

ACROSS THE SAUER INTO THE SIEGFRIED LINE

As part of the XII Corps offensive along a twenty-five mile front, the overall plan in the Fifth Division sector now called for an assault crossing of the SAUER River, to pierce enemy SIEGFRIED Line fortifications and to capture ERNZEN and FERSCHWEILER, two German strongpoints east of the SAUER River, and then drive on to BITBURG. The Fifth Division assault crossing was to be made with the Tenth Combat Team on the left, crossing at BOLLENDORF, and the Eleventh Combat Team crossing Northwest of ECHTERNACH. Also attached to the Division was the Four Hundred Seventeenth Infantry Regiment of the Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division, which was to be committed to combat for the first time and cross the SAUER River on the Fifth's right flank. The Eightieth Infantry Division was expected to make a similar assault along the Fifth's left flank. It was known beforehand that the mission would be a difficult one for the crossings were to be made into powerful SIEGFRIED defenses which, at this point, occupied commanding positions on high ground East of the river and were known to be protected by elaborate minefields.

On the 1st of February, the Tenth Regiment, on a Division order, proceeded to relieve the Eleventh Infantry Regiment in positions North of HOSCHIED and BERDORF facing the SAUER River. Relief operations were complete by 1230 hours, February 2, the Second and Third Battalions, Tenth Infantry, taking up positions on the Main Line of Resistance and Out Post Line, and the First Battalion, Tenth Infantry, in reserve. The Regimental Command Post was established in a farm house at NEIDERSCHLINDERSCHIED. Preparations for the crossing continued on the night of February 3rd; the Second Battalion was relieved from its position North of HOSCHIED by elements of the Sixth Cavalry Group, and assembled in ETTLEBRUCK, relief being completed at 0230 hours on the following morning.

During the two days, February 5 and 6, the Regiment maintained its positions, with the First Battalion on the Main Line of Resistance North of BERDORF, while patrols searched out the river bank for suitable crossing sites. The Regimental Command Post moved to BERDORF and plans were drawn to commence the crossing on the early morning of February 7. The crossing effort was to be made by the Second Battalion, Company E, crossing first. Both the Second and Third Battalions moved into assembly areas to the rear of the First Battalion during the evening of February 6th.

The Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion moved from HOSCHIED to BERDORF on 5 February 1945 in a heavy fog and prepared to support the assault of the SAUER River between BOLLENDORF and WEILERBACH by the Tenth Infantry. This seemed unusual because the combat team had just completed an attack across the main tributary of this river a few miles West, and this crossing promised to be difficult because of the overflowing river, steep banks, and by the all-important fact that the SIEGFRIED Line lay on the far bank. With no actual preparation fires on forward elements planned, the Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion fired a very extensive counter-communication fire plan. Inasmuch as the crossing on 7 February 1945 was postponed, the fire plan having been initiated, it was completed. This undoubtedly proved of great value later.

To the river crossing veterans of the Tenth Infantry, the SAUER loomed as just one more tough river, but an early thaw made the normally placid stream a swollen river of treacherous current which, coupled with the concrete pillboxes of the SIEGFRIED Line on the other side, proffered a military obstacle somewhat comparable to the MOSELLE and the formidable bastions of METZ. The enemy was weaker than at METZ, however, and too much trouble was not an-

ticipated. Approximately 150 yards out from the far shore of the river nearby the crossing site was an enemy pillbox. To the rear and up the hill that rose sharply from the river bed, enemy tanks, interspersed between pillbox defenses with entrenched infantrymen, made a grim menace to anyone daring to come their way.

At 0130 hours, counter battery artillery fire that shook the earth for miles around opened up on the enemy positions from all along the division front, and Company E moved down to the river bank across from WEILERBACH to attempt the crossing in rubber boats captured from the enemy.

The initial effort to cross the company over the swollen and mine-infested waters drew heavy fire from the enemy fortifications on the north bank, which knocked out the boats before the troops could get ashore. Shortly before 0800 hours a second attempt was made to cross the river, and this time all but two of the twelve boats were sunk, and only eight men had succeeded in crossing the far side.

For twenty-two hours the Division bridgehead consisted of those eight men dug in on the far shore and subjected to enemy mortar fire, small arms, and short rounds from the artillery of both sides. The following day they were evacuated by means of a boat sent to them under almost impossible conditions.

In the meantime the Battalion commander reported to the Regiment of the difficulties encountered in the crossing operations, and at 0900 hours Colonel Bell visited the crossing site to inspect proceedings. Subsequently at 1030 hours the Third Battalion was notified to be prepared to make a crossing during the evening. At 1700 hours the Second Battalion Commander left for the Command Post to discuss further plans for a renewal of the attack on the following day. As a result of this meeting plans were drawn to continue the crossing of the Second Battalion. The Third Battalion moved down river where elements patrolled to the river's edge and prepared to cross.

The Second Battalion's sector was inactive during the night as final plans were perfected to continue the crossing at 1000 hours. When the designated hour arrived, 4.2 mortars dropped smoke along the river near the enemy, but were shortly discontinued in order to permit observation when the men of Company E again began to cross in boats provided them during the night. Opposition to the crossing renewed with incessant shelling and machine gun fire, and the extremely difficult terrain consisting of high cliffs along the river bank, plus the swift current, aided the enemy im-





Engineers construct Class 40 Bridge across Sauer River from Luxembourg into Germany in the drive for the Siegfried Line.

measurably. In addition to these natural difficulties visibility was poor, and grazing machine gun fire from the pillboxes along the cliffs on the north side, 120 millimeter mortar fire from the hill sides, artillery and 150 millimeter nebelwerfer concentrations, were zeroed on the crossing sites. Within five minutes after the crossing began some of the company had reached the other side, and shortly thereafter were clearing the buildings near the river bank on the outskirts of WEILERBACH. Smoke was laid on both flanks of the crossing site to obstruct the enemy's observations. By 1020 hours the first wave of troops were well established on the far shore and the next wave was on the way across.

All losses in the crossing were not due to enemy fire. Owing to the extremely swift and treacherous current several of the boats capsized, and the heavily weighted infantrymen were unable to shed their equipment and swim clear of the undertow. Barbed wire, and obstacles planted just beneath the water caused the capsizing and destruction of a good number of boats. Capt. Whittington, Company Commander of G Company, Tenth Infantry finally made a trip across with a boatload after two unsuccessful tries, during which he received three head wounds as a result of an enemy mortar fire. It was a little like D-Day, June 6, 1944, for him as he came ashore on that date with the Fifth Ranger Battalion and earned a Distinguished Service Cross.

The initial objective of the battalion in establishing the bridgehead was the clearing of the section of WEILERBACH adjacent to the river and the securing of the surrounding high ground to the North. Within thirty minutes after the crossing got under way Company E had cleared the first few buildings and was fanning out to the East and West. By 1100 hours the troops had pushed forward against heavy opposition from small arms and artillery fire and had crossed the road running parallel to the river, and were entering the town in strength. Heavy enemy artillery fire continued, especially on the crossing site, while the advancing troops edged in to reduce withering machine gun fire from the pillboxes. Artillery was called in to prevent the hard pressed enemy from escaping when assault troops

armed with pole charges, satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, thermite grenades, and flame throwers moved past and attacked the strongpoints from the rear; or, as the situation demanded, drew fire by decoy permitting direct fire from 155 millimeter GPF guns from across the river to render the positions untenable. By 1600 hours the company had eliminated several of the well concealed fortifications and had cleared the area up to the large warehouse in the center of the settlement. Company G, having followed the leading company across, was organized to protect the right flank. The operation was, by this time, developing smoothly, but as the advance continued, the need of supplies became increasingly acute and efforts to remedy the situation during the night proved only partly successful because of the highly effective artillery and mortar concentrations. Several attempts to build a foot bridge at the old bridge site likewise proved futile.

Crossing operations were carried on despite difficulties during the night of 8-9 February, and the Second Battalion was successful in crossing the major portion of the unit. Meanwhile, the Third Battalion, finding it impossible to cross at the point selected (after losing more boats to enemy fire, including one truck load of wooden boats) assembled in the rear of the Second Battalion and prepared to follow that unit as promptly as the developing bridgehead permitted.

During the following morning the Second Battalion completed its crossing, and at 1030 hours Company F advanced to Hill 183, clearing enemy fortifications in the area, and patrolling farther to the North. The Third Battalion started Company L across with four boats in the midst of heavy artillery fire, but after crossing the one company at this point, moved the remainder of the battalion down the river Eastward and crossed on the Eleventh Infantry Regiment bridge.

On February 10, the First Battalion crossed the river East of the regimental boundary on another bridge which had been established in the Eleventh Infantry area. And when the crossing was completed the battalion moved Northwest passing through the Second Battalion.

Throughout the operation thus far, communications were

a problem. Wires were shot in two no sooner than laid across the river. When restringing or repair operations proved too hazardous by boat, the expedient of shooting the wire across attached to rifle grenades was used. Radio, nevertheless, remained the principal means of maintaining contact with the advancing units during the early phase of the attack.

On the 11th of February the battalions pushed inland and outward to enlarge the bridgehead. The troops moved out under heavy support of mortars, and artillery. Tanks and tank destroyers fanned out and mopped up resistance in the pillbox defenses along the high ground North of the river road. In many instances troops discovered that the artillery had driven the enemy from the fortifications to connecting trenches, and when they bore upon these positions the enemy fled abandoning their strongholds, which many considered death traps, as prisoners later reported.

During the night 11-12 February, leading elements of the First Battalion reached BOLLENDORF, after taking several pillboxes that were delaying the advance, and a point on the main North-South road 500 yards North of the town.

In the process of clearing BOLLENDORF, an integral part of the SIEGFRIED Line, and badly needed by our forces for a permanent bridge site, Company C of the First Battalion took 104 prisoners. On the river road in the center of the town a pillbox was located, camouflaged as a house. It was taken by Company C, which came through BOLLENDORF from the East toward the river in a move on the German's rear.

The pillbox was difficult to reduce. The men, under cover of their own machine gun fire, dropped thermite and fragmentation grenades through the ventilators on top and the embrasures on the sides. One German was killed; the others surrendered.

Companies E and G of the Second Battalion completed mopping up in WEILERBACH sector while Company F moved along the river road to BOLLENDORF and made contact with elements of the First Battalion in the town. With troops closing in on the beleaguered village from three sides its fall was imminent, and about the only task remaining was to clear up the remnants of the enemy left stranded in the vicinity. Company C passed on through the town as resistance collapsed, and by 0925 hours, February 12, the First Battalion checked the pillboxes along the river, found them empty, and reported the town clear.

In the meantime the drive of the Third Battalion continued to the North, to DIESBURGERHOF and the high ground covering the roads. During this operation, while elements of Company K were attacking the town, one squad came upon a house containing a number of Germans still holding out. The enemy detected the approaching squad and turned machine gun fire upon them. In a striking display of individual courage and initiative, indicative of the Tenth's valorous fighting spirit, a private turned to his platoon leader and asked for permission to go in alone after them. Before the officer had time to reply the infantryman made a rush for the house firing as he ran through the door. Soon thereafter, while his comrades tensely waited, the soldier came out of the house with fifteen German prisoners.

The town was taken without a single casualty.

The first belt of the SIEGFRIED Line defenses was successfully breached. Plans to follow through on the initial victory called for the First Battalion to speed north in conjunction with elements of the Eightieth Infantry Division on the left, Fifth Reconnaissance Troop screening the left flank, and the Eleventh Infantry Regiment on the right. However, as it later developed, the Eightieth Infantry Division did not attack as originally planned, but the First Battalion at 1000 hours, February 13, resumed the advance and moved one company to cover the roads to the west. The Second Battalion having completed mopping up operations


in BOLLENDORF and taken additional prisoners in the process, moved North toward the sector of the front between FERSCHWEILER and DIESBURGERHOF, and at the same time maintained contact with the First Battalion on its left. The Third Battalion continued to occupy positions in the vicinity of DIESBURGERHOF against stubborn resistance from small arms and SP fire. Following this encounter the town of FERSCHWEILER from which enemy artillery had covered the river crossing, was open to attack. A patrol went into the town, investigated several houses, and found them empty. Company L jumped off to attack the town and two hours later had taken it. By 1000 hours FERSCHWEILER was cleared of enemy troops, approximately 100 prisoners taken, and Tenth Infantry troops billeted for the night.

All three battalions continued to the North and Northeast during the night of the 13th and morning of the 14th. The Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion moved to positions on the banks of the SAUER River at BOLLENDORF and supported the attack on SCHANKWEILER and FERSCHWEILER. The First Battalion overran about twenty-five Germans laying a minefield and encountered some minor resistance centered around a farm house on the route to WICKENBURG and the woods surrounding the town. Elsewhere Company F led the attack of the Second Battalion beginning at 1130 hours, and cleared the area west and northwest of FERSCHWEILER.

Company G and one platoon of Company E moved to the high ground South of DIESBURGERHOF. The First Battalion proceeded to clear WICKENBURG and adjacent woods, securing the objective at 1600 hours. On the 14th all companies consolidated their positions as the enemy withdrew toward SCHANKWEILER and the PRUM River. The Regimental Command Post group moved from BERDORF and set up in BOLLENDORF across the Sauer. Company F, after completing its mission Northwest of the FERSCHWEILER, was relieved by elements of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment, and assembled in DIESBURGERHOF together with Company E. The breaching of the Siegfried Line and the resulting disorganization of the enemy forces in the sector with the exception of minor mopping up operations completed the Regiment's present mission; and on the 15th, orders were received for relief by the Second Infantry Regiment to take place upon the clearing of the woods Southwest of SCHANKWEILER. Even as some of the units were being relieved, Companies A and B cleared the pocket without much difficulty and, meeting with no further resistance, the command of the sector passed to the commanding officer of the Second Infantry Regiment at 2300 hours.

Having cleared all enemy resistance from the SAUER River to a general line FERSCHWEILER-SCHANKWEILER, the Regiment then assembled for a few days of rest in Luxembourg. The Third Battalion relieved elements of the Second Infantry Regiment guarding the Radio Station Luxembourg, and the Regimental Command Post was established at ALT-LINSTER.

The crossing of the SAUER and subsequent assault on the SIEGFRIED Line was made against the Seventh Army Battle School together with elements of the One Hundred Sixth Fortress Battalion, which manned the pillboxes and positions around them in the Tenth Infantry Regiment's sector. As the pillboxes were in most instances by-passed and attacked from the rear, the enemy's close-in positions were neutralized and in many instances the crews surrendered in groups. Prisoners taken stated that most pillboxes in the sector were intended for shelters rather than for fighting purposes, and that the defenders themselves were not familiar with the installations, having been brought into sector only recently. Prisoners also stated that they feared being smoked out by flamethrowers and pole charges. Defense from the trenches outside the strongpoints, they further stated, was made impracticable by our heavy artillery concentration.



In the fighting vicinity of FERSCHWEILER, where they were supported by SP fire, elements of the Two Hundred Twelfth Engineer Battalion were employed as infantrymen, and in the woods West and Northwest of the town various small combat groups of the Eleven Hundred Twenty-Eighth, Eleven Hundred Twenty-Ninth, and Eleven Hundred Thirtieth Infantry Regiments resisted stubbornly with automatic weapons. After these units were pushed back and annihilated, remnants of the Ninth Volks Grenadier Division were thrown into the sector and combat groups of the Thirty-Sixth and Fifty-Seventh Infantry Regiments were committed in a vain effort to halt the advance.

Fully co-ordinated, and simultaneous with the crossing of the SAUER River by the Tenth Regiment, were the movements of the Eleventh Regiment in preparation for the assault crossing of the SAUER on the same day. (February 7th 1945.)

The night of February 6-7 was spent in a stealthy movement to the river's edge by the troops of the Eleventh Infantry.

Within the Regimental zone of action, plans were formed to attempt surprise crossings of the Second and Third Battalions under cover of darkness by way of foot bridges which were to be constructed by engineers. Reliance was placed on the surprise element by assault troops who were to attempt crossing without a preparatory artillery barrage, but powerful artillery units were to stand by. In direct support of the Eleventh Infantry, were the Nineteenth, Fiftieth, and Twenty-First Field Artillery Battalions, while Company C, Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion (augmented by new, sixty-round rocket launching platforms) and Company C, Ninety-First Chemical Battalion (4.2 mortars). In addition, the entire Seventh Engineer Battalion was also attached, as was Company C Fifth Medical Battalion.

The opening phase of river crossing operations began under cover of darkness on 6 February 1945 when engineers began work on two footbridges while the Second and Third Battalions of the Eleventh Infantry moved forward into new assembly areas nearer the river. Meanwhile, engineers, as yet undetected by the enemy, were experiencing unforeseen difficulties in attempting to bridge the river at two points. Swollen by recent thaws, the SAUER River had widened to twice its normal size, developing an unanticipatedly swift current that frustrated engineer attempts in effecting construction. At 0300 hours on 7 February a reconnaissance patrol of the Second Battalion acting on orders of Major John N. Acuff, Jr., Battalion Commanding Officer, crossed the river in assault boats. Due to the swift current only eight members succeeded in reaching the far shore while an accompanying boat lost control at mid-stream, was carried downstream and forced to return to the friendly bank some distance off. Fortunately, the eight men who reached the enemy shore were undetected, and immediately dug in, thus forming the regiment's initial bridgehead on German soil. It marked the second entry into Germany by troops of the Eleventh Infantry, the original entry being made by the Third Battalion at LAUTERBACH and in the SAARLAUTERN area.

Almost at the same time the Third Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon attempted a similar river crossing approximately 500 yards South of where the Second Battalion's crossing site was established, but the enemy, apparently more wary in this area, not only perceived the attempted crossing, but engineer activities as well, and opened with raking machine gun fire from pillboxes, mortars and artillery barrages that immediately followed completely disorganized the engineer and reconnaissance troops on the friendly shore. Gone was the element of surprise and the enemy now clearly discerned the plan of attack, but meanwhile, Company L had already moved from its assembly

area and was marching toward the river, expecting to find a bridge by 0100 hours. As the company neared the river word was received that bridging attempts had failed so the column was halted when it reached a draw several hundred yards from the river and approximately 500 yards North of ECHTERNACH. Engineer and Third Battalion reconnaissance troops withdrew from the river to this point and sustained 15 casualties, including 4 killed by intense enemy automatic, mortar and artillery fire. By this time friendly artillery, too, had opened with furious counter battery fire and the entire regimental front seethed as enemy guns now commenced to pound the eight-man bridgehead in the Second Battalion sector as well.

Stranded in the bridgehead without visible means of relief and now subjected to concentrations of enemy fire, the eight men of Second Battalion: Sergeant Harry Horvitz, Private First Class James Hood, Robert Laythe, Hal Thomas, Sergeant William Schmidt, Private First Class Weslyn Crandall, Robert Foster and Private Phillips held their positions throughout the night, while E Company units were disorganized by heavy enemy shellings and failed to effect a crossing. This small unit remained on the enemy shore for a twenty-four hour period without food or rest and often countered enemy machine guns with rifle fire. The enemy in turn received a violent pounding from tanks and tank destroyers which had moved up to within direct fire range. Rocket after rocket from new tank-launchers streaked toward enemy positions while Battery B of the Nineteenth Field Artillery established a new record in firing 1519 rounds for a twenty-four hour period.

At 0645 hours of that morning, Company L attempted an assault boat crossing under cover of early morning darkness and smoke screen, but enemy fire proved overpowering and once again crossing attempts were abandoned as the company pulled back partially disorganized. In daylight, engineers worked continuously and attempted to construct footbridges for Second and Third Battalion troops, but in each instance the swift river washed away section after section while the enemy further harried the effort with numerous shellings. Artillery duels continued throughout the day while the Eleventh's Second and Third Battalions regrouped and reorganized to attempt another crossing during the hours of darkness. The First Battalion remained in regimental reserve. On the regiment's right flank, the Four Hundred Seventeenth Infantry, Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division had crossed rifle elements of one battalion which were now cut off from supplies and at the same time encountering enemy resistance from pillboxes in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH. The Tenth Infantry, attacking BORLENDORF on the regimental left flank had also crossed some elements which were now pinned down by strong enemy fire.

When it became apparent that supply and evacuation by means of assault boats was so nearly impossible and so costly as to make further effort in that direction useless, it was decided by G-4 Fifth Division, Lieutenant Colonel Richard McKee, to try to supply the isolated troops by air. The first call was for aircraft from Corps and this was answered after a considerable length of time by four P-40's. The fighters had their belly tanks loaded with K ration, medical supplies, D bars and various items of necessary equipment. Unfortunately, due to the small target area afforded by the bridgehead, the attempt was unsuccessful. The first tank fell on the friendly side of the river, the second fell in the river, the third fell in the Tenth Infantry area on the far shore but was immediately covered by fire and was unable to be recovered owing to the open ground around it. The third tank fell in the German lines and a German prisoner later stated that it was very welcome to the German front line troops.

By this time, the supply situation on the far shore had



PFC John F. Alloway directs traffic in front of German pillbox facing Sauer River. Corporal Winston C. Fancher and PFC Angel Banuelos regulate traffic across Bailey Bridge by telephone.

become critical and the only means of communication (by radio) was endangered as the SCR 300 batteries began to run out. At this time it was decided by the staff of the Fifth Division to continue to try supply by air and use the Division Artillery Air Section liaison planes.

Although no information on packing and dropping of supplies was available the supply echelons began to experiment and pack the necessary supplies. A water can weighted to approximate the weight of a SCR No. 300 radio was dropped using a sheet as a parachute. After several tries a satisfactory method was worked out and the flights over the bridgehead began. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was heavy and consisted for the most part of quadruple 20 millimeter anti-aircraft and 88 millimeter tank gun fire. The flights continued despite the fire and succeeded in dropping the majority of their loads in the hands of the beleaguered troops. The following day, the liaison planes of the Seventy-Sixth Division joined with those of the Fifth Division and in the two days of air operation, at least ten planes made over 80 flights, dropping food, ammunition, splints, medical supplies, batteries, and other supplies. One plane sustained a hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire, which seriously wounded the pilot, Second Lieutenant John R. Staley, Jr. First Lieutenant Robert M. Webb of the Fiftieth Field Artillery Battalion, the observer, succeeded in crash-landing the cub plane on the near shore, with slight assistance from the badly wounded pilot.

Among the observers and "supply bombardiers" flying with the pilots over the embattled bridgehead was the Fifth Division Assistant G-4, Major Ralph Norling.

At 1830 hours simultaneous river crossing thrusts were launched by both Second and Third Battalions. In the Third Battalion sector, Company "K" passed through "L" Company, which was being drawn back to reorganize, and proceeded toward the river bank. Forward elements of K Company stealthily embarked in assault boats and encountered no fire as they began moving across the river. Only three boatloads of K Company managed to reach the far shore; four others were caught in the swift current and were swirled and churned causing the paddlers to lose control and sweeping them almost 1000 yards downstream. One heavy machine gun section of M Company and one light

machine gun section together with a rifle squad of K Company, totalling 28 enlisted men made the far shore and quietly dug in to await reinforcement, which, however, were not to come. When remaining elements of Company K were pulled back to reorganize, Company I was committed to the river crossing. Two attempts to cross failed and resulted in several overturned craft, causing casualties, some of which are yet carried as missing in action. Up until this time the enemy remained ignorant of what was taking place, but cries of distress that came from those who had been thrown into the cold water brought raking machine gun fire from the enemy pillboxes and forced troops on the west riverline to withdraw inshore toward the Battalion assembly area. Enemy artillery, SP's and mortars renewed intense shellings and concentrated small arms fire on the Third Battalion twenty-eight man bridgehead. This small force moved up to a position which afforded more cover, and proceeded to dig-in while under intense small arms and shell fire, I Company attempted yet another crossing at 0200 hours that morning, but the river again proved unnavigable, more boats were carried downstream, enemy fire drove infantrymen from the river bank and disorganization once again ruled. Volunteers attempted to get a rope-cable across, by which assault boats could maintain control in subsequent crossings, but once again the river proved too strong and volunteers who valiantly faced enemy machine gun fire in their attempts to join the bridgehead, were also washed downstream. Two lightly wounded personnel of the K Company bridgehead swam back across the river to be treated at the Third Battalion Aid Station. There was no communication with the troops pinned down on the far shore and further crossing attempts were abandoned.

While this action was taking place, the Second Battalion, too, was experiencing river crossing difficulties at a point 800 yards Northwest of the Third Battalion's site. With F Company in the lead, the Second Battalion moved toward the river at approximately the same time that Third Battalion troops opened their operations. Ten boatloads of F Company infantrymen embarked on the short but hazardous crossing. The river at this point was approximately 50 yards wide. Bristling with fire power, the enemy in pillboxes did not observe this initial effort and F Company elements had a clear route. The river current again took a heavy toll as only 4 assault boats made it to the far shore while others were swept down stream. By this time the enemy was alerted by the sound of heavy fire coming from the Third Battalion area, and shortly after that, pillboxes opened with machine gun fire to pin down elements of F Company who had crossed. Thus, relief was effected for the eight men of the Second Battalion Headquarters Company who held their positions throughout the twenty-four hour period. The reconnaissance squad recrossed the river amid intense machine gun fire while F Company elements immediately countered with a rifle skirmish. With the resumption of enemy artillery fire, friendly armor and artillery re-opened with steady barrages—some of which was direct fire against pillbox positions. Once again new tank-launched rockets streaked into enemy territory, the impact of which is credited with having liquidated a number of pillboxes. In view of these unforeseen circumstances, original plans were now altered and the Regimental Commanding Officer, Colonel Paul J. Black ordered that the First Battalion be given the mission of crossing to the Second Battalion bridgehead and veering South to take the objectives which were originally assigned to the Third Battalion. The Third Battalion was to be placed in Regimental reserve, reorganize and later exploit any breaches effected by either the First or Second Battalions. Actually the plan hinged on

the success of the Second Battalion, which had not as yet established a secure bridgehead, for remaining elements of F Company were scattered by intense enemy shellings and small arms fire. An intelligence report later showed that picked German troops had been moved up from TRIER and thrown in to outpost and defend all pillboxes at first sensing of offensive. Both Second and Third Battalions' miniature bridgeheads were supported by artillery throughout the remainder of the night. Under cover of a smoke screen, engineers renewed bridging attempts at daybreak of 8 February while plans were being formulated to cross the Second Battalion in subsequent hours of darkness. Artillery duels of the previous day were re-enacted, and when the enemy brought up self-propelled guns, friendly tanks and tank destroyers that moved down near the river road drew direct fire. The Regimental Command Post, located in a hotel near the river several hundred yards Northwest of ECHTERNACH, attracted heavy enemy shellfire from long-range and SP guns and some casualties among Headquarters Company personnel resulted.

Second Battalion operations were resumed at 1730 hours, and once again it became necessary to make use of assault boats when engineer ponton bridges were carried off by the river current. "Artificial moonlight" in the form of powerful searchlight batteries illuminated the zone of operations, with beams dimmed at low-hanging clouds deflecting a fair amount of light. Those of F Company who had not crossed earlier now embarked in assault boats and came under direct fire and sustained casualties, but succeeded in crossing and joining other elements of the company in the bridgehead. Fifteen minutes later G Company's first assault wave began crossing the river. Enemy machine guns caught the craft in a deadly crossfire as infantrymen paddled midway across the river. Movement ceased when four were hit, and as pillboxes increased their rate of fire, Private Armand LeTourneau exemplified the true courage of these infantrymen whose mission it was to move into the very teeth of the enemy fire. He regained control of the craft and frantically paddled near shore, then leaped into the river and shore-beached the assault boat while machine gun bullets cracked by. Just as the squad completed digging-in alongside F Company troops mortar shells and aerial bursts descended on the area and continued without let-up for two hours. Rain-soaked bridgehead troops who engaged enemy emplacements with small arms fire waited in vain for reinforcements who were unable to cross in face of violent fire. Here, again Private LeTourneau, of Company G, displayed distinct heroism when he emerged from cover in the midst of the fire, worked his way back to the boat and returned with two arm loads of ammunition with which he opened furious fire, and, in conjunction with others, succeeded in silencing a pillbox machine gun. Captain Durst, Commanding Officer of Company G, followed up his initial elements with the second assault wave when enemy shelling ceased, but violent automatic weapons fire from enemy pillboxes inflicted heavy casualties as well as the churning river which caused one craft to capsize. Captain Durst was hit in the thigh, and others narrowly escaped injury. Two forward artillery observers of the Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion voluntarily swam the river to retrieve several abandoned boats and evacuated wounded from the bridgehead. With the crossing of Company G, the depleted Second Battalion immediately launched a direct assault against enemy pillboxes. Harassed by numerous S-mines (Bouncing Bettys) that were intermittently set off, and also endangered by direct automatic enemy fire, troops of the Second Battalion deployed and organized separate assault teams in preparation for the storming of the first belt of SIEGFRIED defenses.

At 0215 hours of that morning, 9 February, Captain Bartley, Commanding Officer of Company K, together with Cap-

tain Brown, Commanding Officer of Company M, crossed the SAUER River. Purpose of this mission was to resupply the twenty-four man Third Battalion bridgehead which had remained in position since the previous night when the Third Battalion encountered violent enemy fire in protracted but unsuccessful attempt to cross all its troops. Wounded were evacuated while others were instructed to remain in position and were resupplied with K rations, radios and ammunition. In the bridgehead were two capable Company K non-coms, under whose efforts and guidance the unit had fared well in perilous circumstances. The first was Sergeant Edward P. Wenkman, 60 millimeter mortar squad leader, who had previously earned the Silver Star award for heroic action during the original Moselle River crossing. Now, in this bridgehead he had dug fox-holes for the wounded, skillfully rendered first-aid and maintained control. He personally exposed himself to enemy small arms fire and shellings to reconnoiter for points which offered the small group its most effective shelter. The other was First Sergeant Anthony Buinskis. He similarly endangered his life while rendering first-aid and maintaining security of another group in that small scattered bridgehead.

Company E commenced crossing into the Second Battalion bridgehead at 0800 hours on the 9th, bringing pole charges, satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes with which to reduce enemy pillboxes. Battalion Commander Major John N. Acuff directed that boat crossings be effected with one craft at a time, thus cutting the possibility of presenting a concentrated target to enemy machine gunners and artillery. By this method, heavy weapons of H Company went across by noon even as rifle elements were moving up the steep incline beyond Second Battalion phase line A on the highway which ran parallel to the SAUER River. During this period the entire river draw was enshrouded with thick smoke. Three days of heavy rainfall together with recent thaws had turned secondary roads and fields into quagmires, causing vehicles to bog down. It was under these conditions that infantrymen of the Second Battalion began moving up the mine-studded slope toward enemy pillboxes. Assault teams of Company E methodically attacked, or by-passed and encircled German emplacements. In one instance an entire platoon was held up due to a massive minefield that protected a single pillbox. Mine detectors were called for, so a squad of Anti-tank Company's mine platoon was dispatched across the river. Led by Sergeant Napusano the squad cleared a path to the emplacement without drawing enemy fire. The squad probed about, circled the pillbox with cumbersome detectors, then returned to check with E Company infantrymen who had observed proceedings from dug-in positions nearby. Coinciding with a startling declaration that the pillbox had not yet been taken, the very pillbox sprang to life with menacing bursts of machine gun fire. Shortly thereafter an E Company assault team moved on to take the pillbox and 9 prisoners. A similar attack by an F Company team netted 14 more PWs from another strongpoint, and by 1600 hours the bridgehead was sufficiently broadened to allow the First Battalion to begin crossing as planned.

Companies C and A effected assault boat crossings without much trouble from enemy guns or the swift river. German forces were apparently preoccupied with Second Battalion assault teams who had already liquidated several menacing pillboxes. Both First Battalion companies veered Southeast along the shore toward the Third Battalion crossing site. The Eleventh Infantry had by now secured a vital toe-hold in the enemy's vaunted SIEGFRIED Line and the entire Seventh Engineer Battalion renewed bridging attempts and mine-removal operations on the enemy shore, resulting in the construction of a footbridge and the clearing of demolitions before enemy installations.

Having reorganized, the Third Battalion was committed to cross the river and pass through the Second Battalion positions in continuance of the attack. Crossing began at 0730 hours of 10 February 1945, with Company I spearheading the Battalion. Turbulent river waters capsized two assault boats, causing some casualties, including Lieutenant Koslosky, I Company Commander, who is listed as "missing in action." By noon that day the entire Third Battalion was across the river and in position to strike through the Second Battalion which had contacted the Tenth Infantry's right flank beyond the river road.

Meanwhile, elements of the First Battalion contacted the Third Battalion twenty-six man bridgehead, which had remained in deployed positions for 30 consecutive hours. Although hindered by minefields, A and C Companies forged slowly ahead by blasting pillboxes, by-passing others and taking several intact by surprise attacks. Again, it became the infantryman's lot to accomplish almost superhuman work, for riflemen now simultaneously attacked and blasted these strongpoints. In one instance, First Battalion S-2, Lt. Robert Gray entered a pillbox, one of three taken by Company A. The German telephone within crackled with Teutonic language, so Lt. Gray called upon a German-speaking sergeant of Company D to act as interpreter. The conversation revealed that another pillbox being attacked by a B Company assault team, hysterically sought instructions from its CP. A voice from a phone in a third pillbox ordered them to abandon the pillbox. "Back to the CP," came the order, but after a short pause the pillbox responded, "Too late. They're all around us."

During this time the Second Battalion held defensive positions approximately one mile Northwest along the river, through which Third Battalion troops were scheduled to pass, in the resumption of the attack. E Company engaged and drove off a small pocket of enemy troops near the summit of the ridgeline. The Second Battalion had suffered heavily to gain the area as well as the bridgehead. Company F listed 43 enlisted men as "missing in action" and 17 more as wounded and evacuated. Company G now consisted of two rifle platoons, a weapons platoon and company headquarters.

With L Company on the right, I Company on the left and K Company in the reserve, the Third Battalion struck at the enemy from the Regimental left front. Good progress was made amid long-range enemy machine gun fire and occasional aerial bursts, but otherwise slight enemy resistance. The attack carried 800 yards farther inshore with K Company now moving up to cover the partially exposed left flank. Elements of K Company took a pillbox with 20 prisoners. Company L also cleared a pillbox during the advance and took 21 prisoners. Company I drew intense artillery and mortar fire and all elements were pinned down and later forced to withdraw 300 yards. However, the vitally important ridge had been attained and, although plans called for a further advance, enemy guns and artillery, which were reported to have been moved into ERNZEN and the surrounding area, pounded the ridgeline with incessant concentrations of shellfire and Third Battalion units dug in to consolidate positions until renewing the attack on the following day. Engineers succeeded in construction of a footbridge and work was begun on a trestleway. Food and ammunition supplies were hand-carried across the footbridge by kitchen and Battalion Headquarters Company personnel under cover of darkness. It was a difficult procedure with fields and roads in muddied conditions. This incidentally brought a recurrence of trench-foot cases among frontline personnel.

