles from the port city toward the mountains where the Japs are reported hiding. A radio jeep maintains contact with the forward elements of the company.

the bay from Puerto Princesa, at 1700. Once again there was no opposition and the landing force moved inland and secured the area adjacent to the Iwahig Penal Colony. Some bombs had fallen in this area but damage was slight. The airfield that had once existed near the penal colony had almost vanished in the dense secondary growth.

A Company I outpost on Canigaran Point killed a Jap during the night of 28 February to mark the first known contact with the enemy. It was decided that the enemy had anticipated the landing and had withdrawn into prepared positions in the densely wooded and hilly interior.

The second day found the assault forces fanning out onto the flat plains beyond the initial objectives around Puerto Princesa Bay. The 1st and 2d Battalions patrolled the Irahuan River Valley, with the 1st Battalion moving north from Puerto Princesa while the 2d Battalion moved north from Iwahig. The two forces converged on Irahuan and made contact there around 1300. Here an abandoned Jap headquarters was found which reaffirmed the enemy's withdrawal. During this advance small parties of Japs were encountered but no contact was established with the enemy's main body. A Company E patrol made contact with a party of

about fifty Japs, well dug in and on commanding ground on the Iratag trail west of Tagburos. Artillery and mortar fire was directed on this position but before the attack could be pressed further, the enemy withdrew under the cover of darkness. Another Company E patrol had a fire fight south of Iratag, killed thirteen Japs and knocked out a machine gun. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion, which was the last to land, advanced inland to Tagburos. It encountered heavily mined roads and numerous booby traps. The 3d Battalion sent a motorized patrol north to contact guerrilla forces at Bacungan while other patrols reconnoitered in all directions from Tagburos without contacts. A motorized patrol from the 2d Battalion was sent south on the highway to Aborlan.

A guerrilla combat patrol was dispatched from Bacungan to Babuyan on 2 March to overtake an estimated eighty Japs, who had moved from Dumaran Island.

The first real contact was made with the enemy on this date as the infantrymen reached the foothills on the rim of the coastal plain. Advance elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions were halted by a Japanese concentration in the mountainous area north of Irahuan while the 3d Battalion, proceeding westward from Tag-



Because of low tides on D-day somewhere in the Philippines, vehicles and troops had to wade in. These supply vehicles are being towed in by tanks and bulldozers.

buros, encountered another enemy strongpoint about two miles beyond the town. Companies B and C made a flanking movement to destroy pillboxes holding up the 1st Battalion and succeeded in occupying the high ground by late afternoon. Some of the enemy again took advantage of approaching darkness and escaped. There were some contacts with guerrilla forces during the day, one of these being made by a motorized patrol at Tapul.

A patrol from Company G tracked down a group of Japs entrenched in hilltop positions within a natural barrier of dense forest north of Iratag. Company G drew fire from Hill 1445 and attacked the positions. Intense fire wounded the platoon leader and eventually forced the patrol to withdraw. Reinforcements were requested for another attack. During the night the enemy tried unsuccessfully to infiltrate through the Company G position.

Following an air strike with Napalm bombs and 1,000-pounders, and a mortar and artillery barrage, Company G assaulted the position on 7 March. The attack was driven back with seven casualties. More artillery and mortar barrages rained on the position but the enemy held. Another attack was planned the following day but this never materialized as the Japs abandoned the position during the night. The 186th Infantry troops occupied the hill on the morning of 8 March and Companies I and K then pressed toward the coast in the vicinity of Migcauyan, this being done without further contact with the enemy. Meanwhile, smaller pockets of Jap resistance in the mountains northwest of Irahuan and at Iratag had been reduced.

The primary objectives of the mission had been accomplished and the activity in the Puerto Princesa area soon resolved itself into minor patrolling with very little contact being made.

It had been planned to build a dry-weather airstrip immediately upon landing but insufficient engineer troops prevented the execution of this plan. Finally work was begun on a permanent all-weather strip,

which took longer, but was operational by 20 March. Excellent use was made of the port facilities at Puerto Princesa and the work of the harbor personnel was well organized and efficiently executed.


Dumaran Island, off the northeast coast of Palawan, was reconnoitered by a party from the I&R platoon on 9 March. The island was found free of Japs, making it more obvious that the enemy had completely abandoned his positions on the east coast of Palawan and had concentrated his forces on the west coast. Hill 1445 was completely occupied on this date and vigorous patrolling continued. By the close of 10 March, 94 Japs had been killed or found dead while only one had been taken prisoner.

PT boats patrolled Pandanan Island on 10 March and shelled the garrison there. The Japs returned mortar and rifle fire and wounded five in the Allied party. The manner in which the Japs were concentrating on the west coast of Palawan and the fact that a vessel had been sighted off the west coast during the night of 8-9 March, hinted rather strongly of an evacuation plan. Subsequent events—such as the finding of some recently constructed boats—proved that a plan possibly did exist and may have been partially carried out.

Patrolling continued during the period from 10 to 18 March. The hill areas to the north and west of Irahuan and to the south and west of Iwahig were combed. The 3d Battalion worked from Migcauyan toward Napson, and guerrilla patrols continued north and west from Bacungan. The lack of enemy resistance lent credence to the belief that when the Yanks overran the enemy on Hill 1445, they broke the backbone of his defense for the area.

It had been felt that the 186th Regimental Combat Team might be needed to reinforce the Victor IV operation on Zamboanga, and in accordance with these plans the 1st Battalion departed from Palawan on 18 March while the 3d Battalion readied itself for departure a week later. During this period, plans were made to utilize the 2d Battalion, the Cannon Company and the

PALAWAN OPERATION



Map 27

guerrilla forces for further operations and to establish over-all control of Palawan. Supplementary amphibious operations against outlying islands were to continue into the spring, but for all practical purposes Palawan had been liberated by the end of March.

For the most part, the remaining Japs were fighting for self-preservation. Their food stocks had been depleted and their activities consisted mostly of foraging food and dodging Allied patrols. There was one exception to this evasive action on 25 March. Guerrillas

operating in the vicinity of Moorsom Point encountered an estimated two hundred Japs who were well organized and believed to be infantry troops. The Japs attacked from three sides in successive waves, using good fire control, but after losing 52 men in three attacks they scattered. It was learned from a captured Jap that there were about three hundred Nips in the general area east of Moorsom Point and most of these were in well armed small groups, but many were ill due to the lack of food.

Minesweepers were active in the waters adjacent to Palawan, clearing the channels so that islands on the fringe of the mainland could be invaded. A Company E platoon relieved a Company G platoon at Napson on the west coast of Palawan on 1 April. This relief was effected by air with five observation planes being used for the operation. The men were flown out singly and the entire movement required three days. The Company G platoon had been conducting vigorous patrolling on the west coast of Palawan for several weeks and the long trek across the mountains to the base camp at Irahuan did not look inviting even though it did mean a rest.

Extensive patrolling continued and many ambushes were prepared throughout the island. Company F, reinforced, made unopposed landings at Coron, on Busuanga Island, on 9 April. No contact was made with the enemy during the first day. The second day saw three Japs killed and two more days of patrolling resulted in the death of seven more. Scattered light resistance continued through 20 April when elements of the 2d Battalion returned to Palawan to report the Culion Islands free of Japs.

As the campaign dragged on the 2d Battalion and the remainder of the United States forces did less tactical work, turning this phase over to the Filipino troops. This did not mean, however, that the Jungleers were idle, because the Allies still were a long way from the front doorstep of Tokyo. A training program was initiated and strictly adhered to.

Elements of the 2d Battalion did make unopposed landings on Balabac Island on 16 April and on Pandanan Island on 22 April. These landings completed the liberation of the Palawan Archipelago and placed the Americans in control of the Palawan group from Mindoro to Borneo.

The liberation of Puerto Princesa brought to light an example of one of the most cruel and barbaric atrocities ever committed by any nation. About 150 prisoners, who had been captured by the Japanese in the early

stages of the war, had been confined there and used as labor gangs. In late 1944 when the Allied noose began to tighten around the enemy's throat the prisoners were herded into two air-raid shelters, which were soaked with gasoline and ignited. Those attempting to escape were mowed down with machine guns. Only four men managed to survive this ordeal by breaking through the end of a tunnel which led to the open face of a cliff over-looking the sea. In dropping to the beach below one man was injured in the fall and later died. The others were hidden by the Filipinos until they were recovered by 41st Division troops.

Now, in seven assault invasions the veteran 41st Division had, at last, wrenched from the Japanese an area with some semblance of civilization. The Palawan Task Force had marched into its first "modern" town in three years of campaigning. At Puerto Princesa, the capital of Palawan, the troops found themselves walking along macadam streets, reading signs they could understand, seeing schools, churches, real houses and gardens bursting with blooming bougainvillea. Pending the return of the original inhabitants, the troops quartered themselves under roofs for the first time in three years. What great delight they got from such simple, everyday operations as turning on and off water faucets and opening and closing doors and windows.

From the very beginning it had been evident that the mission of taking Palawan could be accomplished with assurance of a decisive victory. Had the Japs elected to make any stand the resistance would have been short-lived. Instead, the enemy chose to retreat and scatter in small groups, thereby forcing the Jungleers to hunt them down.

From the day of the landing to 28 March American casualties for the Victor III operation were 11 killed and 40 wounded. Cumulative casualties to 30 June were 12 killed and 56 wounded. Jap losses were 890 killed or found dead and 20 prisoners of war.

The Victor III operation was terminated on 20 June 1945.

Chapter 14: Victor IV: Zamboanga

THE PATTERN of invasion in the Philippines completely deceived the Japs, for they had long believed that the liberation of these islands would begin at Mindanao, second largest island of the archipelago. But this large island had to wait while Leyte, Luzon, Palawan and nearly a score of lesser islands felt the weight of crushing American assaults. Mindanao was to be the twenty-first of the Philippine Islands to be invaded.

The first Allied landing in the Zamboanga Peninsula occurred on the north coast near Dipolog when two companies of the 24th Division landed by air around 8 March. Their objective was to hold Dipolog Airfield, which already was under guerrilla control.

The 41st Division's phase of the Mindanao campaign called for the invasion of Zamboanga Peninsula, with the seizure of the beachhead adjacent to Wolfe Airstrip, northwest of Zamboanga City, as the primary objective. The secondary objective was a line along Baliwasan River on the west end of San Roque Airfield; the third phase was the capture of San Roque Airfield and the fourth objective was the city itself.

The Thirteenth Air Force began its pre-invasion bombardment on 1 March and continued the pounding on the target area daily. Besides striking at Zamboanga, the airmen also concentrated on destroying enemy aircraft, personnel and supply dumps adjacent to the airfields in the Borneo and Davao areas. The Air Forces maintained an effective blockade against enemy shipping which attempted trips into Makassar and Balabac Straits and along the coast of Borneo and Palawan. Efforts were made to preserve the pier at Zamboanga and the waterworks, supply reservoir and power plant at Pasananca which served Zamboanga.

The Victor IV landing forces left Mindoro and Leyte on 8 March, and two days later stood offshore of the


objective. Intensive pre-assault naval and air bombardments softened the beach defenses between Caldera Point on the west and an area well to the east of Zamboanga City, forcing the enemy to vacate these excellent defensive positions, later declared by observers to be the most extensive and best of their kind yet encountered by the 41st Division.

The assault waves, made up of the 162d Infantry, landed at San Mateo at 0915. As soon as it hit the beach this unit began moving north and west to take the western side of the peninsula. The 163d Infantry followed the 162d ashore, and the latter then turned east and pressed toward San Roque Airstrip and the city of Zamboanga. The first four waves were met with light machine-gun fire but this was soon silenced. As soon as the Nips recovered from the shock of the pre-landing barrage they began a heavy artillery and mortar shelling of the beachhead area. Some landing craft were damaged and the shelling continued throughout the day and night as ships discharged their cargo of troops and supplies.

Progress after the landing was rapid and by noon two battalions were approaching the secondary objectives, which were strategic points near the airfields. This line of advance led through pillboxes, trenches and wire entanglements which had been abandoned by the retreating enemy.

Four hours after the landing, the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, pressed through light opposition and reached Baliwasan River just north of Zamboanga City. The 3d Battalion was held up by rifle and machine-gun fire from houses in the Gavilan Point area.

During the afternoon, elements of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, occupied San Roque village. As night fell, all ground units were advancing slowly against stiffening opposition. Although the beachhead area





Map 29



An air view of Zamboanga City after it was cleared of Japs and occupied by 41st Division troops.

was receiving a steady lambasting from enemy mortars and artillery, the 162d Regiment expanded its beachhead to a depth of 3,500 yards during the day. By nightfall, the 2d Battalion had secured a north-south line along the western edge of Wolfe Airstrip while the 1st Battalion, acting as regimental reserve, remained in position at the east end of the strip.

Back in the United States the news that the Jungleers were once again in action against the Japs broke with startling suddenness as General MacArthur proclaimed the strike with the statement, "The enemy has fled into the hills in disorder."

The Japs had planned to re-occupy their elaborate pillbox system and defend Zamboanga from these beach defenses. However, the intensity of the pre-assault barrage and the suddenness of the landing forced the abandonment of such a plan. The Japs left rear-guard elements to slow down the invaders while the main body of the enemy moved six miles inland where there were a series of fixed positions in the hills. Captured enemy troops later revealed that this was designed to draw the Americans inland from the beaches where they could be annihilated by counter-attack, by the naval guns and artillery pieces in the caves and strong positions in the hills. Whatever the enemy plans had been, they were poorly conceived.

The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 163d Infantry continued their push on the morning of 11 March and crossed Baliwasan River, moving toward Zamboanga City. Patrols to the north and west reported no opposition. Enemy artillery in the vicinity of San Roque and Pasananca still was active and was lobbing shells onto the beach area.

The enemy scored a direct hit on one of the fuel dumps south of Wolfe Airstrip and within a half hour it was about thirty per cent destroyed. The cruiser *Boise* launched counterbattery fire and, aided by strikes

from Army and Marine Corps air units, soon silenced the enemy fire.

Mines and booby traps plagued the doughboys on the coastal road leading to the city, but the engineers did a magnificent job in recovering these obstacles and rendering them harmless. By 1700 the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, supported by tanks, entered Zamboanga City, meeting only light resistance in the form of sniper fire. Zamboanga City, capital of Mindanao and third largest city in the Philippines, was in Allied hands after two days of fighting. The "Queen City of the Sulu Sea" had been one of the most picturesque beauty spots in the Philippines. But shelling and aerial strikes had completed the ruin wrought by the Jap occupation forces, which had held the city since January 1942. By the time the Americans took the city about ninety per cent of its buildings were in some state of damage, many being completely destroyed. Sections of the once stately walls of Plaza Pershing stood awry, tumbling down amid the debris that littered the weed-grown park, the ruin a monument to Japanese neglect and destruction. However, the fleeing enemy left the city power plant and water system in usable condition, and the docks were found in remarkably good shape, although a 25-foot section of the causeway leading to the main dock had been blown out by the enemy.

The Yanks continued the relentless pursuit of the enemy by pressing northward along the ridges of the San Roque and Zamboanga-Pasananca valleys, driving the thinning enemy ranks deeper into the almost impenetrable rain forests, into terrain where the enemy was unable to drag his artillery. The 162d Infantry came upon determined resistance from an enemy force of unknown size in the vicinity of San Roque during the second day's fighting. The regiment succeeded in taking the high ground in this area but made very slow progress.





Men of a heavy-weapons platoon patrol ford a stream through rugged terrain somewhere on Mindanao.

The 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, captured San Roque Airdrome during the afternoon of the third day and continued northeast of the drome, reducing enemy positions all the way. The aviation engineers moved in on the heels of the doughboys and started 24-hour operations on San Roque Airstrip while it was still under fire. During the night the enemy tried several infiltration movements and succeeded in planting mines along the road connecting the beachhead area with Wolfe Airstrip.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 163d Infantry, advanced slowly toward Pasananca on the morning of 12 March with the intention of enveloping strong enemy positions in the hills north of San Roque Airstrip. The road was heavily mined and booby-trapped and the advancing infantrymen encountered intense machine-gun and mortar fire. By evening the 163d had reached a point four hundred yards north of Santa Maria and here it was halted by barbed-wire entanglements, pillboxes and trenches. Despite intermittent artillery fire, the 3d Battalion completed the clearance of Zamboanga City and the peninsula to the east.

Heaviest fighting during the day was in the 162d Regiment's sector at San Roque Village where the Japs launched a series of counterattacks. At 1400 a force of Jap marines, estimated between eight hundred and one thousand, attacked Company L which repelled the fierce attack. Two hours later Company L was driven from the village by another attack, but retook the town after several hours of bitter fighting. Because the situation was so fluid throughout these attacks the artillery had to stand by helplessly.

It was a known fact that the Japanese hated and

feared the small Cub planes used by the artillery for aerial observation and fire direction. This was further substantiated by a dead Jap officer's diary which pointed out that the Cubs would take to the air, hover overhead, disappear, only to be followed by an artillery barrage of deadly accuracy. The diary explained that it did not take the Japs long to associate these planes with artillery fire, and that as soon as a plane was spotted, all activity ceased.

Infiltration tactics again harassed the Jungleers during the night. Jap prisoners later revealed that they were to employ these tactics and to remain concealed during daylight hours and improve their positions.

Jap front lines were materializing into an elaborate defense system consisting of trenches, bunkers, barbed wire and log pillboxes. These showed signs of having been prepared well in advance and they had excellent fields of fire.

Jap mines were becoming increasingly effective in hindering the movements of the doughboys of the 163d Regiment. On 13 March this unit suffered 83 casualties when the Japs blew the top off a hill north of Santa Maria. It was believed that this was a bomb and torpedo dump and that it was electrically detonated. In other sections of the 163d area, the town of Mercedes was taken. Progress continued in the 162d sector as the town of Rocodo was seized and Caldera Point was secured.

The first bit of enemy air action occurred during the late afternoon hours when a single plane sneaked in over the beachhead area and pulled a low-level strafing attack.

The final big push to take Pasananca was begun on



Men of the 41st Division enlarge a beachhead with tank support on the southwestern tip of Zamboanga Peninsula.

the morning of 14 March, the artillery and mortars laying down fire before the jumpoff. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 163d Regiment, met strong resistance but secured a line two hundred yards south of the town. Some of the lead elements reached a road junction in the center of town by noon but were halted by intense enemy fire. Tanks were called upon to assist the attack but were of little value since the terrain restricted them to roads covered by Jap fire.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, moved forward 1,500 yards northwest of Masilay but it also was stopped by mortar and artillery fire. The 2d Battalion, on the right, advanced and secured the commanding terrain near Masilay and the high ground overlooking San Roque. The two battalions tried to close the gap which existed between them but enemy resistance prevented it. The enemy attempted to rout the 162d Infantry from the newly taken ground above Masilay and San Roque on 15 March but the Allied lines remained firm. In the Pasananca sector the 163d spent the day mopping up and securing the town.

Darkness served as a cover for increased enemy activity. The perimeter of the 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was under attack all night but effectively countered these attacks. Enemy troops did infiltrate the American lines in the vicinity of Wolfe Airstrip and succeeded in planting mines along the edges of the main road and igniting the fuel dump which previously had been hit. During the early morning hours, artillery forward observers reported several infiltrations and said that, in one instance, the enemy was armed with bayonets tied to long poles. Forty Japs were killed during the night.

Guerrilla information had indicated that the main

Japanese hill position was on Mount Capisan, shown on guerrilla maps as northwest of Pasananca. Accordingly one battalion of the 162d Infantry moved across country to flank Capisan and assist the advance of the 163d Infantry. After this movement was under way and the lower foothills had been taken it was learned Capisan was to the west, above Masilay. The enveloping battalion was then ordered to change direction and was sent northwest straight up the ridge to envelop Capisan from the east, while the three battalions above Masilay moved up the ridges to assault frontally and from the west. All four battalions arrived at Capisan on the same day.

In this advance the battalions moved separately up the ridges from one-half to ten miles apart. The attacks were made successively through the day, each battalion being supported in its attack by all available Marine Corps dive bombers, all the Division artillery and the battalion mortars and machine guns. The steep ridges made the use of tanks impossible. The daily advances were eight to twelve hundred yards, the objectives being spurs on the main ridge up which the battalion was advancing. The work of the engineer bulldozer operators was outstanding. They bulldozed roads along the knife-edge ridges, directly behind the assault battalions, and always caught up with their battalions by nightfall, thus permitting continuous supply and evacuation.

Except on the east flank the Japs were driven out of all positions, and into the rain forest on an average depth of twelve hundred yards from the beach. More than three thousand Japanese dead were counted in this period. The Japanese survivors—two to three thousand—started marches through the rain forest



The Japs on Zamboanga Peninsula feel the sting of the much-dreaded 81s as mortarmen lay down a barrage.

towards the east and west coasts, the bulk of them moving to the west. On 17 March, the bitterly contested high ground north of San Roque and west of Pasananca finally was secured. Contact was established between the 162d and 163d Regiments in this sector on 18 March.


The invasion of Zamboanga touched off a whirlwind series of successful landings that were to drive the Nips from the Sulu Archipelago. The first of these strikes came on 16 March when Company F of the 162d Infantry crossed Basilan Strait and went ashore at Lamitan on the northeast coast of Basilan Island, twelve miles from the tip of Zamboanga. Only slight resistance was encountered and when Lamitan was secured patrols were dispatched to Isabela and Bojelebung. These were found to be cleared of Japs. Two days later elements of Company F landed unopposed on Malamau, northwest of Basilan. The invasion of Basilan netted the Americans the first raw rubber source to be recovered from the Japs. The 360,000 rubber trees on the plantation of an American rubber company were found in good condition, although the Japs had not cultivated them during their occupation. Nor did the enemy ship any of the rubber to his homeland. The mills and warehouses were found burned. Before the war Basilan's rubber resources had filled the requirements of the Philippine Islands and left enough for some shipments to the United States.

Meanwhile, the fight for the foothills along the Pasananca line went on. Night infiltrations continued but these gradually caused less and less damage and were of little more than nuisance value. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, arrived from Palawan on 19 March. Two days later it moved to positions on the east flank to outflank the Japs in front of the Pasananca water intake.

Stiff resistance greeted the 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, when it continued its attack northwest of Pasananca and it made little progress. This continued until 24 March when the enemy hill positions behind Pasananca were mopped up and the lengthy task of pursuit began. In the preparation fire before the attack on this date, the 205th Field Artillery caught hundreds of the enemy in the open and had devastating effects from its fire.

By the end of March, the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, rejoined the Division and relieved elements of the 163d Infantry on the east side of the Zamboanga Peninsula, thus freeing the veteran Montana outfit for another job of island hopping. Guerrilla forces were operating north of the 186th's lines and the Japs, caught between these two forces, began a slow retreat through the coconut and banana plantations toward the misty rain forests in the towering green mountains to the north.

April became another month of startling headlines. The tragic, almost unbelievable, news of the death of




Map 31

President Roosevelt stunned members of the armed forces as it raced along the lines to the men. Okinawa was attacked and Ernie Pyle, the correspondent who gave the folks back home a down-to-earth picture of the war, met sudden death on tiny Ie Shima shortly after arriving in the Pacific to write about that phase of the war. The Jungleers claimed some of the headlines as they clinched their victory in Zamboanga and made several jumps onto nearby islands to secure the Sulu Sea area.

During the ensuing weeks the 41st Division troops pressed forward above Zamboanga, gradually building up a line along the Sinonog and Maasin Rivers in the vicinity of Moroc-Lumayang. This area became the focal point of activity. During the night of 3 April the Japs, in a strongly defended pocket two thousand yards northwest of Moroc, temporarily held up the

Allied advance with machine-gun and mortar fire. The following night the artillery laid down fire on the enemy positions, and the infantry launched an attack on the morning of 5 April. This attack was met with grim, stubborn resistance and the enemy launched a counterattack. After a severe struggle the Jungleers finally overran the position.

During the early part of April the 41st Division troops expanded and consolidated their positions. Patrols probed deeper into enemy territory along the west coast of the peninsula and reached Sibuko Bay by 24 April. To speed up the ousting of the Japs, the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, made an amphibious hop up the west coast of Zamboanga, going ashore on 26 April at Babuan, eighteen miles above the original landing point at San Mateo. Numerous contacts were made there and at Labuan but the enemy's fanatical re-





Jungleers use a flamethrower to dispose of obstinate Japs after the battle for the base of Mount Daho on Jolo Island.

sistance weakened considerably as he moved into smaller and smaller pockets and as his routes of escape were cut.

Meanwhile, the 163d Regiment thrust deeper into the Sulu Archipelago on 2 April when the 2d Battalion leaped two hundred miles southward from Zamboanga and landed at Tawi Tawi where the vast harbor and former Jap naval base was seized. This surprise move netted two smaller islands in this group as unopposed landings were made on Sanga Sanga and Bongao. This leapfrog movement enabled the Jungleers to isolate strategic, twenty-mile-long Jolo Island, home of the picturesque Moros, and the new conquest brought the Allied forces to within thirty miles of oil-rich Borneo. This provided a springboard for later attacks on Borneo itself by Australian forces. The Japs got the usual tipoff that the landing was in the offing when air groups pounded the Tawi Tawi group daily for two weeks. The landing was made under the cover of naval guns and planes and was aided by guerrilla forces. Casualties were very light.

By-passed Jolo was not being overlooked but was getting a lot of attention in the form of daily air raids. PT boats had made several runs into the channel to attack Japanese shipping in the Jolo City harbor. With all of this activity, it was no surprise when the 163d Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, went ashore on the north coast of the island on 8 April.

The closest enemy concentration was reported to be at Mt. Patikul, but the 1st Battalion overran the ob-

jective with little difficulty and pressed toward Jolo City, the capital of the island, while Company C made an amphibious assault in the harbor to coincide with the entrance of the remainder of the 1st Battalion from the east. The 3d Battalion, upon landing, moved against Mt. Bangkal, securing that objective by 9 April.

A coordinated attack on a series of hills south of Jolo City was launched on 12 April with the 1st Battalion moving out from the captured city while the 3d Battalion pressed its attack from Mt. Bangkal. The 3d Battalion struck against Mt. Magusing, on the eastern flank of the chain, while the 1st Battalion met the first strong opposition of the campaign as it hit at Mt. Dato, the westernmost peak of the series. This entire ridgeline was taken that day but only after some casualties were suffered.

Mt. Daho loomed as the next obstacle to be reduced and the 1st Battalion began the attack on 16 April. It soon became apparent that the Jap headquarters force, estimated at four hundred troops, was determined to make a final stand here. The hill was covered with connecting trenches, dugouts and pillboxes. For four days artillery blasted the enemy positions while Marine Corps air groups completed thirty-six bombing runs over the target area. On 20 April, the 1st Battalion infantrymen edged their way up the side of the hill only to be halted by a hail of lead, which killed 3 men and wounded 29, and forced the withdrawal of the attackers. Another assault was planned for the following day but it was delayed twenty-four hours because

the airfield from which the supporting planes were to take off was unserviceable.

The artillery saturated the target area during the night of 21 April and early the following morning thirty-seven planes flew overhead to lend their support. The combined shelling and bombing was so effective that the doughboys were able to move forward at a rapid pace without a single casualty. The area was found littered with bodies of 235 Japs and it was believed that many more had sealed themselves into caves and blown themselves to bits. This broke the Jap stand in the sector and the few enemy troops that escaped from Mt. Daho wandered aimlessly in small groups and were easy prey for roving guerrilla bands.

One group did reach Mt. Tumatangas and took up defensive positions there. This resulted in continuous fighting from 23 April until 30 June when Mt. Tumatangas and Mt. Taran, an adjoining ridge, were secured.

The capture of Jolo completed the conquest of the entire Sulu chain and gave the Allies possession of the finest port in the archipelago. Beautiful Jolo City, sometimes called "Jewel of the Sulus" and "Shrine City of the Moros," was found in ruins. The Japs had put the torch to much of what remained of the romantic old city when PT boats began their attacks on the shipping in the harbor.



Striking swiftly inland, units of the 41st Recon Troop are halted by a huge tree felled across the road by friendly guerrillas who were trying to obstruct the Jap escape route. Troops of the patrol clear away the obstruction.

Muhammed Janail Abirir II, 65-year-old Sultan of Sulu and leader of the 300,000 Mohammedans in the Sulu Archipelago, personally welcomed Colonel William J. Moroney and his 163d Infantry men as they took over Jolo City. The old Sultan, who had surrendered to General (then Captain) John J. Pershing in the United States' war against the Moros in 1913, had remained loyal to the U.S. during the Japanese occupation and surreptitiously had flown the Stars and Stripes at his hideout camp during the Jap invasion. Upon arrival of the American troops the Sultan again brought forth the tattered old flag and raised it over his domain.

The Sultan had been stripped of his possessions by the Japanese and he felt most keenly the loss of a saber presented to him by General Pershing and a rifle, which had been a gift from General Leonard Wood. Some of the potentate's military prestige was restored, when during an exchange of gifts, Colonel Moroney presented him with his own .45-caliber pistol.

Considerable mopping up remained to be done but the Southern Philippines had been freed from Jap oppression and was once more in American hands. Six islands, Palawan, Zamboanga, Basilan, Tawi Tawi, Jolo, and Busanga, had fallen to the 41st Division within a period of forty days in what undoubtedly was



Halftracks and armored vehicles of the Recon Troop reform after crossing a quickly improvised bridge during a patrol on Jolo, twenty-four hours after the initial landing.



Gunners of Division Artillery fire into Jap pillboxes at the base of Mount Daho on Jolo.

one of the most sensational, but least publicized, campaigns made by a single division during the Pacific War. The 41st had regained from the enemy and was responsible for 186,000 square miles of territory. This remarkable series of campaigns put a ring of steel around the Sulu Sea and gave the Allies bases from which they could dominate Jap shipping routes from Borneo, Malaya, Java and Sumatra. The Jungleers were holding a vast front, probably greater in extent than that occupied by any other division in the war.

From the Manila headquarters of General MacArthur came a communiqué which read, "We now control the entire length of the western shores of the Philippines from the northwestern tip of Luzon to the southwestern tip of Mindanao—a distance of approximately eight hundred miles. The blockade of the South China Sea and the consequent cutting off of the Japanese conquest to the south is intensifying."

To General Doe, the Commander-in-Chief sent the following message: "Palawan and Zamboanga represent splendid performances which reflect greatest credit on all concerned. Their perfect coordination, their resolute determination and their complete success show the fighting services at their best. Please inform all ranks."

Most of the native population was emaciated from the lack of food, clothing and proper medical treatment and programs of relief and rehabilitation were well under way shortly after the arrival of the American forces. This program was aided and abetted by the vast stores of enemy matériel which had been captured. The amount taken in the southern Philippines was greater than that captured anywhere during the liberation of the islands except at Manila.

The Nips had murdered and outraged the natives and had seized their food. The Jap garrison was plenti-

fully supplied, as evidenced by the huge stores captured. Nevertheless, the enemy had refused to give or sell anything to the Filipinos unless they turned collaborators. The Jungleers relieved some of the more serious shortages. Guerrilla troops were fed and clothed and city officials of Zamboanga were brought out of hiding in the hills and were fed and given help in reorganizing their government.

Disease was at an alarming stage among the native population, but paradoxically, the health of the American troops was considerably better than at any other stage of the Pacific war. Malaria, which had taken such dreadful tolls during the early campaigns, now was well controlled. Some men had been downed by the disease many times and at one time the malaria rate ran as high as 361 men in 1,000. On Zamboanga this figure was lowered to between 25 and 30 men per 1,000. Medical men had made great progress in the control of malaria, as well as many other afflictions which were common in the Pacific Theater. Doctors learned that the malaria rate rose and fell in direct proportion to the amount of preventive effort put forth and the atabrine schedule.

Wherever there were troops, malaria-control units were at work, spraying and draining the pools and ditches which provided breeding place for mosquitos. Use of life-saving atabrine had long since become an accepted part of life in the tropics. Doctors also had learned that the constant use of good foot powders was the answer to many of the tropical diseases. However, many men still were plagued with jungle rot, that painful, irritating sloughing off of the skin.

In playing a major role in the recapture of the Philippines the Division had fought as it did through the entire war, not as a division operating as a single unit, but divided into several groups, each a powerful and



Battle-scarred Jungleers continue their march of liberation as a patrol moves out somewhere in the Philippines after clearing out Jap snipers who were holding out in the wreckage.

effective battle team. The Jungleers proceeded with the methodical and thorough skill born during the long New Guinea campaigns, to seize vast territories from the Japs. During these operations the 205th Field Artillery supported the 162d Infantry, the 218th Field Artillery supported the 186th Combat Team, while the 146th Field Artillery was teamed with the 163d Infantry.

Zamboanga has been termed the "perfect amphibious operation." It was No. 8 in the series of amphibious movements made by the 41st Division, and although from the start of the plans there could be no doubt of its success, observers said later that the fight might have been as rough as that at bloody Biak had the Japs elected to defend their beach fortifications.

Meanwhile, the Jungleers were at last out of the steaming, malarial jungles and Zamboanga took on all the aspects of a paradise. The campaign had long since settled down to the business of rooting the Nips out of their hideouts and destroying them as they were found. A life of comparative ease and luxury was begun by the men of the 41st Division. Avacados, papayas, bananas, pineapples, camotes and other native fruits and vegetables were available. Yanks bargained and bartered with the proud and wily Moros. Trinkets and items of clothing were traded to half-naked Filipinos for chickens. Such items as mattress covers and

cigarettes always were good persuaders when one wanted to drive a hard bargain.

Division headquarters move into ancient, moss-covered Fort Pilar, built long ago by the Spaniards as an outpost against the warlike Moros. Pilar's twenty-foot-thick stone walls rose majestically above the old sea wall built to curb the restless waves of the Sulu Sea. It was about this ancient fort that the United States built Pettit Barracks at the turn of the century.

Pilar's sturdy walls had withstood the Nip reign of wanton destruction and waste but the courtyard was filled with weeds and littered with piles of debris. Facing it, rows of venerable acacia trees looked down upon a once beautiful avenue rich with memories of American military men such as Pershing, Wood, MacArthur and Wainwright, who had served there. The Jungleers laid down their guns and turned to cleaning because they were there to stay.

A sample of the Japs' cruel disregard for native rights had been the refusal to permit the Filipinos to worship at the ancient shrine of Bien Bernido al Virgen del Pilar. The shrine, which occupied a space alongside the wall of Fort Pilar, had fallen to ruin. The 41st Signal Company went to work, repaired and repainted the picket fence, cleaned up the sacred spot and erected a sign welcoming the natives to worship there again. The natives came, especially on Saturday



Artillerymen of the 41st Division fire smoke shells to spot the target at the foot of Mount Daho, and prepare to watch aircraft bombing and strafing of the target.

afternoons, and before long there were hundreds of burning candles, which restored the old-time glory of Pilar's historic shrine.

The Division observed its third year of overseas duty on 22 March, but the occasion was not one of celebration, but simply a milestone. There were many months and many miles of hard fighting behind, a trail of white crosses from Australia across New Guinea, onto Biak and now in the Philippines. Men looked to the future but none knew the course ahead.

Many new faces began to appear in the Division as the oldtimers left for home, and replacements, fresh from the States, took over to carry the fight to Tojo's doorstep. No longer was the 41st Division a "Pacific Northwest unit," because its members hailed from every state of the Union. When the Division was first summoned for duty its officer personnel was about seventy per cent National Guardsmen but now they numbered only twelve per cent.

Oldtimers were being rotated home at a rate of three per cent a month but that rate was sufficient to take care of those who were qualified for the return trip. Problems of transportation and getting sufficient numbers of replacements prevented the immediate application of the rotation system. On the home front members of Congress were being subjected to a barrage of mail from relatives of the men, demanding that the 41st Division be returned to the States as a unit, or at least that the oldtimers be returned. Rotation had become the first topic of conversation at any GI gathering, and when the War Department introduced the point system, this subject replaced rotation as No. 1 topic of the day. Every original member of the Division automatically had more than the necessary 85 points

to qualify him for return to the States and discharge.

Contemplating their impending return to the United States and civilian life, the men of the Division took part in a poll designed to reveal the nature of their postwar plans. Of 432 men queried these answers were obtained: 108 men hoped to get back to their old jobs; 87 expected to go back to school; 61 wanted to seek college training under the GI Bill of Rights; 34 expected to remain in the Army; 45 intended to go back to work on a farm; 12, who had not had farm experience, planned to take up farming; 35 former farmers had decided to start life anew in the cities; and 50 hoped to take technical training courses to prepare them for new work. This was a healthy indication that these men, who had fought to preserve their democratic way of life, had no feeling that the world owed them a living. Their only hope was to get an opportunity to make a decent living in the manner of their own choosing and to pick up some semblance of the life which they had left behind but had never forgotten. These were the opinions of mature men of twenty-three and twenty-four years of age, toughened by nearly five years of Army life. They had been mere kids of eighteen, nineteen and twenty, many of them, when they were called from schoolrooms that September day in 1940.

With all the talk of returning home and being returned to civilian life, the fact still remained that the war in the Pacific had to be won. In order to prepare the new men for the big things looming on the horizon, a training program was inaugurated. The next amphibious operation would be the ninth for the veterans of the 41st Division, and according to War Department communiqués issued after the war ended, this one would have taken the Jungleers onto the Japanese


homeland. As the Division increased the intensity of its training speculation ran wild. Men watched the bulletin boards with keen interest as the news broke that the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. There followed the announcement of Russia's entry into the fight against the Japs and the dropping of the second atom bomb. It became more evident that the next Allied thrust would be into Japan itself. Like the Japanese, the men began asking: Where will the first blow against the Jap homeland fall? When will it come? How much longer can the enemy withstand the onslaught, the B-29 raids, the atomic bombs?

That was the status of affairs when the news broke that Friday night, 15 August, that the Japanese were willing to accept the terms as outlined at the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three. First indication that something unusual was taking place came from the firing of guns and flares aboard the ships sitting in the harbor. As the news spread up and down the peninsula there was more firing of weapons and a feeling of relief and thankfulness that the whole bloody mess had come to an end. Tension filled the air for the next few days while there was an exchange of notes and communications between Washington, Mos-



Jungleers inspect a Jap dummy tank near Zamboanga City.

cow and London. Finally the news came that the Allies would accept the Japanese offer of capitulation, but there was no celebration since this was an anticlimax to the men who were relieved of the task of carrying the fight to the enemy's front door. When the surrender became an established fact, conjecture as to the role the Jungleers would play in the occupation of Japan soared to hitherto unknown heights.



Chapter 15: Victor V: Mindanao

THE Victor V operation was designed to eliminate the enemy force, estimated at thirty thousand troops, in Central Mindanao. The initial objective was the seizure of the Malabang-Cotabato area where an advance base was to be established. The target date had been set for 12 April but due to the unavailability of assault shipping this date was set back to 17 April.

The 24th and 31st Divisions were designated as the forces to accomplish this mission while the 41st Division and the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team were held as Army reserves. The assault was to be made in the vicinity of Malabang since no enemy group of any sizeable number was located there, the big Jap concentration being in the Davao sector.

Guerrilla forces seized Malabang while the Victor V convoy was loading and the plans were shifted to make the impact of the American landing at Parang, seventeen miles southward, instead of Malabang, the original objective.

The landings were made unopposed and the first few days were spent in flushing out and eliminating isolated enemy groups. The Mindanao River was found to be navigable and the period from 18 to 21 April found one party making its way up the river to Fort Pikit via Lomopog while another force took the overland route through Dilap. Both forces converged on Fort Pikit and continued the drive to Kabakan, thence to Digos on the Davao Gulf, arriving at the Gulf town on 27 April. In the first ten days of the campaign American troops had dashed across the island

and penetrated 110 miles. This prepared the way for an early assault on the main Jap force in the Davao sector.


It was on 27 April that the 162d Infantry of the 41st Division, still participating in the Victor IV operation at Zamboanga, was alerted for overwater movement to Parang where it was to be attached to X Corps for a role in the liberation of Central Mindanao.

In Northern Mindanao the Japanese forces were concentrated mainly along the Sayre Highway, which ran north from Kabakan to Bugo, on Macajalar Bay. On 27 April elements of the 31st Division began the northward trek from Kabakan while the 108th Regimental Combat Team (40th Division) staged a landing in the vicinity of Bugo on 10 May and began to drive south on Sayre Highway. The 108th Regiment and 31st Division troops met in the vicinity of Impalutao on 29 May.

Meanwhile, the 162d Infantry had departed from Zamboanga on 3 May, arriving at Parang the following day. Upon arrival the Jungleers were assigned the task of defending the Corps beachhead, relieving elements of the 31st Division, and mopping up in the Cotabato area. The relief in the beachhead area was accomplished by 6 May and for the next three days the Jungleers set up base camps and did limited patrolling. The regiment's 3d Battalion and Battery C, 205th Field Artillery Battalion, were attached to the 24th Division for an amphibious movement to Talomo, about fifteen miles north of Digos on the Davao Gulf. The 162d's zone now extended east to Digos and Talomo.



High-point men of the 41st Division, some of them veterans of forty-one months in the South Pacific, board a transport for the first lap of the long-awaited trip back to the States.



Order of Battle for Victor V.



Comedian Joe E. Brown entertains Jungleers in the Philippines.

Troops of the 41st Division were to play two roles in the Victor V operation. From 4 May to 10 June the 162d Infantry operated under Corps control and was mopping up and guarding lines of communication. During the period from 11 to 30 June the Jungleers were committed to battle against the enemy entrenched northwest of Davao and during this latter phase operated under 24th Division control.

During the first phase the Jungleers patrolled south of the Mindanao River towards Sopoken, and in the area north of Dilap and west of Sayre Highway. Large enemy concentrations were reported in both sectors but initial contact was not made with the enemy until 13 May when the Antitank Company ran into an estimated forty or fifty Japs northeast of Dilap. Some of the Jap party was killed but the Jungleers withdrew under heavy enemy mortar fire.

Patrolling and the constant shifting of units continued. Artillery air observers disclosed that a large number of Japs were spotted northeast of Dilap on 18 May. The cannoners concentrated their fire on the area and the following day patrols moved out to make contacts with the enemy but were unsuccessful. This led to the belief that the enemy was merely searching for food and was always on the move.


Numerous contacts were made in the Sarangani Bay area, where large concentrations of Jap troops had been reported, during the next week but operations were greatly impaired by incessant heavy rains which made roads practically impassable at many points. More Japs were detected in the area northeast of Dilap and some brief encounters took place, but the enemy gradually dispersed northward.

The 106th Guerrilla Division was ordered to relieve

the 162d Infantry in its rear area positions and the Jungleers were directed to assemble in the vicinity of Maramag, this movement to be completed by 6 June. The 162d Regiment moved to the Fort Pikit-Kabakan area and on 30 May the first convoy, composed of the 205th Field Artillery and advance regimental headquarters, began to move north over Sayre Highway. As a result of the heavy rains the road was in very poor condition and at some points bulldozers were used to pull the vehicles over particularly bad stretches of the highway. Before long the bogged-down convoy had traffic at a virtual standstill. This situation existed until 5 June when the 162d Regiment's orders to



Division Artillery forward observers direct the firing of white phosphorus smoke shell to mark bombing and strafing targets for aircraft in the Philippines.



Map 34



Infantrymen of the 41st Division go about the unpleasant task of flushing out snipers from a house in the Philippines.

assemble at Maramag were rescinded and the 41st Division unit began movement back to its assembly point in the Fort Pikit-Kabakan sector.

The drive up the coastal plain from Digos to Davao City had been launched on 30 April by the 24th Division. Determined enemy resistance was encountered at almost every turn but the city was captured by 4 May. Considerable mopping up remained to be done and the largest concentration of enemy troops was reported to be in the Mintal-Tamogan area, west and northwest of Davao City. Here the action was to be limited to slow advances against stiff resistance and enemy artillery fire which was to account for many American casualties.

The 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, which had just arrived from Jolo, was attached to the 24th Division on 11 May, and Company K had relieved elements of the 34th Infantry Regiment along the line of communication between Davao and Talomo Rivers by 15 May. The remainder of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry took over security positions in the Davao City area. The 24th Division then began the drive to the north and northwest of Davao. While its 19th Infantry was engaged in this sector its 21st and 34th Infantry Regiments were fighting in the Mintal-Tamogan area and were pushing toward Tamogan.

The 3d Battalion of the 162d Infantry had been attached to the 24th Division since early May and as the drive toward Tamogan was launched, Company K, 162d Infantry, embarked at Digos and made landings at Luayon, Balut Island and Cape San Agustin on 3, 4 and 5 June to clear the entrances to Davao Gulf and to destroy reported enemy coast-watcher stations

on the southeastern section of Mindanao. Only light resistance was encountered at each point and considerable enemy equipment was destroyed.

Following its return to the Fort Pikit-Kabakan assembly point after heavy rains had thwarted its attempted move to Maramag, the 162d Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, received orders on 6 June which attached it to the 24th Division. The Jungleers began the move to the Davao area the following day, and although road conditions hindered progress considerably, advance elements reached Bago by 9 June.

Meanwhile, the 21st Infantry had cleared the area southwest of Mintal and had captured Bayabas, Mulig,



Caught in a cross-fire from hidden Jap machine guns, Jungleers crouch in a shell crater. These men were directing artillery fire and close air support from a forward position in the Philippines.



Men of the 41st Division use a repaired camouflaged Jap landing barge in the Sulu Archipelago.

Alambre and Tankulan. The 34th Infantry drove north from Mintal and captured Ula on 3 June after which there was a short period of consolidation and mopping up in the newly taken areas. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, captured Biao on 8 June. In the center of the 34th Infantry zone, the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, continued its advance northwest on the Kibawe-Talomo trail and captured Riverside on 10 June.

The 162d Regiment, now in the assembly area at Bago, prepared to relieve the 34th Infantry. On 10 June the 1st Battalion took over the positions of the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, in the vicinity of Biao. The 3d Battalion of the 162d Regiment moved to Ula and was subjected to mortar and machine-gun fire as it effected the relief of 34th Infantry elements there. The 162d Infantry was in position by 13 June, and the 163d Regiment's 3d Battalion, which continued mopping up in the Riverside area, was attached to the 162d Regiment.

The 162d Infantry and 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, moved out from Riverside and the 21st Regiment left from Wangan on 14 June for a coordinated attack on Calinan. Company C of the 162d remained in the Piao area to conduct patrol activities. The troops advanced steadily against stubborn resistance and numerous road-blocks and blown-out bridges. Many enemy strong-points were by-passed, and by late afternoon of the first day, forward elements of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, had reached a point mid-way between Riverside and Calinan.

Bridges strong enough to support tanks were completed at Riverside and the following morning the armor rolled out to support the infantry attack. Forward elements had been under mortar fire throughout the night. As the tanks rolled forward they knocked out many of the enemy strongholds which had been by-passed the previous day. By 16 June the infantry advance was meeting a deliberate delaying action but with the aid of artillery fire and aerial bombardments the Jungleers moved to the south edge of the town,


which was entered by the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, on the morning of 18 June. The infantry lost the support of the tanks during the last day of the push when heavy rains made the unimproved roads so slippery that the armor could advance no farther. The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, carried out a series of flanking movements while pressure was being maintained on the town. Company C, patrolling north towards the Davao River from Biao, was making scattered contacts.

Mortar and machine-gun fire greeted the Jungleers as they entered Calinan and the stubbornness of the resistance indicated that the Japs still were determined to make the Allied advance a costly and difficult venture. Large quantities of mines were found on the Riverside-Calinan road and in their haste the infantrymen blew up or removed only those on the highway, leaving those along the sides of the road to be rendered ineffective later.

Following the capture of Calinan, the 34th Infantry relieved the 21st Infantry and attacked west toward Malagos. Simultaneously, the 162d Regiment ad-



Retreating Japs blew up this bridge on Mindanao, but troops of the 41st Division move forward. The smoke at the right is from an oil and gas dump hit by Jap artillery.



Map 35



Troops of the 41st Division start through the jungle in the Philippines.

vanced north from Calinan and secured the Lascon Plantation area. The push continued into the northwest but the enemy had become disorganized and was fleeing into the hills. The official closing date of the campaign was announced as 30 June, and by this date the area north to Davao River had been mopped up and Tamogan had been taken.

When the clearing of the Sayre Highway was completed on 23 May intelligence reports indicated that the enemy's 30th Division and a number of other units had taken refuge in the mountains immediately east of the highway and particularly in the vicinity of Silae and Cabanglasan. In order to destroy these enemy forces and drive their remnants into the wild mountains east of Pulangi River, the 31st Division, with the 108th Regimental Combat Team and the 2d Battalion of the 162d Infantry attached, was ordered to advance into eastern Bukidnon Province. To accomplish this mission a total of five columns advanced east from Sayre Highway more or less simultaneously.