At 0600 hours of 11 February, the Third Battalion launched a strong attack with L Company on the right and I Company on the left. Enemy resistance was light, although some mortar and artillery fire fell in the area. This was in sharp contrast to the First Battalion, which jumped

off in an attack along the Regimental right flank at 0900 hours only to encounter stiff resistance and strong artillery fire. The attack failed to materialize and the Battalion was forced to remain in position until late afternoon at which time shelling ceased. The First Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon together with patrols of A and C Companies were sent forward to probe and investigate enemy dispositions in the objective area (high ground overlooking ERNZEN). As patrols approached, an estimated force of 150 enemy infantrymen was sighted, necessitating the withdrawal of outnumbered First Battalion patrols. The Third Battalion passed on through more lightly defended territory and only a portion of L Company was held up when it encountered a pillbox. Lt. Kaiser, Commanding Officer of Company L, was wounded and Lt. Mitchell Hazam, Executive Officer of Company K, was transferred to assume command. The pillbox was reduced by bazooka and artillery fire and the Battalion flank pulled abreast of I Company and L Company. In darkness, patrols actually worked beyond the road, without meeting resistance. Gains registered this day by the Eleventh Infantry later proved to be vitally important, for, although measured in yards, terrain now became more suitable and the toe hold in Germany was extended and developed into a wedge in SIEGFRIED positions. German artillery found the range on the newly-constructed footbridge and knocked it out with a direct hit. Work immediately began on a new footbridge even as a Class 40 Bailey bridge was being assembled. The Seventh Engineer Battalion reverted to its normal control, with C Company of that unit remaining attached to the Eleventh Infantry. Troops in the line continued to be supplied by hand-carried rations.

A and C Companies launched another attack the next afternoon in an attempt to pull the First Battalion's line abreast of the Third. Once again a concentration of enemy infantry was encountered and the attack was checked by strong enemy fire. With the attack halted, friendly artillery and SP fire pounded the enemy area for several hours. The Second Battalion remained in Regimental reserve. A concentrated attack by the Eleventh Infantry's Third Battalion and First Battalion was mapped out for the next morning. It was to be a converging two-pronged assault on ERNZEN with contact to be maintained on the left with the Tenth Regiment which was driving on FERSCHWEILER.

The attack opened at 0500 hours with I Company on the left and L Company on the right. The Battalion had slowly advanced, but when daylight came the enemy employed violent mortar, artillery and direct SP fire which caught the Companies in exposed positions. The intense shelling continued without letup, and at 1230 hours the Battalion's Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Birdsong went to a forward Battalion observation post from where he observed enemy mortar positions. He relayed these positions to the Nineteenth Field Artillery and within 15 minutes at least one enemy gun was knocked out and others silenced. By an odd coincidence, Iron Cross-wearing elite enemy recon troops of the Two Hundred Twelfth Volks Grenadier Division who were thrown in to fight a strong rearguard delaying action at HOSCHERD, during the previous month's heavy fighting, again found themselves confronted by Eleventh Infantry forces. The unit was apparently shifted to pillbox positions on the SAUER River front. It was clear that enemy morale had since dropped, for a patrol of L Company probed to a menacing bunker during this day's attack and easily took two captains, one lieutenant, 12 NCO's and 35 enlisted men, all of whom were cleaned up and freshly-shaven in eager anticipation of being taken prisoner. Bringing up the Third Battalion's left flank was Company G, which was detached from Second Battalion (in reserve), assigned the mission of clearing a pillbox near FERSCHWEILER and ordered to maintain contact with the Tenth Infantry. The pillbox proved to be non-existent for

the Company actually deployed and attacked an unoccupied storehouse. The unit then moved through the area, took four enemy stragglers and continued on into FERSCHWEILER, freshly-taken by the Tenth Infantry. I Company assaulted three more pillboxes. Company K, in Third Battalion reserve, suffered casualties during the intense shelling, including its Commanding Officer, Captain Charles P. Bartley, who suffered his third wound in combat.

Meanwhile an attack launched by the First Battalion made but very little headway. Company B, committed to pass through A Company, gained approximately one hundred yards and was then halted by stiffening enemy resistance and shellings. The attack which was aiming for ERNZEN fell far short of its mark and the Battalion dug in for the night. Although these attacks did not develop, time now was of no serious consequence, for a Class 40 Bailey Bridge was in, and on it all armored attachments of the Eleventh Combat Team crossed to render close support. Another engineer footbridge was claimed by a direct hit but the swift river currents were by now mastered and a new bridge was constructed without delay. Engineers also smoothed out roads which were rutted, blasted and mud-blended.

Cut off from their units, German soldiers intermittently infiltrated during hours of darkness and voluntarily gave up. One example was when the Regimental forward Command Post moved into a pillbox across the river. Four of the enemy infiltrated to within fifty yards of the pillbox before a sentry challenged them. "Don't shoot," one shouted in English, "we want to give up." On 14 February 1945, the Eleventh Infantry launched a large-scale, armor-supported attack with all three battalions committed. The Second Battalion passed through the Third and First and struck through the middle toward ERNZEN. The First Battalion on the regimental right front similarly attacked in the same direction while the Third Battalion moved due North toward the River PRUM. All three Battalions had surged forward. E and F Companies slipped out of dawn's mist to converge silently on enemy outposts. Not a shot was fired and in no case was the enemy given opportunity to sound the alarm. Pillbox occupants, baffled by their sudden capture, made their way rearward as the attack

continued. By 0900 hours E and F Companies stormed into the town, took more than forty prisoners and consolidated and outposted the area. Previous aerial bombardments and long-range shellings had caused widespread damage in town limits. The First Battalion pushed slowly up from the South and also gained entry. Another unique method in capturing Germans was demonstrated by an E Company outpost, which later that day had set up on high ground Northeast of ERNZEN. Light machine gunner Sergeant Robert Dorough left his position to accomplish a daily "ritual" while Private First Class Herman Newton held the post. In the meantime Lieutenant J. C. Shirley, Company Commander, sighted an enemy patrol double-timing up the slope to the right of the outpost and shouted the warning to Newton, who in turn, called loudly to Dorough. Dorough hitched up his trousers and hid behind a large boulder, from where he saw the enemy squad approaching. Acting impulsively, Dorough peered from behind the boulder and yelled, "Drop those damned weapons and raise your hands." The results were far beyond Dorough's expectations, for the entire squad immediately complied with the demand, and looked in amazement as unarmed Dorough rushed forward from his positions to retrieve a discarded burp gun, under cover of which he brought in seven Germans.

When a counterattack had formed in ERNZEN a day before, it was broken up practically singlehandedly by Corporal Henry C. Sienkiewicz, a gunner in an M-10 tank destroyer of Company A of the Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion. Sienkiewicz had just returned from a Paris pass when he re-assumed his duties as gunner just as two Mark V tanks and a self-propelled gun started to attack. Sienkiewicz's gunnery obtained direct hits on all three targets, destroying them with crews.

Meanwhile the Third Battalion launched an attack against high ground Northeast of FERSCHWEILER, overlooking the PRUM River, with I and L Companies on the left and right. Good progress was made against slight resistance, and by noon the Third Battalion consolidated positions and organized around the objective. Both companies later sent patrols to the PRUM River area and reconnoitered along high ground overlooking HOLSTHUM, where the bridge crossing into the town was observed to have been



Gen. Patton Bridge built across the Sauer River in Division sector. Pvt. Ray M. Aloman tightens noose on effigy of Hitler made by engineers who erected the bridge.



Self-propelled 155 mm. Gun plows through thick mud on way to blast pillboxes in Siegfried Line.

blown, while enemy forces were seen digging in on the forward slope (western) of the hillside beyond the PRUM River. The Third Battalion was then assigned a portion of the Tenth Infantry Sector. Heavy barrages of artillery fire nebelwerfers rockets fell in the Third Battalion area that night, causing some casualties. In addition, rifle fire sporadically issued from the wooded area during the night.

The thinly manned regimental front drew closer together next day when the Three Hundred Fifty-Eighth Infantry of the Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division took over a small portion of the Eleventh's right sector.

A Third Battalion patrol reconnoitered to the PRUM River near PRUMZURLY, found the river approximately sixty feet wide, observed the blown bridge and surprised three Germans whom they took prisoner. While returning to the Battalion Command Post, one prisoner was instantly killed when he set off an S-mine. At 1100 hours on the morning of the 16 February, Captain Robert M. Gill, Third Battalion S-3, accompanied two rocket-launching tanks beyond K Company's positions, pointed out the enemy-held wooded area to tankers and directed where fire should be concentrated. One hundred twenty rounds of new type rockets streaked into the enemy's positions and just as the last rounds shook the earth, a two-platoon patrol of Company I moved forward and entered the woods. Fifty badly shaken Germans were flushed and ten others killed during a rifle skirmish that followed. At the same time three other rocket tanks were devastating HOLSTHUM, one and one-half miles to the North with 180 rounds of rocket fire. As the I Company patrol went deeper into the woods, enemy resistance stiffened considerably, and the patrol withdrew, leaving behind a sizeable enemy force to be dealt with.

At 1550 hours of that afternoon, the enemy launched a small-scale but furious counterattack, converging from the woods and carrying the fight to K Company troops who had dug-in at the wood's fringe. A sharp two-hour fight with the lines no more than fifty yards apart, and in which both Americans and Germans hurled numerous hand grenades. The attack might have succeeded had not the enemy stumbled on a platoon that bristled firepower. Somehow, 11 of 26 platoon members had previously acquired BAR's, with which they now opened such violent fire that the enemy was forced to dig in. The attack was repulsed and when darkness came, the enemy abandoned his position in face of violent BAR fire and withdrew into the woods. However, small arms fire continued throughout the night as enemy snipers and other riflemen sniped at Third Battalion positions. With this area remaining as the only pocket of enemy resistance on the East side of the PRUM River in the regimental zone of operations, a determined

effort was made to clear it. Company I of the second Infantry took over the sector occupied by K Company which shifted to the Third Battalion's right flank. A reconnaissance patrol then entered the woods and scouted about without contacting enemy troops. Based on this report, Company I, Eleventh, deployed and proceeded to enter the woods, only to meet with strong small arms fire. Shortly thereafter, a forty-round barrage of artillery fire descended upon the area, killing 5 and wounding 9 enlisted men, and causing the company to withdraw to its original positions amid further artillery and mortar concentrations.

Meanwhile, the Second Regiment went into attack in the vicinity of BOLLENDORF, on the 16th of February. The terrain in this sector was vicious and murderous. Deep draws, thickly wooded knolls and numerous streams interlaced with strategically placed pillboxes made up the battlefield.

By 1700 hours of 15 February, the Regiment had completed relief of the Tenth Infantry in the vicinity of BOLLENDORF on the East side of the SAUER River. The First and Third Battalions were on line with the second in Regimental reserve.

SHANKWEILER was the regiment's immediate objective. The First Battalion, Second Infantry, jumped off into the attack and at 1740 hours of the 16th Company B had occupied half the town. Resistance was heavy and the enemy employed nebelwerfers and artillery cleverly and effectively. The woods just above SHANKWEILER, where the Second Battalion was waiting to move through one of the regimental elements, was under continuous artillery bombardment. Men stayed close to their foxholes and the mounting scream of a shell sent them diving for cover.

Two bridges were secured and the remainder of SHANKWEILER was occupied by the First Battalion by evening of the next day. The Third Battalion patrolled the ENZ River for a suitable bridge site and at 0300 hours, 17 February, elements of the unit struck at the high ground 1500 yards East of SHANKWEILER and overlooking the PRUM River and captured it.

The Second Battalion was committed and lunged for the town of STOCKEM the next day. Resistance was mounting and the Second felt the fury of enemy counterattacks as it attempted to take the objective. The remaining units of the regiment were improving their positions and armor was moving up in support of the attack.

Mortars pounded into the approaches to STOCKEM as the Second continued to assault the town. The enemy launched a vicious tank-supported counterattack but the line held and the blow was beaten off with heavy casualties inflicted on the Nazis.

The Battalion plunged forward, as the enemy fell back to lick his wounds, and occupied STOCKEM, the town of HALSDORF to the West and bagged sixty-six German prisoners.

HALSDORF was a town that never got into the headlines of any newspaper, but it was noteworthy for one incident if nothing more. It was there, on 20 February, that First Lieutenant Norman R. Hughes led his Company E platoon in the attack on the village. Alone, he charged an enemy strongpoint and silenced its fire by killing four of the enemy and capturing a number of others. When he encountered a hostile self-propelled gun, he fearlessly attacked it alone and armed only with a carbine. He killed the commander and forced the vehicle to withdraw.

Rain continued to filter down and transportation became a problem. Trees were felled and engineers threw them across the road to give footing to the growling trucks that nosed forward laden with ammunition and supplies for the advancing troops.

In the meantime at 0800 hours of the 18th an entire Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tank platoon lined up in the woods in front of the Third Battalion, Eleventh Infantry,

and opened fire on known enemy positions. The tanks maneuvered up and down the area and pounded the enemy for fully thirty minutes, then L Company of the Eleventh deployed and attacked the woods just as enemy guns from East of the PRUM River opened with heavy counterattack fire. Mortar, artillery and nebelwerfer shellings inflicted a number of casualties, but L Company surged determinedly ahead, doggedly cleared 500 yards of the wooded area and later sent combat patrols to the forward slope of the road leading into HOLSTHUM. Meanwhile, one platoon of A Company was sent by the First Battalion to hold down the Third Battalion's right flank. L Company was then pulled out of the line, while I and K outposted the ground taken by L Company. The G Company platoon near HOLSTHUM was then ordered to clear any remaining enemy resistance in that sector. The platoon captured five German soldiers, occupied five houses and cleared the last of the enemy from the regimental zone of action. Thus, with a firm hold on German soil, which it had personally established and cleared, Eleventh Infantry positions were taken over by elements of the Three Hundred Fifty-Eighth Infantry and the Regiment was drawn into Division Reserve.

The artillery had played a considerable role in breaching the SIEGFRIED Line and its work was constant. The Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion arrived in position near KALKESBACH at 1900 hours on 3 February 1945. The immediate area surrounding the battalion was of a rolling nature with some defilade but, as to be expected, not enough. All of the batteries were able to occupy defiladed positions in the sector assigned the battalion. Upon arrival in position general areas for the Fiftieth and Twenty-First Field Artillery Battalions were selected and assigned to them when they arrived the next day. By this time suitable positions with defilade were becoming very scarce. But it was necessary to find still more positions for the Eleventh Infantry Cannon Company, C Company, Ninety-First Chemical Mortar Battalion, six assault guns (105) of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion, two rocket firing tanks, C Company Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, two 40 millimeter Bofors and two multiple barreled .50 caliber machine guns of A Battery, Four Hundred Forty-Ninth AAA Battalion, and finally four 800 million candle power searchlights. Captain Maurice G. Frakes, acting executive of the Nineteenth, was in charge of placing the reinforcing units and by the time all of them were in position every fold in the area had some artillery in it, and in some cases the units were right next to each other. It was necessary to place two of the searchlights in position alongside one of the gun sections of C Battery. The first time it was lighted disgusted remarks were voiced along the vein of, "And they gave us hell for lighting cigarettes."

The multiple .50's and Bofors were placed in position about 2000 yards East of ECHTERNACH on the high ground overlooking the SAUER River and the pillboxes and high ground on the North side of the SAUER River. They were sighted to fire on the high ground Southeast of and due West of ERNZEN. The artillery plan was based on the information that FERSCHWEILER and ERNZEN were enemy troop concentration areas and that the North bank of the SAUER River was studded with manned pillboxes in addition to being very steep and thickly wooded. Therefore the artillery was to prevent reinforcements or a counterattack from coming South out of ERNZEN and FERSCHWEILER to assist the troops already manning the pillboxes and at the same time to keep them in the pillboxes and if possible to cause them to keep down while our infantry advanced. In addition to the reinforcing units mentioned above two 155 millimeter self-propelled guns of C Battery, Five Hundred Fifty-Eighth Field Artillery Battalion were given to the Nineteenth for tactical employment.

Having these weapons the plan was drawn up. Blocks of many concentrations were plotted and assigned to all

reinforcing units. They covered the steep North bank of the river, the high ground on the North bank, the tableland South of the towns of ERNZEN and FERSCHWEILER (including the draws leading South from the two towns), and concentrations of the towns themselves and the area immediately surrounding them. The 155 millimeter self-propelled and two 105 millimeter assault guns were turned over to the liaison officers who were instructed to place them where they could fire direct fire on the pillboxes being assaulted by infantry. The plans were distributed to all infantry commanders, liaison officers, forward observers and reinforcing units in order that each would know where the concentrations were and could call for them by plan if they felt it necessary to fire the entire group or by singled concentrations in which case they could call by concentration number.

As had been previously related the infantry desired no previous preparation but hoped to be able to reach the opposite shore and surprise the enemy. In accordance with the plan of surprise the artillery did very little firing on the 4th and 5th confining their operations to registering using both high and low angle methods as it was thought necessary to use high angle on many of the concentrations along the steep bank of the river.

The infantry and engineers were discovered when they attempted a crossing at 0130 hours on 7 February. The liaison officer with the Third Battalion called for the plans along the river bank in his sector to be fired. In a few minutes the area resembled a Fourth of July celebration. Muzzle flashes, the clap of outgoing rounds echoing between the river bank and the nerve-racking crash of incoming rounds all fused together seemed to denote the end of the world. About this time the Bofors chimed in with their rhythmic thumps only to be joined by the sharp chatter of the multiple .50's. Division Artillery was called to request counterbattery fire. Day and night, with scarcely a moment's silence, artillery of all sizes was slammed against the enemy bank.

Under cover of darkness the 155 self-propelled and two other assault guns had moved up and with the coming of daylight began a methodical pounding at pillboxes. The heavy shelling by artillery continued. Corps and Division Artillery Time on Targets screeched overhead to crash time and again on the towns of ERNZEN and FERSCHWEILER. Enemy territory was ceaselessly searched through with TOT's but still the enemy was able to organize a small counterattack against the forward elements of the Four

Town of Berdorf, Luxembourg.



Hundred Seventeenth Infantry, Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division. It was repelled without the loss of ground.

During the night of 7 February and every night thereafter the 800 million candle power searchlights were used to give artificial moonlight to Fifth Division troops. About two hours after they were turned on the enemy attempted to knock them out with artillery fire. They were unsuccessful and caused no damage to personnel or equipment. Some rounds were uncomfortably close, however.

The following day was a repetition of the previous one. Visibility was poor. Screaming Corps and Division Artillery TOT's fell on the towns of FERSCHWEILER, DIESBURGHOF, ERNZEN, LOEISENHOF, IRREL, PRUMZURLY and HOLSTHUM. The battle raged throughout the day. Several attempts had been made to place forward observers across the river but they had failed. After repeated attempts related previously during which friendly artillery became incessant the infantry managed to establish a firm toe-hold by 9 February. More troops were rapidly put across and engineers began constructing a treadway bridge. It fell to the lot of the Nineteenth to furnish and supervise the work of several shelling reports teams for this bridge during and after its construction.

As the infantry reached the top of the North bank of the river the artillery was shifted to the towns of ERNZEN and FERSCHWEILER and the table-land between the towns and our forward elements. The two towns were pounded incessantly. On the 13 February the battalion displaced to vicinity of FERME MELIEK 2000 yards Southeast of ECHTERNACH and on the 15th displaced to positions near BOLLENDORF. By this time the battle had assumed a more normal aspect as far as the artillery role was concerned. Missions continued to be fired but the ammunition expenditure was considerably less.

On 17 February the battalion displaced to Hotel Waldetta, 800 yards Northeast of BOLLENDORF and on the 19th upon relief of the Eleventh Infantry, the Twenty-First and Fiftieth Field Artillery Battalions were relieved of reinforcing the Nineteenth and the Nineteenth reverted to reinforce the Fiftieth Field Artillery Battalion. 21,576 rounds had been fired during the period 6-19 February. The battalion had now fired well over 100,000 rounds since its entry into combat on 13 July 1944.

By the 15th of February the battle to establish a firm bridgehead across the SAUER River and crack the SIEGFRIED Line was considered finished. The Tenth and Eleventh Regiments, in concerted attacks, had managed to overcome initial difficulties and push through in fighting from the 7th to the 18th. The Second Regiment remained in reserve. It now became the Division's mission to keep on pushing into Germany with immediate objective of striking at BIRBURG, important communications center. Several small rivers and wooded hills lay between the Division and BIRBURG. The first one was the PRUM River which the Second Regiment, passing through the 10th, on the 15th, reached on the 24th of February.

Despite hampering weather conditions and harassing activities by the Boche, the Second Infantry had continued to forge ahead.

Searchlights slashed through the dancing rain as the enemy sought to pick up night patrols reconnoitering approaches to the town of BETTINGEN, on the PRUM River. For two days mop-up work was carried on, bridge sites chosen and on the 24th, at 2300 hours, the First Battalion jumped off to cross the PRUM River and take the high ground to the East above WETTLINGEN. The first made good headway and was followed by the Third Battalion.

All during the next day the First and Third Battalions continued to knife deeper into the hills to the North and East of WETTLINGEN while the Second pushed into the

towns of OLSDORF and BETTINGEN on the tail of a thunderous artillery barrage. Tired of hearing the crunch of our heavy artillery, Germans came forward bearing white flags and sickly smiles. The big push to bowl them over was on.

Resistance was disorganized and elements of the regiment moved ahead rapidly on the 26th with the First Battalion taking the city of STAHL. The Second cleared the woods approaching BIRTLINGEN, took the town and a class 70 bridge intact.

The Tenth Regiment remained in division reserve in LUXEMBOURG until the 19th, when the Combat Team was ordered to resume the attack in Germany to the North and Northeast as an integral part of the Third Army's drive on TRIER and BITBURG. The mission was to cross the PRUM River with the Second Infantry and clear the way to the KYLL River by cutting the TRIER-BITBURG road.

Crossing the SAUER once more to take up positions in the line preparatory to the attack, the First Battalion moved to an assembly area, the Second Battalion relieved the Third Battalion of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment and the Third Battalion relieved the Third Battalion of the Second Infantry Regiment. The Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion moved to BOLLENDORF to support the advance to the PRUM. The Regiment maintained these positions for a period of three days periodically patrolling to the river in preparation for the crossing. During the night of February 23 the Second Battalion was relieved by elements of the Three Hundred Fourth Infantry Regiment of the Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division and assembled in BOLLENDORF. The First and Third Battalions remained in their positions overlooking the PRUM River. Enemy activity at this time was limited to patrolling and construction of hastily prepared defensive positions and the harassing of our lines with intermittent artillery fire.

During this formative interval of jockeying for position and probing the enemy lines to determine the extent of probable resistance that the enemy might muster against the resumption of the drive, Company L sent out a patrol of 10 enlisted men led by the squad leader to the first house in PEFFINGEN for the purpose of establishing an outpost there. The patrol reported in at 2400 hours that they had crossed the river and were set up after meeting only slight resistance from six enemy soldiers; four of which surrendered, two getting away. The patrol gathered all the civilians of the small farm settlement in one large house under guard, and occupied the first four houses as an outpost. The next day the outpost was reinforced. At 1830 hours on the 21st a patrol comprising engineers and infantrymen went down the river to locate a likely crossing site.

A place was selected South of the town of HOLSTHUM and the patrol returned. On the 23d, a night patrol from Company K consisting of one officer and four enlisted men left to reconnoiter the area East of the designated crossing site, but detected an enemy patrol in the process of taking up positions across the river, and returned without crossing. In the early morning of the 24th, a patrol from Company L reconnoitered the river bank at the crossing site, crossed to the other side, and reported a tank ford near the point of the intended crossing that apparently had been used by the enemy.

In the middle of the night a foot bridge was erected by the engineers without incident. Subsequently, during an interim when our artillery began falling near PEFFINGEN and on the hill beyond, two additional bridges were thrown across, and the First Battalion began crossing. No resistance to the crossing was encountered until midnight when Company C, after getting across, began to receive light small arms fire. By 0100 hours, February 25th, all elements of the Third Battalion had crossed, and advanced

ing rapidly along with the First Battalion had established a bridgehead to a depth of 1500 yards. Resistance to the development of the bridgehead was disorganized and ineffective. Germans caught in the swift advance gave themselves up readily and the operation soon became one of pursuit and mopping up. Company I cleared PEFFINGEN prior to the rout of the enemy forces in the bridgehead area, and the Second Battalion commenced crossing for the purpose of continuing the advance with a crossing of the next river, the NIMS. The crossing of the PRUM River was unquestionably easy. Prisoners stated that they had not expected the attack in this sector and had had only a thin line of troops.

At 1600 hours the vehicular bridge across the PRUM was completed, road blocks removed, and orders issued for the Second Battalion to cross the NIMS River after dark and seize the town of NIEDERSTEDEN. In the meantime, Companies C and A cleared INGENDORF without opposition (save some scattered mortar fire) and outposted the town. At the close of the day a total of 214 prisoners had been taken.

The following day, February 26, Company K cleared DOCKENDORF, thus placing advanced elements nearly on the NIMS River. Companies L and I moved up Southwest of the town and by mid-afternoon were approaching the railroad East of MESSERICH.

Minor intermediate objectives fell to the regiment in rapid succession as the pursuit of the enemy continued to the North and East. The vast woods between the PRUM and NIMS Rivers were contested by elements of the Fifteen Hundred Sixtieth Engineers Battalion, employed as infantry and supported by SPs of the Fifteen Hundred Sixtieth Anti-tank Battalion; they failed even to slow the Tenth. Minefields and rugged terrain continued to offer the greatest obstacles to our troops.

Before the scheduled crossing of the NIMS River by the Second Battalion, Tenth Infantry began, the town of MESSERICH had been designated as the objective of Company A. The NIMS River divides the town of MESSERICH into two parts, and the company was ordered, if at all possible, to seize any bridge crossing the river and to take the entire town. Upon seizing the near part of the town the troops discovered that all bridges across the river were blown. The company was receiving heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the high ground, when Lieutenant Charles K. Boughten, Company Commander, inspected the blown bridge and decided that it was possible to cross the rubble. Led by the Company Commander the company crossed and cleared the remainder of the town. The engineers erected a class 40 bridge and the operations of the Combat Team and division were greatly accelerated.

The Second Battalion, Tenth Infantry began crossing the river at about 1400 hours near the town of OBERSTEDEN, opposed only by harassing artillery fire and scattered resistance from elements of three companies of the Three Hundred Twentieth Infantry Regiment, hastily thrown in the fight to resist the crossing. Resistance was quickly neutralized, the enemy positions overrun, and the enemy battalion staff captured without difficulty. Mopping up operations consumed the remainder of the day and were carried out with only occasional shelling of a harassing nature. By 1525 hours, patrols had reached OBERSTEDEN. NIEDERSTEDEN was cleared by 2340 hours, and a line established connecting the two towns.

After MESSERICH, the First Battalion, Tenth Infantry cleared ESSLINGEN and the woods on both sides of the TRIER-BITBURG road Northeast of ESSLINGEN. Elements of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment then passed through the Tenth's lines and closed in on BITBURG, city of 4,800 population and important communication center. At the same time, the Second Infantry fanned its NIMS bridgehead Northward.

In closing in on BITBURG, Division troops neared the climax of the present attack, which began on February 25th, with the river crossing on the muddy PRUM by the Tenth and Second Regiments. Pushing against light resistance but over muddy terrain dotted with frequent minefields, troops of the Tenth and Second had crossed the steep hills and the second river, NIMS, before the Eleventh was committed.

On the 27th, the Third Battalion, Tenth Infantry advanced to the SCHARFBILLIG-BITBURG road, clearing the woods Northwest of SCHARFBILLIG, and consolidated positions there. The Second Battalion assembled in ESSLINGEN, OBERSTEDEN and NIEDERSTEDEN, and advanced East clearing SCHARFBILLIG in a swift attack that resulted in the capture of most of the two enemy companies located there. During the early morning hours of February 28th, the battalion took Hill 385 beyond the town, as elements of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment cleared BITBURG. By 0130 hours enemy resistance in the Tenth Regimental sector was cleared to the TRIER-BITBURG road, and SCHARFBILLIG and Hill 385 secured. Patrols probed on to the East as plans were drawn to wipe out all resistance to the KYLL River.

The First Battalion continued to advance, clearing ROHL at 1100 hours, and sending two companies to the high ground Northeast of the town overlooking the river, while the Second Battalion assembled in SCHARFBILLIG. The Third Battalion passed through ROHL and occupied the high ground to the Northeast. The First and Third Battalions held their positions, but patrolled to the river during the night. The Regimental CP moved into SCHARFBILLIG after brief stopovers at SCHANKWEILER and DOCKENDORF.

Almost 1000 prisoners were taken during the month of February. This number, as well as the fact that a great number of officers were included, indicated a low state of morale existing among the enemy troops. Many gave themselves up in groups and a big majority of these were war-weary. The Russian successes, plus the realization that many home towns were already occupied tended to make most of the men unwilling to sacrifice themselves in what they believed was the final phase of a lost war. Another factor supporting this conclusion concerning the sad state of affairs in the enemy camp, was the capture of a large number of green and inexperienced recruits of seventeen years of age, who were inducted into the service as late as November, 1944, and who were noticeably depressed by our continuous artillery concentrations and fighter bombers, or "jabos." "With two of your 'jabos' you are paralyzing our entire division sector," one officer stated. Other officer prisoners complained that they were sent into action without being acquainted with their men or briefed on the situation. The total disruption of communications by the artillery added considerably to their confusion.

The completeness of the German collapse during the drive across the SAUER and through the SIEGFRIED Line to the KYLL is perhaps no better indicated than by the comparatively low number of casualties sustained by the Regiment in overrunning positions difficult under any circumstances, but which properly manned could have been taken only at great cost in lives and equipment. The Tenth had losses of three officers and fifty enlisted men killed, twelve officers and 286 men wounded, and 138 enlisted men missing.

The Regiment remained in position along the KYLL River in the vicinity of SCHARFBILLIG, patrolling the front and getting set to establish a bridgehead. The Second Battalion, in Regimental reserve, assembled in SCHARFBILLIG. On the following day, March 1st, the regimental boundary between the Tenth and Second Regiments was changed and Company I was relieved by elements of the Second and assembled in ROHL.

During the period 19 through 25 February 1945, the Elev-

enth Infantry Regiment had remained in Division reserve. The unit reorganized, absorbed reinforcements and rested while the Second and Tenth Regiments continued attacking beyond the SAUER River exploiting breaches in SIEGFRIED Line defenses which troops of the Eleventh and Tenth Regiments had personally effected in two previous weeks of heavy fighting. Actually, both Second and Tenth Regiments were now engaged in clearing the enemy from strong natural defenses consisting of clearing the steep hill-masses between the ERNZ and NIMS Rivers, that shielded the Fifth Division objective—the important enemy communication center of BITBURG. While the Eleventh Infantry was in reserve in Luxembourg, orders came for Lieutenant Colonel Philip W. Merrill, Regimental Executive Officer and Eleventh Infantry veteran, to return to the United States to attend Staff and Command School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonel Homer C. Ledbetter, was assigned as executive.

By 26th February, when the Eleventh Infantry moved from its position in reserve, fighter-bombers were hammering enemy columns that were withdrawing along the entire Divisional front. Troops of the Eleventh formed in a new assembly area behind the Second Infantry bridgehead and prepared to strike toward BITBURG. Stripped of his natural defenses the enemy was reeling now in semi-disorganized state toward the KYLL River line while only isolated groups and several fanatical elements of the famous Second Panzer Division remained to fight sporadic rearguard actions.

The Eleventh Infantry launched its attack at 2100 hours when A Company of the First Battalion began moving Northeast from MESSERICH. The company made rapid progress in its drive toward MASHOLDER, a rail junction 2500 yards South of BITBURG, but German tanks or self-propelled guns apparently were brought up to the BITBURG area and opened up an intermittent fire which caused attacking infantry several casualties. Tanks and tank destroyers were sent forward to take up positions in preparation for repulsing any counterattacks. No counterattacks developed, but some automatic weapons and mortar fire issued from the vicinity of MASHOLDER. At 0345 hours of the 27th, B Company had joined A, both companies straddling the main BITBURG road and attacking abreast against light resistance. Meanwhile, supporting armored attachments of the Eleventh Combat Team, Company A, Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion and Company C, Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, formed in an assembly area to the rear of frontlines and prepared to move up to render closer support. Elements of B Company filtered into MASHOLDER while enemy self-propelled guns menaced the railroad bridge West of town. Early the morning of 28 February, Private First Class Edward J. Mokiezycki of B Company lost his way and accidentally wandered into MASHOLDER. While reconnoitering about town, Mokiezycki sighted two platoons of Germans preparing to depart. The rifleman opened fire on the entire group with his M-1, and with the exception of five who surrendered, the enemy contingent fled from town. Mokiezycki stood guard throughout the night, finally being relieved when other members of his company broke in just before daybreak. MASHOLDER was cleared by B Company at 0950 hours and resulted in the taking of twenty-eight prisoners. Casualties in the attacking battalion were extremely light.

Shortly after MASHOLDER was taken, the Third Battalion moved through town and deployed East preparing to carry the attack from Regimental right flank. The Second Battalion remained in reserve and formed in MESSERICH while tanks and tank destroyers moving up to MASHOLDER were unable to cross steep railroad embankments in attempting to shift the bulk of the attack to the right flank. Enemy SP Fire continued to issue from BITBURG, so plans were changed for armor to advance along the West road and support the attack on both flanks by direct fire if necessary.

C Company patrols reconnoitered to the Southern edge of BITBURG, encountered strong small arms fire and withdrew to the KOLMESHOE ridge. At 1300 hours the Third Battalion launched its Easterly attack toward MOTSCH. Company L jumped off and advanced 300 yards before encountering an anti-personnel minefield which, as it developed, came under direct SP and mortar fire from BITBURG. It took L Company three and one-half hours to work above the minefield, advance 1000 yards Eastward amid sporadic SP and mortar fire, and engage a sizeable enemy force in the vicinity high ground AUF-MIRLEK. A protected small arms skirmish finally drove the enemy from his position by 1730 hours, then K Company took up the fight continuing East toward MOTSCH while L Company swerved North to cut the MOTSCH-BITBURG Road. Intense rifle skirmishes developed during these actions, but with A and C Companies enveloping resistance on the left flank, tremendous pressure was being brought to bear on enemy rearguards, while tanks of the Fourth Armored Division, which composed the Eleventh's left flank boundary, fired heavily to disrupt enemy activity along the KYLL River line. A company swarmed into the Southern outskirts of BITBURG at 1635 hours against only scattered rifle fire, then outposted that sector while B Company launched an attack against the right half of the city. B Company sent a patrol under Technical Sergeant Troy B. Keys, acting platoon leader, to the barrack area to determine what the enemy dispositions were. The patrol moved downgrade in darkness and perceived an enemy force moving about the area. Keys dispatched messengers to the Company Command Post to report his observations. Tanks and tank destroyers which were called upon to support the attack with direct fire soon lined the hillside and although previously bombed and cratered by the air force, BITBURG received another violent pounding as tanks launched direct fire barrages into German positions. Coincidentally, German civilians who were being taken into custody for interrogation purposes witnessed this shelling with marked emotional reaction.

By 0900 hours of 28 February the First Battalion had secured most of BITBURG against no opposition, while at the same time L Company broke into MOTSCH. Small arms fighting developed as L Company attempted house-clearing, but within a half hour all resistance collapsed and the company took twenty-four prisoners of war in securing the town. I Company passed through L and continued to attack towards the KYLL River. Having withdrawn across

Searchlight used to create moonlight effect on front lines is being put in operation by PFC James Redd and PFC Manuel Gonzales.