The southernmost column to move east of the road consisted of the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry. This force crossed the Pulangi River, south of Panadtaran and seven miles north of Maramag, on 12 June to clean out the Iglosad-Namnam area. For three days

the Jungleers worked east and north until they met the enemy about 7,500 yards southeast of Maligan. Fighting continued until enemy resistance was broken on 17 June, and the advance continued against rifle and machine-gun fire to the vicinity of Iglosad. As the Jungleers continued around the north slope of Mt. Botony through Luminatao on 20 June, they encountered an estimated two hundred Japs entrenched in strong positions. The Pulangi River and marshy terrain prevented the use of artillery but for the next five days mortars and airplanes pounded the enemy positions. Companies E and G overran the enemy strongpoints and the Japs fled to the mountains to the east on 25 June. Patrolling continued until the close of the campaign but only scattered contacts were made. When the campaign was closed the 2d Battalion, 162d Regiment, was relieved south of Valencia by the Philippine Army's 112th Infantry, which continued the drive east of Glodsad.

Troops of the 41st Division aided in the mopping-up activities until 4 July when they departed from Davao to rejoin the Division at Zamboanga. By 9 July the entire Division was once more concentrated in the Zamboanga sector awaiting orders for the next strike against the slowly diminishing Japanese empire.

Chapter 16: Peaceful Invasion

WHEN THE NEWS of Japan's willingness to surrender broke, it found the Jungleers training for another amphibious assault. This would have been the ninth invasion for General Doe's troops and would have hit at the very heart of the enemy homeland.

Now that the enemy had capitulated there was much speculation as to what part the 41st Division would play in the final settlement of accounts with Japan. The Jungleers did not have to wait long for the answer because on 10 September General MacArthur announced at his press conference that the Sunset Division would occupy the Kure-Hiroshima area on western Honshu.

Kure was the enemy's largest naval base and the center of the Japanese shipbuilding industry. Hiroshima had hit the headlines as the city which first felt the wrath and fury of the atomic bomb. For this operation the 41st Division was relieved from attachment to I Corps and passed to X Corps control, effective on 17 August.

Meanwhile, the training program, which had been geared for an assault landing on the Japanese homeland, was altered and the troops were trained for the occupation duties which lay ahead. Numerous orientation lectures were held to give the men the rudiments of the Japanese language while other lectures were given on the climate, geography and finances of Japan and the customs and morals of the Japanese people. Combat units were trained to handle traffic direction, security guard and other military police functions.

Preliminary preparations for the movement were begun immediately upon receipt of the X Corps field order, dated 10 September. This order directed that the troops would go ashore on a "peaceful invasion" but would be fully prepared for combat in the event there was a resumption of hostilities, treachery or sabotage.

Loading began on 15 September, and four days later the 41st Division ceased operations at Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, and the last elements of the first echelon boarded the ships. The Division moved in two echelons, the first embarking during the period 15 to 19 September while the second echelon, which was composed of thirteen LSTs, got under way from Zamboanga on 14 October.

The first convoy, fourteen APAs and five AKAs, lifted anchor and sailed from Zamboanga at 1400 on 19 September, and arrived at Bugo, Macajalar Bay, the following morning. Here elements of X Corps joined the convoy. The ships departed from Bugo that same day and arrived at Leyte on 21 September. Here fresh stores were taken aboard, and the following day the convoy proceeded to Okinawa, arriving in Buckner Bay during the late afternoon hours of 25 September. An advance party left the convoy at Okinawa on 26 September with the mission of proceeding to Japan to locate and arrange bivouac areas for the Division and Corps troops. This party spent the night of 27 September at Wakayama, Honshu, and about mid-afternoon the following day left for Hiro, arriving there during the morning of 29 September.

Weather reports indicated that a typhoon was mov-



An aerial view of the Division Headquarters and Special Troops area in Hiro.




Men of the 41st Division line the parade ground in front of Division Headquarters in Hiro following a ceremony in which the Division Commander presented decorations to a score of Jungleers.

ing in a southerly direction toward Okinawa and the convoy pulled out of Buckner Bay on 28 September and headed for the open sea in a typhoon retirement formation. The flotilla sailed due west toward Fuichow, China, but after going 250 miles it returned to Okinawa, arriving there on 30 September.

A second departure was made from Okinawa that same day but word was received that the typhoon had hindered the progress of mine-sweeping activities in the Inland Sea, so once again the ships returned to Buckner Bay, arriving on 1 October. The final takeoff from Okinawa was made on 3 October. Two days later the ships arrived at Matsuyama, Shikoku, where elements of the advance party came aboard to report to the Commanding General on conditions in the area to be occupied. The convoy continued on its way on 6 October and as the ships passed through the channel the Americans had an opportunity to get a close view of the land which they were to occupy. On all sides the lofty mountains appeared to rise from beneath the sea and there was very little flat land. Fishing villages were scattered along the shore line and from these rose ladders of terraces which comprised hillside farms. Every inch of the land appeared to be utilized, and once the men went ashore this conception was confirmed. The ships arrived in the Kure area during the afternoon of 6 October. The 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, landed immediately on the beach adjoining the airstrip at Hiro where it fulfilled the duties of a shore battalion. Kure had an excellent harbor and some docking facilities but the Jungleers went ashore onto the airstrip at Hiro, four miles east of Kure.

The unloading of supplies and equipment continued throughout the night. As the first traces of dawn ap-

peared on the horizon, the main body of troops prepared for the peaceful invasion of the Nip homeland. By 0640, 7 October the remainder of the 163d Regiment had come ashore and immediately proceeded to its area about one mile east of Hiro. Division Artillery went into bivouac in the barracks near the Hiro airstrip, while the 186th Infantry moved to Kaidaichi on the eastern outskirts of the atom-bombed city of Hiroshima. The 162d Infantry moved into Kure and garrisoned in



Cleaning out a cave filled with small parts for radios. Parts were later dumped into the sea near Kure.



Women barbers were a common sight in Japan, and here a Jungleer gets a close shave from a feminine tonsorial artist.

the submarine base about two miles west of the main navy yard while Division Headquarters, Division Artillery Headquarters and Special Troop units were established about a half mile west of Hiro in the Japanese Naval School buildings and barracks. The entire unloading procedure, which consumed fifty-four hours from start to finish, was made without incident.

As the troops poured ashore and boarded vehicles to move to their respective areas, there were very few Japs moving in the streets. Buildings bordering on the streets were boarded up and occasionally one would catch sight of the natives peering through cracks and holes in the hurriedly constructed fences, obviously intent upon catching a glimpse of these alleged looters, rapists and bloody butchers who had played such an important role in bringing the war lords of Japan to their knees. Those Japs who were on hand to aid the American forces, did so with the utmost cooperation and, in general, the attitude of the Japanese populace throughout the early stages of the occupation ranged from extreme fear and skepticism to an unpredicted degree of apparent friendliness and cooperation. Policemen, dressed in neat, dark blue uniforms and wearing small, shining swords which dangled at their sides, were standing at uniform distances along the highway, facing away from the Americans. This was in accordance with the Japanese custom that the greatest honor and respect which can be paid a person is not to look upon him.

As the units arrived in their respective areas, details were formed to handle the many odd jobs which confronted the Jungleers. Warehouses were manned and supplies unloaded and stored. Temporary kitchens and

living quarters were established. For the most part the men found their new quarters partially roofless and completely flea-ridden. As the day wore on a light drizzle began falling and this soon developed into a steady rain which poured for five days, transforming the surrounding countryside into a sea of mud.


The period from 9 to 16 October was devoted to camp improvement and local patrolling. The task of prime importance was the conversion of the barracks into liveable quarters. Some of the areas were so dirty that medical authorities advised the men to live in tents until the proper cleaning could be completed. Rotten, shaky floors were replaced, glass was inserted in the windows and shingles and tarpaulins were used temporarily on unserviceable roofs, these being replaced later with sheet iron as it became available. Almost all of the floors were covered with thick, flea-infested straw mats. These were removed and burned, and the barracks were saturated with a solution of DDT. Wiring was inspected and repaired, latrines were constructed, and heating and shower facilities were installed. The buildings were constructed of highly combustible material and the fire hazards were recognized immediately. The necessary precautions were taken in accordance with directives from higher headquarters. Fire marshals were designated and fire-fighting crews were formed and instructed in the use of fire fighting equipment which had been salvaged and repaired. Buckets of sand and barrels of water were placed at strategic locations throughout the area while most barracks areas had small reservoirs of water nearby. While the garrison areas were being improved the 116th Engineers were busy opening water points, constructing messhalls and repairing bridges and roads. The sudden change in climate already was noticeable



The American soldier makes friends with foreign peoples wherever he goes, and Japan was no exception. A doughboy distributes candy to a group of eager Japanese children.

and the 41st Quartermaster Company issued winter clothing as rapidly as it was received. By early November fresh meat, and occasionally fresh vegetables, had made an appearance on the menu.

A field order published on 16 October designated the infantry regimental and field artillery battalion zones of responsibility for the protection, assembly, destruction and the turning over of Japanese Army, Navy and Air Corps supplies and equipment to the Japanese Home Ministry. There was much shuffling of troops during this period. On 28 October units of the 162d Infantry left their submarine base garrison at Kure and moved to Onomichi, Fukuyama and Matsue where occupation, reconnaissance and destruction of matériel was to be conducted. Company B of the 116th Engineers, the 181st Bomb Disposal Squad and the 58th Chemical General Service Company were attached to the regiment for this mission. The movement was completed by 5 November and the Cannon Company assumed the military police duties in the new regimental area. The 1st Battalion established its headquarters in the Matsue sector, the 3d Battalion located at Fukuyama, the headquarters group set up at Onomichi, and the 58th Chemical General Service Company took over the Tadanoumi area, where there were large stores of toxic gas to handle. The 167th Field Artillery Battalion became responsible for reconnaissance of a group of islands southeast of Kure and moved detachments to these islands while the 218th Field Artillery Battalion was responsible for a series of islands south of Hiroshima and to the west of Kure. Battery A of the 218th Battalion moved to Eta Jima on 27 October and three days later was followed by the remainder of the unit. Meanwhile, the second echelon of 41st Division troops had arrived from Zamboanga on 23 October and had finished unloading by the following afternoon.



Top: Two soldiers use sledges to destroy some Japanese arms. Lower: Larger guns were destroyed by placing high explosives in the bore.



MPs of the 41st Division operate a check point near Hiro.

Road reconnaissance and the checking of Japanese warehouses and dumps was progressing at an ever-increasing tempo. Destruction work had already been started and was being conducted at a vigorous pace. However, there seemed little possibility of meeting the deadlines established by higher headquarters. The Japanese, except in rare instances, were most cooperative. For stores which were to be turned over to the Home Ministry the figures furnished by the Japanese were accepted but new inventories were compiled for all other items. Such articles as pistols, revolvers, sabers, swords and binoculars were declared controlled items. Disposal of the matériel was accomplished by the following methods: (1) destruction and scrapping; (2) using it for operations; (3) returning it for use



(1) The 41st Division's gridders line up to run through a series of plays. (2) Absence of gear didn't interfere with drills on the gridiron. (3) The Jungleer basketballers won the crown without dropping a decision. (4) Two Jungleers swap punches in one of the many boxing shows.



The 41st Division Band on the parade ground in front of Division Headquarters at Hiro.

by the Japanese; (4) issuing it to the troops as war trophies; (5) shipping it to the United States for training purposes; (6) shipping it to the United States for war trophies. Methods by which destruction was accomplished varied according to the facilities and transportation available and the nature of the items to be destroyed.

The forces carrying out this program did a miraculous job considering the many obstacles they encountered. Much difficulty arose because of the difference in the Japanese Army classification of supplies as compared with the system used by the United States Army. Too, as the American noose became ever tighter and tighter around the neck of the Empire as the war progressed, the Japs dispersed their supplies over widespread areas to avoid destruction by Allied bombings. All inland roads and bridges had been washed out by a flood caused by a recent typhoon, making many of the dump areas inaccessible. Furthermore, there always was an acute shortage of interpreters. Lack of acetylene, insufficient number of boats, a shortage of technical advisers and the slowness of the minesweeping activities were other factors which greatly hindered the destruction operations.

The destruction of the Japanese means of waging war was of the highest priority for the Occupation Forces. However, from the viewpoint of the Japanese Home Ministry, the release of Japanese Army food and clothing for distribution to the civilian populace was of primary importance. Local civilian manufacturers, who had recently been involved in large-scale war production for the Japanese forces, were eager to procure scrap metals and construction supplies to reconvert their plants for civilian production. Lack of transportation and the equipment for reducing Japanese war matériel to scrap handicapped the efforts of these manufacturers.

One incident of an unusual nature occurred on 23



Soldiers of the 41st Division look over Jap heavy coastal guns which were located along the coastline leading into Kure Harbor.

October when the 186th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for the control of approximately three hundred Chinese forced laborers, located at Kake, north of Hiroshima. The laborers were short of food and clothing and had revolted during July. They were reportedly planning another outbreak. However, a six-man patrol from the 186th Regiment maintained control until late November when roads became passable and adequate housing was secured in Hiro. These Chinese laborers were later repatriated to their native land.

Vast stores of chemical warfare items were discovered in the 41st Division area. More than 3,200 metric tons of bulk toxic chemical agents were found on Okuno Shima, off the coast from Tadanoumi, and 1,536,400 toxic smoke candles were located at Tadanoumi. Another 6,382 tons of toxic gas were found in the Hachinomatza area. The bulk chemicals had to be carried out to sea, ten miles from any land, and dumped in fifty fathoms of water. The Inland Sea was found unsatisfactory for this operation because of the peculiarities of the current which would have carried the chemicals shoreward. The gas was stored in containers with capacities ranging from forty-five to ninety tons, thus necessitating the draining of the gas into smaller containers. This job was given a high priority and was carried out under the supervision of the 273d Chemical Service Platoon, the 58th Chemical General Service Company, the 41st Division Chemical Office and the Chemical Office of X Corps. Cold weather set in before the job had progressed very far and the bulk chemicals became frozen in the large containers, halting all work until the advent of spring and warm weather.

Other items of importance which were destroyed in large quantities included signal equipment, airplanes and airplane parts, coast-defense and antiaircraft guns,



Jungleers supervise a detail of Japanese workmen who are cleaning up around quarters occupied by the 41st Division.



Top: In peacetime many Christmas ornaments came from Japan. Jungleers, remembering this, obtained enough material to erect many Christmas trees. Below: Japanese civilians read the season's greeting sign over the entrance to the area of a 41st Division unit.

artillery pieces, ammunition, powder, small arms, and tools and dies used for the manufacture of war matériel.

A serious tie-up occurred at collection points in mid-November when higher headquarters prohibited the use of American craft for carrying Jap war matériel out to sea in waters which still contained mines. However, as channels were cleared through the mined waters more Jap barges and tugs became available and were pressed into service, although there never were enough to meet the demands.

Among the items found in the 41st Division sector were 124 midget submarines. Another highlight of the destruction and reconnaissance program was the dis-

covery of 759,376 grams of silver, 318 grams of diamonds and 2,522 grams of platinum, which were found in the 146th Field Artillery Battalion area. Fourteen bars of silver were discovered accidentally when a Jap naval officer made an effort to pass off some lead ingots as silver. This precious loot was turned over to the Division Finance Office for disposition.

There was a premature explosion of two hundred tons of black powder on Eta Jima in the 218th Field Artillery Battalion area on 23 November. There were no American casualties. Further reconnaissance revealed that there were three caves of picric acid on the island. Imminent danger of another premature explosion existed since the acid was subjected to pressure of rotting timbers on the ceilings of the caves. Numerous underground magazines and warehouses of ammunition were in the vicinity, adding further hazard. Evacuation of all personnel from the island was begun immediately and plans were initiated to blow up the caves, this being accomplished early in December without further mishaps. Meanwhile, several smelters were put into operation throughout the Division area and were used to melt down guns and other metal objects of warfare.

Besides rendering the Japanese war machine ineffective by the destruction of its weapons and matériel for waging war, the Jungleers were charged with the task of demobilizing Japan's armed forces. Approximately eighty-nine per cent of the 166,987 Army, Navy and Air Corps personnel, garrisoned in the Hiroshima-Kure area at the conclusion of hostilities, had been demobilized by the time the Division landed in the objective area. The remaining 17,762 were demobilized during the period from 6 October to 1 December as the job of destruction of matériel slackened. Many of the Japs who still were on foreign soil were repatriated through the ports in the 41st Division zone and some four thou-



A Red Cross canteen's Japanese girl hostesses pass out coffee and doughnuts to soldiers of the 41st Division at Kure.



Left: Three short-timers ponder the idea of "signing up" as they stand outside the recruiting office. Right: One man decides to make the Army a career, and receives his papers from the recruiting officer of the 163d Infantry.

sand Jap soldiers were kept on hand to aid in this project. By 1 December an estimated 300,000 persons passed through the Hiroshima ports of Ujina and Otake. This figure included some 100,000 Chinese and Koreans who left Japan for their native lands via these ports.

The attitude of the Japanese people was observed very closely throughout the occupation and strict surveillance was maintained over all newspapers in the area. The attitude of the populace, in general, went to two extremes—from that of outright fear and skepticism to an uneasy and unpredicted degree of friendliness. The first of these attitudes was traceable to the Japanese system of education, training, psychology and military background. It was the result of propaganda which portrayed the Americans as robbers, rapists and downright devils from the very depths of hell. Much of the fear came from the belief that any occupying force would use the same brutal methods which the Japanese had employed during their own occupations of foreign lands.

A marked difference in attitude was noticeable according to geographical regions. Those natives of metropolitan areas such as Kure, Hiro and Hiroshima—particularly the latter—were openly fearful and presented a more reserved and bitter attitude.

The obvious miseducation of the Japanese people with regard to American soldiers and their behavior plus the excellent discipline and conduct of the troops and the American generosity soon dispelled the Japs' notions that all Americans were plundering barbarians. As this attitude was dispelled there was in its wake a surprised and grateful feeling.

As time passed, however, the Japanese came to recog-

nize the occupation in its true light. They learned that it was neither a cruel hardship, nor a great deliverance, but a victorious army pursuing a policy which might benefit Japan's future but would still impose some difficulties in the immediate future. For a short period—as was evident from the press and statements of the people—the Japanese had the feeling that the Americans would "fix" Japan without the natives having to do anything except follow orders. Soon, however, it became apparent that this new era for Japan would require some work and self-sacrifice on the part of the people.

The return of men to the United States via the point system really rolled into high gear in November and December of 1945. The point system and the impend-



Religion played an important part in the life of the individual soldier. Here a group of 41st Division soldiers attend Mass in a Catholic chapel in the Division area.



The American soldier was a souvenir collector, and would ship home almost anything he could get into a crate. A postal officer checks over a load of packages carrying souvenirs being sent to the States.

ing return to home and civilian life dominated every conversation and each day there would be a new directive or a dozen new rumors. And each day would see another group of men packing equipment, bidding good-bye to their buddies and heading for Nagoya, the Sixth Army Disposition Center, a ship and eventually home. Units now were operating far below their T/O strength because the replacements were trickling in while those eligible for return to the States were pouring out. This placed additional burdens upon the shoulders of those left behind to fulfill occupation duties, but they continued carrying out their task and dreaming and talking of the day when they too would leave for home.

Thanksgiving Day arrived and the men were treated to a real old-fashioned turkey dinner with all the trimmings. It was a day of rest and relaxation for all and for the privates it was really a holiday since all details, including KP, were pulled by the highest-ranking noncoms.

With the arrival of the Christmas season the weather in Japan became more like that to which many of the men had been accustomed at home. Christmas on Biak the previous year had been sweltering, but in Japan the climate was more temperate and there was more of the Yuletide atmosphere. Much time was spent in decorating barracks, mess halls and recreation rooms and, for a change, the men had real Christmas trees. Japan, prior to the war, manufactured and sold to the United States the bulk of the Christmas ornaments used in America and with this in mind the men scoured the

shops in every nearby town and village and purchased all available Christmas supplies and decorations. Religious services, a well planned dinner, special entertainment, rest and relaxation were the order of the day for all.


Once the job of destroying the enemy's war matériel and demobilizing his war machine was pretty well in hand, much attention was directed to an athletic and recreation program for personnel of the Division. Basketball and badminton courts, baseball and softball diamonds and boxing rings were constructed throughout the Division area and games and matches were scheduled. There also was a basketball and football team composed of personnel from Division units to represent the Jungleers in the Pacific Theater Olympics.

The 41st Division boasted particularly outstanding basketball and football teams, the former crowned champion of the Occupation Forces and later king of the entire Pacific Theater, while the latter advanced to the semi-finals in the race for the Occupation Forces title and then bowed to the 11th Airborne Division, which later copped the Pacific Theater crown.

The basketball team, under the tutelage of Lieutenant Gerald Tucker, a former All-American from Oklahoma University and a member of the 41st Division Artillery, first commanded the attention of the Occupation Forces when it journeyed north, covering most of the Sixth Army area and winning games by lopsided scores from teams representing I Corps, the 98th and 33d Divisions. Then came the Occupation Forces playoffs in Tokyo where a champion was to be crowned and later pitted against teams from other sections of the Pacific Theater for the theater title. In its quest for the Occupation Forces' championship the Jungleer ag-



The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and these students at the cooks' and bakers' school at Hiro seem well pleased with their culinary accomplishment.



A function of the Special Service Section was the operation of a radio station. At left a technician checks equipment prior to going on the air. Most of the shows beamed to Division personnel were rebroadcasts of programs originating in the States. At right two men of the 41st Division go on the air with a special original broadcast.

gregation took easy wins over the 7th Division, 33d Division, and 11th Airborne Division, the latter victory advancing the Sunset five to the finals where it met the 77th Division, winning 48-38, to cop the championship of the Occupation Forces. Further laurels were added by the Jungleers as they beat the Showa Base Fifth Air Force Flyers of Okinawa, 52-33 and 44-43, to earn the privilege of going to Manila to compete for the Theater championship. The Pacific Theater finals were held in Rizal Coliseum, in Manila, and here the 41st Division copped two decisions over an all-star team from Hawaii to reign supreme on the basketball courts in the Pacific Theater. The Jungleers went the distance with an unblemished record.

The 41st Division football team was coached by Captain Jack Faubian, former Oklahoma A&M star, and Lieutenant Colonel Fred Thompson, former Arkansas University coach. The team played three games, the first being played at Nagoya where the Jungleers whitewashed the Nagoya Base eleven, 20-0. This earned them a spot in the Christmas Day contest staged in Kyoto Stadium where the 41st Division trounced USASCOM-C, 27-2. This victory took the Jungleers to the semi-finals for the Occupation Forces championship and in a New Year's Day Tokyo Bowl game the 41st Division suffered its first defeat, 25-12, at the hands of the 11th Airborne Division.

There were other phases of this occupation program beside the athletic program. The G-3 section of the Division instituted a broad and intensive Information and Education program which trained men for Army technical and specialist jobs or provided them with

courses which would aid them in civilian life. Four small schools were established, designed to offer courses in algebra, bookkeeping, accounting, crop management, education, Bible study, mechanics, small business, electrical wiring, English grammar, general science, American history, elementary Japanese, photography, psychology, radio, Spanish, German, plane



This Jungleer gets a helping hand with his Christmas tree from a Japanese.

trigonometry and heavy road equipment operation. Where possible the courses included practical work. To fill the many vacancies being caused by the rotation program the Division also operated the following schools: cooks' and bakers', mechanics, buglers', radio code, message center, rifle marksmanship, typing, shorthand, and military correspondence and records. In line with this program all men were provided the opportunity to visit Hiroshima and the shrine island of Itsuku Shima.

The Army was formulating its post-war policy and setting up a program of occupation for the conquered countries. Under these plans some divisions were being returned to the United States where they were inactivated while many more were being inactivated on for-

eign soil. The latter was to apply to the 41st Division. Shortly after Christmas, replacements were coming into the Division in smaller and smaller lots, and some units of the Division were directed to transfer men to other units in Japan. It seemed an established fact that the Division was going to cease operations, yet there was no official word on the matter. Finally at noon on 30 December came a message from Sixth Army Headquarters stating that as of 2400 hours, 31 December 1945, the 41st Division would be inactivated. Men pitched in and began the long, tedious process of completing the necessary papers to put the Division out of business. Finally after a week of almost ceaseless toil the 41st Division wrote "Finis" to its deeds in World War II and the 24th Infantry Division took over what had been the Jungleer occupation zone.

World War Two Veterans.Org

Appendix

World War Two Veterans.Org

Honor Roll

Donald Abbott
Edward F. Abel
Raymond A. Ackerman
Clayton L. Adams
John A. Adams
Glenn H. Ainsworth
John F. Alberghina
Madison J. Aldige
Floyd E. Alison
Loren R. Allen
Sam Allen
Clyde E. Altemus
Robert L. Amans
Willie Ames
Arthur C. Anderson
Virgil Anderson
Lawrence J. Andrews
Robert Angelo
Lawrence M. Ankrum
Benjamin C. Archuleta
Saturnino Arevalo
James F. Armany
John W. Ash
Charles D. Ashcraft
Murray Axel
Gaylord G. Badberg
Nelson K. Baer
John J. Bagis
James Bahuslar
Claud S. Bailey
Issac J. Baker
Anthony Baldini
Joseph M. Balisteri
John Banaszek
Claude L. Barbour
Walter L. Barger
Francis S. Barnes
William G. Barnes
Howard L. Barnett
Emil J. Baron
Felix Barrera
Frank W. Batcha
John Beard, Jr.
William J. Beaudoin
Harry W. Beausoleil
Cyril E. Beck
Gerald F. Beck
James L. Beck
Heinz Behrendt
John J. Behuncik
Bruce N. Beighey
Frank Belchak
Otis B. Belin
Edgar L. Bell
Virgil A. Bell
Meyer Belofsky
John Bender
Edgar W. Benge
Robert K. Bentley
Carl C. Berg
Marvin A. Berg
Arthur L. Berger
William D. Berry
Raymond A. Berryman
Julian P. Bilbao
Harry L. Billsborough
Maxwell Bilton
Donald Binkley
Albert J. Bitterman
J. B. Blackburn
Lloyd J. Blakemore
George R. Blanich
George O. Bloomquist, Jr.
LeRoy G. Blumenthal
Michael Bobby
Laurel I. Boddington-Field
Miguel P. Bojorquez
James W. Boland
Richard H. Boliek
Eugene H. Bombardier
Leland H. Bone
Ernest D. Bordner
Steve Bossony
Herbert C. Bostwick
Glen J. Bowen
John J. Bowman
George Boyer, Jr.
Duke R. Boyett
Hugh Boyle
Paul J. Braden
Thomas L. Bradley
William H. Bragg
Elbert E. Branch
Otto J. Brandel
William J. Brandes
Elton L. Brann
Ralph D. Breitwiser
Frank Bren
Ronald M. Bretzke

Harold Brill
Fred J. Brittingham
William B. Brooks
William D. Brooks
Doyle L. Brown
Jack Brown
John D. Brown
Lester E. Brown
Robert C. Brown
Theodore J. Brown
Albert B. Brunetti
Rosario A. Bruno
Francis M. Buck
Floyd A. Bunker
Quinton R. Burcham
Fred A. Burgen
Gerald A. Burgess
Neal L. Burgess
Oda Burgess
Paul M. Burgos
Chester A. Burnette
James R. Cain
Elwood C. Call
Richard L. Calvert, Jr.
Frank Campa
Russell E. Campbell
Samuel A. Campbell
Samuel G. Cappuccino
John G. Carey
Alfred Carlson
Denton B. Carroll
Deval A. Cassidy
Angelo Castelli
Daryl L. Cate
John M. Cate
Carlton S. Chambers
William Chambers
Earnest Chappell
Eugene R. Christie
Victor E. Church
Frank L. Churchill
John L. Chute
Norbert R. Chybowski
Anthony P. Ciarle
Ernest Cisneros
Frank M. Cleland
James C. Close
Robert E. Coers
J. T. Coffee
Lloyd A. Cole
Robert A. Cole
Gerald M. Collins
Anthony Colucci
Marion H. Colster
Otis C. Colville
Estel C. Conner
Philip G. Conner
Thomas W. Conner
Hugh Connor
Eldon F. Cook
Lawrence R. Cook
Robert E. Coons
Robert E. Coors
Harry L. Copp
William H. Coppedge
Edward F. Correia
Joseph T. Costello
David T. Cottle
Jack M. Courney
Melvin H. Cove
William B. Cowan
James L. Cram
Anthony S. Crispino
Harold V. Crook
William A. Crow
Buner G. Cruce
Donald J. Crunican
Clifford R. Curry
Bernice Drwin
Kenneth M. Dahlstrom
Richard C. Dandwrand
James A. Daniels
James F. Davenport
Charles P. Davis
Mike Davis
Robert J. Davis
Clifton A. Deason
Howard Dehart
Louis S. Delgado
Alfred DeLoof, Jr.
Ralph DeDominia
Carl DeRyke
Aaron K. Dickey
Other E. Dickson
Sam H. Dickson
Roy L. Dietsch
Joseph A. DiGiacomo, Jr.
Wilford J. Dingman
Edward I. Dittich

Anthony Dombroski
Edward A. Dominski
Anthony L. Donatelli
Edward P. Dotson
James W. Doyle
Theobald Dreher
Jacob P. Dresen
Arthur J. Drigert
Carl F. Duell
Charles I. Duke
Eli Dullont
Alexander R. DuMarce
Ella Dumont
Humbird Dunlap, Jr.
Robert W. Dunlap
Duncan V. DuPree
Fred L. Dutton, Jr.
Howard F. Eaches
William C. Eaker
John J. Edgerton
Paul S. Edwards
George E. Eichenlaub
John J. Ekert
Alexander Elliott
Harold W. Elliott
Donald E. Ellis
Oren E. Else
Robert E. Ely
Richard G. Erdley
Joseph S. Escalona
Stanley Evanoff
Earl E. Ewing
Nicholas J. Fabio
Clarence E. Fair
Charles E. Farr
Kenneth E. Felix
Richard W. Fennemore
Sebastian Ferreira
Lloyd K. Ferren
Stanley W. Fields
Shirley H. Fiscus
Eathel I. Fish
Hal C. Fisher
Harold R. Fisk
Erwin H. Flemming
William B. Flesch
Myron W. Folsom
Lester B. Foltz
Thomas J. Fowey, Jr.
Emery C. Fox
Carl L. Frazier
Wilbert H. Fredericks
Dale A. Fredricks
Geron R. Fredrickson, Jr.
Gerald R. Frees
Albert L. Freitas
Lloyd E. Frost
William L. Funk
Norman R. Gafner
Raymond C. Gagnier
Joseph E. Gaither
Joseph E. Galus
Elmer W. Gardner
Robert Garoutte
Glen Garrison
Edward J. Garski
Owen D. Gaskell
Joaquin N. Gayaldo
Angelo F. Gemelli
Adam Genthner
Adolph L. Gibbs
Everett W. Gilkison
Clement W. Gill
James W. Gillespie
Virgil A. Girard
Jimmy R. Girardo
Joseph G. Glessner
Junnie Godfrey
Fritz H. Goedeke
Raymond W. Goerke
Robert D. Goiner
Zalmen Goldberger
Arthur T. Goldsmith
Ralph Golike
Gerald E. Gordon
Virgil H. Gordon
Frank J. Gorishek
Stanley J. Gorlewski
Perry Gould
Major H. Gower
Samuel Graft
Roderick N. Granger
George W. Grant
Nick J. Grant
Roscoe Graves
Leland G. Greenlee
Charles G. Griffin
Robert R. Griffith
Frank L. Griggs

Arthur M. Gritzmacher
Ollie Grizzle
Bennie T. Gronito
William R. Groschen
Jerome L. Grosshandler
John T. Gruhala
Pascual Guerrero
James E. Guier
Salvadore J. Gullotta
Franklin W. Gunderman
Glen B. Gunter
William C. Haffner, Jr.
Beauford H. Haggard
George W. Haines
Jack D. Hale
Boyd Hall
Earl E. Hall
Fred L. Hall
Lloyd Hall
Robert V. Hall
Odell V. Haltzel
Charles T. Hampton
Alfred H. Hanenkrat
Clarence L. Hanna
Clarence R. Hanns
Thomas P. Hanrahan
Richard A. Hansen
Russell S. Hapke
Ted Hardan
Dallas Harder
Clark B. Hardesty
Pete Harrera
David W. Harrington
Thomas L. Harris
William Harris
Frank K. Harrison
John R. Hart
Harold O. Hartman
Wayne A. Harwood
Paul G. Hassler
Frederick V. Hatton
Eugene Hausman
Robert J. Hawkins
Harvey C. Hayes
Walter G. Hayes
Raymond F. Healsom
Morris C. Heath
Herbert C. Helland
Clyde F. Henderson
Merton E. Henderson
Henry H. Hermesen
Modesto Hernandez
Michael C. Herrara
Darold J. Hess
Harold T. Higgenbotham
Wilbur L. Hill
Henry O. Hinkley
Ira W. Hodge
Frank A. Hoelscher
Kenneth H. Hoffman
J. C. Holder, Jr.
Hugh M. Holmes
Robert C. Holmes
Frank Hopkins, Jr.
James W. Hopkins, Jr.
Thomas P. Horan
William W. Horn
George F. Hornbussell
Harold B. Houston
Francis J. Hovorka
Theodore P. Howe
Raymond W. Howerton
Irving H. Hoyt
George T. Hudson
Wayne W. Huffman
Arthur W. Hughes
Byron D. Hurley
William A. Huse
William G. Hutton
Neil W. Hyde
Lester Hysche
Joseph Immerman
Robert W. Inghram
Ralph Inman
Bernard Irmen
Merne A. Jacobsen
Frank S. Jankowsky
Fred L. Janosik
Albert F. Janosky
William L. Jarvis
Herbert L. Jenkins
George R. Jennings
Howard B. Jensen
Norman F. Jepson
Francis Jette
Albert N. Jimenez
Yee N. Jin
Bill A. Joaquin
Arnold G. Johnson

Arthur C. Johnson
Arven E. Johnson
Clayton D. Johnson
Hannes W. Johnson
Henry L. Johnson
John S. Johnson
Lawrence N. Johnson
Leo R. Johnson
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Byrum D. Jones
Dennis D. Jones
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Marion W. Jones
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The rosters appearing in this book were taken from official records on file in the Department of the Army and are as complete as can possibly be compiled at the time of going to press (August 1948). The Department of the Army hopes to have completely accurate rosters compiled at some future date, but from all present indications this date is a long way off. We have done our very best and humbly apologize for any and all omissions of names and other errors. THE EDITOR.

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Chalmers D. Corle
Milton Drexler

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Gould Whaley
Edwin A. Zundel ★★

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Samuel P. Gordon

John A. Robinson

★ Denotes posthumous award. ★★ Denotes Oak Leaf Cluster. ★★ Denotes second Oak Leaf Cluster.

Battle Honors

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, MAY 6, 1943

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 21

IV. Citation of units in the United States Forces in Southwest Pacific Area. As authorized by Executive Order No. 9075 (sec. III, Bull. 11, W.D., 1942), citation in the name of the President of the United States, as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction, was awarded to the following named forces. The citation is as follows:

*The Papuan Forces, United States Army, Southwest Pacific Area,*¹ are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action during the period July 23, 1942, to January 23, 1943. When a bold and aggressive enemy invaded Papua in strength, the combined action of ground and air units of these forces, in association with Allied units, checked the hostile advance, drove the enemy back to the seacoast and in a series of actions against a highly organized defensive zone, utterly destroyed him. Ground combat forces, operating over roadless jungle-covered mountains and swamps, demonstrated their courage and resourcefulness in closing with an enemy who took every advantage of the nearly impassable terrain. Air forces, by repeatedly attacking the enemy ground forces and installations, by destroying his convoys attempting reinforcement and supply, and by transporting ground forces and supplies to areas for which land routes were nonexistent and sea routes slow and hazardous, made possible the success of the ground operations. Service units, operating far forward of their normal positions and at times in advance of ground combat elements, built landing fields in the jungle, established and operated supply points, and provided for the hospitalization and evacuation of the wounded and sick. The courage, spirit, and devotion to duty of all elements of the command made possible the complete victory attained.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 16 JULY 1945

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 57

BATTLE HONORS. As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bull. 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bull. 11, 1942), citations of the following units in the general orders indicated are confirmed under the provisions of section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction:

1. The *1st Battalion, 162d Infantry Regiment*, is cited for outstanding performance of duty against the enemy near Salamaua, New Guinea, from 29 June to 12 September 1943. On 29 and 30 June 1943, this battalion landed at Nassau Bay, New Guinea, in one of the first amphibious operations by American forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, on a beach held by the enemy, and during a severe storm which destroyed 90 percent of the landing craft able to reach the beach. Moving inland through deep swamps, crossing swift rivers, cutting its way through dense jungle, over steep ridges, carrying by hand all weapons, ammunition, and food, assisted by only a

limited number of natives, this battalion was in contact with the enemy for 76 consecutive days without rest or relief. All operations after the initial landing were far inland. Living conditions were most severe because of constant rain, mud, absence of any shelter, tenacious enemy, and mountainous terrain. The supply of rations, ammunition, and equipment was meager. For 5 weeks all personnel lived on rations dropped by airplane, for days at a time on half rations. Individual cooking was necessary throughout the period. Malaria and battle casualties greatly depleted their ranks, but at no time was there a let-up in morale or in determination to destroy the enemy. Each officer and enlisted man was called upon to give his utmost of courage and stamina. The battalion killed 584 Japanese during this period, while suffering casualties of 11 officers and 176 enlisted men. Cutting the Japanese supply line near Mubo, exerting constant pressure on his flank, the valiant and sustained efforts of this battalion were in large part instrumental in breaking enemy resistance and forcing his withdrawal from Salamaua on 12 September 1943. The *1st Battalion, 162 Infantry Regiment*, has established a worthy combat record, in keeping with the high traditions of the United States Army. [General Orders 91, Headquarters 41st Infantry Division, 18 December 1944, as approved by Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Far East.]

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 22 SEPTEMBER 1944

GENERAL ORDERS
No 76

BATTLE HONORS. As authorized by Executive Order No. 9396 (sec. I, Bull. 22, WD, 1943, 1943), superseding Executive Order No. 9075 (sec. III, Bull. 11, WD, 1942), citation of the following unit in General Orders No. 95, Headquarters Sixth Army, 18 June 1944, as approved by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is confirmed under the provision of section IV, Circular No. 333, War Department, 1943, in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

The *2d Platoon, Company L, 163d Infantry*, is cited for outstanding performance of duty and for heroism near Aitape, New Guinea. On 27 April 1944 this unit, with personnel attached to make a strength of 3 officers and 64 enlisted men, established a trail block at Kamti, part of Kapoam village in the Terricelli mountain foothills, to cover enemy escape routes. At 280700 an enemy force of approximately 200 attacked with fixed bayonets from three sides, but was thrown back after fierce fighting. Forty-two enemy were killed, while the platoon losses were 2 men killed and 1 wounded. Though communications were cut, the platoon maintained its position for 36 hours, receiving supplies by air. After withdrawing 29 April to receive reinforcements, the platoon again formed and maintained the trail block where, that night, another enemy attack was repulsed with losses of 1 man killed and 2 wounded. The exemplary endurance, determination, and bravery of the members of this platoon reflect the highest credit on the United States Army.

¹Includes the 163d Infantry.

Commendations

HEADQUARTERS 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION

26 August 1944

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 65

Recent landings at Wardo and Korim Bay have broken all active organized resistance of the Japanese. The 41st Infantry Division may well be proud of its action against the enemy in the Biak operation. The victory was difficult. We take pride in the fact that the Division came through with a shining record. Information obtained after the landing showed the Japanese strength to be approximately 11,000. The counted enemy dead to date is over 4,700. In addition to that, there are thousands of uncounted dead and over 330 prisoners. The survivors are dying of starvation and disease. We have liberated some 600 Javanese citizens of the Netherlands Indies and 25,000 natives. While our losses cause a note of sadness to each and every one of us, they were only a very small fraction of the casualties inflicted upon the enemy.

Our arduous days of training in learning the use of our superior weapons enable us to keep our losses down. We intend to take advantage of every one of the stratagems of modern war to exploit our material advantages to save the lives of our men.

This is the first time the Division has operated as a unit. Sanananda, Salamaua, Aitape, Hollandia, Toem, Wakde, saw operations of portions of the Division. The Biak operation finally allowed the Division to operate as a whole and to evaluate its worth as a unit. How well it did operate is reflected in the victory obtained at Biak.

The enemy was a cunning, aggressive foe. He was from a veteran division of the China and Burma campaigns. His record was superb and during this action he maintained it. Defeating this enemy was an accomplishment which reflects great credit on the Task Force.

The artillery has well demonstrated its capabilities. The excellent tactical and technical employment of the artillery has made the task of the infantry much easier. The artillery in its support cracked enemy strongpoints; it was accurate, enabling the infantry to close with minimum losses. The artillery forward observers, liaison pilots and their enlisted assistants, have shared the hazards of the infantry. The gunners and the ammunition details performed well in keeping the guns operating.

Our medical corps performed in its usual outstanding manner. Their devotion to duty in caring for our wounded is worth every bit of praise we can bestow. The medical personnel of the Division have received more decorations in proportion to their numbers than any other branch.

Our supply services, the ordnance, quartermaster, medical, signal and engineers were not found wanting. Their contribution to the common effort was notable.

The Division engineers made possible the forward movement of the infantry by construction of roads, by demolition crews often sharing the intense fire of the infantry in order to accomplish their mission.

In communications, one of the most important factors in controlling troops, our signal corps functioned as a fine integrated team. Not only the Division signal company, but

the signal communication teams of the artillery, infantry and other units, carried out their duties under trying and hazardous conditions.

No other task in the Division is comparable to the load carried by the infantry soldier. He is our only reason for existence. He is the man who captures and holds the ground. He carries the fight to the enemy. The infantry soldier was the one who met in hand-to-hand combat the crack troops of the Japanese, threw him from his positions, destroyed him, and gave us our victory. To these men we are eternally grateful and a pride rises in our hearts that is going to carry us on from victory to victory in the future.

We had with us attached personnel—antiaircraft units, additional artillery, service troops. Each and every one did his part to assist in securing the victory we have gained. The whole was an integrated team which has carried on to complete successfully the mission assigned.

To every member of the division and attached units I extend my congratulations on the record you have made. You have fulfilled the highest traditions of the military service of the United States Armed Forces.

JENS A. DOE
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY GROUND FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

10 January 1946

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation
To : Commanding General, 41st Infantry Division

The 41st Infantry Division which contributed splendidly to our glorious victory over Japanese tyranny and aggression, will forever be honored and cherished by a grateful nation.

Your division was committed to action in January 1943, when the 163d Infantry Regiment plunged into combat at Sanananda, Papua. Lacking naval support, and relying on supplies flown in over the Owen Stanley Mountains, the regiment emerged bearing the marks of jungle fighting at its worst. This action, which helped stem the Jap tide threatening Port Moresby, won for the Regiment the Distinguished Unit Citation.

Storming ashore at Salamaua in June 1943, the 162d Infantry Regiment began 76 days of unrelieved fighting, a record in jungle warfare. Your division's 1000 mile campaign through the New Guinea jungles, which included assault landings at Aitape, action at Hollandia, Toem-Wakde, and Biak Island in the Schoutens, will forever be a bright chapter in the history of your organization.

Now, upon the inactivation of the 41st Infantry Division, it is a privilege for me to commend you, your officers, and your men for your outstanding accomplishments on the field of battle.

JACOB L. DEVERS
General, USA
Commanding

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

18 January 1946

Dear General Doe:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness and that of the officers and men of the 41st Division in sending me the Japanese sword taken by your Division in the Kure-Hiroshima area of Japan.

I am aware of the splendid performance of the 41st Division and, having served as Chief of Staff of the IX Corps when the 41st was undergoing its training under that headquarters, I am proud of its accomplishments.

Sincerely,

IKE EISENHOWER

Major General Jens A. Doe, 03743
Hq 41st Inf. Div., APO 41
c/o P.M., San Francisco, California

ORDER OF THE DAY
ON COMPLETION OF
RECAPTURE OF BUNA-GONA AREA

Headquarters, New Guinea Force,
22 January 1943

The campaign we have been engaged in for the recapture of the Buna-Gona area is now virtually at a close. I desire to express to all Australians and Americans alike who have taken part in this long and tedious campaign my heartfelt congratulations and my appreciation of all you have done.

First to the Infantry I would like to pay a special tribute. Seldom have Infantry been called on to endure greater hardships or discomfort than those provided by the mountains, swamps, the floods, of tropical New Guinea. All this you have endured with cheerfulness and meantime have outfought a dour and determined enemy on ground of his own choosing in well prepared defenses. Your achievements have been such as to earn the admiration and appreciation of all your countrymen.

Secondly, I would thank the Air Forces for their magnificent work, for the shattering blows they have delivered to the air forces of the enemy and his ships, which have tried so often and so vainly to reinforce and supply him. To the air transport service which made this campaign a feasible operation, for your untiring efforts in all weathers, I thank you.

Thirdly, there are all those who have supported so splendidly the Infantry in their fighting, the Armored Regiment, the Artillery, the Engineers and the Army Co-operation Squadron, and the Medical Services who have cared for sick and wounded in most difficult circumstances. You have done magnificently.

Fourthly, I want to thank all those in the Services who have kept supplies of all kinds going to the forward troops, and also COSC and all its personnel and particularly its small boat section that has braved hazardous waters and enemy action in getting supplies up the coast.

And finally my thanks to the Navy for its assistance in protecting sea routes and clearing the waters round the battle area and farther north.

We have won a striking victory but a long and hard road lies ahead. All I ask is that all of you maintain the standard you have set. I know you will.

E. F. HERRING
Lieutenant-General
GOC New Guinea Force

HEADQUARTERS 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION
26 April 1943

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 7

1. I wish to congratulate the officers and men of this Division for the outstanding manner in which they have conducted operations since arrival in New Guinea and also for the praise and compliments which their efforts have brought to this Division in the recent inspection by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commander of the Sixth Army.

2. General Krueger stated that General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific, wished the 41st Division to know how highly pleased he had been with its performance and the results of its operations in New Guinea. General Krueger added that he felt exactly the same and was proud to have the 41st Division as part of his Sixth Army.

3. General Krueger was high in his praise of the soldierly manner of the officers and men of this Division. He paid special compliment to the military courtesies observed, especially saluting, correct manner of reporting and general discipline of the entire command. One occasion, General Krueger said, "You can always tell when an officer or a man is from the 41st because he salutes."

4. General Krueger, in addition, indicated he was extremely well pleased with the way the Division had improved its living conditions and prepared defensive works despite the tropic conditions encountered in this area.

5. Again, I wish to congratulate the Division for its soldierly manner and excellent conduct of operations which have brought these commendations. It is my desire that every officer and man of this Division be informed of the high opinion held by General MacArthur, General Krueger and myself.

H. H. FULLER
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS 163D INFANTRY
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER

April 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM:

1. A certified copy of Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 has been sent to this headquarters by the Montana Legislature, and is reproduced for the information of all personnel of this Regiment:

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 1

A joint resolution recognizing the victories of Montana's 163d Infantry Regiment, USA, expressing the gratitude of the people of Montana to the Regiment and providing for a cable message from the Legislature to the Regiment in the combat zone of the South Pacific Theater of War.

Whereas, the official military reports emanating from General Douglas MacArthur's Headquarters in the south Pacific as released by the War Department, and the news dispatches cabled by observers, make manifest that the 163d Infantry—Montana's own—has won imperishable fame in the jungles and on the heights of New Guinea in most arduous combat against an implacable foe; and has from the very outbreak of hostilities demonstrated the finest attributes of the American soldier, in devotion to training, in fraternization and co-operation with the free peoples of the great Pacific world to the south, and in the deep resolve to establish the rule of law among the nations of the earth; and

The Sixth Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana, by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, approved February 22, 1899, recognized the same valiant manhood displayed by the military predecessors of the present Regiment, the First Montana Volunteer Infantry, which at that time had distinguished itself near the city of Manila in the Philippine Islands, and such Legislative Assembly, more than forty-three years ago, cabled to that Regiment an expression of the pride and gratitude of Montana's people; in the years between, the Second Montana Infantry Regiment, immediate predecessor, furnished to the American Expeditionary Force in France, officers and men, who with our allies repulsed the savage hordes of the Prussian General Staff, then and now intent on enslavement of those who oppose the substitution of might for right, and brought back their Colors covered with the streamers and ribands of the great victories in France and Flanders; and

Their successor, the present 163d Infantry Regiment, has emblazoned anew the heroic traditions of the Regiment by annihilating a great Japanese army on the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea to win the first great land battle of the Japanese-American war; and has thereby again demonstrated the unconquerable resolution of Montana's free mountaineers; and

The hearts of all of the people of Montana, while vibrant with affection for the Regiment, are burdened with the pain of its losses, and determined to repay the holy obligation resulting from these sacrifices, by solemnly assuming the responsibilities of free men in support of the reign of law throughout the earth:

Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the Senate of the Twenty-eighth Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana, the

House of Representatives concurring, that the Legislative Assembly tenders to every officer and to every man of the 163d Infantry Regiment the deep gratitude of the whole body of our citizens for the great victory which our men have won, purchased with the blood of many of their bravest, hopeful that the Regiment will accept this expression as an evidence of the love and the devotion which we have for it, and which sustains us on the home front and inspires us to dedicate each day to aid our men overseas;

That we asked the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, when this Resolution is placed in his hands, to communicate the continuing homage of Montana people to General Douglas MacArthur, whose father, General Arthur MacArthur, led the Montana Regiment of 1899 to a victory that brought freedom to the Filipinos who have proved their brotherhood with us and with whose help General Douglas MacArthur as his father's successor, and with the aid of our Regiment, will restore those peoples of the isles of the Pacific to the dignity of men.