Tractor plows through deep mud to gun position during spring-thaw on 5th Division front.

the KYLL River to new defensive positions, the enemy blew bridges in his wake. I Company deployed and outposted the wooded area Eastward to the river, and by night-fall had established contact with elements of the Tenth Infantry which comprised the Eleventh's right flank. Earlier that day at 1130 hours, when troops of the First Battalion had completely cleared BITBURG, the Second Battalion was committed from Regimental reserve with the mission of passing through the captured city and clearing all Regimental left front opposition to the KYLL River. With F Company on the left, G Company on the right, and E in reserve, the Second Battalion passed into the attack at 1320 hours. Organized infantry resistance was nil, but the enemy employed some self-propelled fire from METTERICH. This was countered by tank and tank destroyer fire and by 1420 hours F and G Companies had moved through IRSCH, advancing toward the river against virtually no opposition other than occasional mortar and self-propelled fire. Contact was established with the Fifty-Third Armored Infantry of the Fourth Armored Division and Second Battalion took fifteen prisoners of war in outposting to the river front.

Contact having been established on the left or Northern flank of the Fifth Division with the Fourth Armored Division, the Second Infantry Regiment was swung down in a fast move from the extreme left to the extreme right of the division and outposted along the KYLL River bank on the right flank of the Tenth Infantry Regiment.

With the Second and Third Battalions of the Eleventh Infantry holding river line positions on the Divisional left front, and the First Battalion in reserve in BITBURG, another assault river-crossing loomed for the Eleventh Infantry. Plans now called for a KYLL River bridgehead into which armor could cross and continue the offensive. Terrain along the KYLL River is rough with a series of steep and densely wooded areas.

Now came the Ides of March and disaster for the Germans. It was in March that the Fifth Division made some of its most notable history when it made three successive important bridgeheads across the KYLL, MOSEL and RHINE Rivers and unleashed the potent and highly-publicized Fourth Armored Division for armored slashes while the infantry of the Red Diamond followed with almost equal speed and thorough mopping-up operation. The Fifth never really received credit for its heroic work in making the bridgeheads, which were at all times the focal point of XII Corps operations and usually the base of Third Army's plans. When the Division reached the KYLL it was ahead of divisions on each flank. When it reached the MOSEL it was second only to the Fourth Armored Division and when it reached the RHINE at OPPENHEIM it was the first to get there. Thus the Fifth Division's efficiency

and skill and courage in performing one difficult task only led to its being at the right place at the right time to be committed to perform another difficult task. Because its operations were so advanced, it usually had to operate under a security blackout and receive no press mention for its work; draw-forging natural defense barriers. That the enemy commanded excellent observation from hills beyond the river was evident when enemy artillery and self-propelled weapons intermittently opened fire on vehicular or troop movements on the BITBURG-IRSCH and BITBURG-MOTSCH roads. A thirty-six-hour semi-static period preceded river crossing operation during which time fighter-bombers of the Ninth Air Force (P-47's and P-51's) pounded enemy positions in continuous daylight raids.

The battering absorbed by the enemy had left them disorganized and incapable of warding off the Third Army's intention to crash through the EIFFEL Hills North of the MOSEL River to COBLENZ, flanking the enemy's hold of the SAAR in the South. A springboard was needed from which to set armored elements loose, and on March 2nd, the Regiment was ordered to cross the river on the right of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment, the First Battalion crossing on the left of the Tenth Infantry Regimental sector, and the Second Battalion on the right. At 2400 hours, after thirty minutes of artillery preparation, the First Battalion started across the KYLL on a footbridge erected by the engineers opposite the town of HUTTINGEN. Resistance was light, consisting of small arms and mortar fire, and the advance on HUTTINGEN began immediately. All of the battalion was across by 0140 hours the next morning.

HUTTINGEN was assigned to Company A, Tenth Infantry, and the men of that unit moved out in attack at 0200 hours. The remaining companies jockeyed for more favorable positions after being ordered to hold up just short of the crossing site to await flanking support when it was learned that the Second Battalion, having met heavy opposition, and failing to cross in the sector assigned them, was to cross instead on the First Battalion's bridge. Companies C and B were ordered to push inland from the river to better positions toward the high ground East of HUTTINGEN. Meanwhile at 0615 hours Company A reported that HUTTINGEN was almost cleared. The Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion supported the crossing of the KYLL with a series of concentrations fired on known enemy installation.

The Eleventh Infantry river-crossing preparations began at 2300 hours of 1 March 1945 when Regimental I & R platoon leader, Second Lieutenant Leonard J. Duston, Jr., and two engineers went to the river's edge in the Third Battalion area. Lieutenant Duston waded across the river, probed 100 yards forward and returned without incident.

Plans called for assault crossings by the Second Battalion on the left with ERDOEF as its prime objective, and a bridgehead on the Regimental right front with BADEN as the ultimate Third Battalion objective. It was decided that the assault would take place minus an artillery preparation and thereby retain the surprise element. Armored attachments of Company A Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion and Company C Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, as well as guns of the Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion were in position to deliver strong concentrations of shell fire should the occasion arise. Other components in direct support of assault troops were thirteen-man bazooka teams and a mine squad from Regimental Anti-tank Company attached to each attacking Battalion. Company D was attached to the Second Battalion for support fire purposes.

Operations began with first darkness of 2 March 1945 when engineers of A and C Companies, Seventh Engineers Battalion began the construction of footbridges in Second and Third Battalion areas. Bridging bogged down in the

Third Battalion sector. Originally scheduled to jump off at 2300 hours, the Second Battalion waited until H plus twenty-five minutes at which time, Captain Marks, Commanding Officer A Company, Seventh Engineers, checked with Second Battalion Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. John N. Acuff informing him that the footbridge had been completed. At 0013 hours forward elements of F Company began crossing the KYLL River, and in twelve minutes the entire company had crossed over without drawing enemy fire. By the time G Company began moving over the footbridge, enemy outposts either sensed or perceived activity in the area and hurled approximately a dozen mortar rounds, around the bridge site, all of which fell without effect. By 0100 hours all of G Company and the Battalion Reconnaissance platoon was over, while E Company was held in reserve near IRSCH. No opposition formed, and F Company moved 100 yards inshore to extend its hold. The Battalion Reconnaissance platoon turned North to cover the left flank while G Company took up positions to the right of F from where both companies prepared to attack the entrenched enemy along the Eastern ridgeline. The Second Battalion's action proceeded according to plan until 0245, when F Company met its first counterattack in form of rifle and automatic fire. Temporarily stopped, the unit pulled back amid close quarter fighting and regrouped while under "Potato Masher" fire. On the Battalion's point G Company took a two-man outpost while the Battalion Reconnaissance platoon captured eight prisoners in probing on the left flank. E Company began crossing into the bridgehead at 0350 under light mortar fire and was committed to the battalion's right sector. Concerted local action produced several small groups of prisoners of war and by daylight the Second Battalion bridgehead although yet compact had expanded to a point 600 yards beyond the crossing site where elements of E Company had cut beyond the vital ridgeline and seized half of objective ground (a hairpin-shaped ridge). F and G Companies made slight progress under mortar and artillery fire.

During this time all was not well with the Third Battalion crossing. Captain Dodson, Commanding Officer of L Company, moved his unit toward the river at the prescribed hour only to find that bridging had not been effected. Engineers moved all bridging equipment South toward the Tenth Infantry sector and selected another site but strong small arms fire frustrated this attempt. Lieutenant Colonel Birdsong requested and was granted permission to cross his Battalion in the Tenth Infantry sector, where engineers had succeeded in constructing a footbridge near HUTTINGEN. Reinforced with five two-man bazooka teams, L Company displaced South along the KYLL River, coming under concentration of enemy artillery fire as it advanced. Two men were wounded and one man killed during this move to the bridge, which as it turned out was not intact due to a previous engineer attempt to move it North for Third Battalion use. Engineers reconstructed the footbridge, under cover of a smoke screen and amid sporadic enemy small arms fire. L Company commenced crossing at 0645 hours of 3 March 1945, encountered no enemy resistance, organized on the far shore and swerved left as it advanced North to the Eleventh Infantry sector. METTERICH was the primary Third Battalion objective and by 1020 hours L Company had secured the original Third Battalion bridgehead site, permitting engineers to begin construction on a treadway bridge. L Company continued the attack and cleared METTERICH against only light resistance, but air observation revealed that a great deal of enemy activity was in progress in the wooded area directly beyond METTERICH. Artillery concentrations were hurled at these targets of opportunity even as Thunderbolts and Mustangs of the Nineteenth Tactical Air Command, dive

bombed and strafed enemy armor and enemy infantry in the wooded area. I Company, which was ordered to pass through L at noon with a mission of cleaning the woods, was held back at the edge of METTERICH when nine enemy tanks were sighted, and once again the area was heavily hit with bombs and artillery. K Company began moving forward at 1300 hours—moving slowly as it dislodged several small pockets of resistance and some snipers. A call came from the forward observation post informing Lieutenant Jacobs, K Company Commanding Officer, that two enemy tanks were sighted moving down toward METTERICH. Moments later these opened direct fire on K Company positions. Caught in the open terrain between METTERICH and the wooded area, bazookamen of the company withheld their fire until the unit was ordered to pull back, permitting concentrations of artillery to be delivered without endangering troops. K Company withdrew to high ground just South of METTERICH, and L Company deployed to defend METTERICH against a frontal assault. Earlier, I Company crossed the river to form in Battalion reserve West of the town. Now the unit was alerted. Twenty minutes following the enemy's initial armored attack four more tanks supporting a company of German infantry emerged from the wooded area and temporarily cut the East METTERICH road in attempting to drive a wedge between K and L Companies. Time-on-target artillery fire helped check enemy infantry while tank and tank destroyer fire side-tracked enemy armor. The defending rifle companies, especially K, fired heavily, expending enormous quantities of mortar, rockets, bazooka and rifle grenades to further repulse the counterattacks. A short while later the enemy withdrew so a Company K patrol reconnoitered into the wooded area to determine enemy disposition and strength. The enemy's maneuver was evaluated as a reconnaissance in force for the patrol reported that enemy troops had withdrawn to defensive positions. Third Battalion positions were intermittently shelled throughout the remaining hours of daylight. K Company was ordered to continue the attack at 2100 hours but the company ammunition supply had almost completely expended so the attack was temporarily cancelled. Resupply was delayed until darkness at which time carrying parties consisting of Third Battalion kitchen personnel hand-carried ammunition and food rations across the treadway bridge.

Indicative of the excellent observation afforded enemy artillery observers was the fact that when First Battalion troops (in reserve) foot marched from BITBURG to MORSCH early that afternoon, enemy guns hurled accurate time-on-target concentrations along the route as infantrymen approached MORSCH. Several vehicles were knocked out and six members of Cannon Company were wounded while at their gun emplacement stations around MORSCH.

In the meantime, Second Battalion troops were fighting hard against stiffening resistance and local counterattacks while trying to build up their bridgehead. Having taken half the vitally important ridge when E Company's Third Platoon under Lieutenant Rawls cracked through, Lieutenant J. C. Shirley, E Company Commanding Officer, sent his First Platoon down to seal off the West entrance of a railroad tunnel below the ridge. The company executive officer, First Lieutenant William E. Jackes and Platoon Sergeant Richard R. Marnell fired into the gap, then backed off to await developments. Shortly thereafter, sixty-nine of the enemy filed out to give up as prisoners. By 1015 hours of 3 March 1945, E Company had taken the entire ridge, without the loss of a single man. F and G Companies received frequent artillery concentrations while consolidating positions throughout the day. At 1000 hours that night enemy 120 millimeter mortar heavy flak and self-propelled fire became intense—then the enemy struck with

a counterattack against F Company. German infantry cut through ravine and overran an F Company light machine gun outpost killing or wounding all members of that squad. A heavy concentration of artillery fire broke up other enemy infantry formations and the attack was repulsed. At 0400 hours of 4 May 1945, Lieutenant Shirley, Commanding Officer of E Company, ordered his First Platoon to move North and into position for pre-dawn attack on ERDORF. G and F Companies maneuvered to protect the Second Battalion right flank and also prepared to jump off while under intermittent mortar and self-propelled fire. It was during this shifting of positions that Staff Sergeant Marvin E. Craft of G Company, twice previously awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action, led his squad in a brilliant night raid behind enemy lines and aimed for a troublesome flak gun. The squad closed-in and overwhelmed the stunned enemy gun crew, Sergeant Craft himself forcing a lone guard to yield by grabbing a handful of the German's hair. Six other Germans, comprising the entire gun crew gave up. Rough hilly terrain and sporadic mortar fire slowed E Company's advance and the morning grew light as leading elements of the First Platoon drew within seventy-five yards of town, so the platoon took to ditches that straddled the road. Technical Sergeant Stewart, acting Second Platoon leader, brought up the Company's right flank while Lieutenant Rawls was ordered to pull his Third Platoon abreast on the left flank. With the Company now in position to strike at ERDORF, the enemy commenced pounding the entire area with mortar, artillery, self-propelled and anti-aircraft fire for a nine-hour period—pinning the company down throughout. Lieutenant Brensen, a Nineteenth Field Artillery forward observer, directed heavy and effective counterfire against enemy infantry and gun positions. During this time F and G Companies jumped off to clear the area around Hill 387 and attempted to secure the surrounding wooded area, meeting resistance from tank-supported enemy infantry. Lieutenant Le Vesque, Commanding Officer, G Company, ordered his advance elements to pull back under heavy fire which the enemy continued to employ for eight hours running. F Company was similarly held up on the opposite side of the hill. Artillery duels continued through this period with friendly fire focusing on the ERDORF-BADEM road, from where enemy attacks were being launched. In the midst of these counterattacks, tanks of Company C, Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, commenced crossing the class 40 bridge while Second Battalion S-3 Captain Robert D. Spencer returned to METTERICH to guide tanks of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion into the bridgehead. Armor of Company A, Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion was immediately committed to relieve heavy enemy pressure on G Company's positions.

E Company's attack on ERDORF, prime Regimental objective, which began at 1630 hours of 4 March 1945 was from a tactical standpoint a beautiful assault. Prior to its launching all platoons had been oriented, while Lieutenant Le Clair of Company G Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion; Lieutenant Shirley, Commanding Officer, E Company, and Lieutenant Brensen, Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion forward observer, co-ordinated the time element. At the prescribed moment a platoon of Tank Destroyers moved up to the ridge-summit overlooking ERDORF and swept downhill firing as it moved. Simultaneously, the Nineteenth Field Artillery opened with incessant fire. The relentless fire continued for six minutes, then E Company jumped off into the attack with Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tanks in direct support. Lieutenant Jacks' First Platoon rushed the first buildings frontally while the Third Platoon under Lieutenant Rawls closed in on the railroad station from the right flank. Advancing

swiftly, Lieutenant Jacks and his platoon sergeant, Marnell, did not notice a squad of Germans who had taken to cover of ditches until they cleared a two-story house less than 100 feet away. These by-passed Germans "laid low" and sniped at every opportunity. Infuriated when they observed these actions, Lieutenant Jacks and Sergeant Marnell annihilated the entire enemy squad of ten with carbine and M-1 fire. This well-planned, well-executed attack caught the defenders in a maze of fire from which they could not escape, and within two hours the key objective had been cleared and fifty-eight prisoners of war taken. In attempting to move up and ease pressure on their hard-pressed troops, German panzers were routed by overwhelming American fire. At least two Mark V and one Mark IV tanks were knocked out while other armor fled. At the time of E Company's assault on ERDORF, G and F Companies also plunged forward with armor support and secured positions against very stiff resistance, G Company taking twenty-five prisoners of war and two anti-aircraft guns while F Company took thirteen prisoners of war. In contrast to E Company, which suffered no losses throughout the entire bridgehead action, G and F Companies sustained thirty-four casualties. Within two hours after E Company had cleared ERDORF, Combat Command B of the Fourth Armored Division with the Second Infantry attached, commenced to pass through, attacking Eastward. On the Tenth Infantry front the assault continued.

Company F, Tenth Infantry, made the abortive attempt to span the river Southeast of HUTTINGEN for the Second Battalion. At exactly midnight on 2-3 March, the bridge was laid out in sections and was being pushed over the river by the engineers. Five minutes later, one of the engineers gave the signal for the crossing to begin and the leading platoon started to the bridge. Three minutes later the next platoon was cutting across the open for the bridge. When everyone of the two platoons was on the flat ground, the enemy, entrenched on the East bank, opened up with machine guns and other automatic weapons. Having lost the initial advantage of surprise, so essential in an action of this type, the battalion at 0300 hours moved to the First Battalion's crossing site. By 0500 hours all of Company F had crossed and the First and Second Platoons were moving out in the direction of GONDORF on the regimental right flank. As the men ascended the slope of a high hill about 800 yards inland, they were attacked by an estimated sixty enemy infantrymen supported by machine guns. In the ensuing fire fight enemy resistance shortly collapsed and the leading platoons advanced on to GONDORF and cleared the town, the enemy withdrawing to the high ground beyond. By daylight, all resistance was wiped out in the river area and the Regiment occupied a line roughly from GONDORF to the high ground North of HUTTINGEN.

During the morning Companies B and C pushed on to the high ground and the road Northeast of HUTTINGEN, after overcoming stiff enemy resistance supported by tank fire. Then, at 1030 hours, Company F was driven almost completely from GONDORF by a savage counterattack by approximately a hundred infantrymen closely supported by several tanks.

Seemingly destined to draw all tough jobs, like Hill 386 on the MOSELLE, POUILLY Ridge, POURNOY, and MICHELSHOF Farm, F Company now had GONDORF.

GONDORF was a small village of about fifteen houses surrounded by a high ridge of open terrain, and at the time the attack developed observation was excellent. The two platoons of riflemen and machine gunners of Company F fought tenaciously, defending their gains house by house. They either died at their posts or withdrew only to carry on the fight from better vantage points. Tank and self-propelled fire was direct and twenty-five casualties were



Surgeons of 30th Field Hospital take rapid, skillful care of 5th Division.

sustained in dead, wounded, or missing. Though eventually driven back to the Southern outskirts of the village, their grasp on the town was never relinquished and, with supporting artillery fire from the Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion, they beat off the attackers enabling elements of Company G to enter the town without a costly fight and re-commence clearing the vicinity. However, at dusk, the enemy renewed the attack, this time with stronger tank and self-propelled weapons support. Company L was then attached to the Second Battalion, but the attack was beaten off before the company was committed. At 2000 hours the company reverted to the Third Battalion.

During the morning of March 4, the First Battalion remained in HUTTINGEN and positions on the high ground to the Northeast. One platoon of tank destroyers forded the river and joined the Battalion at approximately 0700 hours. Another platoon of tank destroyers joined the Second Battalion in GONDORF as the town was reported cleared.

When night came Companies I and L of the Third Battalion passed through the lines of the Second Battalion and advanced to the Northeast, Company L toward DUDELDORF, and Company I toward ORDORF. Both companies were preceded by patrols. At 0520 hours the patrol from Company I was checked by resistance from dug-in positions short of ORDORF.

Attacking at daylight, Company L succeeded in getting two platoons in the Southwestern portion of DUDELDORF, where enemy resistance consisting of an estimated ten self-propelled weapons and infantry, was reported heavy. Soon the two platoons were almost completely surrounded and cut off from the remainder of the Battalion. For several hours the fighting raged, the isolated Americans holding their own against savage odds. Not until mid-afternoon, with the assistance of tank destroyers and the Regimental anti-tank platoon, was the Battalion able to break the enemy's defense. By 2000 hours all of the elements of Company L and one section of Tank Destroyers were in the town. The enemy then desperately attempted to reform and counterattack, but the effort was broken up in its formative stage and the remnants of the enemy force withdrew from the town toward the East.

Meanwhile, to the South, the Third Battalion of the

Eleventh Infantry extended its bridgehead. Resupplied K Company pushed off at approximately the same time that troops of the Second Battalion had launched their attack on ERDORF. Forward elements of the company filtered into the woods Northeast of METTERICH, took five prisoners and continued the advance until sudden and direct self-propelled fire was encountered near the road cutting through the center of the woods. Enemy positions were so accurately relayed by forward artillery observers that barrages scored direct hits on a Mark IV and a Tiger Tank, knocking both out. With the coming of dawn, remaining enemy tanks withdrew and K Company resumed its advance. Company I was then ordered to pass through K with the mission of taking BADEM. At 1100 hours, I Company opened its attack with one platoon of tanks and one platoon of tank-destroyers attached. As the tank-infantry teams approached BADEM, enemy counterparts furiously resisted the advance. Fierce tank battles developed as armor penetrated to enemy defenses at the very brink of the objective. Direct fire armored engagements ensued at 200 yards even as infantrymen of I Company were rounding up and liquidating small pockets of resistance. By 1315 hours enemy resistance had collapsed. Five tanks, one halftrack and two reconnaissance cars were knocked out while two other tanks were captured intact. Company C of the Eight Hundred Third and Company A of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh outgunned and outfought the German tankers at every turn. One hundred eighteen prisoners were taken bringing the Regiment's total to 230 for the day. One Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tank was knocked out. I Company reorganized in BADEM, then moved East to occupy high ground overlooking the town. No resistance was encountered in securing the flank and outposts were established 800 yards beyond the objective. K and L Companies had meanwhile deployed and secured a defensive line running parallel to the main BADEM-GONDORF road.

Having achieved all assigned objectives, troops of the Eleventh remained on the alert while Combat Commands of the Fourth Armored Division crossed over Fifth Division bridges and took up the attack. ERDORF, METTERICH, BADEM—all became the scenes of a continuous flow of armor, spearheading to the Northeast toward the RHINE. In the

Third Battalion area, leading armored elements that passed through quickly overran a huge enemy force and took 260 prisoners which they turned over to I Company. Shortly thereafter, the Third Battalion dispatched a task force consisting of L Company reinforced with a platoon of heavy machine guns of M Company together with a platoon of Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tanks to occupy high ground and intercept enemy forces between ORSFELD and KYLLBERG, who were retreating before an Eightieth Division drive along the Fifth's left flank in the vicinity of KYLLBERG. I Company covered the left flank of the task force which in three hours had cleared ORSFELD, taken thirty-four Germans who attempted to infiltrate back to their lines, and went on to take designated high ground thereby blocking the enemy's escape gap. There were more enemy troops pocketed on the Second Battalion's left flank, so at 0845 hours of the following day another Eleventh Infantry task force, composed of F Company, one platoon of Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tanks, one section of H Company's heavy machine guns and one anti-tank mine platoon, cleared WILSECKER and ETELDORF, established contact with the Three Hundred Eighteenth Infantry of the Eightieth Division, returned with forty-six prisoners at 1400 hours, no resistance being encountered during the mopup. During the next day, Regimental operational plans were being formed in conformation with Division move orders. At noon of 6 March 1945 the following units were attached to the Eleventh Infantry: Company C Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, one platoon Fifth Cavalry Troop, Company C Seventh Engineers, one Quartermaster Truck Company, Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion, Company A and one platoon of D Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion Company B (less one platoon) Ninety-First Chemical Company C Fifth Medical Battalion, one platoon Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Reconnaissance Company, and the Five Hundred Twelfth and Seven Hundred Fifty-Second Field Artillery (Corps) Battalions.

In less than twenty-four hours since funnelling through Fifth Division positions East of the KYLL, leading elements of the Fourth Armored took more than 3000 prisoners including a German Major General, in driving to the vicinity of MAYEN only twenty miles from the RHINE River. The Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division, which had similarly established a bridgehead on the KYLL along the Fifth right flank, simultaneously moved forward in an attack spearheaded by the Tenth Armored Division. During this same period, First Army forces were engaged in heavy fighting in the REMAGEN (RHINE) bridgehead after having captured the LUDENDORF BRIDGE.

While these developments were just beginning, the Tenth Infantry was smashing desperately at German opposition linking the slowly expanding bridgehead. The main effort of Company I Tenth Infantry began at 0700 hours when two platoons jumped off in the attack on ORDOF. Thirty minutes later the leading troops came against heavy artillery and small arms fire from well consolidated defensive positions. The advance was temporarily halted. A change in tactics sent one platoon of infantrymen, perched on tanks, around the left flank toward the objective.

The platoon loaded on tanks in the vicinity of GONDORF, and erroneously attacked farther West than planned, running into enemy troops dug-in and supported by direct fire from self-propelled guns. When fired upon, troops dismounted, reformed as best they could under fire, and attacked. The enemy infantry was shortly overwhelmed and were in the process of being herded into a prisoner group when German anti-tank guns, firing without regard for the safety of their own men, knocked out five American tanks of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh in less than one minute killing and wounding many of their own troops in the process.

In the resulting confusion the platoon continued the attack and cleared the nearby town of PICKLIESSEM. Their whereabouts unknown to the Regiment, the platoon members, under the command of Technical Sergeant Henry Tackett, who later received a battlefield commission for his work in this and many other battles, remained in the town during the night where they drove away an enemy SP and annihilated an attacking force of infantrymen attempting to retake the town. The platoon held the town until relieved by elements of the First Battalion at 0730 hours the following morning. In the meantime, a patrol from Company L had pushed on through DUDELDORF to ORDOF at 2400 hours to report the town clear of enemy troops. Hard pressed on the center and outflanked, enemy resistance collapsed in the entire DUDELDORF-ORSDOF sector, and what elements were not destroyed in the attack withdrew to the East.

The Second Battalion moved out at 0830 hours on the 4th to occupy objectives East of GONDORF but heavy resistance was encountered and the objectives not taken until 2300 hours. Company E and G cleared the high ground commanding the vicinity, Company F occupied the ridge East of GONDORF, and Company E cleared the town of PHILLIPSHEIM by midnight. The toughest of the bridgehead fighting had come to a close; the mission of the Regiment accomplished.

On the morning of March 5, the bridgehead was thrown open to the Fourth Armored Division, which struck at 0500 hours in its notable sweep Eastward toward the RHINE. The Tenth by this time was established in military circles as a river crossing outfit. The MAINE, SEINE, MOSELLE, SEILLE, SAUER, PRUM, NIMS, and KYLL, not to mention the numerous lesser streams all fought for, successfully bridged and passed. Now other streams and rivers, just as formidable, traversed the approaches to the heart of Germany, constituting a challenge designed to take the measure of the most skilled and experienced troops.

The KYLL River bridgehead was established against most stubborn resistance, but in the three days required to clear the area and secure it for exploitation purposes by the armor the Division had broken the enemy's defense to the point that further organized resistance on their part was practically impossible.

The Tenth Regiment maintained positions of farthest penetration in the bridgehead perimeter on March 6, patrolling the woods to the front and guarding bridges in the Eleventh Infantry Regiment and Fourth Armored Division's sector, and the Brewery in BITBURG, while the Second Infantry Regiment passed through to attack to the East. Prisoners taken during the day were, for the most part, stragglers left behind when their units withdrew. The Regimental Command Post moved to BUTTINGEN and, on the night of the 6th, the Division, at the request of the division on the South flank, directed that the towns of SPANG, SPANGDAHLEM, and DAHLEM be occupied prior to daylight of the following morning. The mission was assigned to the First Battalion. The towns designated were lightly held and Company C took DAHLEM, and Company B cleared SPANG and SPANGDAHLEM against only slight resistance. The mission was completed by 0400 hours with the capture of 16 prisoners.

From the 1st to the 6th of March the Second Infantry Regiment was in a holding position along the KYLL preparing for the drive on the RHINE. All excess equipment was eliminated. Rolls, packs and vehicles were cut down to minimum loads. Men were briefed on how to handle captured equipment that was usable and told to destroy all other supplies and material. A security news blackout hung over the unit.

A fanatical rear-guard action greeted attacking forces on the first day of the drive. The First Battalion, jumping



Yanks take over former 88 mm. position near Shankweiler.

off from BITBURG, swept through the towns of GINDORF and OBERKAIL. SCHWARTZENBORN turned out to be a tough nut. The Germans were fiercely resisting and threw tanks into the counterattack. The battalion held a line just outside of the town and to the East. Direct fire from Kraut self-propelled guns on three sides of the village set fire to the buildings and ripped out communications. The First Battalion infantrymen crossed a small river to get into SCHWARTZENBORN, but their supporting tanks were unable to follow immediately. Consequently when the Germans counterattacked the doughboys were without any anti-tank defense except bazookas which were soon exhausted. Unopposed, German tanks cruised up to houses containing the infantrymen, poked their long gun muzzles inside and blasted away. Company A in particular lost very heavily in men killed and captured.

The Second Battalion moved through the First on the morning of the seventh and Company G drove forward to capture the much-contested town. Company E and Company F kept the Jerries fleeing East until they seized a bridgehead across the SALM River and cleared the town of EISENSCHMITT. The Southern approach to the new bridgehead was secured by the Third Battalion as it attacked and took the high ground South and Southeast of EISENSCHMITT.

The Seventh Engineers moved into the area and went to work on a span across the SALM River.

"Many Roads lead to the Rhine, Many More to Death," and "Meet Me At The Rhine and Let Your Skull There" were the billboard type signs that greeted elements of the regiment as they drove farther East and Northeast the next day. German propaganda artists had been on the job to discourage the doughboys. The signs didn't delay units. They drove farther East and Northeast clearing roadblocks and woods and taking the town of EICHELLVITTE from the boys who spent their time on a boogie man sign.

On 8 March, the Second Battalion, with light and medium tanks, assault guns and Cannon Company in support and under the command of Regimental Executive Officer, Colonel Walter R. Graham, formed as Task Force GRAHAM for the drive on the MOSEL River. The next morning, at 0800

hours, the unit jumped off from OBERKAIL and in a wide flanking movement through the towns of BEINSFELD, MEISBURG, WALLENBORN, OEDERSDORF and BLECKOUSEN cut in from the rear of MANDERSCHIED to attack and take the city and 131 prisoners of war.

The movement was one of surprise. The Germans had defended MANDERSCHIED on the East and the Task Force's long sweep to the North, East, South and West caught the Kraut with the seat of his trousers toward the attack. Task Force GRAHAM then struck quickly and aggressively to the Northeast, out of MANDERSCHIED, and captured the town of ULMEN. March 10, the unit drove East, wheeled South and took KOCHER on the West bank of the MOSEL.

Other elements of the combat team mopped up the sector between the SALM and MOSEL Rivers during the Task Force's operations. The First Battalion swept the area between EISENSCHMITT and MANDERSCHIED while the Third Battalion attacked to the Northeast and took the towns of BETTENFELD and high ground to the East and Southeast and PANTENBURG.

German resistance was limited and disorganized with the enemy using anti-aircraft artillery against ground forces. It wasn't until Task Force GRAHAM took KOCHER that concerted resistance was offered. During the three days it held the town, preparatory to crossing the MOSEL, the Jerries laid heavy mortar concentrations and small arms fire into the city and made movement in the streets along the waterfront, practically impossible. KOCHER, incidentally, had one of the largest stocks of wine ever found in Germany. That is, it had before the Fifth Division found it.

Tactically, the Tenth Regiment was in Division Reserve. The Third Battalion Tenth Regiment continued to occupy DUDELDORF while the Second Battalion assembled in GONDORF. And on the division front the curious situation now prevailed of having the Eleventh Infantry 15 to 20 miles East of the KYLL on the left, consolidating positions behind the rapid advance of the Fourth Armored Division, which had already reached the RHINE River, while on the Division's right flank the Second Infantry was overcoming stiff resistance at EISENSCHMITT only five miles East of the KYLL. The chief difficulty, like the comparable summer break-

**5th CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
ENGAGEMENT AT REIDENHOUSEN,
GERMANY, 16 MARCH 1945**

to Altstrimming

GERMAN LINE 1530 HRS.

POINT OF ENGAGEMENT 1530 HRS.

FLANKING MOVEMENT OF 5th RCN TR. FROM ALTSTRIMMING, 1500 HRS. 16 MAR.

3d PLAT.

5th RCN COMMAND A.C.

REIDENHOUSEN

1st & 2d PLATS.

REGT. CP.

Regt's Co & Staff hit here.

to Mastershausens

GERMAN LINE 1600 HRS.

MORTAR FIRE

TWO MX. IV TANKS

PROPOSED ROUTE 10th INF. C.T. (MT2)

WITHDRAWAL

WITHDRAWAL

WITHDRAWAL

Legend

- PANZERFAUST (BAZOOKA)
- CANISTER BURST 37 MM
- JEOP, W/50 CAL. MG
- ARMED CAR
- 46th FA BN ARTY LN PLANE ADJUSTING 50 CAL & MORTAR FIRE ON TKS & AT GUNS



PANZERFAUST
 (BAZOOKA)
 CANISTER BURST
 37 MM
 JEEP, W/50
 CAL. MG
 46th FA BN ARTY LN
 PLANE ADJUSTING
 50 CAL & MORTAR
 FIRE ON TKS & AT GUNS

through in France, was one of logistics, of handling troop movements and supplies on the armor-clogged roads.

On the evening of March 8, the Tenth Regiment was ordered to move one battalion to a position on the right flank of the Second Infantry Regiment. The Third Battalion and Cannon Company was given the assignment and completed the movement at 2000 hours.

This contingent of the Regiment was deployed along the line GRANS DORF-SCHWARTZBURG-EICHELHUTTE, while motorized patrols were sent to the towns of DEUDES FELD and MEERFELD. These positions were maintained until the evening of March 10.

On March 8, 1945 the First and Third Battalions of the Eleventh Infantry surged forward to consolidate territory in the wake of the Fourth Armored Division. Infantrymen boarded organic transportation, artillery trucks, tank-destroyers and tanks as during the late August drive through France. No opposition formed as the advancing battalions gained between 15 and 20 miles in consolidating by-passed areas. Each rifle company became a veritable task force, moving with heavy weapons, tank-destroyer and tank components. At 2305 hours of 8 March 1945, the Eleventh Combat Team was attached to the Fourth Armored Division. The Second Battalion, in Regimental reserve with identical attachments as the First and Third Battalions, moved from ERDORF and went into an assembly area in the vicinity of OBERSTADTFELD.

On the whole, the Division's lines were extremely fluid, but this flexibility was a prime factor in the rounding up of small isolated pockets. Plans also provided for any large scale counterattack that may have developed. On the Eleventh's right flank, the Second Infantry fought off one such enemy tank-infantry force in a night clash. The mop-up advance continued through 9th March as countless truckloads of defeated Wehrmacht forces rolled rearward. Surprised enemy troops were surrendering by the thousands to the Fourth Armored Division, but wherever the enemy had elected to make a stand he sustained defeats of annihilating proportions. On the evening of March 10th the Tenth Regiment was relieved of its guard assignments and began to assemble preparatory to movement.

The new mission was relief of other elements of the division in positions along the North bank of the MOSEL River and as the Tenth Regiment prepared to return to the lines, the Division was in a position similar to that of the previous December when, following the fall of METZ, the Tenth had pushed on to the SAAR River while the Eleventh and, later, the Second, remained near METZ to contain and reduce four unfallen forts. This time the Eleventh, attached to the Fourth Armored Division, had followed that unit to the RHINE and was assisting in clearing up resistance between the RHINE and MOSEL Rivers as the direction of the spearhead changed Southward along the West bank of the RHINE in a move calculated to seal off enemy escape routes from the SAAR Basin.

On March 13, the Second Battalion, Tenth Infantry received orders to relieve elements of the Second Infantry Regiment. The movement was completed at 2100 hours and the battalion deployed along a general line vicinity of KOCHER and KLOTEN, North of the MOSEL River. These positions were held until the 15th when the Second Battalion was detached by Division order and placed in Division reserve.