Be it further resolved, that duly authenticated copies of this Resolution be transmitted by the Secretary of State of the State of Montana, through secure military channels, to the Commanding Officer of the 163d Infantry Regiment, and to each Company Commander in said Regiment and to General Douglas MacArthur; and in order that this long pent-up expression of our whole people, who are represented at large only by this Legislative Assembly, may be made known to the Regiment as soon as possible,

Be it further resolved, that the following message be cabled at once, through military or other appropriate channels, to the Commander of the 163d Infantry Regiment to the combat zone:

"With vibrant admiration for your magnificent victory over the Japanese on the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea and elsewhere, with prayers for the wounded and with undying resolve to carry on the high purpose of our noble dead, the hearts of the people of Montana are with you, beating as one every hour of every day. The Twenty-Eighth Legislative Assembly of Montana in session at Helena."

Approved March 5, 1943

SAM C. FORD
Governor

ERNEST T. EATON
President of the Senate

GEO. W. O'CONNOR
Speaker of the House

2. The above will be read to all troops at the first formation following receipt.

By order of Lt. Colonel MASON:

JAMES R. KENT
Capt., 163d Inf.
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

JAMES R. KENT
Capt., 163d Inf.
Adjutant




General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief in the Pacific.



Maj. Gen. Kenyon A. Joyce, Commanding General, IX Corps.



Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, Commanding General, I Corps.




Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, Commanding General, X Corps.



Maj. Gen. P. W. Clarkson, Commanding General, X Corps.



Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General, Eighth Army.



Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Commanding General, Sixth Army.

Commanders of the Sunset Division



Major General Jens A. Doe.

Jens A. Doe was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 20 June 1891. He graduated from the Military Academy and was appointed a second lieutenant on 12 June 1914.

He served with the 11th Infantry at Texas City, Texas, until December 1914 and then moved to Naco, Arizona, and a few weeks later to Douglas, Arizona, where he remained until May 1917 with his regiment. Meanwhile he was promoted to first lieutenant on 1 July 1916 and to captain on 15 May 1917. Between May and August 1917 he served at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, with the 11th Infantry and then enrolled in the Machine-Gun Course of the Infantry and Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from which he graduated in October 1917. He became an instructor at a division school at Fort Oglethorpe and in December 1917 assumed command of the 15th Machine-Gun Battalion at that post. He sailed for France in April 1918.

He was made a major (temporary) on 7 June 1918 and was 5th Division Machine-Gun Officer in France from June to July 1918, then was assigned as commanding officer of the 14th Machine-Gun Battalion. He participated in the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne offensives.

He organized and became instructor in the Army Machine Gun School at Langres, France, in November 1918, and one month later was assigned as an instructor at the II Corps Schools. He enrolled in the Artillery Center, Chantillon, France, in May 1919, was graduated one month later and assigned to the 61st Infantry. He returned to the United States with this unit in June, 1919, and went to Camp Benning, Georgia, where in September 1919 he became an instructor at the Infantry School. His majority was made permanent on 1 July 1920. He enrolled in the Field Officers' Course of the Infantry School in September 1921, and was graduated in May 1922. He then was assigned to the 2d Infantry at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. He was Machine-Gun Officer at Camp Custer, Michigan, from May to July 1923, then was

assigned to duty at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

He enrolled in the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in August 1925, and following his graduation in June 1926, he went to China for duty with the 15th Infantry at Tientsin until January 1930. He then returned to the United States and joined the 16th Infantry at Fort Jay, New York. He commanded the Machine-Gun School of the 1st Brigade at Camp Dix, New Jersey, from April to August 1932, after which he enrolled in the Army War College at Washington, D. C., from which he graduated the following June. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 January 1936 and served as instructor at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth until June 1937. His next assignment was as professor of military science and tactics at the University of California at Berkeley. In September 1940, he joined the 7th Division at Fort Ord, California, and assumed command of the 17th Infantry at that post in February 1941. He was promoted to colonel (temporary) on 26 June 1941 and in April 1942 he was transferred with the 17th Infantry to San Luis Obispo, California, where he remained until June 1942, when he was given an assignment in the South Pacific Theater of Operations.

In World War II, Colonel Doe first saw action in the Buna campaign when the 163d Infantry of the 41st Division, under his command, destroyed the Japanese positions in the center, on the Sanananda Track. This action resulted in his promotion to brigadier general (temporary) 2 February 1943 when he became Assistant Division Commander of the 41st Division.

In connection with the Hollandia landing, General Doe commanded the task force landing at Aitape and prior to the Biak operation he landed in the Toem-Wakde area with his force. Upon completion of this mission he relinquished command of the task force and rejoined his division in time for the Biak landing. In August 1944 he became Commanding General of the 41st Division and was promoted to major general (temporary) on 1 August 1944. During February and March 1945, he directed landings of the Jungleers at Palawan, Zamboanga, Tawi-Tawi and Jolo in the Southern Philippines, and in October of that year led his troops into the Hiro-Kure-Hiroshima area of conquered Japan.

When the 41st Division was inactivated in Japan in January 1946, General Doe returned to the United States for a tour of duty in the War Department. He assumed command of the 5th Division at Camp Campbell, Kentucky, on 9 August 1946 and on 29 September, the same year, became Commanding General of the 3d Infantry Division.

General Doe was one of the most highly decorated division commanders in the Pacific Theater. His decorations included the Silver Star with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, and the Purple Heart.

His citation for the Distinguished Service Cross awarded in 1943, reads in part as follows:

For extraordinary heroism in action near Sanananda, New Guinea, on January 21 and 22, 1943. As commander of an infantry regiment which was engaged in wiping out the remaining points of enemy resistance, Brigadier General Doe distinguished himself by his coolness and gallantry under fire. In the reduction of these strongly fortified areas his outstanding leadership and courageous conduct were a continuous inspiration to his troops. Brigadier General Doe's presence in the most forward areas and his disregard of personal danger were largely responsible for the high morale of his troops and the successful outcome of these operations.

An Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star earned in World War I was presented to him in 1943 with this citation:

In the Southwest Pacific in June 1944, he displayed outstanding leadership and devotion to duty under Japanese machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire, and in personally moving among forward assault troops. By his calm manner and courageous actions, he greatly assisted the advance.

A second Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star was presented in 1945 and the citation read:

For gallantry in action at Zamboanga, Mindanao, P. I. from 10 March 45 to 23 April 45. During this time in the capacity of Division Commander, General Doe directed the initial assault and the consequent capture of Zamboanga. His outstanding leadership, indomitable courage and skillful tactical knowledge resulted in his division securing a firm foothold on Mindanao Island. On many occasions without regard to his personal safety, he went forward to units engaged in heavy fighting in order to gain first-hand information about the tactical situation.


He received the Air Medal in 1945 for numerous flights over Japanese positions and his Distinguished Service Medal, awarded in 1945, was for the Aitape and Wakde campaigns. The Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal was awarded for service on Biak.

General Doe was appointed permanent major general in 1948 with rank from 6 September 1944.

MAJ. GEN. HORACE H. FULLER

Horace H. Fuller was born on 10 August 1886 at Fort Meade, South Dakota. He was graduated from the Military Academy and appointed a second lieutenant in the Cavalry on 11 June 1909.

He served with the 11th Cavalry at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, until April 1914. He was transferred to the 7th Cavalry and served at Fort William McKinley, Philippine Islands, from May to September 1914, and at Camp Stotsenburg, Philippine Islands, to May 1916. In the meantime, he



Major General Horace H. Fuller.

was assigned to the 8th Cavalry. He was promoted to first lieutenant on 12 June 1916 and transferred to the Field Artillery, to rank from 1 July 1916. Returning to the United States, he served at Fort Bliss, Texas, with the 17th Cavalry to May 1917. He was promoted to captain on 15 May 1917. In July, of that year, he was transferred to the 11th Field Artillery, serving at Douglas, Arizona.

In November 1917 he was ordered to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as a student at the School of Fire for Field Artillery, remaining there until January 1918. He rejoined the 11th Field Artillery at Douglas and accompanied the unit to Fort Sill where he served until July 1918. His temporary promotion to major came on 8 January 1918.

Sailing to France in October, 1918, he joined the 108th Field Artillery at Veronnes in the Argonne. He participated in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and in the Ypres-Lys Offensive, in command of the 108th. He earned his lieutenant colonelcy (temporary) on 11 September 1918. He commanded the 109th Field Artillery to March 1919 and then served with the Motor Transport Corps until January 1920, when he was assigned to duty with the Graves Registration Service. He reverted to his permanent rank of captain on 15 April 1920, and was promoted to major on 1 July 1920.

He returned to the United States and served at Fort Benning, Georgia, with the 83d Field Artillery from January 1921 to September 1922. He became a student at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and completed the course in June 1923 as a distinguished graduate. He remained at the school as an instructor until August 1927 and then attended the Army War College, Washington, D. C., where he graduated in June 1928.

His next station was at the Presidio of Monterey, California, with the 76th Field Artillery, where he served until November 1929, when he returned to Washington for a tour with the General Staff Corps. He served as Chief of the Publications and Extension Course Section, Operations and Training Branch, War Department General Staff, until September 1933, when he was ordered to duty with the 6th Field Artillery at Fort Hoyle, Maryland.

A promotion to lieutenant colonel came on 1 May 1934 and he was graduated from the Field Officers' Course at the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, in August 1935, and was assigned to duty as Military Attaché at Paris, France. He served in Paris until August 1940, in the meantime getting his eagles on 1 July 1938.

He returned to the United States in August 1940, and following temporary duty in Washington, he was assigned to take a refresher course at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill in October 1940, preliminary to duty with the 3d Infantry Division with headquarters at Fort Lewis, Washington. He was also promoted to brigadier general (temporary) on 1 October 1940.

In June 1941 he was transferred to Fort Leavenworth as Commandant of the Command and General Staff School. He was assigned to command the 41st Division at Fort Lewis in December 1941 and on 15 December that year won his temporary promotion to major general. He accompanied the Division to the Southwest Pacific Area and in August 1944 became President of the U. S. Army Forces, in the Far East Board. The following November he was made Deputy Chief of Staff, Southeast Asia Command.

He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 1944, with the accompanying citation:

For service in the Southwest Pacific Area from April 6, 1942, to June 17, 1944. Commanding one of the first Infantry divisions to

arrive in the theater, he demonstrated exceptional ability and sound judgment in bringing his division to a high state of efficiency in preparation for jungle combat. He successfully commanded his division in the defense of the Oro Bay-Gona Area and in operations against the enemy from Gona to Morobe, while elements of his division participated in the landing at Nassau Bay and the subsequent drive on Salamaua. Later he led his division in the amphibious assaults against Hollandia and Biak Island. Elements of his division made the successful initial landings at Aitape and in the Wake Island-Sarmi Area. In all attacks he inflicted decisive defeat on an experienced enemy. His personal courage and inspiring leadership made possible the able execution of assigned missions, and contributed materially to our success in dislodging the enemy and forcing him to relinquish his conquests.

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE A. WHITE

George A. White was born in Illinois on 18 July 1880. His first military experience was as a private in the Infantry in the Utah National Guard on 1 August 1895. He entered the Federal service for duty in the Spanish-American War as a musician in the Artillery, serving until 21 December 1898. He reentered the Utah State service on 15 July 1899 and served as private and first sergeant in the Infantry until 3 May 1903. He moved to Oregon where he enlisted as a private in the Oregon National Guard on 4 August 1907, and the following day, 5 August 1907, he was appointed a first lieutenant of Infantry in the Oregon National Guard.

His promotion to captain came on 21 March 1911; to major, AGD, on 14 May 1915, and to brigadier general on 14 May 1915, serving in this rank until 26 June 1916. He was mustered into Federal service for the Border crisis as a captain in the Cavalry on 27 June 1916. He served until 22 February 1917 when he was demobilized and again became brigadier general, AGD.

During World War I he was mustered into Federal service on 10 September 1917 as a major, AGD, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 13 November 1918. Following de-



Major General George A. White.



Brigadier General Harold Haney.

mobilization on 23 July 1919, he was appointed colonel, AGD, National Guard of Oregon, on 23 June 1920, and was promoted to brigadier general on 8 June 1922 and to brigadier general of the line on 23 July 1923.

General White was graduated from the National Guard Officers' Course, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926; and from the Military Intelligence Course of the Army War College, Washington, D. C., in 1928. He was promoted to major general on 3 January 1930.

During World War II, General White was mustered into the Federal service on 16 September 1940. He became commanding general of the 41st Division which was in training at Fort Lewis, Washington. He died on 23 November 1941.

BRIG. GEN. HAROLD HANEY

Harold Haney was born at Brazil, Indiana, on 2 January 1894. After serving as an enlisted man for three years, he was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry in the Regular Army on 9 August 1917, and was promoted to first lieutenant the same day.

Between August 1917 and August 1919 he served with the 57th Infantry at San Benito, Beaumont, and Camp Logan, Texas, later moving with that regiment to Camp Pike, Arkansas. In September 1919 he joined the American forces in Germany, where he first served with the 5th Infantry and later commanded a quartermaster detachment.

He served with the Quartermaster Corps for two years, being promoted to captain on 1 July 1920. He served for a time as salvage officer with the American forces then returned to the United States in May 1922 and was assigned to Camp Dix, New Jersey. There he served as camp salvage officer and as company commander with the 16th Infantry, in September 1923 moving with that regiment to Fort Jay, N.Y.

He was assigned to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in October 1924, where he completed the Company Officers' Course in June 1925. He then went to Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, as assistant professor of military science and tactics. After serving five years in that capacity, he was assigned to the 6th Infantry at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, where he became a company commander and plans and training officer of the 2d Battalion. In March 1933 he joined the 15th Infantry at Tientsin, China, and remained there until September 1935, meanwhile having been promoted to major on 1 August 1935.

He returned to Fort Jay and was given command of the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry. In July 1937 he became assistant professor of military science and tactics at the University of Alabama at University, Alabama, and the following September was enrolled as a student at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Upon completion of his studies in June 1939 he became chairman and chief of the Heavy Weapons Section, and later, assistant executive officer at the Infantry School.

His promotion to lieutenant colonel became effective 9 August 1940 and on 24 December 1941 he was promoted to colonel (temporary). In October 1942 he was assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area and served there until November 1943 as commandant of the Officer Candidate School. He later was assigned to the 41st Division and became Assistant Division Commander, receiving his promotion to brigadier general on 7 January 1945.

On 6 March 1946 he reverted to his permanent rank of lieutenant colonel and was promoted to colonel (temporary).

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS E. RILEA

Thomas E. Rilea was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 5 May 1895. He first entered military service by enlisting in the National Guard of Oregon as a private in the Infantry on 8

December 1914, while attending Oregon Institute of Technology, from which he was graduated in 1916 with the degree of Electrical Engineer. In that same year he served on Federal duty with the National Guard as bugler and corporal on the Mexican border. He was again mustered into Federal service on 25 March 1917, just prior to the outbreak of World War I, serving as a sergeant and regimental sergeant-major of Infantry from 25 March 1917 to 16 June 1918, when he was commissioned second lieutenant in the Adjutant General's Department.

His first commissioned service was on Federal duty with the National Guard in the United States and with the American Expeditionary Forces in France. He was awarded the Purple Heart and was cited by the Oregon Legislature for outstanding service.

He was promoted to first lieutenant on 24 February 1919, and to captain on 31 May 1919. He was mustered out of Federal service on 25 September 1919 and was appointed captain on 8 June 1921, major on 17 November 1924, lieutenant colonel on 16 March 1927, and brigadier general on 9 January 1931.

Following his demobilization after World War I he became Executive Officer of the Oregon National Guard. From 1934 to 1935 he was Vice President of the National Guard Association, and from 1935 to 1936 he was its President. In February 1942 he was relieved of assignment as commanding general of the 82d Infantry Brigade and made assistant commander of the 41st Division. In February 1943 he was assigned to Headquarters, Services of Supply, in the Southwest Pacific Area, and a month later was given command of Base Section 17, at Sydney, Australia. In February 1945 he was hospitalized at Barnes General Hospital, Vancouver Barracks, Washington and in July 1945 was assigned to the Infantry Replacement Training Center at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

BRIG. GEN. EDWIN A. ZUNDEL

Edwin Albert Zundel was born at Greensburg, Pennsylvania, on 29 March 1893. He was graduated from the United States Military Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree and commissioned second lieutenant of Field Artillery on 12 June 1915.


He served on border duty at Fort Sam Houston, Fort Bliss and Laredo, Texas, and then at Nogales, Arizona, with various Field Artillery regiments from June 1915 to June 1917. He was promoted to first lieutenant on 1 July 1916 and to captain on 15 May 1917. He then joined the 11th Field Artillery at Douglas, Arizona, and from September to December 1917 was detailed to Leon Springs, Texas, for duty at the 2d Officers' Training Camp, after which he returned to Douglas to rejoin the 11th Field Artillery. From February to May 1918, he was a student at the School of Fire, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and then rejoined the 11th Field Artillery.

He was promoted to major (temporary) on 3 July 1918 and that month sailed to France with his regiment. The following month he became a battalion commander of the 78th Field Artillery, at Valdahon, France. From November 1918 to April 1919, he served as a battalion commander of the 305th Field Artillery, and then returned to the United States. While stationed in France he participated in engagements in the Meuse-Argonne and Defensive Sector.

His next assignment was at Camp Meade, Maryland, where he served as assistant camp judge advocate until November 1919, when he moved to San Antonio, Texas, as assistant to the zone supply officer. From January to May 1920, he was assistant to the depot quartermaster, San Antonio General



Brigadier General Thomas E. Rilea.



Brigadier General Edwin A. Zundel.

Supply Depot, and then sailed to Hawaii, where he was named assistant to the department quartermaster at Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in Honolulu. Meanwhile, he had reverted to captain on 6 May 1920 but was promoted to major on 1 July that same year. He joined the 13th Field Artillery at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in October 1920, as a battalion commander, and served in this capacity until he returned to the United States in July 1923.

He served as instructor at the United States Military Academy until September 1927, when he was assigned as a student at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill. He was graduated in June 1928, and then was detailed to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He completed the two-year course in June 1930, after which he proceeded to Providence, Rhode Island, as an instructor of the 68th Field Artillery Brigade and 103d Field Artillery, Rhode Island National Guard.

He was ordered to Washington, D. C., for duty with the Regulations Division, National Guard Bureau, in September 1934, and in March 1935 was made assistant to the chief of Operations and Organization Division. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 May 1936. In October 1938 he took a refresher course at the Field Artillery School and then went to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as commander of the 2d Battalion, 83d Field Artillery. He moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, in command of the 83d Field Artillery in July 1940, and also served concurrently as artillery officer of the 4th Infantry Division.

He became commanding officer of the 42d Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Benning in October 1940 and one year later assumed command of the 1st Antitank Group at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, and was promoted to colonel (temporary) on 14 October 1941. The following December he was made artillery officer of II Corps at Wilmington, Delaware, later moving to Jacksonville, Florida, in the same capacity.

In June 1942 he was designated artillery officer of XI Corps at Chicago, Illinois, and in February 1943 was assigned to Sixth Army as artillery officer in the Southwest Pacific. He was made a permanent colonel on 14 October 1943. As artillery officer of Sixth Army he participated in landings on Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands and in the landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester on New Britain, and at Saidor, Aitape and Hollandia on New Guinea, and the Admiralty Islands.

On 24 May 1944 he was promoted to brigadier general (temporary) and assumed command of the 41st Division Artillery at Hollandia. In this capacity he participated in operations on Wakde and Biak, and in the Philippines.

He accompanied the 41st Division into Japan and returned to the United States in February 1946, being assigned as artillery officer of Fourth Army.

He was awarded the Legion of Merit as Sixth Army Artillery Officer, "for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services in the Southwest Pacific area from 6 February 1943 to 4 May 1944."

An oak leaf cluster to the Legion of Merit was awarded to him as 41st Division Artillery commander for the Biak campaign and for his part in planning and preparing the Palawan and Zamboanga campaigns.

He received the Silver Star for gallantry in action at Ibd, Biak Island, on 29 May 1944, and the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious achievement in military operations against the enemy on Mindanao from 10 March 1945 to 25 April 1945.

In July 1945 he was awarded the Air Medal for numerous operational flights in Cub planes over enemy-held territory during the operations on Biak and Mindanao.

General Zundel was appointed permanent brigadier general in 1948 with rank from 7 July 1944.

BRIG. GEN. RALPH WALDO COANE

Ralph W. Coane was born in Oakland, California, on 17



Brigadier General Ralph W. Coane.

October 1891. He enlisted on 5 January 1918 for duty at the Officers' Training School at Camp Kearny, California. He served as a sergeant with the 143d Field Artillery at Camp Kearny and was commissioned a second lieutenant on 28 May 1918.

He was honorably discharged on 18 January 1919, and was appointed a second lieutenant of Field Artillery of the California National Guard on that same date. He was commissioned first lieutenant of Field Artillery, Officers' Reserve Corps, on 13 January 1925; promoted to captain, Officers' Reserve Corps, on 21 July 1930, to major on 8 June 1936, to colonel on 15 January 1941, and to brigadier general (temporary) on 17 March 1942.

General Coane's first assignment after being commissioned was with the 115th Ammunition Troop with which he went overseas in August 1918. He served with that unit until October 1918, when he was transferred to the 143d Field Artillery, then stationed at Camp de Souge, France. He attended the Artillery School of Fire there.

As a Reserve officer he was called to active duty for short periods of training. He was ordered to extended active duty at Santa Barbara, California, on 3 February 1941, and was assigned to duty with the 144th Field Artillery at Fort Lewis, Washington. He was assigned as artillery commander, 41st Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, in March 1942, and the following month accompanied the Division overseas. As a result of wounds received in action, he was returned to the United States in July 1944 and, following hospitalization at Hoff General Hospital at Santa Barbara, California, he was assigned in November 1944 to command the 14th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, Fourth Army, at Camp Polk, Louisiana.

BRIG. GEN. ALBERT H. BEEBE

Albert H. Beebe, Washington National Guard, entered the military service of the State of Washington as an enlisted

man on 17 July 1907 in Company L, 2d Washington Infantry, where he remained until 28 October 1909. He was then transferred to the Coast Artillery Corps, where he served as a sergeant and sergeant-major until 25 May 1910. On 30 July 1917 he enlisted in Company B, 3d Infantry, Washington State Guard, and on 13 August 1917 he was commissioned a captain in the Infantry, Washington State Guard, and assigned to the 3d Infantry Regiment. On 3 January 1919 he was promoted to major. On 10 January 1921 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Field Artillery and was assigned as executive officer of the 146th Field Artillery. On 30 March 1929 he took command of that regiment and on 3 May 1929 he was promoted to colonel. He continued in command of the 146th until he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to command the 66th Field Artillery Brigade on 10 October 1934.

General Beebe entered Federal service on 16 September 1940 in command of the 66th Field Artillery Brigade but was released from Federal service on 25 September because of physical disability. On 28 August 1942, he was appointed major general on the retired list of the Washington National Guard.

He was born at Versailles, New York, on 24 February 1878, and graduated from Cornell University in 1901 with the degree of Bachelor of Law.

MAJ. GEN. CARLOS A. PENINGTON

Carlos A. Penington was born in Wilmington, Illinois, on 3 May 1878. He enlisted in Company D, 1st Washington Volunteers at Seattle, Washington, on 30 March 1898 and served with that unit in the Philippine Islands during the Spanish-American War until he was mustered out on 1 November 1899. He reenlisted in Company A, 2d Washington Infantry, on 27 April 1909, and remained as an enlisted man with that unit until commissioned a first lieutenant in the same company on 9 June 1909. On 28 October 1909 he



Brigadier General Albert H. Beebe.



Major General Carlos A. Penington.

was transferred to the Coast Artillery Corps, and assigned to the regimental staff of the CAC, Washington National Guard. In September 1914 he was promoted to captain and was made a major on 9 May 1916 when he was assigned as Coast Artillery Battalion commander and as State Inspector. From 15 June 1916 to 16 November 1916, he was on active duty at Tacoma, Washington, in charge of recruiting. On 17 November 1916 he was transferred to the Inspector General's Department, and assigned as State Inspector and on 9 June 1917 he was transferred to the Quartermaster Corps and assigned as State Quartermaster.