During the operation carried out by the battalion in this area, 22 enemy prisoners including five wounded, were acquired without a single loss. Beginning on Monday, March 12, the battalion was committed on a three mile front along the river North and East of KOCHER, including the town of KLOTEN and extending nearly to POMMERN.

Considerable small arms fire was encountered by Company F, and by Company G from across the river, where

the Germans held a promontory some two miles long and a mile wide. By March 15, all enemy fire had been silenced, and one of some 15 prisoners, most of whom surrendered voluntarily in KOCHER, reported a company of their troops across the river willing to surrender. During the evening of March 15, a mission of clearing the land across the river was assigned Company E. Searchlights were focused on the town of VALWIGERBERG. Here the company paused for a brief rest and for orientation, and picked up 22 prisoners during the interval. Prior to dawn, the company, with heavy mortar and machine gun support, proceeded on its mission, driving to the West and clearing the promontory.

By 12 March 45, the Second Regiment had effected a series of short moves to the Southeast. Resistance encountered during these moves was insignificant, but a large number of enemy stragglers were policed up. These movements found the Regiment in positions along the North bank of the MOSEL (spelled MOSEL in Germany; MOSELLE in France) River. The overall plan now was a gigantic one. Third Army troops were to cross the MOSEL on a Corps front, drive South and project into the reaches of the SAAR PALATINATE to link up with Seventh Army troops who had made limited gains in attacking the SIEGFRIED defense system. If successful, the maneuver would trap tremendous German forces in the SAAR region. South and West along the MOSEL, the Tenth Armored and Seventy-Sixth Infantry Divisions had taken the strategic city of TRIER and were now poised to drive South in conjunction with the planned XII Corps attack. Meanwhile, it was reported that Combat Command A of the Fourth Armored Division had reached the West bank of the RHINE North of COBLENZ which itself was under attack. At 1130 hours 12 March 1945, the Eleventh Combat Team was relieved of its attachment to the Fourth Armored Division and reverted to normal control. On the same day, troops of the First Battalion relieved Combat Command B of screening positions along the MOSEL in the vicinity of FORST, MUDEN and KELDUNG. Earlier that day, Task Force GRAHAM had attempted to cross the MOSEL River behind Combat Command B Fourth Armored at TREIS, but in driving toward the city from CARDEN a bitter fight developed against a determined foe and resulted in the blowing of the bridge at TREIS even as reconnaissance elements of the Combat Command were crossing it.

Thus it became necessary for the Fifth Division to attempt a force crossing of the MOSEL River for the second time. Those Eleventh Infantry veterans who participated in the original MOSELLE crossing near METZ on 8 September 1944 vividly recalled the violent three-day battle, and in turn, faced this assignment with a good deal of skepticism. A general's-eye view of the plan was as follows: assault crossings of the MOSEL with the Ninetieth Infantry Division on the left and the Fifth Division on the right were to begin on midnight of 13 March. On the Fifth Division front, the Eleventh and Second Regiments were to cross on left and right respectively. Terrain along and beyond the riverfront was known to be extremely rough with steep hill-masses of the EIFFEL Range providing excellent defensive positions to any defending force. However, several favorable factors such as intelligence reports which reported the area as being only lightly defended, and a period of warm clear weather somewhat offset the difficult aspect of the operation. The Fourth Armored regrouped and reorganized in preparation once again to follow-up the attack from a Fifth Division bridgehead. During a static twelve-hour period prior to the river crossing, tanks and assault guns of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion fired direct and indirect at targets of opportunity. Units attached to the Eleventh for the operation were: Company A Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion, Company B Ninety-First Chemical Battalion (less one platoon), Company C Fifth Medical Battalion, Two Hundred Fourth Engineer Battalion, Company C Eight

Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion and the Nineteenth, Five Hundred Twelfth (100 millimeter howitzers) and Seven Hundred Seventy-First (155 millimeter howitzers) Field Artillery Battalions. Some enemy artillery fell in the Eleventh Regimental area during the static period. As in the SAUER and KYLL River operations a defused beam of light from searchlight batteries subtly illuminated the enemy area. During this time, enemy fire was literally nil, with only some harassing artillery fire falling both far and wide of its mark. The engineer assault boats arrived at MUDEN for the Eleventh Infantry, and the First Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon and C Company began crossing the MOSEL River, approximately 100 yards wide with a steady current at this point. The time of the crossing was 0320 hours and by 0345 both units were across with one or two short and inaccurate enemy machine gun bursts providing the only opposition. Following almost immediately, B Company commanded by First Lieutenant Randle commenced crossing and completed the operation in ten minutes.

While First Battalion troops were securing a foothold, the Third Battalion crossed over by 0420 hours. From its assembly area along the banks of the hostile shore, the Third Battalion launched an attack with I on the left and L on the right. At 1830 hours the Third Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon entered LUTZ as did L Company, which cleared and outposted the town against no resistance.

All units of the Second Combat Team had assembled in the vicinity of CARDEN on 13 March. The First and Third Battalions struck out across the MOSEL. Company I was in the boats at 0200 hours, by 0515 three companies were across and at 0715 they had reached the initial bridgehead line. The First Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Blakefield, moving fast, hit South and captured the town of TREIS against heavy resistance while the Second struck East to the bridgehead line.

Engineers began construction work on a pontoon bridge in MUDEN, to where troops of the Second Battalion Eleventh Infantry had moved up in reserve. Alligators as well as motor boats were made available for use of the reserve battalion-drivers for these being requested from the Seven

Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion. With the bridgehead secured, and with enemy resistance varying from only slight to moderate, a meeting of the Regimental staff and attached unit commanders was held on 14 March. Plans were drawn up once again to follow in the wake of the Fourth Armored Division's Combat Command B.

Meanwhile, the Second Battalion crossed the MOSEL River, employing assault boats, alligators and motor boats in effecting crossing.

In the midst of enemy shellings the Eleventh Combat Team launched two powerful tank-infantry attacks on the morning of the 15th. In approaching LIEG the tank infantry force eliminated more enemy machine gun nests and effected entry at 1600 hours. At this time leading elements of Combat Command Baker Fourth Armored Division crossed the MOSEL and moved Southeast. Meanwhile, tanks and Second Battalion Eleventh Infantry pressed beyond LIEG attacking toward high ground South of the town while under artillery fire. One platoon of tanks under Lieutenant Sinclair together with E Company swung to the right flank while G Company and two platoons of tanks followed the advance. When tanks and infantry emerged on the high ground, sudden and violent hostile fire scored direct hits on two leading tanks setting fire to both and causing casualties among tank-crew members. Infantry and remaining tanks immediately deployed and withdrew to natural cover while enemy guns fired direct from left and right flanks. Observation revealed that a battery of 88 millimeter dual purpose guns were camouflaged in haystacks nearby while at least two self-propelled pieces were maneuvering about and firing direct. Although suffering from burns received when he narrowly escaped from his blazing tank, Lieutenant Sinclair mounted another which he attempted to, but could not get into firing position. Captain Conde, A Company tank-commander, simultaneously attempted to obtain artillery support via liaison plane, Battalion and finally Regiment, but was unable to make contact. Heavy enemy fire continued as reinforcing tanks were brought up to relieve the situation. E Company fired heavily at machine gun positions and succeeded in knocking one out. By 1800 hours fierce tank battles had raged and

Bitburg, Germany, was completely ruined.





11th Infantrymen and vehicles file through road block that proved inadequate to troops marching on Cartweiler, Germany.

E Company had skirted a zeroed-in-road block. Two additional tanks were lost, one of which was set ablaze by a direct hit, and another that was disabled when hit in the suspension system. But the enemy lost heavily, too, losing 3 tanks as well as 3 88 millimeter guns. It was decided at this time to consolidate positions gained Southeast of LIEG while a column of Combat Command B passed into the attack along the same route.

When the First Battalion launched its attack at 0645 hours that morning, the Third Battalion coincidentally jumped off on the Regimental left front and aimed for DOMMERSHAUSEN. The main enemy effort occurred at a road block which the enemy had zeroed in with several self-propelled 88 millimeter guns. In a sharp fight, supporting tank-destroyers knocked out two SPs without sustaining loss. An I Company patrol advanced toward a road block and suddenly became pinned down by 20 millimeter fire. Not for very long, however, for just then leading elements of the Fourth Armored Tank column made an appearance blasting both road block and gun position. Thus tank columns of Combat Command B passed through Eleventh Infantry elements along two routes on 15 March and spurred Southeast, Command's objective being SIMMERN, a key pivot point that formed the hub of a four-directional series of roads.

The push out of TREIS by the Second Regiment gained momentum as the days passed. The enemy was disorganized and fleeing to reach the East bank of the RHINE before the American armored columns, that had crossed in the North, swung South and nipped them off. Prisoners were surrendering wholesale. The pressure of the chase was too much. From the sky came the cough of fifty calibers and the scream of P-47's diving into retreating enemy columns. The Fourth Armored Division's tanks pounded enemy SPs and armor into shapeless masses. Doughboys ran on the heels of the enemy.

To expedite pursuit of the disorganized Wehrmacht, Task Force BRECKINRIDGE, so called after Lieutenant Colonel William Breckinridge, executive officer of the Tenth Infantry, was formed with two battalions of the Tenth plus two tank companies from the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh, a company of tank destroyers, the Fifth Reconnaissance Troops and two Field Artillery Battalions. Thus the Eleventh Combat Team pushed ahead behind the Fourth Armored on the Fifth Division's left flank, with the Second Combat Team on the right of the Eleventh and Task Force BRECK-

INRIDGE following the armored units with all speed on the right flank of the Fifth Division.

The advance into the RHINELAND continued, hampered only by the lack of adequate transportation. Rifle companies were forced to hike long distances in hot weather and over rough mountainous terrain while as much motor shuttling as possible with available transportation was conducted.

During the period 16-22 March, the Tenth Regiment entered into a general phase of pursuit and mopping up, chasing the enemy across the MOSEL and NAHE Rivers to the RHINE in the vicinity of WORMS. In general, resistance centered usually around roadblocks or towns within the zone of advance, and only at a few places was contact made with the retreating forces. Strongpoints when encountered were chiefly defended by small enemy groups supported by SP's. The enemy's delaying tactics were obviously designed to enable him to extricate the bulk of his troops from the SAAR basin which was rapidly being closed by the Third Army drive to the South. As the advance gained momentum, however, these troops were overrun, and many elements of the enemy, attempting to escape from the SAAR by reaching the RHINE before the bridges were blown, were encountered and annihilated or taken captive.

Task Force BRECKINRIDGE was halted by a road block protected by German tanks and infantry near BLANKENRATH. On orders from Captain Donald E. Robinson, the Fifth Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized) moved out to flank the roadblock by moving through the town of SOSBERG, North and East of the roadblock. As the troops were moving through the white-flagged streets of SOSBERG, the "point" jeeps of the First Platoon, led by Lieutenant Norman Sterling, topped a small rise leading to the town of REIDENHAUSEN, which lay just behind the roadblock. As they began to move forward toward REIDHAUSEN, they were fired on by machine guns and small arms from enemy positions in the woods on both sides of the road.

The armored cars of the First Platoon moved forward to relieve the jeeps, and the enemy, mistaking them for tanks, began to withdraw toward the high, wooded ground South of REIDHAUSEN. As the enemy defense at the first positions began to melt away, the Second Platoon commanded by Lieutenant Howard Fromont, moved up to support the First Platoon, and the two platoons blasted their way through the positions and into the town itself.

At this point the Third Platoon, under Lieutenant Stanley Swieckowski, swung to the right and began a flanking movement West of the town.

Simultaneous with the advance of the Third Platoon, came a torrent of fire from positions manned by the enemy who had managed to elude the searching fire of the armored cars, and had succeeded in occupying reserve positions behind the town itself.

The artillery observation attached to the task force from the Forty-Sixth Field Artillery reported two tanks, or self-propelled guns, firing from positions in the woods Southwest of the town.

As the reconnaissance cars of the First and Second Platoons broke into town, the surprised German garrison fled for the reserve line. These were taken under fire of 30 calibre, 50 calibre, and 37 millimeter guns firing canister. The amazed German Regiment Commander stepped to the doorway of his Command Post in town and was met with the sight of two platoons of armored cars pouring down the road. Followed by his staff, the Lieutenant Colonel began to run towards the secondary line behind his command post, but was caught in the pants with a burst of .50 calibre fire and severely wounded. He was captured and taken to the rear together with his Regimental adjutant, and several other prisoners.

In the meantime, a hot fire fight had developed between the platoons in town and the enemy manning the secondary positions South of the town. The 37 millimeter guns fired canister at the fleeing remnants of the village garrison with terrible effect. Mortars were hastily set up, and a mortar battery consisting of 60 millimeter, and two 81 millimeter mortars proceeded to fire at the enemy tanks, and at the enemy dug in Southwest of the town.

As the lead jeeps of the Third Platoon burst from the woods at the completion of their flanking movement, they were fired on by an 88 millimeter anti-tank gun concealed near the road junction just behind the road block which was still holding up the advance of Task Force BRECKINRIDGE. In spite of the heavy armor-piercing and high explosive fire hurled at him, Sergeant Alexander Gore leaped to his .50 calibre machine gun, and raked the enemy position, driving the enemy gunners into their foxholes, and forcing the small arms to slacken their fire. His initial bursts were not effective, until the artillery Cub plane riding overhead directed him by radio contact with the jeep radio to lower his fire, and continued to direct both mortars and .50 calibre machine guns, until the enemy was forced to abandon positions.

Shortly after this, the enemy tanks withdrew, and the enemy was forced to slacken fire owing to the hail of steel seeking their positions. At first glance the enemy took the armored cars to be tanks, and abandoned their road-guard positions, leaving their Panzerfausts (bazookas) behind, and fled to the secondary line.

With the loss of the town and the immediate surrounding positions, it was no longer possible for the enemy to maintain and cover the roadblock, and the engineers were able to remove it and allow the forward movement of the task force. It was learned the enemy had been defending the town with a battalion of infantry reinforced by tanks

and anti-tank gun. Owing to the tremendous effect of canister on personnel, plus the heavy automatic firepower of the Reconnaissance troop, the enemy suffered heavy casualties in both killed and wounded.

On March 19th, the Tenth Infantry relieved Fourth Armored units in their NAHE River bridgehead, while the Second Infantry drove Eastward on the Eleventh's right flank, clearing opposition along the North bank of the NAHE River. The Eleventh Infantry continued clearing to BAD-KREUZNACH, German Army Headquarters in World War I, which was entered by the Third Battalion. At this point the Luftwaffe became active in the Eleventh sector launching two air attacks on BAD-KREUZNACH on the night of the 19th. A flight of four enemy bombers attacked bridges that spanned the NAHE River and dropped a total of nine bombs in the area, none of which were effective.


The Eleventh's forward movement to the RHINE River continued almost unopposed through 20th and 21st March. The Fourth Armored's Combat Command B reached WORMS where the enemy had blown the RHINE River bridge. Combat Command A with the Ninetieth Division was fighting in MAINZ.

The Third Battalion of the Tenth Infantry, commanded by Major Wilfrid Haughey, had been attached to the Fourth Armored Division, and that battalion quickly proceeded to clean out the city of WORMS.

At 1945 hours 21 March 1945 troops of the Eleventh Infantry reached the RHINE River when the Third Battalion cleared NIERSTEIN against virtually no resistance other than some mortar and artillery fire that issued from the opposite shore, 500 yards to the East. The First Battalion simultaneously reached the shores of the RHINE when it occupied OPPENHEIM without incident. The Second Battalion concentrated in DALHEIM tactically in reserve, and Regimental Headquarters opened at KONGERHEIM.

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CROSSING THE RHINE

As the relentless Allied drive reached the RHINE River, it was becoming increasingly apparent that, with its hard-won record of successful river crossings behind it, the Fifth Division seemed slated to be among the first to hurdle this legendary and symbolic natural defense of German soil.

The Navy had set up a headquarters at METZ. Assault boats and landing craft were seen pouring up the roads in the rear areas. Amphibious tanks, weasels, pontoon bridges, power launches, tank lighters, and all the materiel and equipment of an amphibious operation began to appear in the forward supply dumps of the Third Army.

To say that the RHINE Crossing was not viewed with some apprehension by the staff and troops alike would be the farthest thing from the truth. It was known that the LUDENDORF Bridge had been seized intact, but it was also known that the bridgehead in the REMAGEN area was hard pressed, and that sizeable groups of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) were bombing and strafing the troops in the area and that several crack German Panzer (Armored) divisions were fighting savagely to drive the American troops into the river.

As the Fifth Division moved to within sight of the RHINE River, the various staff and command echelons scanned maps and aerial photographs to find suitable spots for patrol crossings and for bridge sites. It was understood by all but a few staff members that there would be a few days, two at the least, in which to probe out the enemy defenses across the river, and study the terrain. This, however, was not the case. Acting on orders of the Third Army Commander, General George S. Patton, Jr., the Fifth Division prepared to cross the mighty water barrier on the same day that the bulk of the Division had arrived at the West bank. There is little doubt that this move caught the German East bank defenders off guard, most of whom had been deployed to stop an expected crossing in the vicinity of WORMS, farther to the South.

In the afternoon preceding the night of the 22-23d March, observation flights over the river and the vicinity of the expected crossing were made by the various staff members and Battalions intelligence officers.

The terrain facing the troops directly across from OPPENHEIM, a fair sized town on the West bank, was flat, open, and criss-crossed by small canals and irrigation ditches. Abandoned railroad embankments ran along one portion of the river bank, and several half sunken barges and river craft were scattered near the East shore.

22 March 1945 found the Eleventh Infantry Regiment in positions along the RHINE River, with its First Battalion occupying and outposting OPPENHEIM and the Third Battalion concentrated in, and the vicinity of NIERSTEIN 2000 yards North of OPPENHEIM. During this same period other Third Army units were in the process of massing along the RHINE at various points, but no crossings had as yet taken place. North of the Third Army Zone, First Army troops had deepened and extended their REMAGEN bridgehead, slackening resistance indicating that WEHRMACHT forces were being diverted to meet an imminent Third Army RHINE offensive. The Third Army's blow came on the night of 22 March 1945 when the Eleventh Infantry crossed two rifle battalions from OPPENHEIM and NIERSTEIN, to successfully establish the initial bridgehead and secure vitally important ground farther inland. It was the first assault crossing of the RHINE in history.

With the First Battalion in position at OPPENHEIM, the

Second Battalion in reserve at DACHEIM, and the Third Battalion in NIERSTEIN, Regimental Commander Colonel Paul J. Black called a meeting of Battalion Commanders at the Third Battalion Command Post in NIERSTEIN. During this time some long range enemy artillery as well as mortar fire fell sporadically in OPPENHEIM. The Luftwaffe, too, continued to be active over the regimental area, and anti-aircraft guns went into action more than once that morning. Excellent observation of the enemy shore some 800 yards distant was made possible by virtue of hilly terrain held by the Eleventh. Observation posts were established and these overlooked sparsely wooded lowland areas controlled by Germans. First Battalion mortars harassed enemy troops on the far shore throughout the day, in one instance routing a sizeable group from a mess building, forcing them to take to foxholes. Meanwhile, at the Third Battalion command post, plans for an assault crossing were being formed by Colonel Black, Major Coghill, Regimental operations officer, Third Battalion Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Herman R. Schell. In the midst of this conference, Colonel Black received a message from Major General S. LeRoy Irwin, directing that the RHINE crossing be effected by the Eleventh Infantry that night, instead of the next night. This was the plan: Eleventh Infantry troops were to establish the bridgehead for the Fifth by crossing two battalions. The Tenth and Second Regiments were to follow in that order. The Fourth Armored Division had regrouped in the vicinity of GAU ODERHEIM, and again prepared to strike beyond a Fifth Division bridgehead. To the North, the Ninetieth Infantry Division, which continued to form the Fifth Division's left boundary, was engaged in clearing MAINZ. The Sixth Armored Division formed on the Fifth's right flank, and also prepared to strike beyond the bridgehead. Tremendous quantities of bridging and ferrying equipment were brought up by the Two Hundred Fourth and Seventh Engineer Battalions, the Eleven Hundred Thirty-Fifth Engineer Group and special port battalion personnel, while later, U. S. Navy was to supply help, landing crafts, and vehicle personnel with which to build up the bridgehead. Corps, Division and self-propelled artillery was massed in firing positions but no softening up barrages were to be fired prior to the crossings. At 1530 hours that afternoon, the Second Battalion joined Third Battalion troops in NIERSTEIN after having moved up from DACHEIM, thus bringing all assault elements of the regiment in position along the river front. The Provisional Battalion was to play its part, too, for Canon Company's guns were in firing position and Anti-tank Company attached three bazooka teams to each rifle company as well as a seventeen-man emergency litter bearer team to each Battalion Aid Station. The assaulting battalions were to be the First, which was to cross from OPPENHEIM, and the Third, which was to attack from the Southern edge of NIERSTEIN. Each rifle company was to cross with the maximum of infantry fire power, and mortar and machine gun sections of heavy weapon company, D and M were attached.

At 1100 hours the 22 March the Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion received the information that the Eleventh Infantry would make an assault crossing of the RHINE River that night at 2200 hours. The battalion had very little time to prepare for it.

The Division Artillery had been assigned two groups of reinforcing artillery which were in turn assigned to the Nineteenth with instructions that when the Eleventh crossed, the One Hundred Eighty-Second group was then to reinforce the Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion. Thus

the line-up of artillery for the Eleventh Infantry's crossing was the Nineteenth reinforced by the Twenty-First Field Artillery Battalion One Hundred Seventy-Seventh and One Hundred Eighty-Second Groups. The composition of the groups is listed below:

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SECOND GROUP

Five Hundred Twelfth Field Artillery Battalion (105 Howitzer).

Seven Hundred Seventy-First Field Artillery Battalion (155 Howitzer).

Nine Hundred Forty-Fifth Field Artillery Battalion (155 Howitzer).

Seven Hundred Fortieth Field Artillery Battalion (8" Howitzer).

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVENTH GROUP

Two Hundred Seventy-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion (Armored 18 105s).

Seven Hundred Fifty-Eighth Field Artillery Battalion (8 inch Howitzer).

One Hundred Seventy-Ninth Field Artillery Battalion (155 Howitzer).

One Hundred Ninety-First Field Artillery Battalion (155 Howitzer).

Accordingly, liaison officers from both groups reported to the Nineteenth the afternoon of the 22d and were set up in a small wine cellar adjoining fire direction center. Each liaison officer had a direct line of his group fire direction center and also had wire communications with each battalion of the group.

At this time Major Colegrove and Captain Frakes, with the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Payne, began drawing up the artillery plan for support. No preparations were to be fired except upon call. The plan consisted of nearly two hundred concentrations covering the far shore from the water's edge inland some 300 to 400 yards, concentrations on all roads and trails leading into the bridge-head area and heavy concentrations on the towns of WÄLTER-STADTEN, TREBUR, GEINSHEIM, GROSS-GERAU and surrounding areas. The concentrations were then assigned to the reinforcing battalions.

Meanwhile, some observed missions were being fired by the Nineteenth, but there appeared to be very little activity on the far shore. Twelve shelling report teams were organized from the two reinforcing groups for the purpose of covering the two bridges which were to be built as soon as elements reached the enemy side. Six teams were ordered to cross with the assault companies, three per bridge on the far shore in order to obtain "shell reports" on the enemy shore while six more stood by to cover the friendly side.

At 2030 hours harassing fire mixed with interdicting fire was placed in the town of GEINSHEIM at the rate of 20 rounds per hour which continued until 0022 hours.

At precisely 2145 hours 22 March 1945, the Third Battalion's spearheading companies, I and K moved down to the river bank where Two Hundred Fourth Engineer Battalion personnel awaited in readiness. Preparations functioned quickly, smoothly, and above all, quietly, as assault teams were formed and loaded into the boats. K Company shoved off at 2230 and paddled across the 800 feet (at that point) river without a shot being fired from the enemy shore. In the first boat to reach the far bank were: K Company Commanding Officer, First Lieutenant Irvén Jacobs, Lieutenant John A. Mannow, Private First Class William Hewitt, Private First Class Vergil Miller, Private Theodore Strategos, Private Richard J. Huiller, Private First Class Arthur Juen-gel, Private John Surace, Technician Fifth Grade Richard E. Rose and Private John L. Paquitt. They were the first

of the Division to cross the RHINE, and when the balance of K Company arrived on the East bank, it marked the first time in history that a crossing of the RHINE River had been forced by troops in assault boats. As K Company hit the shore, a group of 7 surprised Germans promptly surrendered and paddled themselves across the river without escort.

Meanwhile, just as I Company, commanded by Captain Link, prepared to follow up K in crossing, heavy firing opened from the right flank where First Battalion troops were simultaneously crossing approximately 700 yards downstream at OPPENHEIM. It developed that B Company's First Platoon had been spotted by enemy machine gunners, who commenced firing while assault boats were yet in mid-stream. Regiment then advised Third Battalion that First Battalion would delay its crossing for ten minutes, but Lieutenant Colonel Birdsong, Third Battalion Commanding Officer, decided to get I Company across anyway while all of K Company organized on the far shore. Along with I Company's first wave were Major Stiller, aide to General Patton, and Lieutenant Cocke of the Air Force who went as observer with the infantry. A flurry of shellfire managed to partially silence enemy automatic weapons in the First Battalion sector, but this heavy firing also alerted the enemy along the entire regimental front, and as I Company neared the far shore it also received some enemy machine-gun fire. No casualties were incurred, but when L Company crossed in Third Battalion reserve ten minutes later, personnel paddled under increasingly heavy small arms fire. Some infantrymen were wounded.

During this time, First Battalion assault troops of A and B Companies were meeting with very heavy resistance in crossing approximately 700 yards South of the Third Battalion at OPPENHEIM. The RHINE crossing itself was a tribute to the courage of riflemen, for whom it was necessary to paddle 800 feet into the very teeth of the enemy fire. B Company under First Lieutenant William Randle was the first of the battalion troops to make the East bank, while A Company commanded by First Lieutenant Bryant pulled abreast. When assault boats were eagerly beached

Infantrymen board trucks prepared to follow 4th Armored Division.



on the hostile shore, enemy fire increased and included that of panzerfausts. An example of what was required in order to establish and extend the First Battalion bridgehead is the action of B Company's Second Platoon which was re-organized and led by Staff Sergeant Foster Ferguson, who took over platoon leadership when the platoon sergeant became a casualty. Concentric rifle and rifle grenade fire alone punched a hole in the enemy's perimeter defense system which consisted of a strong line of machine gun nests, but no pillboxes. Fierce small arms skirmishes raged for a half an hour. Temporarily, at least, enemy resistance reached fanatical proportions, with infantrymen of Ferguson's platoon firing directly into large rectangular foxholes to eliminate strongpoints. Deadly marching fire extended the bridgehead, and shortly thereafter the First Battalion struck inland. Private First Class Paul Conn, Jr., B Company rifleman, remained behind to hold down an enemy machine gun nest that was bypassed. It was an all night affair for Conn who was forced to dig-in with his bare hands, for less than 30 yards away the enemy machine gun intermittently opened at anything that moved. "I was tempted to swim back across the RHINE," said Conn afterwards. Conn remained in a cramped position through the entire night, and when daybreak came he saw 10 Germans who comprised the machine gun nest. Conn then attempted to work his M-1, but it jammed. Finally in desperation he flung all caution to the wind, pulled out a hand grenade and rose before the enemy. Transfixed at the sight of a lone American menacingly coming toward them, the 10 Germans threw up their arms and surrendered. Thus ended Conn's ordeal and the last vestige of enemy resistance on the river's edge.

Lieutenant Colonel Birdsong, Third Battalion Commanding Officer, and Headquarters crossed the river at 2330 hours in the midst of a small arms engagement near the far shore, but at this time the bulk of enemy resistance was being concentrated against the First Battalion. All assault troops were across the river by now clearing last bits of enemy resistance from beyond the East river bank, and the Eleventh Combat Team's attack was beginning to take form as artillery liaison officers and forward observers were also across. Armor of Company A Seven Hundred Thirty-seventh Tank Battalion and the Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion were preparing to cross on motor barges and render direct support, along with amphibious tanks of the Seven Hundred Forty-eighth Tank Battalion. Despite the intense small arms fire encountered by the First Battalion and some by the Third, it was evident that surprise had been achieved in the operation for a German artillery reaction did not come until 0030 hours on the following day—or two hours after the crossing had begun. Assault companies prepared to strike inland at the time enemy artillery commenced falling into the river and hitting both banks ineffectually. Approximately 50 rounds of shell fire, including that of self-propelled weapons, fell in the OPPENHEIM area, but crossing of supplies and additional troops continued. In Regimental reserve, Second Battalion was alerted and prepared to cross near NIERSTEIN, follow up and consolidate ground taken by the Third Battalion. The Tenth Infantry Regiment prepared to follow into the First Battalion's bridgehead opposite OPPENHEIM to take up the Division's right sector.

A Company of the Eleventh met with violent small arms fire as it sought to clear a group of buildings along the bridgehead's right flank. Some 20 prisoners were taken and 14 of the enemy were killed. In seizing the area First Lieutenant Harry Kaylor, Executive Officer of D Company, evacuated wounded back across the river under fire.

At midnight troops of the Tenth moved in columns down to the river and at 0155 hours, March 23, the crossing of the Regiment began with the First, Second and Third Battalions following after the First Battalion of the Eleventh,



Army and Navy cooperate as infantry loads in Navy's Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel to go across Rhine River.

at OPPENHEIM. The Seventh Engineer Battalion handled the assault boats.

Across the river the Tenth Regiment moved immediately to the Southern flank Eastward toward LEESHEIM. Companies A and C of the First Battalion made contact by 0245 hours and moved out abreast toward ERFELDON. Company C encountered some resistance from small arms upon approaching the objective, but the enemy force was incapable of halting the advance, and the majority was soon taken prisoner.

The last battalion of the Tenth Infantry was completely across at 0655 hours, and as the two regiments fanned out along the Eastern bank, the United States Navy brought up landing craft to the West bank and put them into the water. Combat engineer battalions of the One Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Fifth Engineer Group constructed four ferries and began building the treadway bridge. By 0700 hours, the two regiments had all six battalions across, one ferry was working, and the Landing Crafts, Vehicle Personnel were scuttling back and forth carrying supplies.

With all but sniper and some bypassed resistance broken in its bridgehead sector, the First Battalion continued the attack inland and struck Northeast toward GEINSHEIM, Division objective Number One. The axis of advance was the main road leading to GEINSHEIM, and all assaulting platoons with B Company on the left and A on the right, moved forward abreast deploying as skirmishers. A Company left its reserve platoon and Company Command Post in position at the farmhouse which it had previously cleared while a similar contingent of B Company was yet engaged in rounding up outflanked resistance. C Company in Battalion reserve also crossed the river. The going became very rough as assault troops neared the road junction at about 1000 yards inland. Heavy small arms engagements took place and as units attained the road junction they emerged into a broad expanse of open terrain which afforded no cover or concealment. The advance continued along the main road for several yards when suddenly large concentrations of mortar fire showered the area. The enemy enjoyed unobstructed observation in illuminating First Battalion positions with flares. Shelling grew in intensity and artillery and self-propelled weapons joined mortar fire in forcing both units from their course. Forward elements of both companies were by now pinned down and reluctant to go forward in the face of severe fire. Eight casualties were incurred as platoons milled about and herded




5th Division trucks cross Rhine River on ponton bridge that was built in half a day by Third Army engineers.

together until Technical Sergeant Troy B. Key, an Eleventh Infantry veteran and acting platoon leader of B Company, together with Technical Sergeant Brown, a platoon sergeant of A Company, rallied the men forward and out of bursting radius. Sergeants Key and Brown moved about in the fragment infested area to direct the positioning of flank-covering machine gun fire, then went forward to lead their respective units with shouts of "Let's get 'em—keep going." This resulted in a marching fire attack against violently resisting German infantry that employed very heavy panzerfaust fire. The Battalion Aid Station, under Captain Scott, by now also has crossed the river and set up in the farmhouse along the river bank. Although outnumbered B and A Companies continued to advance towards GEINSHEIM and suffered no casualties in gaining several hundred yards. It was the opinion of all, that had the units not moved forward as they did, annihilation by terrific and accurate concentrations of enemy shellfire which followed would have been likely. B Company on the left flank, bore the brunt of an infantry attack which the enemy launched from GEINSHEIM shortly thereafter. Fierce small arms (rifle fire, rifle grenades, hand grenades, and bazookas) engagements ensued at close range, and the line was defended through close co-ordination of A and B Companies. Lieutenant Bryant of A Company and Lieutenant Randle of B Company were in constant communication with each other and fashioned an impregnable defense. At one time Major Schell, Battalion Commanding Officer, inquired of the hard-pressed units whether they thought C Company should be committed, but Lieutenant Randle and Lieutenant Bryant agreed that GEINSHEIM could be taken without further help and so replied. Despite the fact that 81 millimeter mortars, under artillery fire in rear positions could not render full support, the First Battalion inflicted severe losses on the enemy, while suffering miraculously light casualties (2 wounded) itself in so fierce an engagement. The Nineteenth Field Artillery fired heavily too, in

supporting the defense and by 0400 hours the enemy withdrew—presumably to GEINSHEIM where a 25-foot-wide canal provided a defense to its Eastern approaches. It was believed that enemy artillery was emplaced in the vicinity of LEEHEIM and ERFELDON and these areas now became the targets for heavy counter-battery fire as laid down by Corps Artillery. Actually a Tenth Infantry attack was now developing in that direction.

Meanwhile, during the time of the First Battalion's bridgehead fight, the Eleventh Infantry's Third Battalion was involved in extending its bridgehead some 1000 yards to the North. By midnight the entire Third Battalion, less the rear Command Post group, had crossed over into the bridgehead, with L Company receiving very heavy small arms fire as it crossed in Battalion reserve during the latter period. K Company began clearing the left half of the Third Battalion river area while I Company moved South to come nearer First Battalion troops on the right flank. K and I Companies quickly moved inland to secure 500 yards of depth on the left, and 300 yards on the right. Technical Sergeant Heber Braley, K Company platoon sergeant, stumbled into a large foxhole where four Germans napped. The Germans immediately gave up, inquiring if these were American paratroopers. Meanwhile, L Company in reserve mopped up all remaining resistance between K and I Companies along and beyond the shoreline.