On 2 August 1917 he entered Federal service as Assistant Division Quartermaster, 41st Division, going overseas with the Division in December 1917. In France he served as Quartermaster of the 77th Division. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 10 November 1918 and was relieved from active Federal service on 6 August 1919.

On 23 February 1920 he was commissioned a lieutenant colonel, QMC, in the Organized Reserves, and was assigned as Quartermaster, 62d Cavalry Division. On 17 May 1929

he transferred to the Washington National Guard and was assigned as Quartermaster of the 41st Division. He was promoted to colonel in the Field Artillery of the WNG on 10 April 1930 and assumed command of the 148th Field Artillery with headquarters in Tacoma. His promotion to brigadier general was effective 24 July 1934 and he was assigned as commander of the 81st Infantry Brigade of the 41st Division. He entered Federal service in this capacity on 16 September 1940 but because of physical disability incurred in line of duty he retired on 16 December 1941. On 28 August 1942 he was made major general on the retired list of the Washington National Guard.

After World War I, General Penington took an active part in the organization of the U. S. Veterans Bureau in Washington, D. C., and as an assistant director organized and operated the Insurance Division of the Bureau for a number of years. Later he was business manager of the Veterans' Hospital at Fort Bayard, New Mexico, and at American Lake, Washington.

He died at Madigan General Hospital on 26 August 1947.

SS *Sunset* Launching

In tribute to the fighting men of the Pacific Northwest's famed 41st Infantry Division a tanker, the USS *Sunset*, was launched on 20 January 1945 at the Kaiser Swan Island shipyard at Portland, Oregon. Brig. Gen. Ralph P. Cowgill, commanding general of the Oregon State Guard and a former regimental commander of the 41st Division, was the speaker at the dedication which attracted one of the largest crowds ever to witness a launching at the Swan Island yards.

Two State Guard companies, composed of volunteers from the 2d and 4th Battalions at Portland, under the command of Capt. Joseph P. Eckman, and the State Guard band gave an impressive military note and also present were many veterans who had just returned from nearly three years' service in the Southwest Pacific with the *Sunset* Division. These men were home on furlough, leave, rotation, and some were home to stay because of wounds incurred in battle.

Sponsor of the big tanker was Mrs. George A. White, widow of Maj. Gen. George A. White, whose ability and vision as commanding general of the 41st Division are reflected in the great honors which were gained in the Southwest Pacific. With Mrs. White on the dedication platform, in addition to General Cowgill and A. R. Nieman, assistant

general manager of the shipyard, were the mothers of three heroes of the 41st Division who lost their lives in action, Tech. Sgt. Theodore Richter, Sgt. George R. Jennings, and Lt. Irving Hoyt.

Speaking with a fervor which reflected his love and admiration for the Division with which he served so long, General Cowgill related an imposing list of exploits of the former Pacific Northwest National Guardsmen and enumerated the many "first" honors they had gained in training, in their arrival in Australia when all the Southwest Pacific shrank from the advance of the Japanese Army and Navy, and their victorious campaigns against the Nipponese through Papua, New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea.

PROGRAM

LAUNCHING OF THE SS *SUNSET*

11:30. Band and State Guard troops march down Crane Way No. 6 starting from the Assembly building.

11:32. Band and troops halt near Way End Building No. 6 at which time Mr. A. R. Nieman opens the ceremonies.

Nieman: The Oregon State Guard band will play "The



National Anthem" as the Swan Island Color Guard raises the American Flag.

11:34. *Nieman*: The yard whistle now sounds as a warning to all craft in the river that our hull No. 123, the SS *Sunset*, is about to be launched.

11:34 $\frac{1}{4}$. (*Warning whistle sounds.*)

11:34 $\frac{1}{2}$. *Nieman*: Mrs. White, . . . guests, . . . men and women of Swan Island:

It is customary at this point in the launching ceremony to name the person, place, or department that is being honored. Today I feel that Swan Island and we employees of this shipyard are being most deeply honored to have the privilege of naming this ship the *Sunset* for the 41st Division of the United States Army. We are honored to have Mrs. George A. White, whose husband was the "father" of the *Sunset* Division, as sponsor, and three of the Division's Gold Star mothers as her attendants. We are honored to have members of the *Sunset* Division and other branches of the armed services with us today. The nucleus of the *Sunset*'s fighting men have come from the Northwest, from Oregon, Washington, Montana, Idaho and Wyoming. They are our neighbors, our sons, brothers, and husbands and our daughters.

The first *Sunset* Division in World War I made history in military annals and through three years of active service in the Pacific in this war, the sons of the old 41st Division have built their own fame and tradition that have carried the name of "Sunset" to even greater heights.

The *Sunset* Division left Fort Lewis in March, 1942, and were the first American combat troops in Australia. It soon became famous for its part in the fighting at Guadalcanal and New Guinea, at Salamaua, Biak Island, and in other campaigns. They have earned the reputation of being our best jungle troops. In the original division, Oregon furnished two regiments of infantry, including the 162d, the famed Oregon Second. Two battalions of artillery also came from Oregon. Other artillery came from Washington, one regiment of infantry from Montana, and engineers from Idaho. In closing, I should like to speak directly to those members of the 41st Division who are with us today. I should like to tell you that we are immensely proud of you and of the families who have given you to the service. Many of your folks work in this yard and are part of this organization. We on the production front realize that the difficulties we encounter are minor in comparison with the hell of warfare that many of you have been through. But our pulses have been quickened in pride of your victories. Our hearts have grieved with your losses.

We are humbly honored to launch this ship in your name.

At this time, it is with a great deal of pleasure that I introduce to you a former regimental commander of the 41st Division, and a very close associate of the late General George A. White. At the present time, he is now commander of the Oregon State Guard. I am happy to introduce Brigadier General Ralph P. Cowgill. . . General Cowgill.

(Text of General Cowgill's talk will be found in the next column.)

11:39. *Nieman*: The Oregon State Guard band will now favor us with their selection entitled "Bombasto."

11:41. *Nieman*: Mrs. C. E. Hoyt will now present flowers to the sponsor, Mrs. George A. White . . . and to the matrons of honor, Mrs. T. J. Richter . . . and Mrs. J. C. Jennings.

11:44. *Nieman*: The Reverend John W. Beard of the Mt.

Tabor Presbyterian Church will now invoke the blessing of God upon the SS *Sunset*.

11:44 $\frac{1}{4}$. (*Invocation.*)

11:45. *Nieman*: I will now turn the microphone over to Don Frederickson who will describe for you the burning of the plates, and bring to you our sponsor's christening words.

11:49. (*Vessel is launched as the Oregon State Guard band plays "Anchors Aweigh."*)

SPEECH BY GENERAL COWGILL AT LAUNCHING OF THE SS *Sunset*

We are assembled here today to pay an honor to a great National Army division composed of personnel from the Northwest States—Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming—and more particularly represented in Oregon by the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments and the 218th Field Artillery.

It is fitting that at this time respect be paid to the late Maj. Gen. George A. White who commanded that Division until November 1941.

When the 41st Division was called in 1940, he immediately instituted a rigorous training program that fitted the Division to later make world history.

He instilled in the minds of officers and enlisted men the necessity of the toughest training in order to meet any Japanese attack.

A few days before General White passed away, he remarked that he expected the Japanese to attack without warning any day, and he was worried that he could not make others see that the attack was coming.

Two weeks later the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. Suddenly this Nation woke up, late, very late, but not too late, to save a majority of the people of the world from butchery and slavery by two depraved nations.

General White will go down in history as an outstanding soldier and citizen . . . worshipped by his men.

It was his ambition that the 41st or *Sunset* Division would be recognized as second to none in an Army representing the United States. How well General White planned is best told by citing the Division's accomplishments.

(1) At the conclusion of the 1940-41 field maneuvers at Fort Lewis, General McNair indicated that the 41st Division was the No. 1 National Guard Division and one of the three top-ranking divisions in the United States.

(2) First division to go overseas.

(3) Has served longer overseas than any other division.

(4) First division to be trained for jungle warfare.

(5) Has fought more campaigns than any other division.

(6) Has killed more Japs than any other division.

(7) Has captured more Jap prisoners than any other division (2,200).

(8) Awarded Presidential Citation for outstanding performances.

(9) Leads South Pacific outfits in number of individual decorations.

(10) It is estimated that more than sixty per cent of the Division has been awarded the infantry badge.

(11) The Division made an unequalled record in this war by driving across New Guinea to Salamaua—seventy-six days in actual combat. It is related that for one period of twenty-six straight days our troops existed solely on limited canned C rations.

The Division has taken part in the following campaigns:

- (1) Buna-Gona and Sanananda campaigns in Papua.
- (2) Nassau Bay, Tambu Bay, Roosevelt Ridge and Salamaua in New Guinea.
- (3) Aitape, Wakde, Hollandia and Biak island in Dutch New Guinea.

Here among you today are a number of officers and enlisted men who did their part to help make the Division record. You can identify these men by the Sunset insignia they so proudly wear. Some are wounded, some are on rotation and some are returning to the Division for further conquests. I particularly call your attention to the enlisted personnel—they are the hope of America.

I pay tribute today to Mrs. George A. White, the sponsor of this ship. To her goes my best wishes on this memorable day.

To the three Gold Star Mothers here serving as attendants and to the many others in Oregon, I can only offer this: That each and all of them face the future with brave hearts and a feeling that their loss has helped prevent the occupation of our own land by our brutal enemies.

Had we properly maintained a strong combined Army and Navy it is almost certain that this war would never have occurred; therefore, we have no one but ourselves to blame for this war—the loss of our fathers and sons, and our wealth.

Now after more than three years, our Army and Navy is on the march. For three long years our soldiers and citizens in the Philippines have been lifting their chained hands toward heaven praying to the Almighty God for deliverance from brutality and death. Let us pray that we are not too late.

This ship is one link in a vast chain of ships spanning a long, deep, treacherous ocean.

If that chain is broken, our men on the far-flung battle fronts will be deprived of arms, equipment and food that they so seriously need.

The men on the front lines do not have time to worry about conditions at home—they want all of the necessary supplies in order that they may win the war and return home to their loved ones and their jobs.

To you men and women of the Swan Island Shipyard: For the officers and men of the Sunset Division overseas and those present here today, I take this occasion to publicly commend you and your loyal and patriotic workers for the speedy and efficient construction of the ships so necessary for the prosecution of this war.

I wish to commend those officers and men working in this organization who have volunteered their services to the Oregon State Guard.

Many of these officers and men for the past three years have attended drills and maneuvers regularly—some coming directly from night shifts to report for field training on Sundays—that they might be better prepared to meet possible emergencies.

This exemplifies the highest types of citizenship.

It is my hope that all of our armed forces, wherever they may be, will be informed of this launching honoring the fighting men of the United States Army which is another indication that they have the complete and untiring support of your organization.

I am sure that all members of the famous Sunset Division will welcome all of you as honorary members of the Sunset Division Association of Oregon.¹

¹From *On Guard!*, published monthly for the Oregon State Guard.

"The Front Lines"

The Front Lines, daily publication of the 41st Infantry Division, ran the gamut of some of history's biggest headlines from the time of its debut in New Guinea on 15 May 1944, as a weekly news sheet of one hundred mimeographed copies to its peak publication of some three thousand copies at Zamboanga, Mindanao, where word of Japan's unconditional surrender was carried to thousands of Sunset men and attached troops in an eight-page special edition, dated Wednesday, 15 August 1945.

Another highlight of the paper's history was the record sixteen-page edition published when Germany surrendered to the Western Allies and Russia on Tuesday, 8 May 1945. All but two of these pages were prepared in advance, in true newspaper tradition, and carried in crates from Biak to Mindoro and finally to Zamboanga, where the "lid" literally was knocked off one of the biggest stories of all time.

All of the romance of the newspaper game went into the VE edition. A week prior to Germany's actual surrender, when the Nazis' collapse was inevitable, the *Front Lines* staff opened the crates which contained the pages numbered from 3 to 16 and aided by volunteers, headed by Bill Ostermann, from the Division's AG Office, worked long overtime hours putting the pages in proper sequence. Then came the newspaper game's "death watch," or sweating out the actual announcement that hostilities had ended in Europe.

To George Gregas, Pennsylvanian of G-4, went the honor of bringing the flash to *The Front Lines*. George overheard

a telephone conversation in his office and dashed into Fort Pilar, where the headquarters group bunked, and aroused Edward H. Gerken, editor, and quondam reporter for *The New York Sun*, at about 11:30 P.M.

"Hey, Pop," he yelled. "Germany has surrendered!" And took off as a pony rider to spread the word verbally.

The Front Lines, which always had a small compact staff on regular duty, though often aided by piece work from volunteers with printer's ink in their blood, capitalized on preparing all Christmas, New Year's, Easter and any other special editions long in advance, having the headlines and art work ready to roll at a moment's notice. But even *The Front Lines* was caught short on the Japanese surrender story, since the collapse of Japan only ninety-odd days after VE-day was unexpected. However, as soon as the various peace offers began to break into the news, the staff again went into action, and succeeded in bringing out an eight-page special, though original plans had called for an edition surpassing in volume even that published on VE-day.

The integrity of *The Front Lines* was attested to in the various phone calls from troops seeking to verify rumors. One soldier even said, "If *The Front Lines* says it's so, I'll believe it!" In the course of the hectic week preceding actual announcement of the unconditional surrender by President Truman, the edition was prepared "for bed," with artist Edward Holland preparing an appropriate cartoon, and a "cut" of Mr. Truman. And the night before the actual announcement, mem-

JAPAN OFFERS TO SURRENDER



THEY HELPED PAVE THE WAY
 Gen. Douglas MacArthur was born on Jan. 26, 1890, in Arkansas, and served in the Philippines, 1917-1922, and in the Pacific, 1925-1935.

4 ACCEPT JAP OFFER WITH CONDITION OF OWN

ROLE OF ... **IN SWPA**
 Maj. Gen. Jens A. Doe ...



DECLINE OF THE EAST 1942
 TOMORROW?

U.S. USES ATOMIC BOMB

FIRST ONE BLASTS HIROSHIMA, PACKS WALLOP 1000 TIMES GREATER THAN ETO'S BOMB BUSTER


Radio Service - The War Department has taken the wraps of secrecy from the outstanding device of the war. Here are a few background as revealed by the report: The word radar is detection and ranging. It is used independently in the Pacific and Germany is the partner, Germany. Radar is a device which can "see" through fog and smoke. It is used to spot enemy ships to spot enemy aircraft.



JAPANESE FINALLY CRY "KOSAN"

RENDERED

JAPS SIGN ON DOTTED LINE



Radio Service - Two solemn-faced Japanese officials signed on a dotted line at 9 o'clock yesterday morning, and 10 Allied leaders also affixed their signatures to an historic document which formally signified Japan's unconditional surrender to the United Nations.

bers of the staff each took two hours of the "death watch" monitoring the radio, but the news did not break until shortly after 8:00 A.M. when a one-sentence announcement was cut into a routine broadcast of the news.

The Victory Special of *The Front Lines* made such a hit that a Marine Air Group unit asked for the paper's stencils so that it could run off additional copies for its own troops. The 41st ran off two thousand copies of this edition, and the Special Service outfit on the island ran off an additional one thousand. Furthermore, the demand for copies, which contained an account of the 41st Division by Major Roy Sherry, and a portrait of Gen. Jens A. Doe by Lou Wendell of G-3, was so great that a second printing had to be run off.

The Front Lines also had the signal honor of a commendation from the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On Biak in November 1944, the paper once again prepared an extra. Mr. Roosevelt was making his bid for a fourth term. Three columns were prepared, with two columns of back-ground material already stenciled in, and with the right-hand column open for the spot news of the election results. Most of the credit for this edition went to Bob Gillis of the Division's AG Office, who did all of the art work for this run, just as he had done much of the work for other editions. The paper "hit the streets" of Biak close on the heels of the actual radio broadcast. A copy of the edition came to the attention of the White House, and the following letter of commendation was sent to the 41st Division by Stephen Early, Presidential Press Secretary:

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

December 18, 1944

Dear Sergeant Scharper:

Many thanks for sending me the special edition of FRONT LINES. Your letter was so interesting that I showed it to the President, who was greatly impressed with the remarkable job which was done under such difficult and hazardous circumstances.

The President asked me to send his congratulations to Private Gerken and the other men responsible for this achievement. More power to the 41st!

Very sincerely yours,

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

First Sergeant W. A. Scharper,
Hd., 41st Infantry Division,
APO 41

Paradoxically, *The Front Lines* began its career in the rear echelon. After the 41st had hit Hollandia, Capt. Franklin Tourtellotte, then Division Special Service Officer, returned to Finschhafen and suggested that a news sheet be inaugurated for the boys in the rear. Dick Pekar was publishing one up forward. To Captain Tourtellotte (later Major) also goes the credit for the paper's name, which caught the fancy of the troops. Ed Gerken was made editor of *The Front Lines*, and was assisted by LaVern Hamlin of Marshalltown, Iowa.

Near the end of the Division's stay on Biak, publication of the paper was transferred from Special Service to the newly created I&E (Information and Education) Section, under Major Sherry. The TO called for three enlisted men, and Steve Mekuly of Chicago injected some "fresh blood" into the sheet. During its month's stay on Mindoro, the paper was reorganized with its larger staff and began to even up the right-hand margins to give the paper the semblance of a printed sheet. And in this respect, it was Mekuly's painstaking care in what amounted to setting the type by hand which made the difference in physical appearance of the newspaper. The even margins, which required additional time and effort, since the copy first had to be typed out within the required number of "units" were maintained through Mindoro and Zamboanga, but were given up when *The Front Lines* hit Japan in favor of greater output of the news on such important subjects as redeployment, reconversion and other stateside highlights.

When the paper came under the jurisdiction of I&E, it had the advantage of being able to call on the section's draftsmen and artists, and to Seymour Fleischman and Jim Forsberg go the credit for many of the swell-looking headlines which adorned the front pages.

At Hiro, Japan, Paul Bluemle of Springfield, Ohio, formerly with the *Daily News* of that town, contributed his special talents as a reporter and rewrite man, and was elevated to the post of Associate Editor. On 13 December 1945, Paul became editor of *The Front Lines*, under the supervision of the new I&E Officer, Lt. Hugo R. Wichtel.

Throughout the career of the paper, the sports news was excellently handled by Fred Down of the Division's Special Service Section, who gave freely of his off-duty hours to keep the troops abreast of news and results in baseball, football, basketball, boxing, and so on. Among others who contributed toward making the news sheet a success were Lou Friedman, Larry King, Jim Barham, Henry N. Heine, Capt. Chester Kalwasinski, Aldo J. DeBenedetti and Peter Frank, who is best remembered as the paper's "European Consultant" in the "hot" days of the war in Europe.

What Others Said

WAR IN NEW GUINEA

From "Yank Down Under"

Singapore, Java, Sumatra had fallen. Then Rabaul. For Australia, 1942 broke to a bloody dawn. The vaunted umbrella of islands had folded up, the outside ring of protection had gone—except for Port Moresby, arid, half-garrisoned, half-prepared. March, and the Japanese hands, ever reaching forward, fell on Lae and Salamaua, just "over the mountains." Thumbs scoured out new airfields, transports brought in troops, supplies. Enemy aircraft filled the skies over Moresby, day after day, night after night. But the Japanese halted, secure in their thoughts that "tomorrow would do." But the

tomorrows were stirring with new life, with iron in their blood and steel in their hearts. In a time when hope fluttered vainly, miracles happened. The miracles were small groups of men in fighter planes who stemmed the forward rush of the Niponese airmen. The planes were made in the factories of America and Australia. They fell from hands covered with oil and grease.

The world looked at New Guinea. Strategists drew lines from Port Moresby to the mainland. "If it fell . . . this will happen—the bombing of Australian cities, women, children, industries . . ."

But it did not happen. That is the story of the men of New Guinea. The Jap came and was halted. He was pushed back.

He left in the mud and slush his best fighting men. Port Moresby did not fall. Instead of a defensive post, a stooge to take the blows from a champion fighter, it became a fighting base. From it, giant planes streaked towards the Japanese. From it, lean men with confidence in their hearts and courage in their eyes, went across the hell of the Owen Stanley Range. They met the Jap—the confident, plump, egotistical brown man—and they beat him.

The story of the shocking conditions, the incredible hardships and the sheer guts shown by our men cannot be completely told in photographs nor can it be described adequately in writing. It can be better understood perhaps when all realise that the fight for Papua is now recognised as one of the toughest campaigns in all military history.

To combat the Japanese, soldiers climbed slippery, precipitous mountain tracks on hands and knees—forced their way through dense jungle—waded knee-deep in mud—desperately weary, tried to sleep on sodden ground under constant tropical downpour.

At one stage those in contact with the enemy lit no fires, had no warm food, nor took off a single piece of clothing for four weeks. When finally able to have a spell their socks, and in some cases their boots, had to be cut from their feet—water-sodden skin was torn away with socks—feet left raw.

Many wounded men walked for days for medical aid; those who couldn't walk were carried on rough bush stretchers by native Fuzzie Wuzzies. Sometimes it took ten natives to carry one wounded soldier over this terrible country.

Complete lack of roads was the most difficult problem in the campaign; without roads it appeared impossible to supply our troops. This great problem was finally overcome by employing several thousand natives as carriers; and with huge transport planes dropping supplies from the air.

North of the Owen Stanleys the Japs were in considerable forces. Coolies had been brought to carry their supplies across the roadless country.

Following weeks of dreadful fighting the Japs were pushed back over the Owen Stanleys—Moresby was saved—Kokoda Airfield recaptured. Our supply problem was simplified. Big planes were now able to land on the northern side of the ranges with stores which could not be safely dropped from the air. Wounded men were flown out and within a few hours were getting attention in Moresby's hospitals. Many lives were saved and the frightful trip back over the Owen Stanley Track was a thing of the past.

As it was impossible to march sufficient troops over the ranges to drive the Japs from Papua, other means of transport were investigated. The ranges were thoroughly explored for routes by which roads could be rapidly built—but without success. The plan to march troops up the coast from Milne Bay was impracticable because of the impassable swamp country. The plan of transporting troops by plane to the North Coast was, at first, reckoned limited, as the landing fields were soft with incessant rain and heavy aircraft bog easily, but following a successful experimental flight the High Command decided to fly reinforcement troops over the ranges and land them to the south of Buna on the north coast of Papua. These troops were mainly Americans.

About the same time, the Australians fighting on the Kokoda Trail won a complete victory over the Japs at Gorari, a village about 30 miles from the north coast. Brilliant strategy and brave men annihilated practically the whole of the enemy force. More than one thousand Japs were killed. The few lucky enough to escape the Gorari trap fled to the coast, joining up with the Jap garrisons who waited there within strongly

constructed, well-hidden defences. However, against these coastal forces at Gona, Buna and Sanananda the Allies now attacked.

The campaign over the ranges had been tough, but here on the coast were extra hardships. Men fought by day in steamy, reeking swamps, beneath a burning equatorial sun and lay at night, soaked to the skin by the regular tropical downpour, often hungry and always weary, with death lurking behind every leaf and log. The Jap, with the cunning of an animal, had burrowed into the earth and camouflaged his whereabouts with jungle.

Malaria and typhus fever broke out amongst the troops. Strong men who had fought so valiantly across the ranges crumbled as these dread diseases took their toll—it was heart-breaking when victory was so close—some fought on—ill with fever. One, a company commander with his temperature at 105 degrees, led his men in counterattack against the enemy—when the Japs were beaten back he collapsed with a temperature of 106.6.

Despite all difficulties our forces closed relentlessly in, and the Japs who would not surrender were killed.

The doomed Jap garrisons of Papua had waited in vain for the reinforcements their Emperor had promised—but these never arrived—the Allied Air Force had seen to that, as they sank ship after ship.

With the dawn of 1943, Sanananda, last of the Jap garrisons, fell. The Japanese had been driven from Papua and the first stage of the Allied offensive against the Japanese marauders successfully completed.

MEDICS UNDER FIRE

By Sgt. Charles Pearson, "Yank" Staff Correspondent

Dutch New Guinea—A portable surgical hospital is a medical unit of four doctors and generally 32 enlisted men. They're supposed to work directly behind the line of battle and patch up casualties so they can be removed to an evacuation hospital. Sometimes part of the portable hospital's personnel have to be removed too.