K Company sent two platoons North to secure the Southern tip of a small airfield by 0400 hours. Resistance was at first moderate, consisting mainly of strong small arms fire including that of panzerfausts. A short while later some very close action developed at the edge of the air strip in darkness, and in local engagements which resulted in the capture of Technical Sergeant Heber Braley, first platoon sergeant, and Lieutenant Alexander G. Booras, platoon leader. Realizing that disorganization at this time threatened the bridgehead's entire left flank, Lieutenant William B. Belchee, platoon leader, regained control of the situation by person-



ally contacting remnants of both platoons. He moved beyond the enemy lines under heavy fire and reorganized the leaderless platoon. Meanwhile, a good number of men of this platoon had taken cover in an air-raid bunker, and were now surrounded. This information came from Sergeant Clarence A. Ritchie who was captured but later escaped. Sergeant Ritchie also informed Lieutenant Belchee that the enemy was preparing to launch a counterattack. Lieutenant Belchee called to the rear for artillery fire which soon commenced to fall—just in time; for the enemy had attacked his positions. I Company meanwhile was ordered from its phase line on the extreme right flank—some 1500 yards distant—to move up to K Company's flank while L in reserve occupied I's former position. The switch occurred at the right moment for I Company, as it neared the designated flank, ran flush into a German company seeking to encircle K Company. Back at the airstrip, Lieutenant Belchee built up a defensive line and together with his depleted unit fought off an attack by 60 enemy infantrymen who filled the airstrip with wild shrieks as they attacked. In this fierce small arms fight, K Company killed 20 and took 40 of the enemy breaking the attack. It must be remembered that this engagement actually took place behind enemy lines, for Lieutenant Jacobs, K Company Commanding Officer, simultaneously directed a minor action from his Command Post in the small town, but I Company by now went to work on the main enemy force along the right flank. An outline of the bridgehead operation at this time showed continuous action along the entire regimental front, with the First Battalion attacking GEINSHEIM at daybreak, and the Third Battalion reducing enemy resistance on the left half. K Company losses were 4 enlisted men killed and 7 enlisted men wounded—evacuated. Others who at first were listed missing returned.

When I Company encountered the German force which aspired to cut and encircle K Company, Commanding Officer Captain Link directed that his 60 millimeter mortars and machine guns immediately be set up at forward points. Although positions were unorthodox, these tactics later proved invaluable because the enemy force immediately became pinned down by the sudden and accurate shellings. Sergeant Joseph A. Hartke, weapons section leader, zeroed in on the enemy while gunners Private First Class John B. Knight and Sergeant Stanley A. Valancius maintained a continuous barrage. All came under direct small arms fire with which the enemy resisted. No less than three enemy machine guns and 10 automatic rifle positions were accounted for by this devastating fire. I Company's machine guns were strategically set up to give the maximum of overhead fire, and this too, kept the enemy pinned down. Not long afterwards Germans were giving up in large numbers and by 0730 hours the entire enemy force had either been killed or captured. Seventy-six Germans and two officers were rounded up while at least 15 dead were counted on the field of battle. I Company suffered two killed in this engagement. Three I Company runners, Private First Class Conn Connewart, Technician Fourth Grade Frank McArdle and Private Paul Bonwits, were in the midst of marching 41 prisoners back to the enclosure when they suddenly collided with a by-passed enemy platoon. The uncaptured Germans were apparently full of fight for they quickly deployed and set up a machine gun. The runners hurriedly informed the prisoners of war of their plight and tactfully added "Alles Kaput." The prisoners shouted emotional pleas to their erstwhile comrades upshot of which was that 30 fully armed Germans boarded the bandwagon to increase the particular prisoner tally to upwards of 70. By 0900 hours of 23 March 1945 the Second Platoon of Company C, Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyers had been ferried across the Rhine, the first of the Third Army armor to cross,

and were committed almost at once to help clear the Third Battalion front. I Company jumped off, attacking west of the canal between K and I Companies. Heavy support fire by artillery and tank destroyers enabled the company to move rapidly forward and dissect the main TREBUR-GEINSHEIM route at phase line where 40 enemy shaken by violent shellings, neatly stacked arms and surrendered. Two K Company personnel who were missing as a result of the air strip action earlier in the morning, Technical Sergeant Heber Braley and Medic William B. Rea, were liberated when the contingent surrendered. I and L Company patrols probed into TREBUR itself at 1053 hours that morning encountering but slight resistance in the form of rifle fire.

It was dawn 0530 hours on 23 March when B and A Companies resumed the attack on GEINSHEIM, following up the enemy who had partially blown one of the canal bridges while effecting withdrawal. At this time Third Battalion troops had fought deeply on the left, but resistance was lighter there. The opening of this period also marked the beginning of 24 hours of the greatest Luftwaffe activity ever experienced by the Regiment in its sector, including the CAUMONT straffings and VERDUN bombings in earlier French campaigns. For the most part of these attacks were directed at bridging sites in OPPENHEIM and NIERSTEIN. The first of these attacks occurred at 0600 hours when 12 German fighters appeared to climax an hour-long enemy SP shelling of OPPENHEIM crossing site, while troops of the Third Battalion, Tenth Infantry Regiment, were attempting to load into assault boats and paddle across the river. Enemy aircrafts dropped bombs along the river and attempted to machine gun troops and installations, while they themselves were under constant automatic weapons and anti-aircraft fire. One bomb struck the Third Battalion rear Command Post in NIERSTEIN wounding Lieutenant Bishop, Battalion Communications Officer, and wireman Private First Class Burrell, both of whom were laying wire.

Across the river and inland B Company was meeting with intense small arms and bazooka fire as it drew to within 300 yards of GEINSHEIM. A Company, committed to take the right flank of the town, met with lighter resistance. The German arm band Volksturm joined the Wehrmacht troops in defending the town, but these only afforded token resistance and either slipped away or gave up as prisoners or hid in cellars until captured. Staff Sergeant Charlie L. Houston, acting Third Platoon sergeant of B Company together with Lieutenant Laurel Venters, co-ordinated a successful attack on the enemy who was in position at the GEINSHEIM canal. Aptly termed "Walking Death," marching assaults fire was vigorously employed by riflemen of the platoon and enemy troops along the canal were split into disorganization by the relentless advance. Staff Sergeant Thomas C. McCystal, D Company section leader, repaired a jammed machine gun while under heavy fire. He then moved up to where the riflemen of B Company were dug in, and personally opened with continuing and devastating fire, which eventually provided assault troops with an opening through which one entry into GEINSHEIM was effected. Staff Sergeant Dexter Cunningham, whose D Company heavy machine gun section was attached to A Company, also performed nobly. He previously had suffered three separate wounds from an exploding panzerfaust. He refused evacuation and insisted on participating in the GEINSHEIM attack, during which he personally positioned and directed invaluable covering machine gun fire, immeasurably contributing to the attack. He was evacuated only when the town was completely cleared. Lieutenant Venters cut down a German with a tommygun fire while dodging a potatoe-masher. Private First Class Frank Benedict, a BAR man, killed an enemy machine gunner with a burst and took the balance of the crew prisoners with another



DUKW'S and LCVP'S put plenty of ripples in the Rhine River.

burst. The entry into town was gradual, but by 0900 hours all enemy resistance collapsed. A and B Companies out-posted forward and ferreted prisoners from houses, basements and public buildings. By 0945 23 March 1945 the Battalion had taken Division Objective Number One, GEISHEIM, together with more than 150 prisoners, B Company taking approximately 100, and A Company capturing 50. At this moment, supporting armor of Company A, Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion, was being ferried across the river—on their way to GEISHEIM to assist the First Battalion in an attack on WALLERSTADTEN.

Next to the actual infantry fighting to expand the bridgehead the most important and most difficult job in the RHINE crossing was the G-4 function of co-ordinating the engineer work with the supply needs of the Regiments. It was because the build-up of the bridgehead was so fast and smooth that the crossing eventually proved so successful. The engineers set all sorts of records for speed in building Class 40 rafts and two bridges, a heavy ponton and a treadway. The Navy kept its LCVP's constantly plying back and forth and a quartermaster company kept its DUKW's in constant operation in the shuttle of supplies and evacuation of the wounded.

The treadway bridge was finished and in use by 1600 hours on the 23rd. Military police of the Red Diamond were up to their usual standard in the efficiency of traffic control and a constant stream of traffic was kept going over the bridge, as well as by rafts and LCVP's.

On-the-spot control of traffic and loading and unloading of LCVP's was handled by Anti-Tank Company of the Second Infantry Regiment, selected by G-4 Lieutenant Colonel

Richard S. McKee to insure the fast, smooth flow of men and material into the bridgehead.

All that work, of course, continued during intermittent shelling of the crossing site by German artillery. The fire, luckily, was unobserved and the German's map data yielded very few lucky hits. Aircraft were most active.

At 1815 hours on the 23rd, four German planes suddenly flashed in on the bridgehead out of the low ground haze and strafed the treadway bridge. Ack-ack gunners shot down three and no material damage was done. Forty-five minutes later, single German planes made passes at the bridge every 15 minutes or so. One succeeded in setting afire a gasoline truck just as it got on the bridge. Illuminating flares were dropped and the strafing kept up all night, two more being shot down before midnight.

Early on the 23rd, while the drive on ERFELDON was taking place, Company B, the first company of the Tenth to cross the RHINE, had swung Southward clearing several miles of the Eastern bank before turning East on the extreme Southern flank to take a farm settlement and 73 prisoners.

Amphibious tanks of the Seven Hundred Forty-Eighth Tank Battalion were now operating across the river and in the bridgehead area tank destroyers were being ferried across, and more tanks of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion began to cross the treadway bridge at 1800 hours. Regiment then ordered the Second Battalion to push on to DORNHEIM, and the First Battalion, once the town was taken, was ordered to pass through and attack BERKACH. Pursuant to the order Company F moved out by dark to secure the town and was followed by Companies

G and E. The operation was complete by 2030 hours, and the troops passed through the town and took up positions around it, thus setting the stage for a continuation of the advance by the First Battalion. Elsewhere in the regimental zone during the day, the Third Battalion at 1300 hours had jumped off in a Southeasterly direction for a pocket in the bend of the river formed by the RHINE's old and present course. Company L reported the pocket clear at 1630 hours, and the battalion then moved on to LEEHEIM in preparation for an attack on NEUHEIM to take place the following day. The Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion occupied positions at LEEHEIM.

By this time the RHINE bridgehead had taken on the appearance of NORMANDY transplanted into Germany with beachmasters, bridgehead dumps of ammunition and supplies, DUKWS, WEASELS, and LCVP's, pushing back and forth transporting ammunition and supplies to the assault troops pushing inland. Enemy shelling increased during the night.

During the early morning hours of March 24, the First Battalion, having taken over 200 prisoners in the first day of fighting east of the river, began passing through DORNHEIM in its contemplated attack on BERKACH. Approximately a hundred Germans were reported in the vicinity of the town, and plans were made to attack the objective with tanks and infantry. Enemy personnel were observed digging in at the edge of the woods and were promptly shelled by the artillery. At 1020 hours, Companies B and C attacked, troops riding tanks and on foot. Resistance was light and within an hour's time the town and surrounding vicinity were cleared and 58 prisoners taken.

At 1100 hours on the 23rd, the First Battalion of the Second Infantry Regiment crossed the RHINE in landing craft, passed through the bridgehead established by the Eleventh Infantry and continued the attack to the north, to capture the town of ASTHEIM. Two hours later, the Third Battalion crossed and moved toward TREBUR to relieve the Third Battalion of the Eleventh Infantry. The Second Battalion had been given the mission of furnishing close-in security of the crossing and bridge sites.

In its advance to the north, the First Battalion encountered stubborn enemy resistance and to assist them in the taking of ASTHEIM, Company L was dispatched from TREBUR exposing the right flank of Company K. Company L occupied ASTHEIM after dark and held the town until relieved by the First Battalion.

After capturing GEINSHEIM, the First Battalion Eleventh Infantry immediately pushed on toward Division Objective Number Two, the town of WALLERSTADTEN and entered at 1250 hours on the 23rd with little resistance. Approximately 200 prisoners were taken. Meantime Company C had reduced resistance of the pocket west of the town. As Company A outposted the town a force of 75 enemy infantrymen, supported by a "Tiger" tank and one self-propelled gun, launched a counterattack. Staff Sergeant Marvin B. Simmons, a machine gun section sergeant of Company A, immediately set up two machine guns in forward positions and instructed the gunners to withhold their fire until the enemy troops came within 75 yards of the position. He then ran down a street through an enemy mortar barrage and a hail of machine gun bullets to summon supporting tank destroyers. The enemy tank and self-propelled gun stopped approximately 300 yards from the company's position to render support to their attacking infantry. Staff Sergeant Simmons pointed out the tank and self-propelled and arranged a co-ordinated fire plan with the tank destroyer crew. When the attacking enemy troops advanced to within 75 yards of the machine gun position, he gave the signal and his machine guns opened fire simultaneously. The enemy self-propelled gun was knocked out and the tank damaged by tank destroyer fire, while Staff Sergeant Simmons' machine guns killed at least 10 and wounded no less than 30 of the attacking force. The counterattack smashed, the companies occupied positions in WALLERSTADTEN for the night.

It was while the First Battalion of the Second Infantry was occupying ASTHEIM the night of the 23rd and the Third Battalion of the Eleventh Infantry was preparing to leave TREBUR upon relief by the Third Battalion of the Second Infantry, that the Germans struck what was evidently their hardest blow to eliminate the bridgehead. Papers found later revealed that the attacking Germans had orders to eliminate the Fifth Division bridgehead at all costs. Their intelligence was poor, however, because the way the attack developed it was evident they didn't know TREBUR was occupied in strength.

It was a wild, hectic night in both ASTHEIM and TREBUR for all concerned and confusion and chaos reigned. Control of units was well-nigh impossible and the situation came out in favor of the Americans chiefly because of the individual fighting spirit and ability of the infantryman, as it did in so many cases.

In ASTHEIM, Germans attacked in estimated two-company strength and got between the rifle companies and the command post of Lieutenant Colonel William Blakefield. Blakefield defended his Command Post with his handful of headquarters personnel. Then, by radio, he worked out a city-clearing plan with his rifle company commanders who ceased pushing East and turned around and cleaned out the city between them and the Command Post, bringing the town under control by late morning.

In TREBUR, the Third Battalion of the Eleventh had just been alerted to leave when the German counterattack struck at midnight. It was an attack in battalion strength of about 700, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns. I Company of the Eleventh repelled the first thrust, but the enemy succeeded in cutting the supply route into TREBUR and infiltrated into the city. One German mortar set up just 15 yards from a mortar of Company M. Artillery concentrations made further enemy regrouping costly and the street

First Lt. Francis Giacomozzi of Beverly, N. J., and Cpl. Bennie D. Davidson of Calera, Ala., inspect German 75mm high velocity gun that knocked out two of our tanks near Lahr, Germany.



fighting in the pitch black was finally brought under control. In their attack, the Germans lost three tanks and 400 prisoners in addition to 300 killed. American losses were exceedingly light.

The next day the Second Infantry Regimental units moved forward in the face of moderate to heavy resistance and took the town of BAUSCHEIM, areas to the east and west and 520 Nazis tired of war.

In the meantime news was received that a well armed enemy force in approximately battalion strength had managed to infiltrate through the lines in an attempt to capture a command post of a unit of the Ninetieth Infantry Division which had taken over former Tenth Infantry positions at ERFELDEN. Such a move if successful, would have disrupted the flow of supplies and reinforcements for the expanding bridgehead.

The enemy thrust did succeed in isolating the anti-tank platoon of the First Battalion, Tenth Infantry, from the other units of the battalion. Despite intense enemy fire and eventual encirclement it held fast for approximately 10 hours until relieved by elements of the Ninetieth Division. When these units arrived the one-sided struggle came to an abrupt end and the major portion of the enemy force was taken prisoner.

By 0950 hours, Company E, Tenth Infantry, had mopped up the woods near DORNHEIM, and the Second Battalion remained in positions for the remainder of the day.

The Third Battalion had orders to take NAUHEIM by 2400 hours. At 1650 hours on 24 March the unit left LEEHEIM and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of WALLERSTADTEN. When headquarters arrived, plans were consummated for the attack. At 1930 hours, the companies moved out, Companies L and K reaching the town at 2245 hours and Company I shortly thereafter. Within an hour's time the mission was complete and the town cleared of enemy troops.

At 1415 hours, on the 24th, after a preliminary artillery barrage, the First Battalion of the Eleventh, with the Second Battalion of the Eleventh on the right flank moved, with tanks and tank destroyers in support, to attack GROSS-GERAU. C Company led the attack, followed by A and B

Companies and reached the city's outskirts at 1520 hours. Resistance stiffened as a company of infantry in which every other man was armed with a panzerfaust, led by SS personnel, opened fire. As the attack developed A Company moved to the left side of the city and B Company to the center while C Company swung west and north around the city to the railroad area. Almost simultaneously E and G Companies entered the southeastern (right) edge. After an intense fire fight marked by many individual acts of bravery, the main core of resistance was broken. Volksturm troops backing up the infantry surrendered quickly. By 1900 hours both the First and Second Battalions occupied objectives within the city but neither had completely cleared its zone. Positions were consolidated and held for the night. Contact was made with the First Battalion, Three Hundred Fifth-Ninth Infantry, Ninetieth Infantry Division at 0200 hours, 25 March as that unit moved up on the left of the Second Battalion, Eleventh Infantry. Capture of GROSS-GERAU made the bridgehead secure.

Thirty-six hours after the crossing, the bridgehead was five miles deep and seven miles wide and, in addition to the three regiments of the Fifth Division, two regiments of the Ninetieth Division, the Eight Hundred and Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, the Seven Hundred Forty-Eighth Tank Battalion, all four organic artillery battalions and corps artillery battalions, were across.


Troops, including battalion and regimental commanders, and the division commander had believed the crossing would be made the night 23-24 March, until late the morning of 22 March, when orders came down from the Third Army to cross that night. Despite the hasty preparation, the bridgehead operation turned out to be one of the smoothest that the division had ever made. Casualties were very light, and engineer work was rapid and efficient.

GROSS-GERAU was cleared of remaining enemy soldiers by noon of 25 March and elements of the Sixth Armored Division passed through to continue the attack to the north and northeast toward FRANKFURT.

In this new phase of the operation east of the Rhine the three infantry regiments of the division with the close support of the division and corps artillery battalions, con-

Marching up the autobahn to Frankfurt.





tinued to expand the bridgehead toward FRANKFURT and DARMSTADT. The Second Regiment with the First Battalion anchored on the bank of the RHINE was within 4000 meters of the MAIN River to the north. The Tenth, having regrouped during the interim, was shifting from the right flank and driving northward toward the MAIN and FRANKFURT between the Second and Eleventh Regiments. Third Battalion patrols found HASSLOCH clear and the battalion occupied the town during the afternoon of the 25th, patrolling the woods east and northeast of the town. One hundred thirty-seven prisoners were taken. The Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion displaced from TREBUR to NAUHEIM.

The First Battalion and the Regimental Command Post group assembled in NAUHEIM and the Fifth Reconnaissance Troop and a company of Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tanks were attached to the combat team for the projected drive through the woods on FRANKFURT.

Only makeshift emergency units were encountered in the drive to further enlarge the bridgehead. The main unit opposing the advance, identified as the Landes Schutzen Replacement Battalion, was formed of 50-60-year-old men who were not fit to offer any serious resistance. Almost the entire battalion ended up in the prisoner of war cage.

As the drive neared the MAIN, various anti-aircraft alarm units, formed from newly inducted 16-year-old boys, were contacted.

On the 26th day of March the Tenth Regiment entered the final phase preparatory to crossing the MAIN into FRANKFURT. At 0700 hours companies of the First Battalion jumped off from NAUHEIM and advanced northward clearing the woods in the regimental zone. Resistance was scattered and prisoners continued to surrender in groups. At 1350 hours, Company C reached the extensive RHINE-MAIN Airfield, reputed to be the second largest airfield in Germany, and found at least eight planes intact. At 1600 hours the columns encountered some 88 millimeter fire in the advance on SCHWANHEIM, a suburb of FRANKFURT, on the near side of the MAIN. At SCHWANHEIM, however, the enemy consisting of SS troops attempted a stand, and Companies B and C met stiff resistance.

With the Second Infantry Regiment now holding at the junction of the RHINE and MAIN Rivers on the Tenth's left flank, thus securing the left flank of the Division, the stage was set for the battle of FRANKFURT. FRANKFURT, the Reich's ninth largest city, had a pre-war population of 500,000 and had been well bombed by British and American bombers. It was estimated at the time that some 100,000 people remained in the city.

The armor had preceded the Division to FRANKFURT from the Division's bridgehead, and having secured the highway bridge crossing into the city from the south, rushed over two companies of the Ninth Armored Infantry Battalion. Light tanks were then started across when the Germans defending the city attempted to blow the bridge, putting two small gaps in it that prevented vehicles from crossing, but, not foot troops. Having driven northeastward for four days and nights, covering approximately 20 miles since crossing the RHINE and capturing nearly 4,000 prisoners, veteran troops of the Division began the crossing of the MAIN during the night of March 26, when the Third Battalion of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment hurried up to the bridge and dashed across the span under heavy artillery fire at 1935 hours.

The Third Battalion of the Eleventh had been chosen because it was momentarily in Eleventh Infantry Regimental reserve and was the most easily and quickest available unit to send to the FRANKFURT bridge site. Thus coincidence made K Company of the Eleventh the first to cross into FRANKFURT as well as the first to cross the RHINE.

The bridgehead which the armored infantry was holding turned out to consist of the ground floors of two buildings at the far end of the bridge so K, L and I Companies immediately set to work house clearing. The enemy continued to pound the area with artillery and the Third Battalion Command Post was hit nine times by heavy shells. By 0700 hours the next morning, the battalion had a bridgehead 600 yards deep and 800 yards wide.

In the memory of Fifth Division men there are many rivers and many bridges but to anyone who was there in FRANKFURT on the night of the 26th and the day and night of the 27th March, the bridge over the MAIN into FRANKFURT will be remembered as being the most heavily defended by German artillery. FRANKFURT, with its airfields, had been heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns, and those batteries now began to use up a plentiful supply of ammunition. They pounded the bridge, trying to damage it and kill and wound as many Americans as possible. It was a good 500-yard sprint through a dangerous open approach and across the long bridge, but no one walked. Not even the machine gunners with their heavy loads. The Division Command Post was set up 500 yards from the bridge and it was hit several times.

The Third Battalion of the Tenth, under Major Haughey, crossed the bridge during darkness the night of the 26-27 March and started toward the railroad station.

Resistance mounted as the men worked their way under enemy tank fire through the rubble and few remaining buildings, eliminating snipers and mopping up. The huge FRANKFURT railway station was reached by Company I after three blocks of bitter sniper fire. Access to the main doorway and lobby was difficult so the troops stole in through the rear entrance. Civilian observers, with binoculars, directed self-propelled fire, 88 millimeter and heavy mortar fire on the station, which was also under fire from small arms and machine guns.

Company I, however, ward off every attempt to retake the structure, which contained numerous underground passages and rooms. Unable to force an attack from their quarters in the station, a new route for an attack was se-



Bridge leading into Frankfurt, which was very heavily and continuously shelled during the time it was crossed by eight infantry battalions of the 5th Division.



Anti-aircraft gun sets up in front of Frankfurt Opera House.

WorldWarTwoVeterans.Org

lected. One platoon was left behind to hold the Germans while another withdrew along the new route jumping fences, climbing garage roofs, and passing through hotels. The mortar section, slowed down by the weighty loads, was unable to keep up with the riflemen but captured several prisoners who were hiding under hotel steps. Once both platoons reached a more advantageous location, the attack was renewed and the company drove swiftly into the main section of the city. By 1830 hours the area assigned to the battalion was clear, and the unit prepared to continue the drive to the north.

At noon the Germans shelled the bridge heavily but failed to increase the damage, and the One Hundred Sixty-Sixth Engineers resumed repair work, while the Second Battalion's Company G got ready to cross and then was forced to take cover due to intense shelling. By 1330 hours enemy shelling let up somewhat and the Tenth continued to cross. Company G went over followed by Company E after another heavy period of shelling. By 1550 hours Company F had crossed and the troops had cleared a few houses west of the bridge before striking southward. Meanwhile the First Battalion had completed the clearing of SCHWANHEIM and moved to the crossing site in preparation to cross on the 28th. The regimental observation post was established in south FRANKFURT near the scene of crossing, and the Fifth Reconnaissance Troop was detached from the Regiment at 2350 hours.

As the afternoon wore on, the Germans became increasingly aware of the flow of men, material and supplies across the single span connecting the bridgehead with the troops in that part of FRANKFURT on the northeast bank of the MAIN River. At approximately 1600 hours a crimson smoke round was seen to burst just above the bridge. Hardly had this been noted, when an artillery concentration of almost

unbelievable intensity descended on the bridge and immediate vicinity. The majority of the fire seemed to come from high velocity anti-aircraft guns, some of which must have been mounted on towers about the town. This latter deduction was made after study of the angle of fire and observation that the enemy must have had on the bridge at that time. Previous to this, the enemy fire seemed to come from tanks and the type of round used was of the armor-piercing type. This latter concentration, however, was almost entirely high explosive, and the damage to personnel and vehicles was considerable. It was at this time that the Company Commander of F Company, Tenth Infantry, Captain Thaddeus Kubarik was killed in the doorway of the joint Second-Third Battalion Command Post, a building slightly to the right of, and about 100 yards distant from, the bridge.

Artillery fire crashed into the MAIN River bridge as the Second Combat Team moved into the attack on FRANKFURT on the morning of the 27th. All battalions made crossings in the face of the fierce artillery fire and by evening had secured positions well within the city. Colonel Roffe, of the Second Infantry, took over the lion's share of the city clearing job.

During the period wiremen worked frantically to repair lines frayed by the constant pounding of enemy shells.

Comparatively, the crossing of the MAIN and the capture of FRANKFURT was a more difficult and costlier undertaking than the crossing of the RHINE River. The defenders of the city, including civilians and the city police force, offered stiff resistance in the house-to-house fighting from the river to the railway station. However, after the capture of the station and the city commander's building, where previously the commanding general was wounded and his lieutenant colonel killed by a direct artillery



Infantry engages in street-fighting in Frankfurt.

WorldWarTwoVeterans.Org

hit, resistance became sporadic. Defenders were chiefly armed with rifles, machine guns and panzerfaust rockets, but neither the replacement battalion nor the police resisted for long.

On the 28th of March the Second Battalion of the Eleventh and the First Battalion of the Tenth crossed into the bridgehead and the eight battalions quickly expanded the bridgehead and cleared the city by evening of the 29th of March. The First Battalion of the Eleventh remained on the near side of the bridge in division reserve. At the close of the 30th day of March all FRANKFURT with its suburbs was clear of enemy.

The same day the Fifth Division went into XX Corps reserve, having been switched over from the XII Corps.

Having had no rest since November 1, 1944, when it went back into the lines along the MOSELLE after a short 10-day reorganizing period, the Red Diamond Division welcomed the rest which the outfit now received. Not that FRANKFURT was a good place to relax, though. As a city, it was a wreck from bombings, and the non-fraternization rule was in effect. The weather was getting warmer, however, and everyone lolled in the luxury of leisurely meals, frequent showers, shows and clean, dry clothes and equipment.

As the war swirled past FRANKFURT and the Fifth Division, the Division went into Third Army reserve and then SHAEF reserve.

The fluidity of modern warfare, however, had left a depleted Sixth SS Mountain Division of the Wehrmacht behind the lines. In attempting to get back to its own lines the SS Division cut across the great autobahn route which was the XII Corps main supply route and raised havoc with rear installations. The Second Regiment with the Fifth Recon Troop attached, went to work and between the 31st of March and the Fifth of April finished off the

Sixth SS as a fighting unit, capturing the artillery commander of that unit in the process and rescuing a field hospital unit, complete with nurses, which had been captured by the stormtroopers. Many SS soldiers were slaughtered when their commanders ordered them to charge the invincible firepower of the Fifth Recon and Second Regiment.

The Tenth Regiment was in reserve and despite the fact that the unit had received warning orders on April 1, to be prepared for a possible move, and the Eleventh Infantry had relieved all elements from guard of captured installations, most of the troops were enjoying a period of quiet and rest after the strenuous days of steel and fire preceding their capture of the prize city. Beautiful spring weather prevailed now in contrast to the chilled wintry blasts and snow of LUXEMBOURG and the rain and mud of the EIFFEL hills, and almost every soldier not on duty constituted a voluntary patrol, strolling leisurely through the streets of the city discovering whatever he might of interest and charm. The war seemed remote and rumors persisted that the veteran troops of the Fifth had seen their last days of actual combat. Indeed, the war in Europe was rapidly reaching its climax and only the vicissitudes evolving from the enormous problems created in the final stages of the collapse of huge enemy forces prevented the rumors from being true. The morale of the victorious troops was extremely high, and one indulgent rumor even had the Fifth Division preparing for a triumphant entry into Berlin to join hands with the Russians.

There had been no contact with enemy units during the period, but stragglers, deserters and soldiers in civilian clothes attempting to make their way home, were picked up during the patrolling of the city and while guarding various captured installations in the area assigned to the regiment for the purpose of maintaining law and order.



Short barrelled heavy rocket projector mounted on tiger tank captured near Menden, Germany.



5-barrelled type Nebelwerfer.



Battery of 88mm flak guns used against ground targets by enemy.

The RUHR POCKET

On April 5, the Division less the Eleventh Infantry Regiment moved north along the autobahn to a new assembly area in the vicinity of GIESSEN. Plans were made for test firing of weapons, disciplinary drill and some ceremonies. The Eleventh Regiment remained in SHAEF reserve as a sort of "palace guard" for the advance command post of SHAEF which left French soil and moved elements from PARIS and RHEIMS up to FRANKFURT to establish headquarters.

Suddenly, on 7 April, the Division was ordered northward to join III Corps of the First Army in the job of reducing the RUHR pocket, where several first-class divisions of the German army had been trapped by the First and Ninth Armies in the heart of the industrially rich RUHR region.

The Tenth Combat Team was ordered to move out first. A period of hasty preparation ensued and on April 8, at 0600 hours, the Twenty-First and Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion, Companies A, B, D, and the assault gun platoon of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion, Companies B and C of the Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company B of the Seventh Engineers were attached to the regiment for the move. FRANKENBERG was the tentative designation, and at 1300 hours leading elements crossed the IP (Initial Point).

Enroute to FRANKENBERG the reinforced combat team was directed to proceed beyond the city to an assembly area in the vicinity of Bigge and to prepare to pass through elements of the Forty-seventh Infantry Regiment of the Ninth Division on the morning of April 9, and to attack westward along the south bank of the RUHR River in the general direction of the city of ARNSBERG. At dark the combat team assembled with the First Battalion in Bestwig, the Second in Ostwig and Borghausen, the Third in Bigge and the regimental Command Post in Nutlar.

In moving to the RUHR, the Tenth Combat Team performed the same "hurry hurry" mission it carried out in December when it was the first element of the division to pull out of the Saar and hasten to Luxembourg. This time the regiment was informed about 0200 hours on the 7th of April to move. Troops rode 100 miles pig-a-back on tanks, tank destroyers, artillery, and all other available types of conveyances, many of which dropped out enroute due to mechanical difficulties, so that each battalion was short anywhere from fifty to one-hundred-fifty men upon arrival in the assembly area. Nevertheless the regiment assembled and prepared to attack.

The First Battalion moved from its assembly area at 0800 hours the morning of the 9th and, passing through the First Battalion of the Forty-Seventh according to plans, advanced in a southwestern direction toward the enemy. When the First Battalion moved into the attack, enemy resistance had been scattered and included fire from a few self-propelled weapons, mortars, and machine guns. The Second Battalion advanced on the right adjacent to elements of the Ninth U. S. Army, and the Thirty-Ninth Infantry Regiment took the left or southern flank. The mission was to overcome any resistance met and to continue on, checking each village in the route of advance. Company B, riding Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tanks and with one platoon of heavy machine guns, formed the point of the advance when the attack got under way at 0900 hours. The motorized column proceeded without resistance save for one roadblock consisting of three felled trees which was by-passed. Small arms and mortar fire

was encountered from dug-in-enemy at about 1340 hours in the vicinity of Hill 507 near BERINGHAUSER-KLAUSE, and it was not until 1720 hours that this scattered but stubborn resistance was eliminated and the village taken. Eleven prisoners were captured in the initial encounter and twenty-four in the town.

The attack then swung west and northwest.

All elements in the attack of the combat team made substantial gains. The Second Battalion by 0920 hours had taken over the Forty-Seventh Infantry's positions in MESCHÉDE and continued to the west.

During the night, orders were received to continue the attack to the west and seize crossings of the WENNE River. Since the First Battalion was still a considerable distance east of the Second Battalion it was decided to leave the First Battalion to continue mopping up its sector while the Second Battalion spearheaded the drive. The Third Battalion was ordered to advance westward from the vicinity of MESCHÉDE, and one troop of the Thirty-Second Cavalry was attached to the Second Battalion to screen the left flank until the Third Battalion came abreast.

On the 10th of April, the First Battalion completed clearing its zone and assembled in regimental reserve in MESCHÉDE, closing at 1800 hours. The Second Battalion jumped off in the regiment's main effort at 0700 hours and cleared WALLEN and SIESSE against light opposition. Afterwards, Company E closed in on the town of BERGE which was captured together with a bridge intact across the river as had been planned.

Company G took up the attack from the point and captured the town of Niederberge. Resistance, including some self-propelled weapons fire from the vicinity of OLPE, was scattered and prisoners continued to flow in an ever increasing stream to the Prisoner of War cage.

The Third Battalion began its drive from MESCHÉDE at 0630 hours, Company L heading South on the East side of the Henne-Talspeere reservoir and clearing the towns of ULMECKE and VELLINGHAUSEN, while Companies I and K turned South on the West side of the reservoir and cleared ENKHAUSEN. Company I then continued southwest and cleared Schuren. At this point, Company K took up the drive and passing through I's positions, advanced West, clearing the town of OSTERBERG before shifting southwest to WENHOLTHAUSEN. WENHOLTHAUSEN was cleared against fairly light opposition, but, in taking the town, Company K had inadvertently moved out of the regimental zone and unknowingly performed the III Corps of the First Army a significant favor.

Despite the fact that the town of WENHOLTHAUSEN was in the Seventh Armored Division sector, a hurried call from III Corps headquarters requested that the Tenth Combat Team assist the Armor in dealing with the town. Twenty minutes later General Irwin was able to report to the III Corps Commander that K Company of the Tenth Regiment not only had the town, but a bridge across the river intact.

After the action at WENHOLTHAUSEN, patrols from Company I and the Thirty-Second Cavalry checked the remainder of the Battalion area which had not previously been cleared during the advance, and positions were taken for the night with Company I in the vicinity of SCHUREN, Company K in WENHOLTHAUSEN and Company L at ENKHAUSEN. As night fell, elements of the Seventh Armored Division, advancing from the south, arrived in WENHOLTHAUSEN.



Wire-laying weasel used by both infantry and artillery battalions for use both on water and land.

Meanwhile, orders were received directing that the Second Infantry Regiment take over the southern half of the Tenth Regimental sector, and leading elements crossed the bridge at BERGE at about 1700 hours relieving elements of Company E on the high ground southwest of the town. Other activities during the night included the capture and clearing of the town of VISBECK by a reinforced platoon from Company G. Meanwhile, the Second Regiment completed the 160-mile move to the north and set up in the vicinity of KALLE, Germany, preparatory to hitting the RUHR.

The entire RUHR pocket action was one wherein the U. S. Army Divisions attacked concentrically from all points of the compass into the mass of Germans hopelessly encircled. The resistance was erratic. Field Marshal Model, German commander of Army Group B in the pocket had ordered his troops to fight to the last because it immobilized so many U. S. Divisions and kept them away from the RHINELAND.

On the 10th of April the Second Infantry joined the Tenth Infantry in the attack which progressed rapidly against German units who were alternately fanatic and weak. Some towns were the scenes of brief, short, sharp fights. The fight that Company C of the Tenth had to capture HELLE-FELD on the 11th was that kind.

The sharp but decisive encounter cost the company ten casualties, but resulted in the capture of 96 enemy prisoners. After taking the high ground overlooking the town, the company had waited in a patch of woods ready to dash across a 200 yard open field to the edge of the town. Heavy fire, including 20mm "horizontal flak" kept the men at bay, and not until artillery fire knocked out a German SP, and Technical Sergeant Charles B. Collins mowed down several snipers, one from a church steeple, and support from concentrated rifle fire was adequate did they move across the open field to secure a foothold at the edge of the town. In a sense the First Battalion had had a field day for, in addition to the unestimated number of the enemy killed and wounded, a total of 153 prisoners were taken. Three nebelwerfers, one troop carrier, one U. S. truck, one tracked troop carrier, four 20mm guns, one tank, and nine half tracks were destroyed.

Then there were fantastic situations that read like a

second act in musical comedy. VISBECK's capture by Company F of the Tenth Infantry was such a situation.

VISBECK was supposed to have been defended to the last man, but the German major in command did not want the job. He had so informed the SS, but was told in effect to carry out his orders to die for Hitler. Such fanaticism, however, failed to appeal to the garrison commander, who up until then had held a job equivalent to a transportation corps major in Paris, but he got out the German military handbook on defense and had his forces dig in and deploy around the town according to the book. In all he spent two days and one sleepless night supervising the details and seeing that the instructions were being followed. Then he went to bed.

At 0200 hours in the morning he was rudely awakened by a doughboy from F Company and forced to surrender. That, the major complained to the Tenth Infantry was not in the part of the book that he read and he was highly indignant that such a thing should happen. He was also indignant that the Americans had attacked at such an ungodly hour. That was not in the book either.

Troops of the Second Regiment had the same kind of fights. Tanks of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh flushed Jerries out of the underbrush by the dirty dozen. An infantry battalion's usual take in prisoners for a day was around 500. Casualties were light but still some fanatic Nazi fighters showed up and caused casualties until they were killed.

The Second Regiment surprised and captured General-lieutenant Richard Wirtz, chief engineer officer for Army Group B in the town of STEMEL. The general insisted he was "surprised and captured" and did not surrender. He told interrogators that this was a very "unfair" war because the Allies had such a tremendous superiority, while the Germans had practically nothing left of their once-proud army.

On the 14th of April, the Eleventh Infantry Regiment, which had been relieved of its job in FRANKFURT, was committed. The Second Battalion joined the attack and the First Battalion was attached to the Seventh Armored Division.

By the 16th of April the regiments had cleared their zones entirely and tried to cope with the problem of dis-

placed persons, captured installations and unapprehended German soldiers.

The problem was made particularly serious when with the pocket on the verge of complete annihilation, most enemy officers had given their men instructions to escape the best way they possibly could. In many cases discharge papers were issued apparently to enable the soldier to pass through our lines. Many changed into civilian clothes, split up into small groups of two or three men, and attempted to escape. Needless to say, most of them failed. Roadblocks were set up covering the area to check phoney civilians with the results that many hundreds of them were carted away upon being identified as German soldiers. In ARNSBERG a complete round-up of all male civilians took place. After the lot was screened by counter-intelligence and interrogating personnel about 10% of them had to be evacuated as prisoners.

The Second and Eleventh Infantry Regiments processed thousands of German prisoners of war as the RUHR pocket collapsed. The next largest problem was that of handling the thousands of slave laborers—the Poles, the Russians, Serbs, French, Greeks, Czechs, and Hungarians—who didn't know what to do with their newly given freedom or where to go or how to get there. Most of them just took to the road and when night came they took more than the road. To prevent chaos, large displaced person centers were set up by the Division to solve the immediate problems of control and feeding. Military Government officers, headed by Lieutenant Colonel George Peddy, supervised but a good deal of the work had to be done by platoon leaders and mess sergeants in actually running camps. A camp that was a model in efficiency and cleanliness was established in MENDEN by Major John Hudspeth.

It was a most peculiar situation. A tough combat division that had fought its hardest to disrupt the economy of Germany now found itself administrating the chaos it had helped create.

All the while, of course, due to the WEREWOLF threat which never actually developed, the Divisions area had to be thoroughly combed and searched for any possible Nazi hideouts. Field Marshal Model and his staff of high ranking German officers had never been captured and there was always the possibility they might be in the area.

With that background, the reconnaissance platoon of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion suddenly stumbled into a dramatic scene that turned into a death scene for one of the real true die-hard Nazi generals who proved that he preferred death to surrender. It was a drama that might well have been entitled "The General Dies at Dusk" and the scene was laid inside, then outside of a hunting lodge nestled in the forested hills near the town of SCHWAMMENBERG.

A jeep, half-track and two light tanks of the Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh, under command of Staff Sergeant Glenn Kessler approached the hunting lodge merely because it looked like a good place to look for anybody who might be hiding. Private First Class Elbert Bebrocke, Private First Class Wayne Ammon and Sergeant Bennie Davidson entered the house to search it while the rest of the platoon surrounded the lodge. Frightened German civilians told Bebrocke that nine German officers were in the house but just then the officers, who had left the house just before the platoon drove up, opened fire from a woodpile in back of the lodge. Staff Sergeant Donald Simons ran to his light tank and maneuvered it to fire frontally on the woodpile. As the rifleman closed in from the flanks, one American soldier was killed by Schmeisser "burp" gun fire. The platoon poured rifle, machine gun, tommy-gun and 37 millimeter canister shot into the woodpile.

One German was killed and one German lieutenant wounded by Staff Sergeant Kessler as they tried to make

a break for the forest. The lieutenant was brought back and held under pistol threat while the platoon continued to fire at the woodpile. In a few minutes a German officer in a fancy dress blouse came out from behind the pile.

"He was the ornieriest bastard I ever saw," reported Simons. Kessler had to prod and shove him down beside the other captive. (The "ornery bastard" was later identified as Lieutenant General Kurt von Kortzfleisch, who had been second in command to Field Marshal Model.)

As the platoon searched the woods for the other six Germans, Kortzfleisch suddenly thrust his hand out in a stiff, ludicrous Nazi salute, yelled "Heil Hitler" three times and spouted German so fast that Corporal Frank Blick, who could understand German, could only catch "I am a true German, fighting to the last . . . I am glad to die for my Fuhrer." Simultaneously, the wounded lieutenant dove for the underbrush, and Blick shot and killed the general with his Springfield '03 rifle. As he fell to the ground, other guns made sure he was dead. Tommy-guns rapidly searched the underbrush with lead and finished off the lieutenant. The other six officers had gotten safely away.

This is the only known account of any Nazi general who was fanatic enough to die instead of surrender.

On that same date, the 20th of April, Major General S. LeRoy "Red" Irwin was notified that Major General Eddy was leaving the XII Corps and that he, General Irwin, was to be the new Corps commander. General Irwin had been commander of the Red Diamond Division since June 3, 1943, all through its training days in the United Kingdom and the combat on the continent up to April 20. Upon his departure from the Division on 22 April, General Irwin said: "it is a blow to me to be separated from the unit whose fortunes I have shared since the last days in Iceland. We have seen much since then, and have made more than a little history. I cannot adequately express the pride and admiration I feel for the Division. It is more than a great Division—it is a magnificent one. The skill and courage of its officers and men have carried the Division to such fame that its exploits are known throughout our country."

Arriving on the 22nd of April to assume command of the Fifth Division was Major General Albert E. Brown, an experienced infantryman and World War I veteran. The new Commanding General brought with him experience gained at ATTU with the Seventh Infantry Division, in training camps in the States, in duty with the War Department general staff, and as a combat observer for several weeks in the European Theater with other veteran divisions.

Red Diamond men were forced to stop hungry civilians from completely looting food warehouses, in Nauheim, Germany.





Nazi snipers force infantrymen to take cover behind German
World War I monument, in Sundern.



Troops of 2nd Battalion, 10th Infantry line the streets of Menden, Germany, as an honor guard as Major General S. LeRoy Irwin leaves the 5th Division to take command of the XII Corps.

Meschede, Germany, with its bombed out machine shops.



Displaced persons eat at huge refugee camp set up and run by Military Government officers of the 5th Division.



AS RESISTANCE CRUMBLLED . . .



. . . we cut road blocks

. . . broke through atop armor

WorldWarTwoVeterans.Org



. . . and rounded up the shattered Wehrmacht.



CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND WAR'S END

With BERLIN fallen to the Russian Armies, the RUHR pocket cleaned up and the First Army holding a firm bridgehead across the ELBE River linking up with the Russians, there remained very few sectors of German resistance in Europe. There was no organized defense in existence any longer, yet certain Army Groups continued to fight because they didn't have any orders to do otherwise. But fate and the U. S. Army commanders decreed that the Fifth Infantry Division should be in on the curtain call of the Wehrmacht, in its Czechoslovakian "last ditch" stand.

On the 23rd of April the Two Hundred Ninetieth Infantry Regiment of the Seventy-Fifth Infantry Division took over control of the entire Fifth Division area. On the 25th the Division was ordered to rejoin the Third Army and the XII Corps. The destination was REGEN, near the point where GERMANY-AUSTRIA-CZECHOSLOVAKIA bordered, which was more than 300 miles distant. The administrative trip was to be made with only two stops, one at HANAU, outside FRANKFURT, and the other in BAMBERG.

The resulting move southward was an eye-opener to the First Army official who had come to help the Division's G-4 and Traffic Control with details. At this time the Division found itself minus some 85 trucks "somewhere in Germany" with another Division. For the proposed move the Division's G-4 asked for only 55 additional trucks and permission to use captured German trucks. The First Army official could not believe this, stating that: "Whenever one of our Divisions move we always furnish them six truck companies." However on 26 April the Fifth Division moved southward with only the equivalent of one extra truck company plus an untold number of Jerry vehicles that were scattered all over the roads. The move was successfully completed—300 miles to the vicinity of BAMBERG—thanks to the careful preparations and allotment of personnel to carriers, to the ingenuity the infantrymen displayed in getting themselves aboard tanks, tank destroyers and every other kind of vehicle, and thanks to the Division's experience in traveling light, far and fast.

The move took two days with an overnight stop at HANAU and vicinity, a short distance from FRANKFURT.

Upon the arrival of the Tenth Regiment in the assembly area, orders were received directing the regiment with the Fifth Reconnaissance Troop to clear a zone extending generally southeast along the Czech-German border and to take positions along the border defending to the northeast. On the last day of the month, the regiment cleared its zone between the highway east from FREYUNG and the Czech border, and the troops took up positions awaiting further orders. No firm contact with the enemy was established in the operation, but roadblocks and occasional enemy ambushes were dealt with, while stragglers and deserters usually surrendered upon the approach of our troops. Mountain snow, cold, and rain, together with slippery roads rather than enemy opposition hindered the advance.

The XII Corps tactical situation found the Eleventh Armored Division driving through the forested mountains to LINZ, Austria, where the link-up with the Russians was to be effected. The link-up would create another huge pocket in Czechoslovakia, with the Third U. S. Army pressing in from the northwest, west and south and the Russians pressing in from the north, east and southeast. The Fifth Division's attack was from the south.

At 1000 hours on 30 April the Eleventh Infantry was ordered to attack southeast in the general direction of

LINZ, to eliminate all resistance that had not been disposed of by the Eleventh Armored Division attack.

The next day with the I and R platoon forward covering the front and flanks, the First and Third Battalions moved out as ordered, going in parallel columns and then sending companies to patrol the flanks as needs of the terrain required. By evening the regiment had covered more than 20 miles and stopped for the night. During the day several units had been forced to take detours in order to get through muddy mountainous roads. Resistance was negligible but there had been several enemy planes observed in the vicinity.

The Eleventh made another long motorized jump the next day moving on southeastward. The First Battalion moved over 30 miles to the vicinity of SEITERSCHLAG where it was forced to dismount due to road blocks and mines. Then companies and patrols pushed on to the MUHLE River. On the right the Third Battalion, by motorized shuttling, moved to the German-Austrian border. Here 200 Hungarians were captured without a fight. A road block at this point forced troops to move by foot to NATHSCHLAG. At 1945 hours "I" Company captured a bridge intact over the MUHLE River. The capture included a Jerry who was preparing to blow the demolitions placed under the bridge. Two companies secured this area which included a military hospital containing 123 PW's while one company crossed the river and secured SCHLAGEL and AIGEN on the far side. The Second Battalion moved up to OEPING and Companies "E" and "F" began clearing toward the river.

On 2 May the work of clearing the north bank of the MUHLE River continued. Resistance was mainly disorganized but in several instances at road blocks there were determined small arms fights. The First Battalion captured a bridge intact in its sector and cleared to the towns of ULRICHSBERG and KLAFFER. B and C Companies moved northeast to take objectives north and south of GLOCKELBERG. Three large road blocks were cleared in the northeast half of the woods in this area. At 1830 hours contact was made with the Third Battalion, Tenth Infantry. The Second Battalion continued its move eastward. During this day the Third Battalion, Eleventh Infantry was expanding its bridgehead across the MUHLE River. A patrol ranging east out of AIGEN ran into 4 tanks and 50 Jerries, who were preparing to counterattack. Antitank and artillery fire knocked out one Mark IV tank, and drove the other accompanying foot troops back up into the hills. Another patrol checked several small villages to the north of AIGEN and established contact with the First Battalion.

The following day the First and Third Battalions spent in consolidating their positions and in patrolling their front and flanks. Many prisoners continued to pour in to both areas. The Second Battalion had completed preparations and moved northward at 0920 hours to relieve elements for Tenth Infantry at LAZ GEHANG, Czechoslovakia (544384).

As the Eleventh's attack into Austria had progressed, the Tenth Infantry found the same difficulty with mountainous terrain. The Third Battalion in particular had its rifle companies climbing up snow-covered hills that could be negotiated only on hands and knees. The supply lines had to cover the same route which meant a steady diet of K-ration for the rifle companies. On the 2nd of May the Third Battalion had rifle companies in three different countries—Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

On May 4, as the First and Second Battalions of the Tenth Infantry pushed deeper into Czechoslovakia and the

9 MAY 45

The map displays a complex network of roads and railways across Central Europe. A prominent thick black line, representing a major axis of advance, originates in the north near Berlin and winds southwards through the Bohemian region, passing near Prague and heading towards the Alpine area. Numerous military symbols are scattered across the map, including crosses (X) and circles (O), some of which are labeled with numbers (e.g., 99, 13, 14, 80, 36, 416, 172) or codes (e.g., MOB 4-13, MOB 4-67, MOB 4-12). These symbols likely denote specific military units, positions, or events. Major cities such as Berlin, Prague, Vienna, and Munich are clearly marked. The map also shows geographical features like the Bohemian Massif and the Alpine region. A coordinate grid is visible at the bottom, with longitude markings from 0° to 14°.

Third Army prepared to loose its knockout blow in the Nazi dominated country, dramatic events heralding the long anticipated complete collapse of the German Reich were taking place. After the fall of BERLIN and the reported death of Adolf Hitler, the second unconditional surrender within five days took effect at 0800 hours when more than a million German troops in the Netherlands, Denmark, and northwest Germany laid down their arms.

But no surrender by Admiral Doenitz, successor to Hitler as appointed by Hitler, had as yet affected the Army Group still holding out in Czechoslovakian plains and hills. With everyone momentarily expecting news of a peace or an armistice, the Division continued to forge into the SUDETENLAND of Czechoslovakia, with one more river-crossing operation looming, this time the VLTAVA River in the BOHEMIAN HILLS.

Preparatory to this operation the regimental boundary on the right was changed and the First and Third Battalions of the Tenth Infantry relieved by elements of the Second Infantry. The First Battalion then assembled at KREUZBERG, the Third at HERZOGAREUT, the Second disposed along the stream south of KUNZVART, with the Forty-Sixth FA Bn in position near KUNZVART. On May 5, the advance was resumed by the First and Second Battalions. The Second Battalion advancing to the northeast, ran into heavier resistance around KUNZVART where enemy elements of the First Panzer Division set up and stubbornly defended a road-block.

On the evening of 4 May 1945, the Second Infantry, less First Battalion which was in Corps Reserve, relieved the First Battalion Tenth Infantry in positions along the Czech-German border north of ALT REICHENAU. That same evening before dark, the Second Battalion pushed Company G ahead to seize BOHM RORREN against light resistance.

To prepare for the next day's attack, both battalions patrolled aggressively to the line of the TEPLA River in an effort to find a crossing site. Shortly before midnight Company G patrol found the bridge east of Hill 746 intact, but heavy small arms fire prevented its seizure.

Company G thereupon sent its Third platoon to the bridge to secure a bridgehead through which the company could move in the morning. When the platoon arrived, the bridge had been blown and could be used only by foottroops. Against resistance consisting of small arms fire and panzerfaust fire, the platoon forced a crossing of the stream, drove the enemy from three of the five pill-boxes covering the bridge and took up positions along the railroad on the far shore.

At dawn, enemy fire increased, and a tank 2000 yards down stream kept up a constant harassing fire which rendered the bridge impassable. The platoon dug in and held its positions until at 1500 hours the remainder of the company was able to swing to the east, cross the river on a footbridge and outflank the German strong points forcing their withdrawal.

Company G then moved on PECH B from the west while Company F attacked from the south and cleared the town just before dark. Company E cleared GUTHAUSEN and followed Company G across the river.

While the Second Battalion was forcing the crossing of the VLTAVA River, the Third Battalion had been proceeding against light opposition 6,000 yards to seize STOZEK and clear its zone to the river.

The speed of the Second Infantry attack continued 6 May as the Second Battalion advanced 11,000 yards on a 4,000 yard front clearing the woods north of the TEPLA VLTAVA River and capturing the towns of MILESICE and MULLERSCHLAG.

The Third Battalion left the line of the TEPLA River

manned by Company I and went into regimental reserve at 1700 hours in the vicinity of HOUSNA.

The First Battalion, released to the regiment from Corps Reserve, advanced on and captured STEINBERG and BLOCHWALD. Company C relieved Company E at PECH B at noon and by nightfall accepted the surrender of the town of VOLARY.

It was in VOLARY that the Fifth Division unearthed one of the most senseless examples of German bestiality ever found. A large group of Polish and Hungarian Jewesses had been taken from concentration camps in eastern Poland by SS guards, both men and women, and forced to take a foot-march toward Austria. They were beaten constantly and brutally mistreated enroute and forced to live off of grass and rotten potatoes. They managed to reach VOLARY where the Allied advance prevented further movement. Those who died in VOLARY were dumped into shallow common graves but the remaining 60 Jewesses when liberated by the Second Combat Team were taken immediately to the German civilian hospital and given the best of care by Fifth Medical Battalion personnel. The case, as were all other atrocities discovered by the Division, was thoroughly investigated by the Inspector-General Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bates.

The collapse of enemy resistance in the Eleventh Regimental sector resulted in plans being made to shift the entire regiment northward into Czechoslovakia. 4 May was spent in preparing for the move. There was still much patrol activity on the front and prisoners continued to pour in. At the same time arrangements were made complete for the One Hundred First Regiment, Twenty-Six Division to take over the sector.

The First Battalion moved north at 0930 hours 5 May and at 1900 hours reached the assembly area near SCHONEBEN. Meanwhile the Second Battalion which was already in Czechoslovakia pushed northeast and G Company received mortar fire in the vicinity of ZILNOVA. Fighting was halted for a parley about surrender terms at 1500 hours and then orders were received to prepare for closing on the VLTAVA River. The Third Battalion remained in AIGEN, patrolling and handling prisoners.

While still working on negotiations with the Jerries across the river at HOR PLANA the First Battalion, on the morning of 6 May suddenly pulled stakes and shifted 51 miles north to KNIZECI PLANA, Czechoslovakia. In the Second Battalion area F Company was relieved by K Company, One Hundred First Infantry, Twenty-Six Division. The Battalion was also ordered to prepare for an advance on foot northwest.

As the Germans still stubbornly held out, the XII Corps planned another repetition of the famous Fifth Infantry-Fourth Armored combination and planned to set the Fourth Armored slashing through lines of the Fifth toward PRAGUE.

It was at this point that Majors Howard and Hair, two visitors to the Second Battalion of the Tenth Infantry from the Ninth Bomber Command, accompanied a small task force from the Second Battalion on its mission to clear out the road block set up by troops of the First Panzer Division in KUNZVART. In the movement through the two mile hostile area from the American lines to the road block, Major Howard rode with the riflemen atop the leading tank destroyer of the accompanying tank destroyer platoon of the Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion. The troops arrived at the road block and proceeded to take up security positions while the tank destroyers shelled the road block and the town of KUNZVART just beyond. At the conclusion of the raid, the troops were subjected to long range enemy machine gun fire and suffered two casualties. One rifle man was wounded in the hand, and Major Howard was seriously wounded in the head. Resistance was eliminated through the coordi-



5th Division Prisoner of War enclosure in the Ruhr Pocket.

nated efforts of artillery and infantry and the town cleared at 1618 hours. Companies F and G supported by one platoon of tank destroyers moved rapidly to the north and secured the bridge across the VLTAVA in HOR VLTAVICE. Meanwhile, two additional bridges were seized intact by elements of the First Battalion in reaching the town of ZATON and adjacent woods. Activity of other units during the day included the movement of the Regimental Command Post to KUNZVART and the screening of the left flank of the advancing troops by the Third Battalion.

When night came a platoon from Company F established two outposts on the far side of the railroad bridge which spanned the main highway south of WINTERBURG. Later a peculiarly aggressive enemy patrol, in an attempt to set off four dynamite sticks previously planted under the bridge, bypassed the forward outpost and tried to slip past the second observation post, located fifty yards from the span.

Seeing the lurking shadows in the inky blackness, the outpost guard barked a halt and hearing no response, fired five shots in the direction of the figures. The shooting awakened Sgt. Emory H. Ellison who awoke the other members of the squad of ten men. Meanwhile the Germans opened fire with bazookas and small arms but the outpost returned the fire and held off the Germans. The fight raged the remaining hours of the night, and the enemy patrol failed to reach the bridge. Near dawn, tanks and machine guns of Company H, positioned 200 yards away, lay in a heavy fire which routed the enemy, saving destruction of the bridge which would have slowed down the advance on the capture of WINTERBURG.

On the morning of the 6th, as General Patton's troops and armor drove into Czechoslovakia on a 110 mile front, elements of the Tenth Regiment forged eight miles north to determine if the city of WINTERBURG was ready to surrender as had been reported. As the Second Battalion and Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh tankers approached WINTERBURG the burgermeister, resplendent in his dashing sport roadster, rode up to the leading elements of Company F, contacted the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harris C. Walker, and surrendered the city without a shot being fired in its defense.

A proposed parley with the First SS Panzer Division fell through, so preparations continued for an attack. The job this time fell to the Second Infantry Regiment and the Second Battalion, commanded by Major Horace Townsend, was the lead battalion. The Regiment by this time was under the command of Colonel Walter Graham, who had

succeeded Colonel Roffe on 28 April. Colonel Roffe went to the Fourteenth Armored Division as assistant Division commander.

At 0820 hours on the morning of May 7th the reconnaissance platoon of the Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion moved out of VOLARY as the point of the Second Battalion's advance. At about 0840 hours the unit was ambushed by Germans and one American was killed and three others wounded. The tank destroyers returned the fire but was forced to break off the fire fight and withdrew when a messenger from Major Pace rushed up with the message:

"CEASE FIRE."

The long-awaited word had come through. It didn't state that peace was here, but it did carry the message everyone was waiting for—"cease fire and cease all forward movement."

The order had been received at 0831 hours at Division headquarters. At 0241 hours that morning, the 7th day of May, in a schoolhouse in RHEIMS, France (city which had been liberated by the Second Combat Team of the Fifth Division on August 30, 1944) Colonel General Jodl representing the German Army signed unconditional terms of surrender for the Germans. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, signed for General Eisenhower.

Thus did the war's end find the Fifth Infantry Division fighting in Czechoslovakia, having fought its way from the NORMANDY beachhead across France, into Germany, through Luxembourg, then through the SIEGFRIED Line into Germany again and thence east to Austria and Czechoslovakia, in ten long sacrificial months.

The collapse of the German Army gave the FIFTH a complicated job of administrating huge Prisoner of War enclosures, accounting German equipment, administrating the German civil population and taking care of and controlling the displaced persons.

Contact with the Russian One Hundred Seventh Infantry Division was made by Captain Donald Robinson of the Fifth Reconnaissance Troop several miles beyond the American lines and cordial relations were quickly established.

The Twenty-Sixth Infantry Division took over the FIFTH's zone of occupation in Czechoslovakia on the 21st of May and the Red Diamond warriors moved 80 miles south to the Occupation Zone assigned to the Division under "Plan Eclipse."





German civilians are forced to walk past bodies of 30 Jewish women starved to death by German SS troops in a 300 mile march across Czechoslovakia. Buried in shallow graves in Volary, Czechoslovakia, the bodies were exhumed by German civilians working under direction of Medics of 5th Infantry Division. Bodies were placed in coffins and reburied in cemetery in Volary.

PLAN ECLIPSE

With the utter collapse of German control in BAVARIA, and that part of Czechoslovakia bordering on BAVARIA, the situation in regards to government, sanitation, refugees, and food supply became critical.

At the close of hostilities, inner Germany was in a state of turmoil. Refugees and displaced persons jammed the roads. They were without food, without water, without transportation, and without the slightest vestige of sanitation whatsoever. Looting by ex-slave workers and released prisoners of war reached a new high. Deserters from the Wehrmacht, escaping war criminals, black market operators, and former inmates of the notorious concentration camps clamored for food, passes, transportation, and medical aid. Great numbers of German troops, still in possession of their weapons and equipment continued to flee to the American lines misguidedly seeking protection from the Russian troops. It was readily apparent to the Army and Corps Chiefs that something had to be done immediately.

The result of this decision was "Plan Eclipse," a scheme designed to provide government and protection for the various cities and states of the Reich, to insure the apprehension for trial of war criminals, and to establish control points for the tattered army of refugees pouring through the conquered areas. Although the Military Government officials had been briefed as to their duties and functions in the occupied territory, the sudden cessation of hostilities and the great number of inhabited localities turned over to the Allies made their task one of immense proportions and extreme difficulties. In order to aid them in carrying out their mission, and to maintain Allied supremacy throughout Germany, it was necessary to occupy the majority of the cities and villages with Allied troops. Prisoner of War enclosures were needed to retain the large number of German troops surrendering, Aid stations and refugee camps were needed, communications must be maintained, and, in short, an entirely new system of government and economy was needed.

To the victorious troops of the FIFTH Infantry Division fell the task of carrying out "Plan Eclipse" in South-eastern BAVARIA. The Division Command Post was established in the town of VILSHOFEN, Germany, some seventeen miles Northwest of PASSAU, and roughly eighty miles Northeast of MUNICH. The troops were spread throughout an area covering approximately 1800 square miles, bordering on the 1938 German-Czech frontier, and astride the DANUBE River.

Owing to the size of the territory to be administered to by the Red Diamond, the various combat teams ceased to function tactically and were broken up to furnish the Division with the necessary number of controlling units.

One of the first missions assigned to the Division was the rounding up and separation of the various German units then in the area occupied by the FIFTH Division. The old (1938) German-Austro-Czech border (as prescribed by the Versailles Treaty in 1918) was closed and guards posted at the various crossing points to prevent unauthorized passage.

Shortly after V-E day, troops of the FIFTH Division separated the German units who had surrendered to U. S. forces from those who had surrendered to the Russian forces and had violated their surrender terms by fleeing to the supposed protection of the American lines.

These latter, some 60,000 in all, were disarmed, loaded on their own transportation, supplemented by the necessary

number of American vehicles and transported across the thirty some miles of country between the American and Russian lines. There they were handed over to their rightful captors along with their vehicles and equipment.

At the conclusion of this delicate, and extremely complex mission, the Division proceeded to take up positions astride the DANUBE River in the vicinity of PASSAU. Billets were secured and the troops settled down to a life nearly approximating that of garrison life in the States. It was difficult for the combat-conscious men to become accustomed to the monotony of administration, occupation, and guard duty. It was hard to realize that the FIFTH Division had stepped ashore in the NORMANDY beachhead but 11 months previous, and that the threat of Nazi Germany was a thing of the past.

HOMeward BOUND

In accordance with "Plan Eclipse" the FIFTH Infantry Division occupied positions in BAVARIA from the 15th of May 1945 until the Division was ordered to turn the area over to the 83rd Infantry Division on the 13th of June.

Although there were still a considerable number of "Old Men," veterans of Iceland, England, and Northern Ireland in the Division at the time the Red Diamond turned its face homeward, the majority of the original troops were no longer with the Division. Heavy casualties had necessitated a large number of replacements, and, through a system of rotation to the United States, over 2,000 officers and men had already returned to their homes. At the close of the occupation period, the Division lost some 4,000 veterans transferred to the One Hundred Third Infantry Division, and another 1,000 were yet to be transferred to the Assembly Area Command at CAMP ST. LOUIS, France. The Division received, in turn, 4,000 replacements from the One Hundred Third.

On the 18th of June, 1945, the first units of the FIFTH Division left VILSHOFEN, Germany, and started the long trip home. When the Division Command Post opened in VILSHOFEN, Germany, the troops had travelled 2,049 miles from the beaches in Normandy.

By rail, and motor column the FIFTH Division moved to METZ (a hallowed and well remembered city, site of some of the bloodiest battles fought by the Red Diamond. Over 6,000 American dead lay in Limey Cemetery alone).

From METZ the motor columns sped to RHEIMS, followed by the majority of the troops in special trains. It was during this rail movement that a careless signalman failed to stop an oncoming train while the Tenth Infantry troop train stood on the main line. The resulting collision cost the Division one officer killed, and twenty-one officers wounded. The officer killed was Captain Edward J. Martin, Tenth Infantry Regiment, a veteran of Iceland.

On the 21st of June, 1945, the first units arrived at CAMP ST. LOUIS, Assembly Area for homeward bound troops. During the period of assembly at CAMP ST. LOUIS, tragedy again struck at the Tenth Infantry Regiment in the form of a dud high explosive 37 millimeter shell. In as much as the Camp itself was situated on French "Terrain Militaire" used as an artillery range prior to the outbreak of the second World War, the area was spotted with shell holes and unexploded rounds. The explosion of one round resulted in the death of four, and the wounding of seven, all from Company G, Tenth Infantry.

After a short stay during which the troops turned in all vehicles, weapons, and equipment, the FIFTH Division was

loaded into the inevitable "Forty-and-eight" French box-cars for the three day trip to the LEHAVRE Port of Embarkation.

The last units closed into the CAMP LUCKY STRIKE Staging Area on the 5th of July, and the FIFTH Division prepared for shipment to the United States for the first time in nearly four years. Another tragedy occurred while the Division prepared for shipment home, this time in the ranks of the Adjutant General's section of the Division Staff. While enroute to CAMP LUCKY STRIKE from DIEPPE, France, a Communication Zone Tractor trailer type personnel carrier overturned, killing four, and injuring 14.

Units of the Division proper landed in the States in the later part of July and went immediately to their separation centers by way of the various Ports of Embarkation.

All members of the Division were released through the

nearest separation center for a 30 day tour of duty at their homes. This was for the purpose of "Rest, Recuperation, Rehabilitation, and Recovery." Personnel of the war-weary FIFTH Division were furnished government transportation to the separation center nearest their homes, one member of the Division being flown to Hawaii.

At the conclusion of the 30 day recuperation period the FIFTH Division reassembled at CAMP CAMPBELL, Kentucky. This was the first time the Division had assembled as a whole since the training period in TIDWORTH GARRISON, England, in the summer of 1943. Early September saw the FIFTH Infantry Division completely reassembled and waiting its next assignment. In answer to the Motto of the FIFTH, "We Will," the Division could proudly answer, "We Did!"

The MEN BEHIND THE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS

The splendid record achieved by the FIFTH Infantry Division in combat during World War II was possible only through the loyal and constant support of the division services,—the quartermaster, ordnance, engineers, medics, finance, and many other agencies that go to make up the composite team of a combat division. It was through them that the morale of the troops was kept at its height, that they were fed, clothed, paid, and when time would permit, entertained.

Usually left out of correspondents' news stories, these units become more or less the forgotten men, but actually they comprise some of the most important parts of a combat team.

As the FIFTH Division rolled across France, Luxembourg, and Germany, the Fifth Quartermaster Company was always forward with the division, seldom, if ever, being behind the division headquarters, and many times as far forward as Infantry regimental command posts. The problems of supplying rations, clothing, gasoline and oil, and other numerous items to the troops was one that presented a new problem each day. The Army supply dumps were normally forty miles to the rear, but many times averaged up to 150 miles, and it was necessary to send the supply trucks back daily for division supplies.

A constant problem for the quartermaster was shoes. Troops marching over the long, hard roads, created a constant strain on the shoe supply. With the coming of winter, the quartermaster made early requisitions for shoes, shoe-pacs and ski socks, but the heavy demand for these items delayed the issue until the spring of 1945.

When the division raced across France and halted before Verdun, the Quartermaster faced one of its greatest problems. The division, along with the rest of the THIRD Army, was without gasoline to move, and for five days the division had barely enough gasoline for cooking and to keep the ration trucks moving. It was not until the division returned to the United States that the quartermaster found what he thought was the true reason for the shortage. The gasoline supplies had been shifted northward to take care of the drive towards Antwerp.

To augment the normal issue of winter clothing, 44,503 German fur jackets seized in Verdun were issued to FIFTH Division troops and units of XX Corps during the early

winter, and these proved a practical winter garment when worn under the regular clothing. A weekly laundry schedule was maintained throughout combat and during the cold winter months when trench foot became a definite threat, laundry service of socks was maintained daily.

Throughout the whole European campaign Quartermaster fumigation and bath units, with hot and cold water, were maintained as close to the troops as operational conditions would allow, and here the tired, dirty soldier could get not only a hot bath, but a clean change of clothes.

Equally important was the work of the Seven Hundred Fifth Ordnance Company. Faced with a constant shortage of tires and critically needed spare parts, the ordnance section had not only to keep up with the division, but to keep the trucks moving and the weapons shooting. Hardly had the company landed on the Normandy beachhead when it made its first battlefield repairs. When the First Army was planning the St. Lo break through, the company aided materially in the manufacture of hedge row cutters, a device made of angle iron welded into pronged cutting blades, and hinged to the front of tanks and tank destroyers.

Many times it was difficult to get spare parts for trucks, and when faced with this problem, the ordnance company utilized its mobile machine shop for improvising or making the parts.

Usually located from three to four miles in rear of the division command post, the company often moved to areas near the field artillery battalions. When the situation was somewhat static contact teams were sent to artillery battery positions to make ordnance repairs so that the weapons would not have to be moved. To insure a constant stream of replacements for ordnance parts, daily trips were made by the supply trucks to the Army depots until the distance became so great that trips were made every other day.

The ordnance company was constantly facing new tasks. In the siege of Fort Driant, near Metz, a welding crew was sent with a cutting torch to attempt to cut the heavy steel doors barring entrance to the fort, but the doors proved too heavy for the light equipment. In the battle of the Bulge, the ammunition section operated, with native crews, the "Red Diamond Express," a small narrow gauge Luxembourg railroad for transporting ammunition to the front, thereby relieving wear and tear on the roads during the

spring thaw. When tank tracks began wearing out during the SEINE River crossing, the company received a special division order of extra treads and rushed them to the front on special tank carrying trucks, only to find that the tanks had crossed the river and the one remaining bridge would not support the tank carriers. It was necessary to unload the treads and send for smaller trucks to haul them to the bridgehead.