During one of the Dutch New Guinea campaigns a portable unit was brought up by buffaloes to a position behind the advancing infantry of the 41st Division. They were moving up a coastal road from the landing beach toward Jap-held airstrips. The road was on a narrow strip of land with the sea on one side and a steep, heavily wooded coral terrace on the other.

The portable hospital medics arrived in late morning and set up their tents in a coconut grove. The infantry up ahead was moving along without much resistance. The hospital personnel were getting the idea they might have an easy show ahead. The coconut grove was picturesque. Just off the shore was a reef. A lot of men were out on it looking for cat eye shells. It was all quiet and peaceful.

In the distance could be heard the occasional chatter of machine guns and the popping of small arms. It was a comforting sound. They were our guns.

Suddenly they noticed the fire was rapidly intensifying. The thump of heavy mortars was almost blotting out the sound of the machine guns. The operator at the field phone called out that they had run into a strong force and were being heavily pounded with 90mm mortars. The first casualties were already on their way back.

Shortly a captured Japanese truck sputtered into the hospital area with six wounded on it. All of them were badly torn up. Capts. Edward L. Waisbrot of Canton, Ohio, and Theo-

dore Moss of Kew Gardens, L. I., were quickly working on a man whose arms had been smashed to jelly. It was an amputation.

At the other table set up in the pyramidal tent which was serving as an operating theater, Capts. Bernard Sollord of Baltimore, Md., and Sydney Kahn of Chicago were amputating the leg of a soldier. It had been badly fractured and the main blood vessel hopelessly torn.

The six casualties had now multiplied to twenty, and they were still streaming in. T/4 Cecil Wells of Hockersville, Okla., a former boxer and carnival pitchman now wardmaster, was going from one soldier to another trying to ease his pain while patients were coming in faster than they could be treated.

A call was sent back for more doctors. Three came up later in a jeep. Lieutenant Burroughs from Oakland, Calif., came from the evacuation hospital. Captain Krupke of Chicago was from another portable unit and Captain Ludden came from a clearing company. Another table was set up in the already crowded tent. Three teams of doctors continued work steadily.

Up ahead the infantry was stopped. Jap artillery and a naval gun were ranging in on them. Down between the hospital and the beachhead a second Jap force was driving a wedge between the fighting battalion and the rest of the force. It was now dark. The doctors were working by the illumination from one Japanese headlight powered by a storage battery, several Coleman lamps and all the available flashlights in the camp. It was hot in the tent and the surgeons were stripped to their underpants.

The casualties continued to come in, now from both directions. The patched up ones were being evacuated by landing craft and buffaloes. The force ahead was slowly giving ground. The battle was coming closer. An occasional mortar shell landed in the area. The supply tent and extra equipment had already been blasted into ribbons. One hospital attendant had been hit by a shell fragment.

Down in the kitchen tent Sgt. John Millner of Washington, D. C., T/5 Arlen Bradstreet of Stockton Springs, Maine, and T/5 Lucien Nadeau of Matawaska, Maine, were brewing hot coffee and bringing it in to the operating theater. Operating room assistants Pfc. William Abbott of Sommerville, Mass., Sgt. Emerson Heim of Tonawanda, N. Y., T/5 Richard Lucier of North Adams, Mass., and T/5 Sydney Shub of Ithaca, N. Y., were giving plasma and morphine and setting the wounded onto litters in slit trenches. Knee mortar shells were coming down from the ridge and exploding around the ward tent.

In the pitch black of the night it had not been possible to bring some of the wounded from the lines of fire. They had to wait until daybreak.

At 0500 the next morning all the wounded had been cared for. The doctors knocked off for a bit of sleep. An hour later in the early light of dawn the casualties began again.

At 1030 a message came up from the beachhead to be ready to move out at a moment's notice, but to continue working as well as possible. Dr. Moss was working on a man whose head had been split open and whose brain was injured. He was hemorrhaging badly. A patient on another table had had his arm blown off at the shoulder. The fighting was getting closer. Wounded men were walking back from the lines and collapsing at the hospital.

The battalion was withdrawing, trying to consolidate its position. The Japs had cut the supply line and were moving up the beach from both directions. Cpl. Ted Hunter of Macwahoc, Maine, and T/5 Leroy Fulkerson of Columbus, Ohio,

climbed up a bamboo ladder against the coral terrace and brought down a soldier with a hip wound. Infiltrating Japs were working down through the wooded terrace behind the hospital, setting up knee mortars and trying to hit wounded going out in the buffaloes. Pfc. Leonard Solow of New York City had the job of getting them away from the jetty.

One Jap reached the ledge directly above the ward tent. An infantryman shot him. He fell into a slit trench behind the kitchen tent.

At noon the last American vehicle came through. The fighting was now right in the area. At 1300 hours the hospital started to evacuate, but at 1400 those men whose lives depended on immediate attention were still being worked over. An hour later the last of the doctors climbed into the buffaloes and traveled back to the evacuation hospital with the wounded. Half an hour later the Japs were swarming over the area.

Back at the evac hospital the portable surgical unit doctors continued working. Two days later they were again sent up to the area of the hectic twenty-four hours. This time the Japs were in headlong flight, being pursued by the reorganized battalion supported by tanks. This time the portable surgical unit could patch up the wounded without ducking for cover every few minutes.

As one tired medic put it, "If I was in the infantry I might be getting that extra ten bucks fighting pay they talk about. But then, they say medics never see combat."

SUNSET DIVISION ECLIPSES THE RISING SUN

By Sgt. Dave Richardson, "Yank" Staff Correspondent

New Guinea (By Radio)—Of all the gorgeous sunsets American fighting men have witnessed from this tropical battleground, most vivid was the one that lit up the sky the evening Yanks and Aussies smashed through to capture Sananda Point.

It seemed a fitting climax to the fierce battles in which units of the 41st Division—the Sunset Division—and the Aussies chased the Japs down the very trail up which they came so confidently a few months before.

Typical of the heroes of this battle was Cpl. Carlton C. Tidrick of Belton, Mont. Tidrick's squad was sent out on a mission near a Jap stronghold, which opened up on the Yanks with machine guns and automatic rifles. Tidrick was hit three times, and Pvt. Kenneth E. Paul, an ex-farmer from Big Fork, Mont., was also wounded.

Bleeding so heavily that his squad pleaded with him to get to safety, Tidrick thought quick. He knew that crawling back might mean death. But he also knew that Paul was badly injured and that the lieutenant had to have information of the Jap position.

Half carrying, half dragging Paul back to the platoon, Tidrick returned the big farmer over to the Medics but refused treatment himself until he had given the lieutenant details of the Jap positions. Concerning the rest of his squad, he said: "If the others aren't hit as badly as I am they can wait and get back afterwards. If they're hit worse than I am, they're dead." Then he collapsed. Tidrick's commander recommended him for the DSC and the Silver Star.

Advance man for his rifle platoon, Sgt. Joe Oliphant of Fort Worth, Tex., edged up to within a few feet of some Japs in fox holes. They fired on him and he gave them a few bursts with his tommy gun. Evidently the Japs thought Oliphant had a lot of men with him for they got out of the fox holes and

started to run back to other positions. Before they could get there, however, Oliphant sprayed them with his tommy gun dropped most of them, releasing his trigger when he realized he had only five more shots left. When his platoon caught up with him, Oliphant was saving his last five bullets to defend himself. Sprawled before him were twelve dead Japs.

Pfc. Maurice Levy, former Chicago artist, made even a bigger haul with his Garand. He sneaked through the Jap lines to the edge of a path running from a machine-gun nest to other Jap positions. Twenty-two Japs passed down that trail within a few hours, and Levy killed every one of them. Finally the Japs located Levy and got four bullets into him. But when his pals captured the nest, they found Levy still eyeing the trail for more victims.

S/Sgt. Johnnie Mohl is always up front when his men attack. Mohl is from White Pine, Mont., and left Montana State College in his junior year to join the Army. Together with Cpl. Bill Rummel, former Hartford (Kans.) service-station operator, Mohl crawled into the Jap perimeter one night as part of a platoon plan of attack. Mohl and Rummel crawled up to the pill boxes and poured lead into them. The confused Japs were firing all over the place, not knowing which were their own men and which were the Yanks.

Mohl and Rummel were having a good time until one of their guns jammed and the other ran out of bullets.

"We got mad as hell that we had to throw away our guns just when the fun started," Mohl said. "But we had our pockets full of grenades which we kept rolling into the pillboxes until our men arrived."

The battle up Sanananda Trail was made all the more difficult by New Guinea's rainy season which had begun a few weeks before. In several places the trail was under two or three feet of water. On either side of the built-up trail were swamps. Because the Japs had built their pillboxes and strong positions on all available high ground commanding the trail, the Yanks and Aussies had to advance and live for days in the swamps and water.

Getting supplies through to American infantrymen in these positions was a major problem. Sgt. Owen D. Gaskell, husky supply man from Oregon, met his death this way. He had waded through water skirting the Jap perimeter with a supply squad bumped into a Jap machine-gun nest. He was shot through the helmet but the bullet just grazed his head. He motioned his squad to make a wide detour and go on as he drew fire from the nest by tossing hand grenades at the gun slits.

When his squad was safely past the nest with ammunition and food for the Americans on the other side of the trail, Gaskell went to join them. But the Japs had him spotted and killed him.

IT'S HARD TO GET NEWS IN N.G. JUNGLE

By P. A. Rayner, "Telegraph" War Correspondent

The war in this part of the Southwest Pacific area is the most unsatisfactory kind of campaign I can imagine. The largest land scrap was the battle for Buna, and that also was anything but satisfactory to newsmen as battles go when measured with the African and Russian campaigns.

Once or twice the Buna battle pushed the second Middle East campaign off the front pages of the world's press, but I think had the world's Press known that Buna and Gona together were represented by a few native huts they might have been given less prominence.

Never so far and most likely never in the mysterious future will we war correspondents be able to sit on a pleasant hilltop to enjoy an unobstructed view of land and air fighting on the grand panoramic scale so long as this bushman's kind of warfare continues in the New Guinea theater.

We are still jockeying for topographical pin points which frequently are nameless until they become an objective.

Somewhere out of the all consuming jungle you occasionally hear the whine of an artillery piece.

Then follows the solidified silence of nothingness, broken only by the nerve wracking crack of a twig as one of our patrols edges a little farther forward to peer through the Kunai and swings around to make a surprise attack on a mokka which is gnawing into his leg.

If you listen carefully straining the membrane of your ears to the point where they muffle the frozen quiet you might hear a rifle shot or the smack of a grenade, but you cannot depend on that with any certainty.

That is the way it is right now in the general Mubo Salamaua region along the Komiatum trail. You think, eat, sleep and act as though the jungle creeping Japanese are always within sight and hearing, whether they are there or not.

It is only by being prepared for the worst that you can hope to survive, and if the worst is not as bad as you thought it might be, it is your advantage and you are thankful.

In this abyssmal void of dank and dripping greenery, vigilance, quietness, stealth and cunning, backed up by indefatigable patience, are greater weapons than guns and rifles and bayonets.

He who is not alert, he who is noisy, and he who is unprepared to wait his chance in this *limbus fatuorum* is truly lost, as here surely is a fool's paradise, in which death is waiting with open arms for the unwary.

Here there can never be battle on the grand scale. In the first place there is not room for spectacular maneuver. Movements through the labyrinth of the New Guinea Gehenna is tortuous and tiring. It is limited to stringlike tracks, where men can go forward or back only in Indian file, so that it is impossible for the aggressor to present a front that is more imposing than five or six men wide and two or three men deep.

This is most certainly a defender's region. If he gets in first and digs in on carefully selected heights he can command every approach to his citadel.

If the only approaches to his position are along one-man tracks, he requires little concentrated fire-power to hold them off. That is the advantage the Japanese now enjoy around Komiatum on the outskirts of Salamaua.

Air power used in co-operation with land troops can help a great deal to soften the particular pockets of resistance and it can harass communications and supply.

We have succeeded many times by this means, but it is costly and it takes a long time, for the jungle keeps its secrets very well.

Each Japanese hilltop pocket is like an island fortress in the sea of jungle round about where just now the enemy has the advantage of short supply lines.

Only three to fifteen miles out of Salamaua he is able to pop up on some alternative hill if forced to retire in a way that is like the underground tactics of the rabbit.

Even if we put 100,000 men into the outskirts of Salamaua with the idea of flooding the region and overrunning the Japanese islands of resistance they could not be used to full advantage.

Even if they could move forward in spearheads they could

not be supplied adequately in this wilderness. Sea control around the entire south-eastern coast of Papua would help considerably.

For the time being, our entire movement in the Salamaua area is limited to the men we can maintain there, and this is again limited by the quantity of supplies and equipment we can bring in by air.

When flying conditions are anything like reasonable we can, with hard work, maintain a fair force, but when the weather closes down over the ranges, all supplies are cut and reserves quickly dwindle.

There is no grand scale fighting, and there is no spectacle.

Even the objectives in the bandit's kind of war are insignificant hilltops and unhygienic native villages. Tactically they

are important. They must be won back.

Beyond that they are no incentive to the man who must scale precipitous heights and worm his tortuous way through the kunai or wade knee deep in mud with a heavy pack on his back; whose bed is the cold ground where night catches him if he can afford to stop and who is nerve wracked in this war of nerves that harbours lurking death from the unseen sniper's shot or an ambush along the track.

To the man who is doing the fighting, moving when he can, shooting when he can, resting when he can; to those who direct and observe him waiting and waiting while time slides past on winged feet and money and supplies are spent with seemingly little result, this is a most unsatisfactory, indefinite, aggravating kind of war.

Troop Lists

BUNA-GONA-SANANANDA

127 Infantry, with attachments
128 Infantry, with attachments
163 Infantry, with attachments
186 Infantry, with attachments
14 Infantry Brigade (Australian), with attachments
18 Infantry Brigade (Australian), with attachments
2/6 Armored Regiment (Australian)
2/1 Field Regiment (Australian), minus
2/5 Field Regiment (Australian), minus
2/6 Field Regiment (Australian)
13 Field Regiment (Australian), minus
CRE I Corps Troops (Australian)
Signals, I Corps (Australian)
I Corps Salvage Unit (Australian)
15 Graves Registration Unit (Australian)
2 Field Hospital
COSC, Oro Bay

SALAMAU: MACKECHNIE FORCE

1 Battalion, 162 Infantry
1 Platoon, Clearing Company, 116 Medical Battalion
218 Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery A)
Company A, 116 Engineer Battalion (less one platoon)
Detachment, 41 Signal Company
Detachment, 41 Quartermaster Company
Detachment, COSC, Oro Bay and Buna
Detachment, Battery C, 209 Coast Artillery (AA)
Company A, Papuan Infantry Battalion
Companies A and D, 532 Boat & Shore Regiment
Detachment, ANGAU
Detachment, 41 Division Medical Detachment

SALAMAU: COANE FORCE

At Morobe
2 Battalion, 162 Infantry
Platoon, Cannon Company, 162 Infantry
Medical Detachment, 162 Infantry
1 Platoon, Clearing Company, 116 Medical Battalion
Detachment, Battery C, 209 Coast Artillery (AA)
Battery A, 218 Field Artillery Battalion
Troop D, 2/6 Field Regiment (Australian)
Detachment, COSC
Company A, 116 Medical Battalion

At Mageri Point
MacKechnie Force Rear Detachment
Detachment, Company A, 532 Engineers (Amphib)
Detachment, Company D, 532 Engineers (Amphib)

At Nassau Bay
Company A, Papuan Infantry Battalion
3 Battalion, 162 Infantry
Company A, 116 Engineer Battalion (less platoon)
Platoon, AT Company, 162 Infantry
Company A, 532 Engineers (less detachment)
Company D, 532 Engineers (less detachment)
Detachment, Battery C, 209 Coast Artillery (AA)
Detachment, 41 Signal Company

Detachment, 41 Quartermaster Company
Detachment, COSC
Medical Detachment, 162 Infantry
16 Portable Hospital

HOLLANDIA

41 Infantry Division (less one RCT)
Headquarters 41 Infantry Division
Headquarters Company, 41 Infantry Division
41 Military Police Platoon
41 Infantry Division Band
41 Signal Company
116 Medical Battalion (less Company B)
41 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
41 Quartermaster Company
741 Ordnance (LM) Company
116 Engineer Battalion (less Company A)
Headquarters 41 Division Artillery
Headquarters Battery, 41 Division Artillery
218 Field Artillery Battalion
146 Field Artillery Battalion
205 Field Artillery Battalion
162 Infantry
186 Infantry
947 Field Artillery Battalion
641 TD Battalion (less Companies A and B)
Hq & Hq Battery, 116 AAA Group
165 AAA Gun Battalion
469 AAA AW Battalion
603 Tank Company (less one platoon)
69 Engineer Topographical Detachment
79 Engineer Combat Battalion
92 Evacuation Hospital
12 Portable Surgical Hospital
26 Portable Surgical Hospital
Company B, 262 Medical Battalion
Detachment, Company B, 442 Signal Construction Company (Aviation)
Detachment, Battery B, 227 AAA Searchlight Battalion
Platoon, 36 Military Police Company
31 Fighter Sub-Sector Unit
19 Repair Platoon, Company D, 583 Signal Aviation Battalion
20 Repair Platoon, Company D, 583 Signal Aviation Battalion
Shadow Relay Station, 1 Fighter Control
Navy Air Support Parties
14 Air Support Party
Beach Fire Support Parties
1881 Aviation Engineer Battalion
649 Ordnance Ammunition Company
Two AA Repair Teams, 253 Ordnance Maintenance Company
993 Quartermaster Service Company
4189 Quartermaster Service Company
3522 Quartermaster Truck Company
Platoon, 2058 Quartermaster Truck Company (Aviation)
601 Graves Registration Company (less detachments)
532 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
Battery C, 236 AAA Searchlight Battalion
674 AAA Machine Gun Battery
675 AAA Machine Gun Battery
718 Coast Artillery Battery (155mm gun)
720 Coast Artillery Battery (155mm gun)
Provisional Coast Artillery Harbor Survey Detachment SC Team No. 3
Provisional Coast Artillery Harbor Survey Detachment SC Team No. 4
542 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment (less Boat Company)
Maintenance Detachment, 562 Boat Maintenance Battalion
Hq & Hq Company, 1112 Engineer Combat Group (less detachment)

Company B, 135 Medical Regiment
605 Medical Clearing Company
29 Malaria Survey Unit
5 Malaria Control Unit
56 Malaria Control Unit
27 Medical Supply Platoon (Aviation)
287 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
One AA Repair Team
One Detachment, Truck Maintenance
864 Engineer Aviation Battalion
860 Engineer Aviation Battalion
863 Engineer Aviation Battalion
Platoon, 477 Engineer Maintenance Company
Platoon, 453 Engineer Depot Company
Surveying Detachment, 650 Engineer Topographical Battalion
567 Engineer Dump Truck Company
342 Quartermaster Depot Supply Company (less two platoons)
Platoon, 812 Amphibious Truck Company
3818 Quartermaster Gas Supply Company (less platoon)
273 Signal Construction Company
Detachment, 99 Signal Battalion
Platoon, 244 Port Company
296 Port Company
Two Platoons, 109 Quartermaster Bakery Company

AITAPE

163 Infantry RCT
Company B, 641 TD Battalion
383 AAA AW Battalion
Batteries B and C, 743 Coast Artillery (Gun) Battalion
1 Platoon, Battery C, 227 AAA Searchlight Battalion
Platoon, 603 Tank Company
Shore Battalion, 593 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
Company A, 593 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
27 Engineer Combat Battalion
Company A (Collecting), 135 Medical Regiment
Company H (Clearing), 135 Medical Regiment
54 Evacuation Hospital
3 Portable Surgical Hospital
27 Malaria Survey Unit
53 Malaria Control Unit
49 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
Detachment, 629 Ordnance Ammunition Company
1 AA Repair Team
Unit 3, 94 Chemical Composite Company
Detachment, 16 Signal Operations Battalion
Detachment, Headquarters Company, 99 Signal Battalion
Detachment, Company A, 60 Signal Battalion
Detachment, 41 Signal Company
62 Works Wing (RAAF)
13 Survey & Design Unit (RAAF)
5 Mobile Works Squadron (RAAF)
6 Mobile Works Squadron (RAAF)
7 Mobile Works Squadron (RAAF)
10 Works Support Unit (RAAF)
Elements, 4 Maintenance Unit (RAAF)
872 Engineer Aviation Battalion (AB)
874 Engineer Aviation Battalion (AB)
875 Engineer Aviation Battalion (AB)
Platoon, 4095 Quartermaster Service Company
244 Port Company (less platoon)
Platoon, 112 Quartermaster Bakery Company
Section, 601 Graves Registration Company
Platoon, 342 Quartermaster Depot Supply Company
Platoon, 466 Amphibious Truck Company

2058 Quartermaster Truck Company (less platoon)
15 Air Liaison Party
1 Platoon, 5th Special Service Company

WAKDE

163 Infantry RCT
218 Field Artillery Battalion
Hq & Hq Battery, 191 Field Artillery Group
One Company, 641 TD Battalion
166 AAA Gun Battalion (less two batteries)
202 AAA AW Battalion (less two batteries)
Two Batteries, 202 AAA AW Battalion
Battery B (less platoon), 236 AAA Searchlight Battalion
Platoon, 603 Tank Company
Shore Battalion (less one company) 593
Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
One Boat Company, 542 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
Maintenance Detachment, 562 Engineer Boat Maintenance Company
Detachment, Hq & Hq Co, 1112 Engineer Combat Group
27 Engineer Combat Battalion
Unit No. 3, 94 Chemical Composite Company
59 Malaria Control Unit
38 Malaria Survey Unit
Company A, 135 Medical Regiment (less platoon)
Company H, 135 Medical Regiment (less platoon)
54 Evacuation Hospital (less 200 beds)
2 Portable Surgical Hospital
3 Portable Surgical Hospital
11 Portable Surgical Hospital
49 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
One AA Repair Team
One Detachment, Truck Maintenance
Detachment, 629 Ordnance Ammunition Company
836 Engineer Aviation Battalion
617 Engineer Equipment Company
2 Platoon, 453 Engineer Depot Company
Survey Detachment, 650 Engineer Topographical Battalion
1 Section, 3 Platoon, 601 Graves Registration Company
1 Platoon, 3750 Quartermaster Truck Company
318 Port Company (less platoon)
Two Sections, 1 Platoon, 112 Quartermaster Bakery Company
One Section, 1 Platoon, 639 Quartermaster Laundry Company
Detachment, 558 Quartermaster Railroad Company
Platoon, 4189 Quartermaster Service Company
253 Signal Construction Company
Detachment, 16 Signal Operations Battalion
Detachment, Headquarters Company, 99 Signal Battalion
2 Air Liaison Party
3 Air Liaison Party
10 Air Liaison Party
Headquarters Detachment, I Fighter Wing (SF)
32 Fighter Sub-Sector
Assault Echelon, Company A, 583 Battalion
1 LW Repair Platoon, Company A, 583d Battalion
2 LW Repair Platoon, Company A, 583d Battalion
3 LW Repair Platoon, Company A, 583 Battalion
4 LW Repair Platoon, Company A, 583 Battalion
6 LW Repair Platoon, Company A, 583 Battalion
Advance Echelon, Headquarters Platoon and Plotting Platoon, Company A, 583 Signal AW Battalion
AWW Control (GO) NGF
Advance Echelon, 308 Bombardment Wing
Company A, 929 Signal Battalion (Sep) ASC
Detachment, 15 Weather Squadron
Detachment, 5 AACCS
Hq & Hq Squadron, 46 Service Group
29 Portable Hospital
307 Airdrome Hospital
836 Service Squadron
1538 Ordnance S&M Company
2027 Quartermaster Truck Company
481 Quartermaster Platoon
348 Fighter Group
84 Airdrome Squadron
10 Service Squadron
1828 Ordnance S&M Company
2012 Quartermaster Truck Company
1098 Signal Company
82 Reconnaissance Squadron (F)
100 Service Squadron
1832 Ordnance S&M Company
2462 Quartermaster Truck Company
1094 Signal Company (SG)
1083 Quartermaster Company (SG)
Bal, 308 Bombardment Wing
85 Airdrome Squadron

36 Fighter Squadron, 8th Fighter Group
17 Reconnaissance Squadron, 71 Recon Group
32 Sector (Fighters)
1 Fighter Control Squadron
11 Repair Platoon, Company D, 565 Battalion
12 Repair Platoon, Company D, 565 Battalion
13 Repair Platoon, Company D, 565 Battalion
Headquarters and Plotting Platoons, Company D, 565 Battalion
1 Repair Platoon, 724 Signal AW Company
2 Platoon, 709 Signal AW Company
Rear Echelon, Company A, 583 Signal Battalion
69 Service Squadron
1541 Ordnance S&M Company
2015 Quartermaster Truck Company
415 Quartermaster Platoon, AD
8 Fighter Group (less 36 Squadron)
Headquarters 71 Reconnaissance Group
110 Reconnaissance Squadron (F)
43 Bombardment Group (H)