Captured German material was utilized to the utmost. Thousands of rounds of German 8 centimeter mortar ammunition, which could be used in the American 81mm mortar, were collected and used. At other times German artillery pieces and ammunition, captured intact, were used.

Hundreds of men are alive today because medical personnel was near at hand to give aid when it was needed most. Always, during combat, the medical personnel was up front with the infantry, and it was common knowledge to the doughboy that should he get hit he would pass through the collecting and clearing stations and be on his way to an evacuation hospital within two hours. This rapid method of caring for the wounded was due to the procedure of sending the litter bearers right into the front lines to pick up casualties as fast as they happened. Being constantly exposed to enemy gun fire earned many purple hearts, bronze and silver stars, one Legion of Merit, several Distinguished Service Crosses and in one case a Congressional Medal of Honor for medical personnel.

The fast mobile type of warfare throughout Europe placed considerable strain upon the medical personnel, especially when the communication lines became extended and evacuation hospitals were sometimes 200 miles to the rear. In some of these operations as many as 450 casualties per day passed through the division clearing station, requiring the use of far more ambulances than the division was authorized.

During ten months of combat the division clearing station processed, treated and evacuated 29,967 casualties, helped in treatment and care of displaced persons, and maintenance of German military hospitals.

The medical supply section, departing from normal procedure, carried a sufficient supply of drugs and bandages during long moves to insure no one losing his life through lack of some critically needed item.

Besides the treatment of wounded, the medical battalion, under the division surgeon, was also responsible for battlefield sanitation, and the sanitation of areas the division occupied. So efficiently was this work conducted that the health of the division was superior throughout the entire campaign.

The overcoming of difficult obstacles in terrain always fell to the engineers. The Seventh Engineer battalion believes that it left better roads in France than it found. In order for the division to keep moving, it was necessary to build, repair, and maintain roads because of shelling, rains, and the wear and tear that goes with combat.

Many rivers were crossed several times as the division made a total of 25 river crossings, with the engineers installing an average of three bridges per crossing. In the SAUER River crossing three bridges were built before one was finally maintained, the others being shot out as fast as they were put in. At the MOSELLE River, the battalion had three bridges destroyed, and when finally enough bridges were held for the division to move across, a high flood took them away leaving the division stranded across the river. At the MOSELLE River crossing the area was wet and muddy and roads had to be built for the artillery to reach its positions.

The engineer bulldozer crews were kept constantly busy with road maintenance, digging gun pits for the artillery, and preparing road blocks.

At the SAUER River it was necessary for one platoon of engineers to clear a mine field of 1500 mines in two hours to enable an infantry regiment to push forward. When the RHINE was crossed seven assault boats in each wave carried the infantry across.

In the attack against the forts at Metz, the engineers were called upon to create and furnish many ingenious devices. In the battle for Fort Driant, when fumes from explosives filled the intricate network of tunnels where Germans and Americans fought it out in the dark corridors, the engineers fashioned a makeshift ventilating system from a captured German blower, and pumped fresh air to friend and foe alike.

In addition to combat duties, the engineer battalion was also responsible for supply and maintenance of all engineer equipment used by the various divisional units.

Besides the units closely associated with combat were many smaller units and departments that contributed to the smooth operation and morale of the division. Morale factor number one was probably the soldier's mail. During 299 days of combat Army Post Office No. 5 travelled 1500 miles handling more than 40,000 bags of mail containing approximately 10,000,000 letters, an amount comparable to a city of 150,000 population for a like period. The post office, often hampered by lack of transportation, crossed France, Luxembourg, and Germany operating in open fields, tents, German bowling alleys, theatres, feed mills, an iron mine, prison camps, school houses and even a castle. Sales of stamps during the combat period approximated \$10,000 monthly, and the money order business was above \$2,000,000 for the ten months of combat.

Standing high on the popularity list of all men of the FIFTH Division was the finance office. Making its first disbursement on May 19, 1941, the division finance office by the end of hostilities in Europe had paid out as cash payments to the troops alone the sum of \$27,044,885.73. Upon return to the United States, for the first time in four years, the finance office paid the troops in American dollars. During the preceding four years the troops had been paid in Icelandic kronurs, English pounds, French francs, Belgium francs, and German marks. Besides handling the payment of troops the finance office also took care of soldiers' deposits, collections for money due the government, and personal transfer transmissions.

The fact that the division maintained an efficient system of communications during combat was due to the hard work and splendid training of the FIFTH Signal Company personnel. The company was not only responsible for the proper signal communications throughout the division but for the supply of signal equipment to other units as well. The ten months of combat required a large amount of equipment. The METZ operation required 1,800 miles of field wire alone, and in the assault on SAARLAUTERN heavy shelling destroyed 12,000 feet of five-pair cable which had to be replaced.

Using several captured German trailers the signal company was able to transport 70 tons of signal supplies during the latter days of combat. But many times replacement of supplies necessitated battle field salvage and in the battle of the Bulge it was necessary to make use of 575 miles of abandoned wire.

The large amount of administration necessary in a division falls largely on the adjutant general's department. During combat this section was split in two parts, the classification section being with the forward echelon. To this classification section fell the task of obtaining, transporting, and assignment of reinforcements to keep the division up to combat strength. During many operations this was a gigantic task. During the MOSELLE River crossing the classification section received more than 1,000 re-

inforcements. It was necessary to examine each man's service record, classify and assign him to the place he was most needed. During ten months of combat this section received, classified, and assigned 17,497 new officers and men to the division.

Among the other small sections that contributed their parts towards successful operation of the division were the chaplains, who stayed with the battalion aid stations, the collecting and clearing stations during combat and were always ready to administer to the spiritual needs of the men when they needed it most.

The band was called on many times to act as route markers, guards at prisoner of war enclosures, and litter bearers. When time would permit they would play concerts for men in the rear echelons and rest camps.

The provost marshal's department was constantly busy with traffic control, route marking, and making numerous investigations of complaints filed by the Germans during the occupation.

The special service program, originated in Iceland and continued through combat, did much to relieve the monotony of combat and provided movies, athletics when time would permit, and other recreational facilities to the troops. Through the efforts a total of 57,400 officers and men saw 42 performances of the live shows touring Europe. Under this section also was placed the work of the Red Cross. Closely allied with the special services was a mobile post exchange system set up to operate on the continent and furnish supplies not issued the troops.



Attached

WorldWarTwoVeterans.Org

INTELLIGENCE UNITS

Highly important in the efficient operation of the FIFTH Division during combat was the work of Combat Intelligence Corps Detachment No. 5, Order of Battle Detachment No. 21, Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams No. 430 and 430G (German), Interpreter of Prisoners of War Teams 3 and 19, Photo Interpretation Team No. 67, and Air Support Party No. 1. It was the work of these teams that gave division headquarters a composite picture of the operations in the division sector.

The combat intelligence corps detachment was given the important responsibility of destruction of all enemy intelligence secret police, and para-military organizations encountered in the division area, and for detecting and combatting attempts by enemy agents and saboteurs attempting to operate behind the division front lines. Coupled with these activities the detachment also worked closely with military government officials in control of the civilian population.

Working through civilians the military interpreter intelligence teams maintained close liaison with the French Forces of the Interior and furnished valuable information concerning enemy troop dispositions and strength in the division area, furnished maps, river studies, plans of forts, and any pertinent data that might be used in an operation.

Interrogation of prisoners of war teams worked with the infantry regiments. Composed of highly trained specialists, the teams questioned prisoners for such specific information

as identification of enemy units, strength, disposition of troops, weapons, plan of maneuver, effectiveness of friendly fire and plan of attack, and other such information as might be of use during an operation. It was through the work of these teams that many bits of information were picked up that completed the big picture at higher headquarters.

The task of interpretation of aerial photographs fell to the photo interpretation team and it was the team's responsibility to accurately report enemy installations, road conditions, bridge conditions and possible locations for bridges and troops crossings. Another vital mission of the team was construction of mosaics, correcting maps from aerial photographs, and making charts of towns for patrols and task forces.

Correlating information furnished by the above teams was the problem of the order of battle detachment. With information from all sources available the detachment was always ready to furnish logistic and tactical data concerning enemy troop dispositions, strength, supply, morale, and other factors necessary to an attack.

The coordination of the ground forces and air support arm was the responsibility of the air support party. This unit advised the division commander as to the capabilities and limitations of aircraft as to the mission performed by the division, and checked all preplanned missions to secure the maximum benefit from air support in the operations.

spite 33-1
they recognized
THE TRUTH
men describe their capture:

führer on October 7:
my comrades and I saw the senseless fight. We therefore volunteered for it. I describe to you the situation of the men on our advance, and when we are in positions we raised our hands and we Americans...

nann on October 3:
ing an enemy attack I remained in my position. I saw the Americans coming towards me, so I wanted to show my desire to surrender. I took me out of the danger zone in the treatment we well.

tenführer on October 12:
We were three men on an observation post hill was a stream and the Americans crossed over to the other bank. At dawn the first Allied patrol we met.

Panzerregiment on October 10:
«We crept out of our dugouts during the night. Then, at dawn, we took to a leaflet which one of our comrades had hidden. We walked over to the American position without any attempt to hide. When we raised our hands over our heads, the leaflet.»

The road to War
THE ROAD H

Grundsätze des Kriegsgefangenenrechts
(Paul Haager Konvention 1907, Genfer Konvention 1929)

1. Wenn ein Gefangener der Übergabe an einen Gefangenenlager als Kriegsgefangener unterstellt wird, so ist der Gefangene dem Gefangenenlager zu übergeben. Dem Gefangenenlager ist es anheim, die Gefangenen in der Weise zu unterhalten, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht.
2. Kriegsgefangene haben in halb so weit möglich in Gemässheit der Gefangenenlager zu werden, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht, um ihre persönlichen Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.
3. Die Gefangenen haben in halb so weit möglich in Gemässheit der Gefangenenlager zu werden, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht, um ihre persönlichen Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.
4. Übernehmen und Wartung sind den Kriegsgefangenen zu belassen. Die Gefangenen haben in halb so weit möglich in Gemässheit der Gefangenenlager zu werden, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht, um ihre persönlichen Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.
5. In den Kriegsgefangenenlagern haben die Gefangenen in halb so weit möglich in Gemässheit der Gefangenenlager zu werden, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht, um ihre persönlichen Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.
6. Die Gefangenen haben in halb so weit möglich in Gemässheit der Gefangenenlager zu werden, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht, um ihre persönlichen Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.

REGELN FÜR DIE GEFANGENNAHME:

Um Missverständnisse bei der Gefangennahme auszuschliessen, ist folgendes angezeigt: Waffen weglegen, Helm und Koppel herunter; Hände hochheben und ein Taschentuch oder

OTZ 44-LÜCKE
ERKANNTEN SIE
Wahrheit

44-Männer schildern ihre Gefangennahme:

führer am 7. Oktober:
meiner Kameraden und ich selbst sahen ein, dass wir zu kämpfen. So meldeten wir uns für Spätrupp, die die Lage der Minenfelder beschreiben, um sie beim Rückzug zu helfen. Sobald wir uns den amerikanischen Stellungen näherten, nahen unsere Hände und gingen auf die Amerikaner zu.

nann am 3. Oktober:
einem feindlichen Angriff blieb ich in meinem Gefangenenlager. Ich sah die Amerikaner kommen auf mich zu, da ich ein Taschentuch, um zu zeigen, dass ich mich ergab. Die Amerikaner brachten mich sofort aus der Kampfzone. Ich wurde behandelt.

führer am 12. Oktober:
wir waren 3 Mann auf B-Posten. Am Fusse des Hügel, den die Amerikaner kamen auf anderen Ufer. Im L. haben wir unsere Waffen, Helme und Koppeln we über ans andere Ufer. Sobald es hell wurde, ergab ten alliierten Spätrupp, dem wir begegneten.

grenadier am 10. Oktober:
Wir sind in der Nacht aus unseren Schützengräben und haben uns im Niemandsland verortet und haben uns die Anweisungen der Amerikaner befolgt, wie sie hatten. Wir gingen in die Gefangenenlager, ohne uns zu verweigern. Wir haben die Hände über uns gehalten, wie es der Gefangenenlager anheim steht, um ihre persönlichen Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.

Der Weg über die Kriegsgefangenschaft

AN DIE SOLDATEN DES 7. UND 38. PANZER-GRANADIER REGIMENTES:
In diesen letzten Wochen des Krieges fragt sich jeder deutsche Soldat immer wieder: Welcher Weg führt

Zurück in die Heimat

Eure Führer befehlen Euch auszuhalten und die Stellung unter allen Umständen zu halten. Ihr jedoch wisst, dass ihr unseren Grossangriff nicht aufhalten könnt, dass der Krieg für Deutschland verloren ist und Weiterkämpfen Selbstmord bedeutet.

44-Männer „bewährte“ 44-Männer, nicht einfache Soldaten wie die doch nur in die 44-Uniform gesteckt wurden, stehen in Euren Reihen, um mit Waffengewalt Euren Rückzug zur Heimat zu verhindern. Wieder sollen einfache, meist nur mangelhaft ausgebildete Soldaten geopfert werden, um das Leben der Parteibonzen in der Heimat einige weitere Tage zu verlängern.

Über eine halbe Million Eurer Kameraden haben bisher an der 44 den einzig sicheren Weg nach Hause gewählt:

AMERIKANISCHE KRIEGSGEFANGENSCHAFT

Sie wussten, dass wir uns genau an die Regeln des Gefangenenrechts halten. Jeder Soldat, der von uns gefangen genommen wird und anständige Behandlung, bekommt dieselbe Nahrung wie wir Soldaten, und hat Anspruch auf alle Begünstigungen, die den Soldaten festgelegt sind.

Wenn auch ihr diesen einzigen Weg in die Heimat befolgt die nachstehenden Anweisungen:

- Werft Waffen, Helm und Koppel weg. H. Hände über den Kopf, die Handflächen nach unten. Kommt langsam auf die amerikanischen Stellungen zu.
- Wenn ihr in Hörweite unserer Truppen steht, schreit: „EI SSÖRENDE“
- Das bedeutet: „Ich ergebe mich.“

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Hundreds of thousands of leaflets were fired in artillery shell, or dropped from airplanes during World War II in psychological warfare, especially during the last few months of the war. These leaflets, no doubt, contributed to the eventual breakdown of German morale and resistance, thereby saving many American lives. Pictured on this page are a few of the many employed by the Fifth Division in an effort to induce German troops to surrender.

Ein Wort an die abgeschnittenen deutschen Einheit

METZ IST GEFALLEN

Unter den zahllosen deutschen Soldaten aus Metz jetzt in der Sicherheit amerikanischer Kriegsgefangenen befinden, ist auch Oberst Meyer, der bisherige Stadtdant von Metz.

Oberst Meyer hat kapituliert, weil er nicht wie die anderen deutsche Befehlshaber der Stadt Aach wissen mit dem Blut von nutzlos hingemordeten Zivilisten belasten wollte.

Wenn Oberst Meyer heute bei Euch wäre, würde er Kameraden!

Die HKL ist bereits 30 km. östlich von Metz.

Die Reste der deutschen Einheiten in L. ziehen sich vor den anstürmenden Amerikanern in den Westwall zurück.

Ein weiteres Ausharren in Euren Stellungen sowohl für die deutsche als auch für die Heerführung ohne jegliche taktische Bedeutung.

Ihr habt Eure Pflicht als Soldaten getan. Eure Pflicht jetzt ist, Euch Euren Kameraden zu erhalten.

Die Schlacht um Metz ist verloren.

Ihr Könnt Euer Leben

LETZTE NACHRICHT: Generalleutnant Befehlshaber der 462. Infanterie 44-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor Duncker haben sich ebenfalls in L.

2nd Dec. Issue
TRANSLATION
Feldpost

8th Army Liberates Ravenna

ROME. — The city of Ravenna has been liberated by the British Eighth Army in the Faenza sector. The towns of Gudo, on the railroad line from Ravenna to Bologna, were in spite of strong resistance, Allied forces crossed the Lamon west of Faenza.

Antwerp Re-Opened

ANTWERP. — The first big convoy has arrived in the harbor of Antwerp. Belgian workers are helping to unload the ships in the undamaged harbor facilities which extend for 200 kilometers. The supply lines of the Allies have been shortened by more than 600 kilometers by the re-opening of the harbor at Antwerp.

German Units Amalgamated

The „Feldpost“ learns that the German Army, as a result of its catastrophic losses, has again been forced to amalgamate various units. The 91st and 275th Infantry Divisions were again together and given the name 344th Infantry Division. The just recently renamed 12th Infantry Grenadier Division was put together with the 47th People's Grenadier Division, after the 47th which was only put into action on November 16th equipment, these patched-up divisions are now called „Bow and Arrow Troops“.

New Life in Occupied Germany

EILENDORF. — In his fight from Eilendorf, the Nazi mayor took all the funds of the community with him. The new Mayor, put into office by the Allies, has succeeded in picking up a community treasury of 30,000 marks from the proceeds of slaughtered cattle and abandoned goods.

„Weather No Obstacle“

LONDON. — Lieutenant-General Ira Eaker, commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean, has announced: „This winter Southern Germany will be bombed by more planes than ever before. Bad weather conditions are no obstacle, since advances in bombing technique now guarantee excellent results.“

Polacy w Armii Niemieckiej

PRZEMOC wcielona Was w szeregi śmiertelnych wrogów Polski, po katowskich zwycięstwach nad naszymi narodem. Przemoc narzuciła Wam mundur niemiecki. Każą Wam bić się z oswobodzicielami armii wolnych narodów, szurmującymi zachodnią wal t.zw. „fortecy Eurydy“. Wraz z Amerykanami, Brytyjczykami, Kanadyjczykami, Francuzami walczą tam nasze Polyskie Siły Zbrojne.

Wielu z Was otrzymało już wskazówki, czego od Was oczekuje Polska.

Rząd Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej rozkazuje Wam:

- Nie strzelać do Waszych braci-zołnierzy Wojsk Sprzymierzonych.
- Gdy musicie strzelać — chybiać celu.
- Przy pierwszej okazji przechodzić do Wojsk Sprzymierzonych lub chwycić się, by doznać się ich nadzieją.
- Rzetelnie informować Sprzymierzonych, gdy wejdziecie z nimi w styczność.
- Z chwilą znalezienia się po stronie Sprzymierzonych meldować o tym Policję, prosząc o oddzielenie od jeńców niemieckich i zezwolenie na powrót do waszych wojskowych polskimi.

Oczekują na Was bracia Wasi walczący obok naszych Sprzymierzonych o wyzwolenie.

Millionen deutscher Frauen haben hier abgebildete Flugblatt gele

An die deutsche Frau!

Deutschland selbst wird nun zum Kriegsschauplatz. V. jetzt an wird jede Bombe und jede Granate auf deutschem Boden explodieren. Deutsches Blut wird deutsche Erde tränken. Städte, Dörfer und Felder werden in Rauch und Flam aufgehen. So wollen es Hitler und seine Partei-Fanatiker.

Willst Du den Krieg im Land

- Frage den heimkehrenden deutschen Soldaten, ob persönlich Opfermut und Heldentum anglo-amerikanische Kriegsmaschine stehen bringen können.
 - Frage den heimkehrenden deutschen Soldaten, ob er für deutsche Frauen und K. gleiche Los wünscht wie das der Zivilbevölkerung der Normandie, Italiens und Russlands.
 - Frage den heimkehrenden deutschen Soldaten, ob er will, dass sein Helmatort so die zerschossenen Dörfer und Normandie, Italiens und Russlands.
- Die Treue des deutschen Soldaten gehört nicht der Partei, sondern Dir, deutsche Frau, Deinem Heim, Deiner Heimat. Und Du kannst den deutschen Kinder und die Heimat vor sinnloser Vernichtung bewahren, wenn Du forderst:

SCHLUS

an die Angehörigen der Kampfgruppe Weiss.

FESTUNGS MG BATAL

Die gewissenlose Führung Deutschlands sandte Euch 44-Verbände abzulösen. Sie gab Euch den Befehl Eure letzten Mann zu verteidigen.

Habt Ihr Euch schon mal durch den Kopf gehen lassen, Mitglieder der Kriegsmarine und Soldaten aus den Lazarettfrontlinien schickt?

Ihr seid keine erstklassigen Truppen, aber ihr genügt als

KANONENFUTTER FÜR DIE 44

Habt Ihr Euch schon mal durch den Kopf gehen lassen, keine Unterstützung von deutschen Waffern und Geschützen kommt, wenn die amerikanische Arie Euch doch ununterstützt unter Beschuss hält?

Ihr habt keine Unterstützung von der deutschen Artillerie, die seid ja nur

KANONENFUTTER FÜR DIE 44

Habt Ihr Euch schon mal durch den Kopf gehen lassen, wie Ihr einer Decke zurecht kommen sollt, wenn die Nächte jetzt im kalter werden?

Nur eine Decke für Euch, denn ihr seid ja nur

KANONENFUTTER FÜR DIE 44

Habt Ihr Euch schon mal durch den Kopf gehen lassen, wie es Euch ergehen wird, wenn ein grosserer Teil von Euch verwundet wird?

Ihr habt keine Tragbahnen und keinen Sanka, denn ihr seid doch nur

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World War I
The feat of Arms, however, which marks especially the 5th Division's ability as a fighting unit was the crossing of the Meuse River, and establishment of a bridge head on the eastern bank. This operation was one of the most brilliant military feats in the history of the American Army in France.
—John J. PERSHING

Fifth Infantry Division DIAMOND DUST

World War II
Rivers Crossed: Main, Esnes, Loing, Seine(3), Yonne, Marne(2), Meuse, Moselle(2), Nied, Saarlautern, Saar, Moselle, Sauer(2), Enz, Prum, Nims, Kyll, Mosel, Rhine, Main, Wenne, Tepla.

ICELAND • ENGLAND • IRELAND • FRANCE • LUXEMBOURG GERMANY • AUSTRIA • CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Volume I, Number 4 Passau-Germany Saturday, 16 June, 1945

Division Heads Back to France, U.S.

10th Infantry Hardest Hit On Battle-fields

In ten months of combat, from 9 July 1944 in Normandy to 8 May 1945 in Czechoslovakia, the 10th Infantry Division suffered the loss of 564 officers and 11,822 enlisted battle casualties and a loss of 454 officer and 12,569 enlisted non-battle casualties for a combined loss of 25,409, according to official G-1 figures.

Officially, of course, the category of non-battle casualties includes such things as trench-foot, frostbitten feet, and battle fatigue all of which are a result of battle but not carried as battle casualties and usually not collecting Purple Hearts.

Translating the battle casualty figure means that the division turned over completely once in killed and wounded. Since, however, the overwhelming majority of the casualties occurred in the rifle battalions, it actually means that the rifle companies changed personnel between two and three hundred per cent.

The 10th regiment suffered the highest number of battle casualties, which was 182 officer and 4,422 enlisted men. The 2nd Infantry lost 165 and 3,580 and the 11th lost 152 and 3,258.

Footsloggers Really Earned Name; Combat Marches Total 297 Miles

It all started when Sergeant Charles Geinosky, Co F, 2d Infantry wrote into Diamond Dust trying to find how far his platoon marched in combat since they hit the Continent in July. There appears to have been some heated arguments with the conservatives holding to 500 miles, against 600. Because there seemed to be cash at stake, an effort has been made to discover the actual distance covered on foot.

Fifth to be Redeployed After 3 1/2 Years in ETO, 10 Months Combat

The 5th Infantry Division, longest overseas in the U. S. Army is being relieved of its job of occupation in southern Germany by the 83rd Infantry Division, placed in another category under the Readjustment and Redeployment Program and sent back to fraternizing country.

at the future holds for the Division still is a military, but it can be stated that the Red-Diamond for a large personnel transition, is not going to many but is going back to France and thence to the States.

Killed in Action
The breakdown for killed in action reads:
2nd . . . 38 officers . . . 676 enlisted men
10th . . . 10 officers . . . 668 enlisted men
11th . . . 26 officers . . . 558 enlisted men

Thus, each regiment lost nearly the fighting strength of one battalion in killed alone and the division lost nearly the line fighting strength of one regiment.

The breakdown for wounded in action for the three regiments was:
2nd . . . 120 officers . . . 2,639 enlisted men
10th . . . 30 officers . . . 668 enlisted men
11th . . . 119 officers . . . 2,482 enlisted men

To furnish a little more ammunition for bull sessions, DIAMOND DUST gives the breakdown of KIA and WIA for the division and each regiment in each major battle, as compiled from a combination of G-1 and G-3 reports and AG figures. In reading them, remember that the totals of the regiments will not equal the division figure for each battle because of the casualties suffered by the engineers and artillery. Nor are the figures any good index of the fierceness or skillfulness of fighting. They are simply the black-and-white figures of flesh-and-blood losses.

Unit C OK So
An unofficial but reports that it takes hater from the C. C. P. 38 home.

The competent son, Waters, long time son, S. LeRoy Irwin, with loyament camp somewhat that all personal equipment checked and that required the certificate retention of captured material.

No change has been in regulations concerning trophies. See III, C, Aug. 44, still stands as of 17 Jan. 45. The latter document goes so far as to cite a sample certificate:

"I, I certify that I have personally examined the items of captured enemy military equipment in the possession of . . . that the trophy value of such items exceeds any training, service, or salvage value, that they do not include any explosives and that the possession thereof is in conformity with the provisions of Sec III, Cir. 313, WD, 31 Aug. 44, and the existing regulations of the Theater Commander.

"a. The items referred to are:
Signature
Rank and Branch
Organization

Only the following items are prohibited:
1. Nameplates.
2. Items which contain any explosives.
3. Items of which the value as trophies, as determined by the theater commander, is outweighed by their usefulness in the service or for research or training purposes in the theaters of operations or elsewhere, or by their value as critical scrap material.

All Leaves 10th
ert P. Bell, commander of the 10th Infantry 24 May 1942, left guided through its ming days last Sunday.

vent to the 99th as its assistant der, a position brigadier general.

Going
May nearly 2,000 ave left the divites and probable al score remains to lose another score is lowered

an Has, Too
with high ing home the next

Division Earned 35 DSC Awards

Standing high among divisions in the ETO, members of the Fifth have so far been awarded 35 Distinguished Service Crosses for extraordinary heroism on General Orders published by Third Army Headquarters. Fourteen decorations have been made posthumously, two recipients have since died.

The Red Diamond came out of every major engagement with at least one of the coveted honors. Exemplifying the fighting spirit of the Division, grades and ranks from Private to Lt Colonel are represented.

Currently, the Second Infantry has the greatest number with 14 awards published. Eleven members of the Eleventh have been cited, and four men from the Tenth, but there are still a number of recommendations on which final action has not been taken. One artilleryman in the 50th Field, and one tankman in the 737th Tank Bn have been decorated. Fifth Recon Troop and 7th Engineers each have two.

PERSONAL DIARIES AVAILABLE
Division personnel who have submitted diaries to the Base censor may have those diaries returned by forwarding a request to Chief Base Censor, Base Censor Office 3, APO 640, US Army. The name, rank and serial number of the owner, and, if available, the diary file number, indicated on the receipt returned to the owner at time of submitting the property, will be included in the request.

Musical Comedy Scores Big Hit
A large and appreciative G. I. audience witnessed the premiere of the musical show, "Revelous of 1945", cast, and presented by members of C Company, 10th Infantry, at the Globe theater in Grafenau last Sunday evening. The show was held over for a second performance on Monday night and during the week was seen by several division units.

Written and directed by Pfc. Harry Proskakov, a former New York showman, the gala show featured two hours of laughs aplenty, clever acting and popular music by the company dance orchestra and by talented vocalists.

The show itself contained many personalities with former stage and radio experience. T/3 Milton Gruder, who has appeared on many summer theaters in the New York circuit, acted as master of ceremonies and kept the audience amused throughout the performance with gags and jokes. Another highlight of the evening's entertainment was the comedy team of Prsybylak and Pastore, whose crazy antics won the resounding applause of the throng.

The skit, "The Guardhouse", featuring the comedian, Pfc. William Prochask, the sad Czech, drew plenty of praise for its true-to-life impersonations of guardhouse doings. A dance band composed of T/3 Jack Motley, drummer Eugene Rogers, Pfc. Anthony James, Pfc. Merle Freeman and T/Sgt. Otis Butler, provided swing and sweet music during the show. Sgt. Butler, ex-radio crooner, handled the vocals.

Hillbilly Square was put on by Pfc. Otha Cressy, S/Sgt. Ward Askew and with vocals by Sgt. Donald Followay. Pfc. Frank Colinsone lent the show its romantic touch with his crooning of a few of the current popular ballads.

THE DIAMOND DUST
The Diamond Dust, as a division newspaper, was first published during World War I. With the reactivation of the 5th Infantry Division in 1939, the newspaper was again revived and printed as often as facilities would permit. Part of the time it was a mimeographed sheet. At other times it was printed by letterpress. The page shown here was printed at Passau, Germany, and the headline tells one of the most important stories ever printed in the division paper.

Regardless of the method of printing, the Diamond Dust was always a welcome visitor to all units of the division and proved to be one of the best morale factors known. While publication dates varied, and no set schedule could be maintained, the men eagerly looked forward to each issue.

Doughboy Plans Battleship To Carry Regiment on Land

If the sons or grandsons of Fifth Division men should ever come up against something like Metz or the Sauer river around Echternach, it'll be a pushover with the "Land-Battleship," according to Sergeant Arnold W. Anderson, of Co K, 11th, and Loyal, Wisconsin. The veteran communications chief spent long hours in Iceland, County Down, and during the state-mate along the Moselle making sketches for his weapon of the future.


It's not as fantastic as it sounds. Every time the 3rd Battalion encountered formidable opposition as they did at Angers, Fontainebleau, Dornot, and Ludweiler-Warndt, to mention a few hot spots, Anderson sold his idea with expansive gestures. Everyone agreed that the "Land Battleship" would have saved a lot of sweating.

"There's been a lot of talk about some of the bigger tanks having outgrown useful size — bridges not strong enough to hold them, and that kind of argument," he began. "The trouble is the engineers have been too conservative, ought to let their imagination stretch a bit."


"Just imagine a 300 foot long behemoth propelled by multiple, independently-powered caterpillar treads, all over the bottom."

continued on p. 2 col. 1

continued on p. 2 col. 1



WorldWarTwo





First review of Fifth Infantry Division held after return from ETO.

RED DIAMOND DAY

Red Diamond Day, commemorating the return of the Fifth Division to the United States, was observed on October 3, 1945, with a division review and presentation of the presidential citation to Company E, and First Section, Third Platoon, Company H, Second Infantry Regiment. Many prominent government officials attended the celebration that day.

Following the review, guests of the division inspected the mess halls, barracks, and day rooms of the different organizations. The afternoon was filled with baseball games to determine the division championship, inspection of weapons displays, and variety shows staged by different units at the post field house. A dance at two service clubs featured the evening's entertainment.

Red Diamond Day was dedicated to "... those officers and men who served their country for so long and who earned for themselves the eternal gratitude of all Americans."

Flag Staff at Headquarters, Camp Campbell, Kentucky.



First review of Fifth Infantry Division held after return from ETO.



DIVISION GENERAL STAFF



Col. Paul O. Franson, Chief of Staff.



Above—Fifth Infantry Division General Staff. Front row, left to right—Lt. Col. Clayton E. Crafts, G-1; Col. Paul O. Franson, Chief of Staff; Lt. Col. Donald W. Thackeray, G-2. Back row—Lt. Col. Richard L. McKee, G-4; Lt. Col. Randolph C. Dickens, G-3; Lt. Col. George E. B. Petty, Military Government.

G-1 Section.



G-2 Section.



G-3 Section.



G-4 Section.

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Regimental Headquarters Staff, Second Infantry Regiment.



Staff, First Battalion, Second Infantry Regiment.



Right—Staff, Second Battalion, Second Infantry Regiment.



Staff, Third Battalion, Second Infantry Regiment.



Staff, First Battalion, Tenth Infantry Regiment.



Staff, Tenth Infantry Regiment.





Staff, Second Battalion, Tenth Infantry Regiment.



Staff, Third Battalion, Tenth Infantry Regiment.

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Left—Staff, Eleventh Infantry Regiment.



Right—Staff, First Battalion, Eleventh Infantry Regiment.

Below—Staff, Third Battalion, Eleventh Infantry Regiment.



Above—Staff, Second Battalion, Eleventh Infantry Regiment.

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Part of Staff of Nineteenth Field Artillery Battalion.



Staff, Twenty-first Field Artillery Battalion.



Right—Staff, Forty-Sixth Field Artillery Battalion.




Left—Staff, Fiftieth Field Artillery Battalion.

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Capt. Noe N. Benoit and Capt. Richard Berman, Collecting Company "A," Fifth Medical Battalion.



Capt. Thomason Dann and Capt. Walter A. Daniel, Collecting Company "C," Fifth Medical Battalion.



Ration Dump.



Staff, Fifth Quartermaster Company.

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Division Signal Officers and Clerks of Division Signal Office.

Staff, Seventh Engineer Battalion.





Capt. Donald E. Robinson, Commanding Fifth Reconnaissance Troop.



Division Postal Section.

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Command Post, Eight Hundred Third Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Light Tank of Seven Hundred Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion.





Armored Car, Eight Hundred Eighteenth Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Prisoner Interrogation Team attached to Fifth Division.



Ninety-seven years of service is represented in these three veteran division band men. Front to rear: Sergeant W. Kulebokeon, Staff Sergeant Joe Davis, Technical Sergeant Russel Anders, and Technical Sergeant John W. Golden.



Fifth Division Artillery Airforce.



Fifth Division Finance Office distributes pay to Class "A" Agent Officers in British Pounds.



RED DIAMOND ROLL CALL

OF

UNIT COMMANDERS

COMMANDING GENERALS

BRIGADIER GENERAL CORTLANDT PARKER
Oct. 20, 1941 to Aug. 1, 1942

MAJOR GENERAL CORTLANDT PARKER
Aug. 2, 1942 to July 3, 1943

MAJOR GENERAL S. LEROY IRWIN
July 3, 1943 to April 21, 1945

MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN
April 21, 1945 to present

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BRIGADIER GENERAL ALN D. WARNOCK
Nov. 20, 1942 to Oct. 21, 1945

DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDING GENERAL

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD A. VANDERVEER
Sept. 8, 1942 to present

2ND INFANTRY REGIMENT

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

COLONEL LAWRENCE O. MICKEL
Oct. 20, 1941 to April 28, 1944

LT. COL. PAUL T. CARROLL
April 29, 1944 to July 9, 1944

COLONEL A. WORRELL ROFFE
July 9, 1944 to April 28, 1945

COLONEL WALTER N. GRAHAM
April 28, 1945 to present

BATTALION COMMANDERS

FIRST BATTALION

LT. COL. GEORGE W. CHILDS
to July 26, 1944

MAJOR HORACE E. TOWNSEND
July 26, 1944 to July 30, 1944

LT. COL. PAUL T. CARROLL
July 30, 1944 to Sept. 5, 1944

LT. COL. WILLIAM H. BLAKEFIELD
Sept. 5, 1944 to April 28, 1945

MAJOR BERYEL J. PACE
April 28, 1945 to present

SECOND BATTALION

LT. COL. LESLIE K. BALL
to Feb. 20, 1945

MAJOR HORACE E. TOWNSEND
Feb. 20, 1945 to March 11, 1945

MAJOR BERYEL J. PACE
March 11, 1945 to April 21, 1945

MAJOR HORACE E. TOWNSEND
April 21, 1945 to present

THIRD BATTALION

LT. COL. THOMAS A. LINDLEY
to Sept. 5, 1944

LT. COL. ROBERT E. CONNOR
Sept. 5, 1944 to present

10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

REGIMENTAL COMMANDER

COLONEL ROBERT P. BELL
May 24, 1942 to June 10, 1945

BATTALION COMMANDERS

FIRST BATTALION

LT. COL. FRANK V. LANGFITT, JR.
to Sept. 16, 1944

MAJOR WILFRID H. HAUGHEY, JR.
Sept. 17, 1944 to Dec. 6, 1944

MAJOR STANLEY M. HAYES
June 11, 1945 to Aug. 30, 1945

LT. COL. FRANK V. LANGFITT, JR.
Dec. 7, 1944 to present

SECOND BATTALION

LT. COL. JULIAN H. MARTIN
to July 30, 1944

LT. COL. WILLIAM E. SIMPSON
July 31, 1944 to Sept. 17, 1944

LT. COL. PAUL T. CARROLL
Sept. 18, 1944 to Sept. 23, 1944

LT. COL. WILLIAM E. SIMPSON
Sept. 24, 1944 to Nov. 4, 1944

LT. COL. HARRIS C. WALKER
Nov. 5, 1944 to present

THIRD BATTALION

LT. COL. ALDEN P. SHIPLEY
to Feb. 8, 1945

MAJOR WILFRID H. HAUGHEY, JR.
Feb 9, 1945 to present

11TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

COLONEL CHARLES W. YUILL
to Nov. 20, 1944

COLONEL PAUL J. BLACK
Nov. 21, 1944 to present

BATTALION COMMANDERS

FIRST BATTALION

LT. COL. HOMER C. LEDBETTER
to Nov. 20, 1944

LT. COL. HERMAN R. SCHELL
Nov. 21, 1944 to present

SECOND BATTALION

LT. COL. KELLEY B. LEMMON, JR.
to Sept. 19, 1944*

LT. COL. JOHN T. RUSSELL
Sept. 26, 1944 to Dec. 17, 1944

MAJOR FERRIS A. CHURCH
Dec. 18, 1944 to Dec. 22, 1944

LT. COL. JOHN N. ACUFF, JR.
Dec. 23, 1944 to present

*CAPT. FERRIS A. CHURCH
Acting Commander during 6-day period
Sept. 20, 1944 to Sept. 25, 1944

THIRD BATTALION

LT. COL. WILLIAM H. BIRDSONG, JR.
to present

*19TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

BATTALION COMMANDER

LT. COL. CHARLES J. PAYNE

21ST FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

BATTALION COMMANDERS

LT. COL. ROBERT L. BRUNZELL
to Oct 6, 1944

LT. COL. CHARLES P. BAERMAN
Oct. 7, 1944 to present

46TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

BATTALION COMMANDERS

LT. COL. JAMES R. JOHNSON
to Oct. 8, 1944

LT. COL. ROBERT L. BRUNZELL
Oct. 9, 1944 to Dec. 12, 1944

MAJOR CHARLES R. BALLOU
Dec. 12, 1944 to Dec. 28, 1944

LT. COL. B. B. BLANK
Dec. 29, 1944 to present

*50TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

BATTALION COMMANDER

LT. COL. WILLIAM R. CALHOUN

*7TH ENGINEER BATTALION

BATTALION COMMANDER

LT. COL. HUGO J. STARK

*5TH MEDICAL BATTALION

BATTALION COMMANDER

LT. COL. HOWARD H. BASS

*HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

COMPANY COMMANDER

MAJOR JOHN C. OHAYER

*5TH SIGNAL COMPANY

COMPANY COMMANDER

CAPT. JOSEPH W. KOHNSTAMM

*5TH QUARTERMASTER COMPANY

COMPANY COMMANDER

CAPT. RALPH F. KUBAL

5TH RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

TROOP COMMANDERS

CAPT. THEODORE E. TWELMEYER
to Aug. 27, 1944

CAPT. DONALD E. ROBINSON
Aug. 28, 1944 to present

705TH ORDNANCE COMPANY

COMPANY COMMANDER

CAPT. SYLVESTER W. BANASZAK
to Oct. 6, 1944

LT. ROBERT P. RITTER
Oct. 7, 1944 to Nov. 6, 1944

CAPT. MAX D. THOMASON
Nov. 7, 1944 to May 15, 1945

LT. ROBERT P. RITTER
May 16, 1945 to present

*DIVISION STAFF

CHIEF OF STAFF

COL. PAUL O. FRANSON

AC of S, G-1
Assistants

LT. COL. CLAYTON E. CRAFTS
CAPT. BERNARD FISHER

AC of S, G-2
Assistants

LT. COL. DONALD W. THACKERAY
MAJOR THOMAS C. MCGUIRE

AC of S, G-3
Assistants

LT. COL. RANDOLPH C. DICKENS
LT. COL. GEORGE K. MOODY
MAJOR PAUL H. VANDERHEIDEN
Assistant (Air)
CAPT. ADOLPH D. KATZ

AC of S, G-4
Assistants

LT. COL. RICHARD L. MCKEE
MAJOR RALPH L. NORLING

ADJUTANT GENERAL
Assistants

LT. COL. CHARLES H. CONWAY
MAJOR ELMER L. LAWSON

INSPECTOR GENERAL

LT. COL. DEWEY B. GILL
to Feb. 19, 1945

LT. COL. CLARENCE J. NELSON
Feb. 20, 1945 to March 23, 1945

LT. COL. ROBERT F. BATES
March 24, 1945 to present

JUDGE ADVOCATE

LT. COL. EDWARD S. HEMPHILL

FINANCE OFFICER

LT. COL. ARTHUR B. DWINNELL

CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICER

LT. COL. LEVIN B. COTTINGHAM

CHAPLAIN

LT. COL. CLARENCE F. GOLISCH

SURGEON

LT. COL. ENOS G. WALKER

MEDICAL INSPECTOR

MAJOR MARCUS H. SUGARMAN

DENTAL SURGEON

MAJOR WILLIAM A. KNEEDLER

NEURO-PSYCHIATRIST

MAJOR HARRY D. NESMITH

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

LT. COL. GEORGE E. B. PEDDY

Assistants

MAJOR HENRY N. HOOPER
MAJOR JOHN H. HUDSPETH
MAJOR JOHN H. VINCENT

ORDNANCE OFFICER

LT. COL. BURNS C. COX

Assistant

MAJOR ROBERT H. DIETZ

QUARTERMASTER OFFICER

LT. COL. DANIEL R. TAYLOR

Assistant

CAPT. ROBERT A. BAGLEY

SIGNAL OFFICER

LT. COL. DAVID P. GIBBS
to Feb. 19, 1945

MAJOR JOHN T. NEWMAN
Feb. 20, 1945 to present

Assistant

CAPT. JOHN F. JENKINS

PROVOST MARSHAL

MAJOR JAMES C. COUTY

SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICER

MAJOR ROBERT J. MALCOLM

*Held position for entire combat period
unless otherwise noted.



German armored vehicles knocked out in counter offensive—Luxembourg.

Regimental CP of the 10th Infantry with Major Marsh, Regimental S-2 at the phone.



An American tank fords a stream in the Fontainebleau section of France in the drive which routed the Germans from the area. American Engineers are repairing a bridge over the stream.



G.I.'s of the 5th Infantry Division stand at parade rest during ceremonies at the St. Mihiel American cemetery at Thiancourt, France.



American soldiers of the 5th Division give this German tank a close scrutiny.



CP in the field somewhere in Normandy. Left to right: Sgt. Goldberg, Capt. Carey, S/Sgt. Gilliland, and Col. R. C. Dickens, AC of S, G-3.



The "Red Diamond Express" operated by the 5th Quartermaster Company, Fifth Infantry Division, as part of the main division supply line.

DID YOU KNOW . . .



During combat 71,603 prisoners of war were captured by the division?

787 pairs of spectacles were issued to division personnel during 10 months of combat?

Records show that Combat Units used 3,583,860 gallons of gasoline during 10 months of combat?

The Seventh Engineers furnished 9,000,000 gallons of purified water to the division during combat?

Approximately 350,400 captured German rations were issued to Displaced Persons and German P. W.'s during April and May, 1945?

During 10 months of combat the communication system of the division used 18,780 miles of telephone field wire?

Over \$2,000,000 worth of medical supplies were captured during combat?

WorldWarTwoVeterans.Org


Over 44,503 captured fur lined German jackets were issued to the division and attachments to supplement normal winter clothing?

Division personnel salvaged 21,580 five-gallon gasoline cans from the battlefield during combat operations?

Units of the division and attachments expended 11,699,541 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition during combat?

Pilots of Artillery Observation Planes flew 6,050 hours during combat or a total of 484,000 miles?







Above—
Private Dale B. Rex received the Distinguished Service Cross from Major General Irwin for the capture of more than three hundred Germans during the fighting on the Moselle bridge-head.



Left—
Private Harold Garman, Fifth Division Aid man who won Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism during combat.



Right—
Foxhole surgeon, Duane Kinman, 19-year-old medic, who performed miraculous emergency operation that saved the life of Private Henry Roan.

AWARDS TO PERSONNEL OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND ATTACHED UNITS

13 July 1944 to 6 May 1945

	5th Infantry Division	Attached Units	Total
Medal of Honor.....	1		1
Distinguished Service Cross.....	34	1	35
Legion of Merit.....	9		9
Silver Star	602	39	641
Soldier's Medal	10		10
Bronze Star Medal.....	2066	221	2287
Air Medal	122		122
Military Cross (British).....	1		1
Military Medal (British).....	1		1
Order of the Red Star (Russian).....	6		6
Medal of Merit (Russian).....	6		6
Legion of Honor (French).....	6		6
Croix de Guerre with Pa'm (French).....	16		16
Croix de Guerre (Armee) (French).....	12		12
Croix de Guerre Corps D'Armee (French).....	3		3
Croix de Guerre (Division) (French).....	9	2	11
Croix de Guerre (Regiment) (French).....	25	4	29

HEADQUARTERS 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Cumulative Casualties, 5th Infantry Division Period 9 July 1944 to 9 May 1945

(Compiled from G-1 Daily Summary)

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Captured</i>	<i>Total Battle</i>	<i>Non-battle</i>	<i>Grand Total</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Hq. 5th Inf. Div...	3	3	1		7	42	49	
Hq. Co., 5th Inf. Div.	1	1			2	52	54	
Hq. Sp. Tr. & Med.								
Det.	1	1			2	8	10	
Div. Band						6	6	
MP Plat., 5th Inf. Div.	2	9			11	56	67	
5th Sig. Co.....	3	15		1	19	83	102	
5th Cav. Rcn. Tr.								
(Mecz)		26	4		30	107	137	
5th QM Co.....						60	60	
705th Ord. (LM) Co.		2	1		3	55	58	
7th Engr. Bn.....	23	181	1		205	338	543	
5th Medical Bn....	8	63	1	4	76	326	402	
2nd Infantry	714	2736	215	80	3745	3677	7422	
10th Infantry	697	3218	689		4604	2519	7123	
11th Infantry	583	2691	123	13	3410	4611	8021	
Hq. & Hq. Btry.,								
Div. Arty.	1				1	27	28	
19th FA Bn.....	6	32	1		39	220	259	
21st FA Bn.....	5	30	2		37	126	163	
46th FA Bn.....	24	70	10	2	106	153	259	
50th FA Bn.....	11	75	2	1	89	296	385	
TOTAL	2082	9153	1050	101	12386	12762	25148	
<i>Attached Units</i>								
449th AAA AW Bn.	8	42			50	194	244	Atchd. 13 July—Detchd. 9 May 45.
735th Tank Bn....	44	132	5	6	190	119	309	Atchd. 12 July—22 Sept. 44: Atchd. 1 Nov.—Detchd. 20 Dec. 44.
818th TD Bn. (SP)	9	28	1		38	43	81	Atchd. 19 July—22 Sept.: Atchd. 23 Oct.—Detchd. 20 Dec. 44.
38th Cav. Rcn. Sqd.	4	18	2		24	26	50	Atchd. 13 July—Detchd. 18 July 44.
150th Engr. C Bn..		5			5	1	6	Atchd. 9 Aug.—Detchd. 13 Aug. 44.
204th FA Bn.....			4		4	3	7	Atchd. 9 Aug.—Detchd. 13 Aug. 44.
774th TD Bn. (t)..	5	12			17	15	32	Atchd. 14 Sept.—Detchd. 15 Oct. 44.
241st FA Bn.....		1			1		1	Atchd. 25 Sept.—Detchd. 30 Sept. 44.
284th FA Bn.....	1	15	3		19	18	37	Atchd. 25 Sept.—Detchd. 20 Oct. 44; Atchd. 16 Dec.—20 Dec. 44.
244th FA Bn.....						2	2	Atchd. 22 Nov.—Detchd. 7 Dec. 44.
6th Cav. Gp.....	11	69			80	112	192	Atchd. 3 Dec.—16 Dec. 44.
807th TD Bn. (t)..		3			3	13	16	Atchd. 17 Dec.—Detchd. 21 Dec. 44.
654th TD Bn. (SP)						3	3	Atchd. 22 Dec.—Detchd. 25 Dec. 44.
803rd TD Bn. (SP)	8	18	5	4	35	80	115	Atchd. 26 Dec.—Detchd. 9 May 45.
351st Engr. GS Regt.	1	3			4	31	35	Atchd. 24 Dec.—Detchd. 16 Jan. 45.
737th Tank Bn....	22	42			64	50	114	Atchd. 23 Dec.—Detchd. 9 May 45.
TOTAL	113	388	20	10	534	710	1244	
GRAND TOTAL	L. 2195	9541	1070	111	12920	13472	26392	



BATTLE CASUALTY SUMMARY

(Actual totals from morning reports received and processed
to and including 29 May 1945)

	Officers	Em
Killed in action.....	117	2103
Died of wounds.....	18	319
Died of injuries.....	None	2
Seriously wounded in action.....	45	698
Seriously injured in action.....	1	5
Slightly wounded in action.....	355	7158
Slightly injured in action.....	44	1091
*Missing in action.....	16	321
Seriously ill—gas casualty.....	None	None
**Captured	7	210
Interned by neutral country.....	None	None
TOTALS	597	11907
Returned to duty.....	170	3794

*Missing in action—Figures shown above represent the actual number of O and EM missing and unaccounted for as of 29 May 1945.

**Captured—Figures shown above represent the actual number of O and EM captured and not yet returned to Allied military control as of 29 May 1945.





AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

(From official reports of the Ordnance Officer)

	14 July 44 to 31 July 44	31 July 44 to 20 Aug. 44	20 Aug. 44 to 20 Sept. 44	20 Sept. 44 to 20 Oct. 44	20 Oct. 44 to 20 Nov. 44	20 Nov. 44 to 20 Dec. 44
Cal. 30	928,943	1,287,659	1,242,471	455,072	1,039,780	680,372
Cal. 45, Ball.....	47,600	54,291	45,465	15,520	41,466	49,692
Cal. 50, MG.....	35,940	18,615	15,380	9,878	25,139	18,745
Grenades	10,280	9,366	11,652	9,623	10,974	7,123
Mines	202		247	11,657	208	400
Rockets	637	819	526	600	1,161	1,168
Torpedo, Bangalore	30	88		325	20	60
60mm Mortar	12,779	10,241	8,479	14,804	13,305	7,429
81mm Mortar	10,484	7,035	12,261	17,878	20,622	26,401
105 How.	16,222	15,094	42,064	40,914	30,540	38,641
Shells, 251b, Br.....						
155 How.	2,940	2,490	5,524	6,148	3,798	5,731
37mm Gun T & AT.....		222	182	2	11	9
57mm Gun AT.....					225	346

	20 Dec. 44 to 20 Jan. 45	20 Jan. 45 to 20 Feb. 45	20 Feb. 45 to 20 March 45	20 March 45 to 20 April 45	20 April 45 to 9 May 45	Division total Expenditure
Cal. 30	823,660	1,065,667	984,356	881,576	324,050	9,713,606
Cal. 45, Ball.....	44,950	32,200	75,380	46,054	45,434	498,052
Cal. 50, MG.....	57,145	17,077	25,150	111,338	7,795	342,202
Grenades	6,150	7,559	7,776	5,471	5,343	91,317
Mines	865	1,545	1,000	1,100	1,100	18,324
Rockets	519	1,176	1,005	460	492	8,563
Torpedo, Bangalors		60				583
60mm Mortar	11,861	4,615	4,506	3,297	172	91,488
81mm Mortar	15,843	13,235	7,798	5,006	947	137,510
105 How.	59,189	83,131	52,232	26,140	3,686	407,853
Shells, 251b, Br.....		608	791			1,399
155 How.	12,052	18,173	10,595	5,740	843	74,034
37mm Gun T & AT.....	123	151	290	313	55	1,358
57mm Gun AT.....	219	217	225	299		1,531





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Ammunition Expenditure Attached Units 5th Infantry Division

	<i>14 July 44 to 31 July 44</i>	<i>30 July 44 to 20 Aug. 44</i>	<i>20 Aug. 44 to 20 Sept. 44</i>	<i>20 Sept. 44 to 20 Oct. 44</i>	<i>20 Oct. 44 to 20 Nov. 44</i>	<i>20 Nov. 44 to 20 Dec. 44</i>
Cal. 30	273,000		170,590	173,500	197,400	2,000
Cal. 45	18,720		14,810		37,749	1,500
Cal. 50 MG.....	13,780	33,666	23,884	16,387	4,735	7,965
Grenades	200		75	150	310	
Rocket 4.5 HE.....						
4.2 Mortar	1,198					
81mm Mortar	1,069		114	18		
37mm Gun			320	460	457	
75mm Gun	3,561		2,822	6,152	15,778	
76mm Gun			322	1,215	1,518	
105mm	588		13,604	17,400	7,730	19,062
90mm Gun						
40mm Gun	2,029	1,878	467	1,147	131	303
3-in. Gun	1,662		1,219		3,863	

	<i>20 Dec. 44 to 20 Jan. 45</i>	<i>20 Jan. 45 to 20 Feb. 45</i>	<i>20 Feb. 45 to 20 March 45</i>	<i>20 March 45 to 20 April 45</i>	<i>20 April 45 to 9 May 45</i>	<i>Total Rds. Expended</i>
Cal. 30	102,660	460,725	225,800	376,900	3,360	1,985,935
Cal. 45	100	1,800	22,600	2,387		99,666
Cal. 50 MG.....	42,763	128,585	14,500	177,650	2,400	466,315
Grenades					150	885
Rocket 4.5 HE.....		1,120				1,120
4.2 Mortar						1,198
81mm Mortar	200					1,401
37mm Gun			100	964		2,301
75mm Gun	5,400	7,650	2,137	850	100	44,450
76mm Gun		100	100	228	150	3,633
105mm	1,000	4,695	200	50		64,329
90mm Gun			1,200	881	122	2,203
40mm Gun	1,214	3,618	100	7,705	106	18,698
3-in. Gun	13,326	7,913	683			28,666



CONSUMPTION OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL

(From records of Division Ordnance Officer)

<i>July 1-31</i>	<i>Aug.</i>	<i>Sept.</i>	<i>Oct.</i>	<i>Nov.</i>	<i>Dec.</i>	<i>Jan.</i>	<i>Feb.</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>April</i>	<i>Total</i>
¼ ton Trucks.....	18	38	45	19	26	29	57	32	40	304
¾ ton Trucks.....	3	7	19	2	4	9	15	13	4	76
1½ ton Trucks.....	2	1	6	2	2	3		4	2	22
2½ ton Trucks.....	1	9	11	8	11	12	31	21	9	113
4 ton Trucks.....			1		1	1	1	1		5
10 ton Wreckers.....			1					1		2
Hand and shoulder weapons.....	288	570	447	114	375	299	187	83	161	2524
Machine Guns	26	53	19	10	23	41	26	11	6	215
Mortars	11	21	19	43	10	2	3	5	1	115
57mm Guns		8	2	1				2		13
All other Artillery Pieces.....		8	1			5	4	18		36
Half Tracks	2	1								3
Armored Cars		1			3	2		2	1	9
Tractors				2	1	3	3	3	2	14






RIVER CROSSINGS

(With Dates of Action)

Main River.....	8 August
Essones River.....	21 August
Loing River.....	23 August
Seine River.....	23 August (Fountainbleau) 11th
Seine River.....	25 August (Montereau) 10th
Seine River.....	27 August (Nogent sur Seine) 2nd
Yonne River.....	25 August
Marne River.....	28 August 2nd
Meuse River.....	31 August 11th
Moselle River.....	8-10 Sept. (Dornot) 11th
Moselle River.....	10-16 Sept. (Arnaville) 10th
Nied River.....	12-13 Nov. 2nd
Seille River.....	9 Nov. 10th
Roselle River.....	6 Dec.
Sauer River.....	18 Jan. (original)
Sauer River.....	7-10 Feb. (Siegfried Line)
Enz River.....	18 Feb.
Prum River.....	24 Feb.
Nims River.....	26 Feb.
Kyll River.....	3 March
Mosel River.....	14 March
Rhine River.....	22-23 March
Main River.....	26 March
Wenne River.....	10 April (unopposed)
Tepla River.....	5 May





PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED BY 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

9 July 1944—9 May 1945

(Taken from G-2 Official Files)

<i>Unit</i>	<i>PWs Captured</i>
Division Hq., CIC and Other Attachments.....	695
Division Headquarters Co.....	16
Hq. Special Troops.....	3
Division Band	0
MP Platoon	374
5th Signal Co. (Mecz).....	52
5th Recon. Co. (Mecz).....	289
5th Qm. Co.....	30
705th Ord. (LM) Co.....	8
7th Engineer Bn.....	91
*5th Medical Bn.....	3545
2nd Infantry Regt.....	22103
10th Infantry Regt.....	24408
11th Infantry Regt.....	19063
Hq. Btry., Div. Arty.....	28
19th FA Bn.....	76
21st FA Bn.....	28
46th FA Bn.....	53
50th FA Bn.....	140
	71002
<i>Attached**</i>	
449th AAA AW Bn.....	61
818th TD Bn.....	99
735th Tank Bn.....	25
774th TD Bn.....	26
803rd TD Bn.....	243
737th Tank Bn.....	147
	601

*Not actually captured by Medical Bn. Represents number of sick and wounded prisoners evacuated through Medical channels and does not include prisoners captured in hospitals.

**Represents only PWs captured while units were attached to Division.



5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Attached</i>	<i>Detached</i>
735th Tank Bn.....	13 July 44	20 Oct. 44
818th TD Bn.....	13 July 44	20 Dec. 44
449th AAA AW Bn.....	13 July 44	23 Nov. 44
Co. D, 81st Cml. Bn.....	13 July 44	1 Aug. 44
4th Plat., 606th Grave Reg.....	13 July 44	Info. not available
38th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn.....	14 July 44	
38th Cav. Sqdn.—Tr. B.....		18 July 44
Tr. B, 38th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn.....		30 July 44
Btry. D, 116th AAA Gun Bn.....	30 July 44	1 Aug. 44
187th FA Bn. (155mm. How.).....	30 July 44	1 Aug. 44
150th Engr. C Bn.....	9 Aug. 44	13 Aug. 44
1st Plat., 994th Engr. Tdwy. Br. Co.....	9 Aug. 44	13 Aug. 44
537th Engr. L Pon. Br. Co.....	9 Aug. 44	13 Aug. 44
204th FA Bn.....	9 Aug. 44	13 Aug. 44
Btry. B, 7th FA Obsn. Bn.....	10 Aug. 44	13 Aug. 44
1st Plat., 537th Engr. L Pon. Co.....	24 Aug. 44	27 Aug. 44
160th Engr. C Bn.....	25 Aug. 44	27 Aug. 44
989th Engr. Tdwy. Br. Co.....	25 Aug. 44	27 Aug. 44
241st FA Bn.....	25 Aug. 44	29 Sept. 44
282nd FA Bn.....	25 Aug. 44	5 Sept. 44
284th FA Bn.....	25 Aug. 44	21 Oct. 44
160th Engr. C Bn.....	29 Aug. 44	30 Aug. 44
989th Engr. Tdwy. Co.....	29 Aug. 44	30 Aug. 44
509th Engr. L Pon. Co.....	29 Aug. 44	30 Aug. 44
Tr. C, 3rd Cav. Sqdn.....	7 Sept. 44	11 Sept. 44
84th Cml. Co. (SG).....	7 Sept. 44	20 Sept. 44
CCB, 7th Armd. Div.....	9 Sept. 44	15 Sept. 44
434th FA Bn. (105 SP How.).....	10 Sept. 44	15 Sept. 44
Tr. C, 3rd Cav. Rcn. Sqdn.....	11 Sept. 44	14 Sept. 44
3rd Cav. Rcn. Sqdn. (-Tr. B, already attached).....	11 Sept. 44	14 Sept. 44
774th TD Bn. (T).....	14 Sept. 44	24 Sept. 44
Co.'s C and D, 81st Cml. Mortar Bn.....	19 Sept. 44	20 Oct. 44
774th TD Bn. (-Co. B).....	26 Sept. 44	
774th TD Bn. (-Co. B) less Co. A.....		15 Oct. 44
Co. A.....		22 Oct. 44
818th TD Bn. (-Co. A).....	23 Oct. 44	20 Dec. 44
735th Tank Bn.....	1 Nov. 44	20 Dec. 44
705th TD Bn (SP).....	1 Nov. 44	2 Nov. 44
773rd TD Bn. (SP).....	1 Nov. 44	2 Nov. 44
Co.'s C and D, 81st Cml. Bn. (4.2 Mortar).....	1 Nov. 44	
Co. C.....		10 Nov. 44
Co. D.....		22 Nov. 44
284th Fa. Bn.....	8 Nov. 44	22 Nov. 44
774th TD Bn. (T).....	5 Nov. 44	22 Nov. 44
244th FA Bn. (Captured Weapons).....	22 Nov. 44	7 Dec. 44
Btry. B, 558th FA Bn. (-1 sec., 155mm).....	28 March 44	7 Dec. 44
6th Cav. Gp.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
Hq. & Hq. Tr., 6th Cav. Gp.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
6th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
5th Ranger Bn.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
Co. C, 602nd TD Bn.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
Co. B, 293rd Engr. Bn.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
Tr. E, 28th Cav. Sqdn.....	1 Dec. 44	16 Dec. 44
284th FA Bn. (105mm How.).....	16 Dec. 44	21 Dec. 44
Btry. B, 558th FA Bn.....	16 Dec. 44	21 Dec. 44
Co. A, 81st Cml. Bn. (4.2 Mortars).....	16 Dec. 44	21 Dec. 44
807th TD Bn. (T).....	17 Dec. 44	21 Dec. 44
808th TD Bn. (T) (-Co. C).....	21 Dec. 44	23 Dec. 44
654th TD Bn. (SP).....	22 Dec. 44	25 Dec. 44
Co. C, 91st Cml. Bn. (4.2 Mortar).....	22 Dec. 44	15 Jan. 45
TF RILEY.....	22 Dec. 44	23 Dec. 44
351st Engr. GS Regt.....	23 Dec. 44	
2nd Bn., 351st Engr. GS Regt.....		7 Jan. 45
351st Engr. GS Regt.....		16 Jan. 44

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Attached</i>	<i>Detached</i>
737th Tank Bn.....	23 Dec. 44	11 June 45
Co. C, 808th TD Bn. (T).....	23 Dec. 44	28 Dec. 44
Co. D, 91st Cml. Bn. (4.2 Mortar).....	23 Dec. 44	1 Feb. 45
803rd TD Bn. (SP).....	25 Dec. 44	13 June 45
3rd Bn., 8th Inf. Regt.....	15 Jan. 45	17 Jan. 45
417th CT, 76th Inf. Div.....	4 Feb. 45	11 Feb. 45
Co. C, 91st Cml. Bn.....	4 Feb. 45	22 Feb. 45
81st Cml. Co., 2 sections.....	6 Feb. 45	12 Feb. 45
1st Plat., Co. B, 808th TD Bn.....	10 Feb. 45	16 Feb. 45
Btry. C, 558 FA Bn. (-1 Plat.).....	11 Feb. 45	21 Feb. 45
84th Cml. Co. (SG).....	12 Feb. 45	28 Feb. 45
84th Cml. Co. (SG).....	2 March 45	5 March 45
84th Cml. Co. (SG) (2 sections).....	13 March 45	24 March 45
84th Cml. Co. (SG).....	21 March 45	24 March 45
748th Tank Bn. (DD).....	22 March 45	23 March 45
357th Inf. Regt.....	23 March 45	24 March 45
Co. B, 691st TD Bn. (T).....	23 March 45	24 March 45
2nd Cav. Sqdn. (-Tr C).....	26 March 45	28 March 45
32nd Cav. Sqdn. w/tr F, 18th Cav. Sqdn.....	8 April 45	13 April 45
Co. B, 17th Tank Bn.....	8 April 45	10 April 45
Co. B, 90th Cml. Mortar Bn. (4.2).....	8 April 45	15 April 45
Co. C, 90th Cml. Mortar Bn. (4.2).....	12 April 45	15 April 45
16th Belgian Fusileer Bn.....	18 April 45	19 April 45
TF SATT	2 April 45	4 April 45

Attached Specialist Teams

	<i>Attached</i>	<i>Detached</i>
5th Counter Intelligence Corps.....	2 Sept. 43	18 July 45
Military Intelligence Interrogation Team No. 430-F.....	19 May 44	3 Dec. 44
Team No. 430-G.....	10 Dec. 44	24 May 45
Photo Intelligence Team No. 67.....	25 June 44	24 May 45
Order of Battle Team No. 21.....	19 May 44	24 May 45
Interrogation of Prisoners of War Team No. 19.....	8 March 44	19 June 45
Team No. 3.....	8 March 44	19 June 45
Office of Strategic Team (French).....		16 June 45
Air Support Party No. 1.....	16 April 44	Info. not available

DETACHMENTS

<i>Unit Detached</i>	<i>Attached to</i>	<i>Date</i>
Div. Arty.	95th Inf. Div.	23 Nov.-27 Nov.
3rd Bn., 10th Inf.....	95th Inf. Div.	26 Nov.-28 Nov.
3rd Bn., 2nd Inf.....	95th Inf. Div.	12 Dec.-17 Dec.
10th Inf.	4th Inf. Div.	22 Dec.-24 Dec.
plus 46th FA Bn.		
Co. B, 7th Engr. Bn.		
Co. C, 808th TD Bn.		
Co. B, 737th TK Bn.		
Co. B, 5th Med. Bn.		
5th Cav. Rcn. Tr.....	4th Inf. Div.	23 Dec.-24 Dec.
11th CT	4th Armd. Div.	8 March-11 March
plus Co. C, 803rd TD Bn (SP)		
Co. B (-1 plat.) 91st Cml. Bn.		
1st Plat. Rcn. Co. 803rd TD Bn. (SP)		
Co. A, 737th Tank Bn.		
Co. C, 7th Engr. Bn.		
Co. B, 5th Med. Bn.		
3327th Qm. Trk. Co.		



Captain Fred Bomkamp, AG Section, addressing replacements.

HEADQUARTERS 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Monthly Reinforcement and RTD Report*

<i>Month</i>	<i>REINFORCEMENTS</i>		<i>Officers</i>	<i>RTD'S**</i>		<i>Monthly Total</i>
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted Men</i>		<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted Men</i>	
July 1944	40	811	2	43		896
August 1944	80	1156	11	133		1380
September 1944	199	3678	34	1269		5180
October 1944	24	360	44	1154		1582
November 1944	95	1569	48	1412		3124
December 1944	86	2171	30	993		3280
January 1945	37	1091	40	1063		2231
February 1945	20	1107	26	1210		2363
March 1945	24	1012	37	887		1960
April 1945	31	385	22	672		1110
May 1945	20	61	10	168		259
TOTAL	656	13401	304	9004		23365

*From office of G-1, 5th Infantry Division.

**Men who left Division and were later returned.



Chaplain C. F. Golisch directing service for major group of replacements for 5th Division in France.



Captain Fred Bomkamp, AG Section, addressing first major group of 5th Division replacements in France.



Historical Section, 5th Infantry Division, in one of its meetings in Germany.

THE 5TH DIVISION HISTORICAL SECTION

This history has been compiled by the FIFTH Division Historical Section, composed of members of the G-2, or Intelligence Section, of Division Headquarters.

Supervisor

LT. COL. DONALD W. THACKERAY

Historian and Assistant Supervisor

MAJOR THOMAS C. MCGUIRE

Photographs by Third Army Photographic Team attached to the Division, LIEUTENANT MARK FREEMAN, commanding.

Photographers: Technician 4th Grade Gerard V. Horton, Private First Class John T. Raia, Technical Sergeant Harry Downard, Private Robert J. Schneider.

Combat Narrative by First Lieutenant Keith Hubbard.

Historical Sketches by Captain Mike Rinehart.

Revised and Edited by Major Paul H. Vanderheiden and Captain A. B. Campbell, Jr.

Original Battle Sketches by First Lieutenant Keith Hubbard.

Finished drawings by Technician 4th Grade Harry W. Dahlstrom, Technical Sergeant Jack Wood, Technician 5th Grade Wallace Ferguson, Private James Fitzgerald.



Part of the Third Army Photographic team which followed the Fifth Division in its path across Europe.

Illustrations by Technician 3rd Grade James J. Cummins and Corporal George Singer.

Cover Idea by Captain A. B. Campbell, Jr.

Cover Drawing by Technician 5th Grade Keith Pitzer.

Schematic Layout by Captain A. B. Campbell, Jr.

Technical Layout by Captain Mike Rinehart.

Route and Situation Maps by Major Thomas C. McGuire and G-2 Drafting Section.

Historical Clerks: Technical Sergeant John F. Culp, Technician 4th Grade Murrell T. Clark, Corporals William Wormus, Peter P. Samac, Walter B. Richardson, John R. Lantz.

FREEMAN'S FAMOUS FIGHTING FIFTH PHOTOGRAPHERS
Detachment No. 6, 166th Signal Photographic Company. This group of photographers followed the 5th Division during its combat on the European front, and is responsible for the many excellent photographs and action pictures appearing in this book. The detachment, commanded by Lt. Mark A. Freeman, has decorations consisting of 1 silver star, 1 Croix de Guerre, 4 purple hearts, and 5 bronze star medals. Members of the detachment are, left to right, Sgt. John T. Raia, Cpl. Gerald V. Horton, Pvt. Robert J. Schneider; rear row, Sgt. Robert R. Brill, Pfc. Albert J. Smith, Pvt. Henry E. Stevenson, Lt. Mark A. Freeman.





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ALBERT LOVE ENTERPRISES
1090 CAPITOL AVENUE
P. O. Box 5109
ATLANTA 2, GEORGIA