BIAK

41 Infantry Division (less 163 RCT and 218 FA Battalion)
Headquarters 41 Infantry Division
Headquarters Company, 41 Infantry Division
41 Military Police Platoon (less detachment)
41 Infantry Division Band
41 Signal Company
116 Medical Battalion (less Company B)
41 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
41 Quartermaster Company
741 Ordnance Company (LM)
116 Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A)
Hq & Hq Battery, 41 Division Artillery
146 Field Artillery Battalion
205 Field Artillery Battalion
162 Infantry
186 Infantry
947 Field Artillery Battalion
121 Field Artillery Battalion
Hq & Hq Battery, 208 AAA Group
165 AAA Gun Battalion
476 AAA AW Battalion
Battery C, 236 AAA Searchlight Battalion
674 AAA Machine Gun Battery
675 AAA Machine Gun Battery
718 Coast Artillery Battery (155mm gun)
720 Coast Artillery Battery (155mm gun)
Provisional Coast Artillery Harbor Survey Detachment SC Team No. 3
Provisional Coast Artillery Harbor Survey Detachment CA Team No. 4
Company D, 641 TD Battalion
603 Truck Company (less platoon)
542 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment (less Company D)
Maintenance Detachment, 562 Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion
Hq & Hq Company, 1112 Engineer Combat Group (less detachment)
Unit No. 2, 94 Chemical Composite Company
Company B, 135 Medical Regiment
Company B, 262 Medical Battalion
605 Medical Clearing Company
92 Evacuation Hospital
29 Malaria Survey Unit
5 Malaria Control Unit
56 Malaria Control Unit
27 Medical Supply Platoon
12 Portable Surgical Hospital
26 Portable Surgical Hospital
649 Ordnance Ammunition Company
287 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
AA Repair Team, 253 Ordnance Maintenance Company
Detachment, Truck Maintenance
864 Engineer Aviation Battalion
860 Engineer Aviation Battalion
863 Engineer Aviation Battalion
Platoon, 477 Engineer Maintenance Company
1 Platoon, 453 Engineer Depot Company
Survey Detachment, 650 Engineer Topographical Battalion
567 Engineer Dump Truck Company
993 Quartermaster Service Company
4189 Quartermaster Service Company (less platoon)
3818 Quartermaster Gas Supply Company (less platoon)
3522 Quartermaster Truck Company
Platoon, 2058 Quartermaster Truck Company
296 Port Company
Platoon, 244 Port Company
Two Platoons, 109 Quartermaster Bakery Company
601 Graves Registration Company (less detachments)
342 Quartermaster Depot Supply Company (less two platoons)
Platoon, 812 Amphibious Truck Company
273 Signal Construction Company
Detachment, 99 Signal Battalion
8 Fighter Group
2 Air Liaison Party

14 Air Liaison Party
Detachment, I Fighter Wing
Company B, 583 Signal AW Battalions (less detachments)
Headquarters and Plotting Platoons, 583 Signal AW Battalion
8 Fighter Control Squadron
Headquarters 1, 2, 20 Platoons, Company A, 565 Signal AW Battalion
1 Platoon, Company A, 574 Signal AW Battalion
1 Platoon, 724 Signal AW Battalion
Plotting Platoon, Company E, 565 Signal AW Battalion
Company A, 929 Signal Battalion
Detachment, 5 AACCS
84 Airdrome Squadron
4 Portable Surgical Hospital
Hq & Hq Squadron, 7 Service Group
10 Service Squadron
1062 Quartermaster Company (SG)
1098 Signal Company (SG)
1828 Ordnance S&M Company
2012 Quartermaster Truck Company
49 Fighter Group
69 Service Squadron
1541 Ordnance S&M Company
2015 Quartermaster Truck Company
detachment
421 Night Fighter Squadron
308 Bombardment Wing (less Advance Detachment)
85 Airdrome Squadron
17 Reconnaissance Squadron
35 Fighter Group
80 Airdrome Squadron
478 Service Squadron
1536 Ordnance S&M Company
82 Reconnaissance Squadron
Detachment, 5287 Ordnance Battalion
1910 Ordnance Ammunition Company
193 Ordnance Depot Company
1621 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company detachment
25 Photo Reconnaissance Squadron
Headquarters, 71 Reconnaissance Group
110 Reconnaissance Squadron
43 Bombardment Squadron (H)
481 Service Squadron
1798 Ordnance S&M Company
1927 Quartermaster Truck Company

VICTOR III: PALAWAN

186 Infantry RCT
167 Field Artillery Battalion
Company C, 116 Engineer Battalion
Company C, 116 Medical Battalion
476 AAA AW Battalion (less Batteries C and D)
Battery A, 166 AAA Gun Battalion
Detachment (3 SLs), 1 Platoon, Battery B, 237 AAA SL Battalion
Company A, 532 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
Company F, 532 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
Company A, 658 Amphibious Tractor Battalion
Detachment, 273 Chemical Service Platoon
1897 Engineer Aviation Battalion
619 Engineer Base Equipment Company
2 Platoon, 1458 Engineer Boat Maintenance Company
Detachment, 783 Engineer Petroleum Distributing Company
168 Evacuation Hospital
67 Malaria Control Unit
41 Malaria Survey Unit
26 Portable Surgical Hospital
Detachment, 623 Ordnance Ammunition Company
Detachment, 267 Ordnance Maintenance Company
158 Ordnance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal)
Detachment, 119 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
1 Section, 4 Platoon, 119 Quartermaster Bakery Company
Detachment, 4297 Quartermaster Gas Supply Company
3 Platoon (less 2 Section), 601 Graves Registration Company
182 Quartermaster Laundry Platoon (Type B)
301 Quartermaster Railroad Company (less 2 Platoon)
3528 Quartermaster Truck Company
1 Platoon, Company C, 52 Signal Battalion
10 Radio Station Section, 832 Signal Service Battalion
Combat Photo Unit No. 1
1 Platoon, 296 Port Company
1 Platoon, 808 Amphibious Truck Company
159 Finance Disbursing Unit
12 PCAU
705 Army Postal Unit
XIII Fighter Command (less Rear Echelon)
Rear Echelon, XIII Fighter Command

347 Fighter Group
Detachment, 85 Fighter Wing
42 Bombardment Group (M)
Detachment, 419 Night Fighter Squadron
One Flight, 2 ASR Squadron
320 Fighter Control Squadron
Headquarters, 1, 2, 3 and 5 Platoons, Company
A, 574 SAW Battalion
1034 Signal Company (SG)
Company D, 583 SAW Battalion
Platoon, Company C, 574 SAW Battalion
22 GO Team, Company D, 583 SAW Battalion
2 Platoon, Company A, 429 Signal
Construction Battalion
3207 Detachment, 3367 Signal Service
Battalion (ACS)
3684 Detachment, 3367 Signal Service
Battalion (ACS)
Hq & Hq Squadron, 6 Service Group
28 Air Service Squadron
82 Air Service Squadron
1619 Ordnance S&M Company
1655 Ordnance S&M Company
1943 Quartermaster Truck Company
2013 Quartermaster Truck Company
1154 Quartermaster Company (SG)
11 Airdrome Squadron
12 Airdrome Squadron
886 Chemical Company (AO)
14 Portable Surgical Hospital
208 Malaria Survey Unit
84 Malaria Control Unit
Signal Headquarters Company, AWS, XIII
Fighter Command
3 Radar Calibration Detachment
Detachment, 62 AACs
Detachments Nos. 84 and 93, 20 Weather
Squadron
Mobile Communications Unit
C-8
3 N 3 B
B 4 B
C-3
C-17
C-9
G-9
C B Detachment
670 Medical Clearing Company
Detachment, 295 JASCO
84 Naval Construction Battalion
Acorn 45
Acorn 47
Detachment, Hq & Hq Company, 532 Engineer
Boat & Shore Regiment

VICTOR IV: ZAMBOANGA

41 Infantry Division (less one RCT)
205 AAA AW Battalion
166 AAA Gun Battalion (less Batteries
A and B)
2 Platoon, Battery B, 237 AAA Searchlight
Battalion
543 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment (less
boat battalion)
Company C, 543 Engineer Boat & Shore
Regiment
Platoon, 1462 Engineer Boat Maintenance
Company
Company A, 716 Tank Battalion
658 Amphibious Tractor Battalion (less
Company A)
273 Chemical Service Platoon (less
detachment)
873 Engineer Aviation Battalion
783 Engineer Petroleum Distributing Company
(less detachments)
1418 Engineer Mobile Searchlight
Maintenance Unit
8 Portable Surgical Hospital
12 Portable Surgical Hospital
2 Field Hospital
5 Malaria Survey Unit
90 Malaria Control Unit
91 Malaria Control Unit
623 Ordnance Ammunition Company (less
detachment)
119 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
(less detachment)
Detachment, 267 Ordnance Maintenance
Company
Detachment, 3608 Ordnance Heavy
Maintenance Company
390 Quartermaster Truck Company
4297 Quartermaster Gas Supply Company (less
detachment)
354 Quartermaster Laundry Platoon, 2 Field
Hospital
3 Platoon (less 2 Section), 3064 Graves
Registration Company
2 Platoon, 301 Quartermaster Railhead
Company
4 Platoon (less one section), 119
Quartermaster Bakery Company
Company C (less 1 Platoon), 52 Signal
Construction Battalion
203 Signal Radar Maintenance Unit (Type C)

8 Radio Station Section, 332 Signal Service
Battalion
Combat Photo Unit No. 6
296 Port Company (less platoon)
608 Amphibious Truck Company (less platoon)
Mobile Communications Unit
B 4 D Port Direction
C-3 Radio Station Operating Base
CS Visual Station Operating Base
C9 Radio Station Harbor Defenses
1/2 D-10
G-9 Dispensary
3 N 2 D Camp, Huts
118 Naval Construction Battalion
PT Advancing Base (3)
PT Operating Base (7 & 16)

VICTOR IV: SULU ARCHIPELAGO

2 Battalion, 163 Infantry
Platoon, Company A, 116 Engineer Battalion
Battery B, 146 Field Artillery Battalion
Detachment, Air Section, 41 Division Artillery
Platoon, Company B, 653 Amphibious Tractor
Battalion
Platoon, Battery C, 202 AAA AW Battalion
Company A, 873 Engineer Aviation Battalion
Shore Detachment, 543 Engineer Boat & Shore
Regiment
Battalion Section, Company B, 116 Medical
Battalion
12 Portable Surgical Hospital

VICTOR V

Hq & Hq Company, X Corps
Hq & Hq Battery, X Corps Artillery
24 Infantry Division
31 Infantry Division
Hq & Hq Battery, 116 AAA Group
388 AAA AW Battalion
487 AAA AW Battalion
496 AAA Gun Battalion
Battery B, 166 AAA Gun Battalion
Battery B, 222 AAA Searchlight Battalion
Three SL sections, 1 Platoon, Battery B, 237
AAA SL Battalion
143 AAA Operations Detachment
533 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
Company A, 263 Medical Battalion
Detachment, 163 Ordnance Maintenance
Company
506 Engineer Light Ponton Company
181 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm
howitzer)
655 Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzer)
983 Field Artillery Battalion (155mm gun)
640 Tank Destroyer Battalion
180 Chemical Composite Platoon
96 Engineer General Service Regiment
Hq & Hq Company, 932 Engineer
Construction Group
240 Engineer Construction Battalion
1874 Engineer Aviation Battalion
490 Engineer Base Equipment Company
441 Engineer Depot Company (less two
platoons)
Platoon, 441 Engineer Depot Company
570 Engineer Dump Truck Company
477 Engineer Maintenance Company (less two
platoons)
Detachment, 783 Engineer Petroleum
Distributing Company
Survey Platoon, 67 Engineer Topographical
Company
30 Evacuation Hospital
99 Evacuation Hospital
52 Field Hospital (less 1 Hospital Unit)
90 Field Hospital
172 Station Hospital
361 Station Hospital
2 Portable Surgical Hospital
13 Portable Surgical Hospital
23 Portable Surgical Hospital
57 Portable Surgical Hospital
62 Portable Surgical Hospital
64 Portable Surgical Hospital
Platoon, 932 Medical Ambulance Company
395 Medical Collecting Company
411 Medical Collecting Company
603 Medical Clearing Company
656 Medical Clearing Company
74 Medical Depot Company
4 Malaria Control Unit
15 Malaria Control Unit
54 Malaria Control Unit
56 Malaria Control Unit
60 Malaria Control Unit
102 Malaria Control Unit
29 Malaria Survey Unit
401 Medical Composite Unit (Malaria Survey)
204 Malaria Survey Unit
Hq & Hq Detachment, 194 Ordnance Battalion
642 Ordnance Ammunition Company
Detachment, 578 Ordnance Ammunition
Company
310 Ordnance Depot Company (less
detachment)
Detachment, 310 Ordnance Depot Company
509 Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company
Detachment, 558 Ordnance Heavy Maintenance
Company
108 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
291 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
Teams 6 and 8, 3073 Ordnance Composite
Company
181 Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
182 Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
Hq & Hq Detachment, 195 Quartermaster
Battalion
Hq & Hq Detachment, 531 Quartermaster
Battalion
Two sections, 3 Platoon, 109 Quartermaster
Bakery Company
4 Platoon, 370 Quartermaster Bakery Company
686 Quartermaster Bakery Company (less 3
and 4 Platoons)
3 Platoon, 343 Quartermaster Depot Supply
Company
849 Quartermaster Gas Supply Company
1 Platoon, 3064 Graves Registration Company
3 Section, 3 Platoon, 3064 Graves Registration
Company
3 Section, 110 Graves Registration Platoon
1 Platoon (less 2 Section), 580 Quartermaster
Laundry Company
2 Platoon (less section), 588 Quartermaster
Laundry Company
174 Quartermaster Laundry Platoon (Type B)
176 Quartermaster Laundry Platoon (Type B)
241 Quartermaster Laundry Detachment (Type
B)
417 Quartermaster Refrigeration Detachment
418 Quartermaster Refrigeration Detachment
1 Platoon, 234 Quartermaster Salvage
Collecting Company
983 Quartermaster Service Company (less
platoon)
1 Platoon, 983 Quartermaster Service Company
3746 Quartermaster Truck Company (with
attached 3342 QM Service Det)
3770 Quartermaster Truck Company (with
attached 3347 QM Service Det)
Company A, 98 Signal Battalion
99 Signal Battalion (less Companies A and C)
2 Message Center Team Type 2 (DB), 832
Signal Service Battalion
2 Radio Telegraph Fixed Station 2-pos (EI),
832 Signal Service Battalion
15 Message Center Team Type 2 (DB), 832
Signal Service Battalion
15 Radio Telegraph Fixed Station 2-pos (EI),
832 Signal Service Battalion
20 Radio Carrier Terminal Team, 3169 Signal
Service Battalion
26 Radio Link Repeater Team, 3169 Signal
Service Battalion
27 Radio Link Repeater Team, 3169 Signal
Service Battalion
3 Radio Repair Section, 176 Signal Repair
Company
98 Signal Radar Maintenance Team (Type A)
298 Signal Radar Maintenance Team (Type C)
824 Amphibious Truck Company
297 Port Company
313 Port Company
159 Army Postal Unit
197 Finance Disbursing Section
216 Military Police Company
14 PCA Unit
29 PCA Unit
30 PCA Unit
1 Platoon, 5 Special Service Company
Hedron MAG 24
VMSB 244
VMSB 133
VMSB 241
One flight, 550 Night Fighter Squadron
X Fighter Squadron, MAG 14
25 Liaison Squadron
Three Support Aircraft Parties (7 Tactical Air
Communications Sq)
Seron MAG 24
96 AAF Weather Squadron
Detachments 3691 and 3717 of 3367 Signal
Service Battalion
Detachments, 66 AACs
Three Marine AW Squadrons
Platoon, 2012 Quartermaster Truck Company
319 Fighter Control Squadron
Headquarters 551 Signal AW Battalion
Headquarters, Plotting and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Platoons, Company A, 551 SAW Battalion
Headquarters, Plotting and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Platoons, Company B, 551 SAW Battalion
Mobile Communications Unit
E 21 PT Portable Base Equipment
C-3 Radio Station Operating Base (Small)
B4B Port Director (Med)
C-8 Visual Station
C-9 Radio Station
G-10, 10-Bed Dispensary
NIA, 250-Man Camp
Malaria Control Team

TROOP LISTS

Small Boat Pool
 Small Motor Pool
 Naval CB Detachment
 NABU No. 11
 Navy Post Office (Small)
 Detachment, 2773 Engineer Base Reproduction Company
 Advance Section, 3 Medical Laboratory
 191 Finance Disbursing Section
 12 Special Service Company (less 2, 3 and 4 Platoons)
 164 MP POW Processing Company (less 1 and 2 Platoons)
 2 S&I Section, 3169 Signal Service Battalion
 162 Infantry RCT
 Company C (less platoon) and Company D, 543 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
 295 JASCO (less detachment)
 3 Battalion, 163 Infantry RCT
 658 Amphibious Tractor Battalion (less Company B and 1 Platoon, Company A)
 716 Tank Battalion (less Companies B and C)
 80 Chemical Mortar Battalion (less Companies A and B)
 158 Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
 Detachment, 623 Ordnance Ammunition

Company
 Company A, 239 Engineer Construction Battalion
 Company C, 865 Engineer Aviation Battalion
 608 Port Company

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Headquarters, 41 Infantry Division
 Headquarters Company, 41 Infantry Division
 162 Infantry
 163 Infantry
 186 Infantry
 Hq & Hq Battery, 41 Division Artillery
 146 Field Artillery Battalion
 167 Field Artillery Battalion
 205 Field Artillery Battalion
 218 Field Artillery Battalion
 116 Medical Battalion
 116 Engineer Combat Battalion
 41 Division MP Platoon
 741 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
 41 Signal Company
 41 Cavalry Company
 41 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
 41 Quartermaster Company

59 Ordnance Ammunition Company
 354 Quartermaster Laundry Section
 58 Chemical General Service Company
 273 Chemical Service Platoon
 58 Historical Team
 411 Medical Collecting Company
 656 Medical Clearing Company
 8 Portable Surgical Hospital
 12 Portable Surgical Hospital
 2 Field Hospital
 90 Malaria Control Detachment
 91 Malaria Control Detachment
 119 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
 983 Quartermaster Service Company
 390 Quartermaster Truck Company
 3 Platoon, 3064 Graves Registration Company
 808 Amphibious Truck Company
 Headquarters 52 CIC Area Detachment
 41 CIC Detachment
 181 Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
 623 Ordnance Ammunition Company
 Company C, 533 Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment
 3 Platoon, 1461 Boat Maintenance Company
 Platoon, Company B, 5 Amphibious Force
 Recovery Team No. 17

THE 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION ASSOCIATION

At 0930 hours, 25 August 1945, a representative group from the units of the 41st Infantry Division met in the Division Chapel in the city of Zamboanga on Mindanao Island in the Philippines, and at the proposal of the Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Jens A. Doe, launched into being an organization to be known as the 41st Infantry Division Association. The membership of this Association was to be composed of those men who had served with the 41st Infantry Division during its period of active service with the Army in periods of national emergency or in time of war.

The first objective of the organization was to be the publication of a history of the 41st Infantry Division from the date of its entry into federal service, 16 September 1940, to the date of its inactivation in World War II, which turned out to be 31 December 1945. It was provided that a copy of that history was to go to each Association member, and to the next of kin of all Division men who gave their lives in World War II. Another Association function would be the maintenance of a directory service, which is to be available to members of the Association for so long as funds permit. Other activities were to be assumed as the need arose or the membership dictated through the Board of Governors.

Subsequent meetings were held prior to the departure of the Division for the occupation of Japan, and on 7 September 1945, the Constitution and By-Laws were accepted by the organizing group. Occupational duties prevented further action until all units were established in their areas in the Hiro-Kure-Hiroshima districts of Japan. However, on 12 October the Board of Governors convened and started the chain of events which culminated in fully establishing the 41st Infantry Division Association as a responsible organization capable of carrying out its announced objectives.

William F. McCartney, a former newspaperman with the *Evening News* of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and a member of the 273d Chemical Service Platoon, then attached to the 41st Division, was selected as editor of the history and work on that project got under way immediately. Charles C. Carver, then of Portland, Oregon, who was serving as a chief warrant officer, was elected to the position of Secretary-Treasurer.

Inactivation of the Division on 31 December 1945 necessitated removal of the business and editorial activities to the United States. The business office was located with the Secretary-Treasurer in Portland, while the writing and editing of the history was transferred with the editor to Washington,

D.C., where all material for compiling the proposed volume was on file in the Department of the Army.

During this period of transition the Association continued to grow, and on 3 December 1946 became a corporation under the laws of the State of Oregon, with full powers and responsibilities of a non-profit corporation. Such a move was considered advisable inasmuch as the membership had grown to almost 7,700 by that time and the publishing of the history had become a national project of considerable proportions, thus requiring the maximum protection provided by law.

With the completion and distribution of the history of the 41st Infantry Division an assured fact, the future of the Association lay in the hands of the members through the duly elected Board of Governors. Its perpetuation during the coming years as a conservative, non-political force will have much to do with preserving the ideals which too often are lost sight of in the heat of daily living. Those men of the 41st Infantry Division who wrote the Constitution and By-Laws had that thought in mind when they wrote the following Preamble, which is offered to all who served:

"We, who have served with the 41st Infantry Division in the war against Japan, in order to perpetuate the memories of its activities against the enemy, of our gallant dead, and of the glorious comradeship forged on the fields of battle, do hereby associate ourselves together into an Association to be known as the 41st Infantry Division Association."

The officials at the time of publication of this history were as follows:

Honorary President: Maj. Gen. Jens A. Doe, Fort Ord, California; President: Frank W. Kerr, Clinton, New York; First Vice President: Robert T. Pantzer, Chester, Montana; Second Vice President: *Vacant*; Editor of the 41st Infantry Division History: William F. McCartney, Marysville, Pennsylvania; Secretary-Treasurer: Charles C. Carver, Sherwood, Oregon; Board of Governors: Hargis Westerfield, Bloomington, Indiana; Harry E. Hansel, Jr., Ottumwa, Iowa; Richard S. Newens, Alexandria, Virginia; William H. Winchester, Long Island City, New York; Omar O. Orr, Huntington Park, California; Gerald F. Cook, Warrenton, Oregon; William W. Heal, Provo, Utah; Franklin L. Kliever, Lebanon, Oregon; Jack L. Eipper, Long Beach, California; Harold G. Maison, Salem, Oregon; Lt. Col. Lee L. Alfred, Portland, Oregon; and Charles M. Thomas, Dallas, Oregon.

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A NOTE ON THIS BOOK

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The U.S. Infantry Association also publishes the Infantry Journal, a monthly magazine for the ground combat forces of the United States. The U. S. Infantry Association is a non-profit organization composed of soldiers and civilians interested in all phases of national defense. Its various publications cover all levels of military affairs, from technical books on weapons and tactics, to historical, psychological, political and economic books on the higher aspects of war. Its membership includes all branches of the active, reserve and retired armed services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, National Guard, Coast Guard, Organized Reserve Corps, and civilians. Readers desiring catalogs of its publications, and information on membership, can obtain them from the U.S. Infantry Association, 1115 Seventeenth St., N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

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
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186TH REGT. 167TH.
218TH AND 205TH FA BNS
LEFT SAN FRANCISCO
25 APRIL 1942:
ARRIVED AUSTRALIA
13 MAY 1942

163D REGT.
167TH FA BN. DIV. HQ
AND OTHER UNITS LEFT
SAN FRANCISCO
19 MARCH 1942.
ARRIVED AUSTRALIA
APRIL 6 1942

SAN FRANCISCO

INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

GILBERT IS.

162ND REGT
AND 641ST. TD BN
FROM FORT LEWIS
TO FORT DIX
IN FEB 1942:
LEFT BROOKLYN NAVY YARD
3 MARCH 1942
FOR BORO BORO
IN SOCIETY ISLANDS VIA
PANAMA CANAL.
ARRIVING 25 MARCH 1942

162ND REGIMENT CONVOY

SOCIETY ISLANDS

CROSSED INTERNATIONAL
DATE LINE 31 MARCH 1942

CONVOY SPLITS:
PART TO AUCKLAND.
PART TO BRISBANE

ROUTE OF THE 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

